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This thesis analyses the relationship between criminalising political expression and 
conflict transformation. It begins with a discussion of traditional approaches to 
researching crime in conflict contexts, arguing that the assumptions of state legitimacy 
DQG µFULPLQDO¶ LOOHJLWLPDF\ DUH particularly problematic in the contested contexts of 
deeply divided societies. Instead, drawing on critical legal and criminological research, 
it argues that through considering the process by which such catHJRULHVRIµFULPH¶DUH
created ± criminalisation ± it is possible to analyse the contested role they can have. 
This means taking crime to embody a social construction which contributes towards a 
wider social reality of crime and the criminal. How this takes effect is through what the 
thesis describes as the interaction between formal criminalisation - the legal processes 
which codify and embody legal norms and principles established by a government ± and 
informal criminalisation - the social reality of the formal process which is given 
expression through the way it is implemented, interpreted, resisted, or accepted by the 
wider population. 
 
From the perspective of conflict transformation, conflict is not the problem but rather 
encapsulates a problem, and frequently embodies at least part of the solution. Indeed it 
is through dialogue and communication which transformation can occur (both 
constructively and destructively), and so the thesis narrowed its focus onto the 
criminalisation of political expression. Criminalising political expression, therefore, can 
directly shape the nature of an intergroup conflict in deeply divided societies 
undermining the ability of actors to find a peaceful resolution to their conflict, or 
potentially enhancing it depending on how it operates. Accordingly the thesis argues 
that this can be distinguished into an explanatory typology of WKUHH µWDUJHWV¶ of 
criminalisation: identity, activity, and violence. These, together with the nature of 
informal criminalisation, have important implications for conflict transformation 
depending on the context. Through considering four conflict contexts which 
criminalisation responds towards - namely non-violent movements, collective political 
violence, negotiations, and peacebuilding - the thesis argues that when criminalisation 
targets non-violent political expression it will likely undermine conflict transformation 
in the short and long-term by closing down opportunities for dialogue, contributing 
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towards intergroup polarisation, and dehumanising actors. On the other hand, 
criminalising political violence may facilitate conflict transformation, but this depends 
on the legitimacy of criminal justice and the nature of its enforcement.  
 
Employing an interpretivist methodology, the research involved an in-depth 
comparative analysis of the case studies of Northern Ireland and South Africa through 
poststructuralist discourse analysis and practice tracing, drawing on original interviews 
with key actors, and archival research. Furthermore, the thesis then employed a small-n 
study of Belgium, Canada, Turkey, and Sri Lanka to consider how this theoretical 
relationship between conflict transformation and criminalising political expression 
applies to crucial, typical, and counterfactual cases. The thesis concludes by discussing 
the implications these findings have for a number of policy areas including 
criminalising non-violent extremism and legacy issues associated with criminal records 
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On March 1st 1976 Special Category Status (SCS) in Northern Ireland officially ended, 
VLJQLI\LQJWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\RIµFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶6LQFH
1972 SCS had been granted to those convicted for terrorism related offences,1 but 
following recommendations of the Gardiner report alongside political pressure, the 
Government decided that the time had come for a change in strategy. Political violence 
was accordingly UHIUDPHG³DVVLPSOHFULPLQDODFWLYLW\´*RUPDOO\0F(YR\DQG:DOO
1993:56), and corresponding changes were made in terms of criminal procedure to 
HQVXUHDVH[SHGLHQWDSURFHVVDVSRVVLEOHLQLQFDUFHUDWLQJWKHVHµFULPLQDOV¶2  
 
However this phase of criminalisation embodies an important puzzle, because while it 
represents a clear political strategy targeting violent political expression, in many ways 
it reflected previous policies which preceded the introduction of SCS. Moreover its core 
focus on labelling political violence as criminal was adopted by the Stormont 
Government up until direct rule (Donohue, 1998; Hadden, Boyle and Campbell, 1988). 
7KLV LV SX]]OLQJ EHFDXVH LW LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH µFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ VWUDWHJ\ HPERGLHV D
process which was not contained solely to the 1976-81 period but has similar 
manifestations in the previous decades (Walsh, 1983; Boyle, Hadden and Campbell, 
1988). The puzzle becomes more compelling if further cases are also considered, such 
as South Africa where the National Party implemented comparable legislation with 
similar intent in the early 1960s (Dugard, 1978; Mathews, 1972). Therefore, what is 
generally framed as a specific British political strategy (Gormally, McEvoy and Wall, 
1993; Hadden, Boyle, Campbell, 1988) appears to reflect a much wider pattern of state 
behaviour, and one which has received little academic attention. Indeed this thesis 
argues that it represents an important process of conflict transformation, shaping 
intergroup relations in terms of actor, issue, and structure transformation; determining 
                                                          
1
 These were termed scheduled offences relating to the schedule of included criminal offences committed 
for political purposes as part of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. 
2
 There were a range of reforms implemented including amended rules on evidence, juryless courts and 
extensive new security powers. For more on this see Walsh (1983) or Tayler (1980). 
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ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµOHJLWLPDWH¶SROLWLFDOH[SUHVVLRQ and the accompanying practices of law 
enforcement and political resistance. 
 
Furthermore, research on criminalisation in Northern Ireland emphasises its political 
significance particularly in how it contributed towards a new phase of prison resistance; 
culminating in the hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981 (Ellison and Smith, 2000; Moloney, 
2002; Ross, 2006; Wright and Bryett, 1991). Hence, on its own it had a profound impact 
on the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland, but if it embodies a wider pattern of 
state behaviour then it is important to consider whether it has similar implications 
beyond this immediate example. By broadening the analysis beyond this period to cover 
the entire conflict from partition, and comparing similar cases, this thesis contends that 
rather than representing a specific state strategy, it embodies an evolving mechanism of 
state power which responds reactively to the conflict context. The target, 
implementation, and legitimacy all change over the course of a conflict; so by 
considering the case studies of Northern Ireland (1922-2017) and South Africa (1950-
2017), this thesis analyses criminalisation across four conflict contexts ± non-violent 
movements, collective political violence, negotiations, and peacebuilding - to develop a 
theory of how criminalising political expression impacts conflict transformation.  
 
Part of the reason why criminalising political expression has received relatively little 
academic attention is because of its subjective character. Criminalisation embodies a 
process much more complex than its instrumental design, because while a state may 
criminalise certain activities, its impact will depend on its enforcement and how the 
criminalised perceive the process. Theoretically this relates to the critical criminological 
conceptualisation of criminalisation as the process which constructs the social reality of 
crime (Becker, 1963; Hulsman, 1986; Quinney, 1977). Moreover, in conducting this 
project the subjective reality was evident throughout the fieldwork; definitions of what 
criminalisation referred to varied considerably throughout all interviews, even across 
actors from within the same political community. For instance, an IRA ex-prisoner 
GHVFULEHGFULPLQDOLVDWLRQDV³DQRWKHUZHDSRQ´RIWKH%ULWLVKVWDWH,5$H[-prisoner C, 
FRQWUDVWLQJZLWKDVHQLRU%ULWLVKFLYLO VHUYDQWZKRGHVFULEHG LWDVEHLQJ³DERXW
EULQJLQJ LQ QHZ ZD\V RI GHILQLQJ EHKDYLRXU´ (Senior civil servant, 2016). The 
illegitimacy implied in the former contrasts with the assumption of state legitimacy in 
the latter. In this way criminalisation comes to embody an informal process of social 
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construction shaping the reality of conflict for each individual. In line with this the 
thesis distinguishes between the formal conceptualisation of criminalisation defined 
according to its instrumental design, and the informal conceptualisation reflecting its 
implementation and perceived reality. Incorporating this critical criminological 
conceptualisation of criminalisation into conflict analysis provides the field with an 
important theoretical framework which conveys both its complexity and subjectivity. 
 
To analyse this subjective process the multilevel framework of conflict transformation 
is applied, as it considers how criminalisation can operate in multiple and fluid ways at 
the same time, depending on its implementation, perceived effects, and context 
(Cochrane, 2012; Maddison, 2017; Miall, 2004). In other words, the thesis does not 
claim strict causality, but develops theoretical arguments which explain how 
criminalising political expression can impact on the process of conflict transformation. 
According to these factors criminalising political expression can be understood in 
relation to whether it contributes towards the constructive or destructive transformation 
of a conflict (Miall, 2004). For this reason the thesis develops a typology of 
criminalisation distinguishing between three main targets: political identity, activity, 
and violence. In summary, the thesis develops three main arguments which explain how 
each type of criminalisation, defined according to its target, will impact conflict 
transformation: (1) if it targets the political identity of a group this will contribute 
towards intergroup polarisation framing groups in opposing terms as victims and 
perpetrators reducing their political identity to criminal characterisations; (2) by 
targeting political activity this closes off opportunities for non-violent political 
expression reducing the likelihood of accommodative strategies and intergroup 
dialogue; and (3) the targeting of political violence may both facilitate or inhibit conflict 
transformation depending on whether it is enforced impartially, targeting the behaviour 
of violence not political identities, and whether it is applied proportionately, not 





Through this framework the thesis seeks to address four broadly defined research aims. 
Firstly, it considers an important, yet under-researched, process in conflict ± 
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criminalising political expression ± providing an original typology and analysis. In other 
words, as theory building research it develops a theoretical framework that 
conceptualises the criminalisation of political expression, demonstrating how it 
intersects with conflict transformation. In this way it draws together the fields of critical 
criminology and legal theory with that of conflict transformation, providing an 
interdisciplinary analysis of how criminalisation operates in the conflict context, 
building on previous research in this area (McEvoy and Newburn, 2003; Toros, 2012).  
 
Secondly, it provides original empirical data in the form of sixty-three interviews with 
political elites, academics, law enforcement personnel, ex-prisoners, NGOs, and 
survivors of conflict. This is complemented by primary archival research from the Linen 
Hall Library Political Collection in Northern Ireland, alongside the Historical Research 
Archive based at the University of Witwatersrand, and the Mayibuye Archive based at 
the University of Western Cape. By conducting fieldwork and directly consulting 
primary source material, the thesis has sought to maximise its empirical validity and 
contribution. These sources are referenced throughout the thesis and integral to the 
overall findings.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis employs a mixed methods approach; conducting an in-depth 
comparative analysis of two cases and small-n analysis of a further four cases not 
previously compared before in relation to criminalisation. This has been primarily 
because criminalisation in Northern Ireland has been reduced to the 1970s strategy of 
the British Government, but this reduces a complex and important process down to a 
specific period. Therefore, the comparison enables a much broader and nuanced 
understanding of this process, demonstrating the spatial and temporal variation between 
and within the cases. The findings derived through the two case comparison are then 
applied to a further four cases through a small-n analysis of Sri Lanka, Turkey, Canada, 
and Belgium. These cases were VHOHFWHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKHLU FDVH µW\SH¶ and, 
accordingly, provide further insights into a number of aspects of the relationship 
between CPE and the process of conflict transformation, particularly in terms of the 
evolving and reactive nature of CPE as it develops over the course of a conflict. 
 
Fourthly, as the research draws heavily on interview data, it connects closely with key 
policy debates ongoing in the cases (and beyond) in relation to issues of criminal record 
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expungement, negotiations, criminalising non-violent extremism, and post-settlement 
criminal justice reform. The thesis will, therefore, provide theoretical and empirical 
contributions to these policy debates particularly centred on the two primary case 
studies. For instance, it discusses the current policies relating to criminal records in 
Northern Ireland and South Africa highlighting the various approaches towards violent 





Following this introduction the thesis is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion. 
Chapter one begins by discussing the traditional legal positivist approaches to the study 
of crime and conflict, explaining what these are, and how they are often based on two 
problematic assumptions, particularly in the contexts of deeply divided societies: (1) 
that the criminal categories applied by the state are legitimate; and (2) that they are 
homogenous. In contrast the chapter sets out a critical conceptualisation of 
FULPLQDOLVDWLRQDVDSURFHVVRIVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQZKLFKFUHDWHV WKHµVRFLDO UHDOLW\¶RI
crime, distinguishing between formal instrumental legal process and the informal social 
reality it shapes. Narrowing the focus onto the criminalisation of political expression, 
the chapter considers how this would apply to the multilevel framework of conflict 
transformation. This is because, from the perspective of conflict transformation, conflict 
functions as ³D PRWRU RI FKDQJH´ /HGHUDFK  DQG DV LW LV EDVHG LQ KXPDQ
relationships it is intertwined with the ability to communicate; with political expression. 
Criminalising political expression, therefore, can directly shape the nature of conflict 
undermining the ability of actors to find a peaceful resolution to their disagreement, or 
potentially enhance it depending on how it operates. In this way this chapter sets out the 
theoretical framework which is derived from the evidence in the rest of the thesis.  
 
Chapter two discusses the methodological framework applied in the thesis, setting out 
its justification and implementation. Specifically chapters three, four, five, and six each 
consider how criminalising political expression operates within individual conflict 
contexts through a two case comparison of Northern Ireland and South Africa, and 
chapter seven extends the analysis through a further small-n analysis of four cases 
selected on the basis of case types. This chapter also explains the importance of the case 
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selection, data sources, data collection methodology, and analysis, and outlines the 
practical issues experienced in conducting fieldwork on such a topic, and the associated 
legal and ethical challenges. 
 
Chapter three focuses on the first conflict context, on the implications of criminalising 
non-violent political expression, thereby representing the first of the four chapters 
comparing the two primary cases; in this case involving a two case comparative study 
of Northern Ireland from 1922 until 1968, and South Africa from 1950 until 1961. In 
such cases criminal justice is used to consolidate the power of the state by reducing or 
eliminating the capacity to challenge the state through non-violent political means. This 
chapter therefore builds on the critical conceptualisation of criminalisation developed in 
chapter one, arguing that it contributes towards the creation of a particular social reality, 
and that violence often operates as a reflection of this reality (Väyrynen, 1991). In 
summary it argues that such criminalisation can impact upon actor motivations to 
engage in political violence for three interrelated reasons: (1) it contributes towards 
intergroup polarisation; (2) it collectivises repression; and (3) it increases the cost of 
non-violent collective action.  
 
Chapter four considers the implications of politicising crime as part of a wider counter-
insurgency strategy. Specifically, following the onset of collective political violence 
states frequently respond by implementing counterinsurgency policies, where the 
criminal justice system is used to legalise various emergency powers. These powers 
become normalised and justified through an important transformation within the 
criminal justice system, as ordinary criminal offences are linked to a political 
motivation, creating a criminal 'other'. The implications of this particular cooption of the 
criminal justice system are that the predominant approaches within criminal justice - 
deterrence, retribution, and reform - become subsumed under the wider paradigm of 
counter-insurgency. For this reason the chapter advances three arguments linked to each 
of these approaches: (1) that the logic of deterrence is ineffective for political actors 
who perceive the costs of criminal sanctions differently from ordinary offenders; (2) 
that reform becomes a site of resistance for political actors, as it becomes designed to 
break their political resolve; and (3) that punishment for offences is less about the moral 
cost of the crime than it is about the potential for actors to reoffend.  
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Chapter five considers how (de)criminalisation in the context of negotiations can 
facilitate conflict transformation. The intersection between negotiation and conflict 
transformation is important because they initially appear to be in tension. By negotiating 
with criminalised actors the state's international legitimacy may enhance that of a 
criminalised group, whereas criminalisation is inherently a process designed to 
delegitimise these same actors. Furthermore, conflict transformation advocates for the 
resolution of underlying causes whereas negotiations often involve parties seeking to 
maximise their bargaining power and achieve the best outcome for their interests. This 
chapter, accordingly, argues that criminalisation embodies an important incentive 
structure which can facilitate conflict transformation in particular contexts, but also 
undermine it depending on its target and implementation. Specifically, focusing on the 
criminalisation of non-violent political expression, this typically impedes, or at least 
constrains, conflict transformation. This is because it undermines dialogue, 
dehumanises actors, and embodies structural constraints. Therefore conflict 
transformation may be facilitated through some form of decriminalisation, the timing 
and nature of which varies depending on the wider context. However, this needs to be 
qualified because decriminalisation can contribute towards intergroup polarisation 
alienating actors who perceive justice as being compromised. In other words, what is 
needed for conflict transformation to occur is not necessarily decriminalisation or 
criminalisation in general, but a reorientation of criminalisation away from actors and 
on to specific acts, thereby legitimising non-violent political expression and 
negotiations.3 Put differently, continuing to criminalise non-violent political expression 
signals a lack of credible commitment on the part of the state, perpetuating intergroup 
hostility. Therefore, this reorientation embodies an important incentive structure which 
has the potential to facilitate conflict transformation depending on how it is 
implemented. 
 
Chapter six considers the process of criminal record expungement as an illustrative 
example of how informal decriminalisation can take effect and the complex relationship 
it has with conflict transformation. Through such a process the prevailing narratives of 
culpability within a conflict will frame who is considered legitimate or not, polarising 
intergroup relations into polemic categories of victims and perpetrators, making their 
                                                          
3
 A paper version of this chapter has been published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (Kirkpatrick, 
2017). 
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transformation integral to the wider peacebuilding process. However, if used as a 
mechanism of state power, criminal record expungement will likely embed intergroup 
polarisation and structural issues potentially perpetuating the conflict; or if the criminal 
record is for an offence which is still widely deemed to be illegitimate, expunging the 
criminal record could inhibit conflict transformation. The comparison between Northern 
Ireland and South Africa highlights these complexities, demonstrating how the potential 
for criminal record expungement to facilitate conflict transformation depends on 
whether it addresses ± or indeed can address - informal criminalisation as embodied in 
the prevailing conflict narratives,  stigmatisation, and identity polarisation. Furthermore, 
the chapter argues that expunging criminal records can exacerbate intergroup conflict if 
they only address formal criminal sanctions without accounting for their wider socio-
political implications.  
 
Chapter seven extends this analysis through a small-n comparative framework 
considering the cases of Belgium, Canada, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. This mixed methods 
approach was employed to add an additional layer of analysis through the consideration 
of crucial, typical, and counterfactual cases. In other words, these cases are instructive 
because Belgium represents a counterfactual case where the state never implemented 
the criminalisation of political expression, providing an important contrast to the other 
cases, particularly in terms of why, in the context of a deeply divided society, the state 
might not implement CPE. Canada acts as a crucial case because, although the state 
criminalised political activity during the October Crisis, this did not lead to an 
escalation in the conflict due to the nature of informal criminalisation. Turkey and Sri 
Lanka embody typical cases whereby the states in both cases implemented CPI, CPA, 
and CPV, but by considering the entire conflicts together this provided insights into the 
evolving and reactive nature of CPE as it shapes and is shaped by changes in the 
conflict context. 
 
Although each previous chapter addresses a specific aspect of criminalising political 
expression and in a particular conflict context, they will be brought together in the 
WKHVLV¶FRQFOXVLRQ to show their connection with each other. The complex relationship 
between criminalisation and conflict transformation will be discussed, emphasising the 
importance of its experienced reality as well as the substantive legal framework: formal 
and informal criminalisation. Furthermore, this section will consider the research 
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implications of the two primary cases, applying the key themes to the contemporary 




Re-conceptualising criminalisation: A conflict transformation approach 
 
7KHWKUHDWRIµFULPH¶DQGWKHµFULPLQDO¶DUHHYRFDWLYHFRQFHSWVZKLFKZKHQDSSOLHGWR
behaviours and individuals, enable the labeller to delegitimise their target, justify certain 
security powers, and implement sanctions. )RULQVWDQFHE\GHILQLQJWKHFULPHRIµWKHIW¶
the state not only determines what constitutes the crime, but also establishes the 
parameters for punishment, providing for certain enforcement powers like police 
searches, and also delegitimises the perpetrators of the offence by labelling them as 
criminals. Yet in the context of political conflict this process has profound implications 
for the nature of conflict itself, and particularly so in the case of deeply divided societies 
(DDS). In such cases, if the state is dominated by a single group, the state may use 
criminalisation to target certain forms of political expression as a means of 
subordinating other groups. In other words, criminalising political expression (CPE) has 
considerable power to shape intergroup relations in ways which could either facilitate or 
undermine conflict transformation. 
 
Previous research has shown how such measures are often used by states because they 
can provide a legal veneer over state repression (McEvoy and Rebouche, 2007; TRC 
Report 4, 1998), help consolidate in-group cohesion (Ó Dochartaigh, 2013; Patterson, 
1999; Todd, 1987), justify expanded security powers (Brewer, 1994; Donohue, 1998; 
Dugard, 1978), and delegitimise opposing groups (Abel, 1995; Brewer et al, 1996; 
Frankel, 1979; McConville, 2014). But while these studies have provided a number of 
valuable insights into the significance of criminalisation for conflict analysis, none have 
gone so far as to develop a substantive theory of criminalisation or identify a pattern of 
state behaviour.1 This has three important implications: firstly because it tends to result 
LQ FULPH EHLQJ VWXGLHG DV D ³WDNHQ-for-JUDQWHG FRQVWUXFW´ &RKHQ  LPSOLFLWO\
assuming the legitimacy of the labeller (the state), the practices of labelling (law 
enforcement), and the acceptance of the label within the wider population (narrative), 
even when this legitimacy is subject to contestation and resistance. The contestation of 
                                                          
1
 Brewer et al.¶VFRPSDUDWLYHVWXG\ZRXOGEHWKHFORVHVWWRDWKHRU\EXWZKLOHDQLPSRUWDQWFRPSDUDWLYH
study it only outlines a limited conceptualisation. Their approach will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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prisoners over politicaO VWDWXV DQG WKH FRQFHSW RI µSULVRQHUV RI FRQVFLHQFH¶2 are 
HPEOHPDWLF H[DPSOHV RI WKHVH FKDOOHQJHV ZKHUH WKH ODEHO¶V OHJLWLPDF\ LV FDOOHG LQWR
question. Secondly, it can lead to a conflation of non-violent and violent political 
expression making it unclear what the distinctions are between them. Thirdly, 
criminalising political expression embodies a fundamental process which shapes 
conflict transformation and is shaped by it, meaning it has the potential to affect the 
destructive and constructive transformation of a conflict. Developing a theory of CPE, 
accordingly, will demonstrate how such a relationship may operate in particular 
contexts. 
 
Addressing this research gap the chapter will draw together critical criminological and 
legal approaches with those of conflict transformation, setting out a conceptual 
framework through which criminalisation can be analysed. It will argue that 
criminalisation represents an important mechanism of transformation which can both 
facilitate and undermine conflict transformation depending on its context and 
implementation. This chapter will, accordingly, outline how current research in conflict 
analysis has approached the concept of crime, first from a legal positivist 
understanding,3 and then from a critical approach. To account for the contested and 
subjective nature of criminalisation (Becker, 1963; Hulsman, 1986; Quinney, 1970; 
Shiner, 2009) this thesis will position itself firmly within these critical approaches, 
arguing that criminalisation is an important process of social construction which a state 
may use to shape intergroup power relations. In this sense criminalisation can be used to 
permit state violence while challenging opposing expressions of political expression; 
consolidating in-group cohesion at the expense of intergroup relations. Analysing such a 
process requires a consideration of both the formal legal process embodied in legislation 
and its conformity with legal norms, but also ± and arguably of greater importance ± its 
diffuse implementation through law enforcement, the media, and wider society 
(Foucault, 1975; Shiner, 2009). For instance, implementing new drug regulations into 
an Olympic sport may be assessed in relation to how they complement or bring new 
meaning to current regulations, but also how they will impact the training and practices 
of athletes, how they are represented in the media, and whether they increase or 
                                                          
2
 For instance Amnesty International set up a relief organisation in 1962 called Prisoners of Conscience 
designed to address these issues through financial support to prisoners and their families.  
3
 This refers to the positivist conceptualisation of crime, not the positivist methodological approach. 
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decrease public trust in the sport. The implications of these rules, accordingly, depend 
on their informal interpretation by athletes, coaches, the media, and general public. This 
chapter therefore draws together critical criminological and legal research with conflict 
analysis to develop an interdisciplinary conceptualisation of criminalising political 
expression. 
 
Furthermore, in order to consider the various aspects of political expression which may 
be criminalised the chapter distinguishes between three different manifestations: 
political identity, activity, and violence. While these categories overlap, they relate to 
distinct processes particularly in terms of their implementation and perceived reality. 
Distinguishing between them enables these implications to be considered from a 
comparative perspective, to see how each individually and collectively operates. 
Because of the complexity inherent in such an analysis, the chapter will connect this 
critical conceptualisation ZLWK FRQIOLFW WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶V PXOWLGLPHQVLRQDO DSSURDFK WR
XQGHUVWDQGWKH³FRPSOH[DQGHYROYLQJFRQIOLFWUHODWLRQVKLSV´which these types of CPE 
represent (Cochrane, 2012:184; Lederach, 1997, 2003; Miall, 2004). This means 
criminalisation will be considered as a dynamic and evolving process which shapes and 
is shaped by conflict as it develops. In these ways this chapter discusses the theoretical 
framework which the rest of the thesis applies.  
 
 
Crime and conflict analysis 
 
Research into the relationship between criminal activity and political violence can be 
categorised into four broad sub-fields: economic approaches to conflict, the crime-terror 
nexus, human rights approaches, and critical approaches.4 Of these, the first three can be 
grouped together in relation to their analytical assumptions regarding crime as a 
legitimate and measureable concept, whereas critical approaches begin from a distinct 
epistemological position (McEvoy and Gormally, 1997). In other words, the first three 
approaches all consider specific defined criminal behaviours from legal positivist and 
                                                          
4
 There is also a concept of criminal wars primarily relating to research on Mexico, but this chapter is 
concerned about the broader conceptual debate surrounding criminality and conflict, not just the 
convergence between organised crime and political violence. For more see Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2015) 




state-centred perspectives, just different types and through different theoretical and 
methodological frameworks ± i.e. how they conform to human rights norms or confer 
economic benefits.  
 
Economic approaches focus on the economic benefits of a violent conflict, and how 
some actors perceive war as profitable, taking advantage of the security vacuum to 
develop lucrative criminal enterprises through the extraction of natural resources, the 
drug trade, extortion, and looting (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Duran-
Martinez, 2015; Keen, 1998; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005; Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik, 2002; Mueller, 2000). In such cases actors are not engaging in violence to 
advance a political cause, nor fighting to defeat an enemy, but instead seek to perpetuate 
violent conflict because it is lucrative to do so. Whether it is the extraction of diamonds 
(Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005), extortion (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2002), 
or looting (Mueller, 2000), these criminal acts are treated as a definitive and 
homogenous variable primarily based in the self-interest of actors. For instance, Collier 
(2000:852DUJXHVWKDWUHEHOOLRQLV³DYDULHW\RIFULPH´ZLWK³WKHRQO\GLIIHUHQFHIURP
common crime being that predation is directed against natural resources instead of 
KRXVHKROGZHDOWK´7KHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQRUGLQDU\FULPHDQGWKHFULPHRIUHEHOOLon 




In contrast, research on thHµFULPH-WHUURU¶QH[XVGLVFXVVHVKRZWKHUH LVDFRQYHUJHQFH
between organised crime and terrorist groups, whether through alliances between such 
groups, or through terrorist groups developing µin-house¶ criminal capabilities 
+XWFKLQVRQDQG2¶PDOOH\1095; Cornell, 2005; Kynoch, 2005; Oehme III, 2008; 
Sanin, 2004; Silke, 1999a 6RPH RI WKHVH VWXGLHV IRFXV VSHFLILFDOO\ RQ µWHUURULVW¶
groups, whereas others will discuss insurgents or other politically motivated violent 
actors, but throughout all of these studies is a focus on the permeable boundaries 
between political violence and criminality. For instance, some analyse how terrorist 
groups are financing political activities through organised crime (Kynoch, 2005), or 
drawing on networks with organised crime to provide a support role for their political 
violence (Silke, 1999a). These approaches tend towards a more complex understanding 
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of crime by engaging with its diffuse boundaries with political violence, but still 
underpinning them is a positivist understanding of crime. 
 
Human rights approaches include a wide range of studies which consider specific 
criminal behaviours in the context of conflict - such as sexual violence, genocide, acts 
of terror, amongst many others - through a human rights framework (Cohen and Nordas, 
2015; Edwards, 2008; Wachala, 2012; Walsh and Piazza, 2010). Now while each of 
these approaches varies considerably, they all consider certain criminal behaviours 
through the framework of human rights; that the crimes under analysis are violations of 
KXPDQ ULJKWV 7KH WKHPH RI WKH µFULPLQDO SUREOHP¶ LV LPSOLFLW WKURXJKRXW ZLWK WKH
normative focus being to prevent or address criminality from (re)occurring. Resolving 
conflict from these perspectives becomes synonymous with re-establishing the rule of 
law; ensuring that legal norms are abided by and human rights are respected. While they 
often will seek to change the law to address these issues, it is the state who represents 
the guarantor of these norms, and so it is through a reformed or enhanced state system 
that crime will be addressed. However, this assumes an objective criterion ± human 
rights ± to base their analysis on. The cultural interpretation of human rights, and their 
subjective implementation and realisation through politics, means focusing on an 
objective criterion created by states ZLOO EH XQDEOH WR DFFRXQW IRU WKH ³FRPSOH[ DQG
G\QDPLFSURFHVVRIFDWHJRULVDWLRQDQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´DVRSSRVHGWRWKH³VWDWLFSURFHVV
RI GHGXFWLYH UHDVRQLQJ IURP SUHPLVHV VHW E\ D OHJDO GHILQLWLRQ´ (Lacey, 1995:8). 
Therefore, the above assumptions are problematic given that those involved in assessing 
human rights are doing so through a subjective, culturally bound, politically defined 
framework.  
 
Furthermore, these approaches do not engage explicitly with criminalisation because its 
source of legitimacy ± the state5 - is assumed. Instead they implicitly conform to the 
predominant legal framework of legal positivism (Sullivan, 1994). From this 
perspective, law places an obligation on individuals to obey, because to do otherwise 
would jeopardise social order by causing harm (Hart, 1994, 2008). Criminalisation 
WKHUHIRUH VHHNV WR ³HQFRXUDJH FHUWDLQ W\SHV RI FRQGXFW DQG GLVFRXUDJH RWKHUV´ (Hart, 
                                                          
5 The underlying assumption here is that the legal system holds some domestic or international 
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞŽĨŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ ?ƚǇƉĞ ?ŽĨƐƚĂƚĞŝƐůĞƐƐ
important than the legitimacy the state holds in a given context. For more see the discussion on 
legitimacy in chapter 7. 
|15| 
 
2008:6); ordering a society so that it follows what is defined as acceptable behaviour. 
While legal scholars differ over the source of legal legitimacy (Conklin, 2001), the 
centrality of the state is consistent throughout. Crime is accordingly understood as an 
established and legitimate concept defined by the state. This was succinctly summarised 
in an interview with a member of the South African Parliamentary Committee on 
Justice and Correctional Services: ³%XW QRWKLQJ MXVWLILHV FULPH &ULPH LV FULPH DQG LW
will always remain crime and it needs to be dealt with as VXFK´Member of the South 
African Parliamentary CJCS, 2016). From this perspective crime is a clear and 
legitimately defined concept. However, the above approaches focus primarily on 
µFULPHV¶ZKLFK are widely deemed illegitimate - whether sexual violence, extortion, or 
the acts of terror - but if they are extended to more contested crimes their assumption of 
state legitimacy becomes much more problematic.6 
 
This is because both the prognosis and cure associated with the positivist paradigm are 
restricted in their ability to address the complexity and subjectivity associated with 
criminalisatLRQ LQ GHHSO\ GLYLGHG VRFLHWLHV 7KLV UHODWHV WR FRQWH[WV ZKHUH ³DVFULSWLYH
ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with 
higKSROLWLFDOVDOLHQFH´/XVWLFNRUSXWGLIIHUHQWO\ZKHUHJURXSVDUHGLYLGHG
into competing political communities due to factors directly linked to their group 
identities. The political GLYLVLRQVEHWZHHQJURXSVPDSRQWR³SRWHQWLDOO\YLROHQWYHUWical 
FOHDYDJHV´ ZKLFK DUH VHULRXV HQRXJK WR WKUHDWHQ WKH FRPSRVLWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH
0DF*LQW\  2¶)O\QQ . Understanding these divisions can be achieved 
through considering the construction and contestation of group identities to understand 
how iW³FRQWULEXWHVWRFRQIOLFWLQWKHVHVRFLHWLHV´.DFKX\HYVNLDQG2OHVNHU
7KLV LVEHFDXVH³DVRFLHW\FDQQRWVXUYLYH LI LW ORVHV LWV LGHQWLW\´, meaning threats to a 
JURXS¶VLGHQWLW\DUHH[LVWHQWLDOWKUHDWHQLQJWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHJURXSLWVHOI.Dchuyevski 
and Olesker, 2014:306). How groups defend or advance their identity relates to the 
wider cleavages themselves. 
 
In such contexts where the government is dominated by a particular group(s), it may not 
use criminalisation necessarily as a legitimate mechanism which abides by international 
                                                          
6
 Critical approaches would also challenge this legitimacy as it is often used to justify other forms of 
violence such as state violence through counter-terrorism practices, or structural violence such as poverty, 
racism, or sexism. 
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norms of justice and equality, but as a mechanism of state power to consolidate its own 
hegemonic position at the expense of other groups. By criminalising political expression 
the state can frame an out-JURXS¶VLGentity as µcriminal¶ placing restrictions on its ability 
to express and promote it, and directing law enforcement against it. In this way 
FULPLQDOLVDWLRQHPERGLHV³GLVFLSOLQDU\DQGUHJXODWRU\PHFKDQLVPVZKLFKFDQVHUYHWKH
scope of a better and more effiFLHQW PDQDJHPHQW RI SRSXODWLRQ´ 7RURV DQG 0DYHOOL
2013:79)7 that the state frames as ³DFKLHYLQJ DQ RYHUDOO HTXLOLEULXP WKDW SURWHFWV WKH
VHFXULW\ RI WKH ZKROH IURP LQWHUQDO GDQJHUV´ /HPNH  7KH SUREOHP ZKLFK
emerges, however, is that in deeply GLYLGHG VRFLHWLHV WKLV µZKROH¶ RIWHQ UHIHUV WR D
particular group at the expense of others. &ULPLQDOLVDWLRQIUDPHVWKHµWKUHDW¶WRVHFXULW\
in terms of the out-JURXS¶VLGHQWLW\WKHUHE\IXQFWLRQLQJ as a factor ³RIVHJUHJDWLRQDQG
social hierarchization...gXDUDQWHHLQJUHODWLRQVRIGRPLQDWLRQDQGHIIHFWVRIKHJHPRQ\´
(Foucault, 1976:141). For instance, in Egypt, following the assassination of then 
President Anwar Sadat in 1981, an emergency law was re-enacted providing for the 
banning of public gatherings, ceQVRUVKLSDQGGHWHQWLRQDOOMXVWLILHGRQ³WKHSUHWH[WRI
ILJKWLQJ ,VODPLVW PLOLWDQWV´ $EGHOUDKPDQ, 2015:16). In such a context the label of 
crime is used to legitimise state repression, consolidating the power of the state at the 
expense of other communal groups. Therefore, when the state is dominated by a 
particular group, this enables that group to use ³the law acts as a mechanism for the 
reproduction of social and political inequality´ UDWKHU WKDQ DV DQ LPSDUWLDO SURFHVV
(Zureik, Moughrabi and Sacco, 1993:440). Accordingly, the assumptions of state 
legitimacy and unit homogeneity with respect to crime are problematic in such contexts, 
as they will reinforce intergroup divisions by replicating the dominant state discourse of 
criminality. To understand this political subjectivity and complexity this chapter will, 





                                                          
7
 Foucault refers to these as biopolitical mechanisms and applies it to systems of racism (1976). For more 
on this see: Leerom Medovoi (2012) Swords and Regulation: Toward a Theory of Political Violence in 
the Neoliberal Moment. Symploke 20(1-2):21-34; Kyle Grayson (2012) The ambivalence of assassination: 
Biopolitics, culture and the political violence. Security Dialogue 43(1):25-41.    
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A critical conceptualisation of criminalisation 
 
Despite the prevalence of legal positivism in conflict analysis, a number of studies have 
DQDO\VHG µFULPH¶ WKURXJK D FULWLFDO OHJDO RU FULPLQRORJLFDO IUDPHZRUN &RKHQ 
Kennedy, 2006; McEvoy, 2001; McEvoy and Gormally, 1997; McEvoy and Newburn, 
2003; McWilliams, 1997; Super, 2013; Walsh, 1983, 2000; Zedner, 2005). While these 
approaches are again varied, they are based in a unifying epistemological approach 
towards the study of µFULPH¶ DQG µFULPLQDOV¶ ZKLFK DUJXHV ³FULPH LV FUHDWHG´ E\ DQ
authority and ascribed to certain actors (Quinney, 1970:15). In other words, they reject 
the positivist claim to objectivity; instead arguing that this leads to a tendency towards 
³VHHLQJOLNHDVWDWH´0F(YR\; Cohen, 1984). From this perspective crime is 
XQGHUVWRRGDV³WKHproduct RIFULPLQDOSROLF\´ZLWKFULPLQDOLVDWLRQEHLQJ³RQHRI WKe 
PDQ\ ZD\V WR FRQVWUXFW VRFLDO UHDOLW\´ +XOVPDQ  HPSKDVLV LQ RULJLQDO
Quinney, 1970, 1977).  Accordingly, the focus is no longer solely on the criminal, but 
on the mechanisms which designate them as criminal and the structures which lead to 
such behaviour (Becker, 1963).  
 
But even taking criminalisation as the analytical focus, its conceptualisation needs to 
distinguish between the formal legal process and its informal implementation;8 as 
previous research has distinguished between primary and secondary criminalisation (Hulsman, 
1986), formal and substantive criminalisation (Lacey, 2009), or the social practices of 
criminalisation which operate through formal and informal mechanisms (Shiner, 2009).In other 
words, formal criminalisation can be defined as the legal processes which codify and 
embody legal norms and principles established by a government; whereas informal 
criminalisation is the social reality of the formal process which is given expression 
through the way it is implemented, interpreted, resisted, or accepted by the wider 
population. To be clear, Shiner (2009:176, 174) distinguishes between these two forms 
of criminalisation linking the formaODSSURDFKWR³prosecution, trial, sentencing, and the 
operation of incarceration and parole´ DQG LQIRUPDO WR ³the...media both journalistic 
and entertainment, schools, churches, families, clubs, and societies, corporations, water 
fountains, pubs, common rooms, and coffee shops´. Therefore, informal processes are 
                                                          
8
 While linked, this is distinct from informalism which relates closely to restorative justice. For more on 
this see Kieran McEvoy and Harry Mika (2002) Restorative justice and the critique of informalism in 
Northern Ireland. British Journal of Criminology 42:534-562. 
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not necessarily the product of formal ones, but operate in an interactive relationship 
whereby both shape and are shaped by each other. Therefore this diverse list illustrates 
the subjective nature of criminalisation and the diffuse ways in which it permeates 
through media discourse (Hulsman, 1986:70), political discourse (McEvoy and 
Rebouche, 2007), and becomes manifest across multiple social, political, cultural, 
economic, and legal institutions. In other words, although formal criminalisation may 
appear to be almost the same across states, it may be fundamentally different with 
respect to informal criminalisation; groups may experience criminalisation differently 
depending on whether they are represented in the police, whether they are the 'source' of 
crime, whether they are politically marginalised, or whether they are culturally 
criminalised.  
 
Take for example the analogy of a football match. While both sides understand the 
formal rules and regulations, their interpretation of them will depend on whether they 
perceive the referee as legitimate, and whether the potential sanctions are outweighed 
by the benefits. For instance, if the referee is perceived as being from the same 
community as one of the sides, the other side may be less likely to regard them as 
impartial and so challenge the referee¶V decisions. Indeed the referee may not be 
impartial, applying the regulations according to their personal bias. Similarly, if a player 
is about to score a goal but can only do so by nudging the ball with their hand (thereby 
committing a hand-ball) they may perceive the benefits justify the risk. The formal 
regulations themselves are therefore dependent on their informal implementation. 
 
This subjective reality results in significant variation which positivist approaches are 
unable to convey. For instance, this was reflected in interviews conducted by the author 
with a range of actors in Northern Ireland and South Africa.9 Depending on the 
community, vocation, politics, or culture, their perception of what constituted 
criminalisation differed. For instance a Member of the South African National 
Prosecution Authority stated, referring to the decision-making process regarding 
ZKHWKHUWRSURVHFXWH³6RHVVHQWLDOO\LW¶VWKHIDFWVWKHODZDQGWKHQZKDWWKHSURVSHFWV
                                                          
9
 The methodology underpinning these interviews will be discussed in chapter two, but in summary the 
author conducted sixty-three semi-structured interviews with law enforcement, politicians, academics, 
NGOs, political ex-prisoners, and survivors of the conflicts. All the interviews were conducted in 2016 in 
Northern Ireland, England, and South Africa. 
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DUHRIDVXFFHVVIXOSURVHFXWLRQ´13$0ember, 2016). In this sense criminalisation is 
primarily based in the application of legal norms grounded in the positivist approach. 
Members of NGOs had a different interpretation with some highlighting its subjective 
QDWXUH ³&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ FUHDWHV WKH legal tools to actually incarcerate people on the 
JURXQG RI WKLQJV WKDW \RX¶YH FRQVWUXFWHG DV FULPLQDO DFWV´ -REVRQ  From this 
perspective the state determines what constitutes criminality to suit its particular agenda 
and responsibilities. In contrast former political prisoners understandably focused on its 
coercive nature; themselves having been subject to it. However, even within this group 
perspectives differed, with Republican ex-SULVRQHUV GHVFULELQJ LW DV ³MXVW DQRWKHU
ZHDSRQ´ ,5$ H[-prisoner A, 2016), and LoyalisW RQHV DV ³UHWULEXWLYH´ 89) H[-
SULVRQHU $  DQG WKDW LW ZDV GHVLJQHG ³WR VWULS \RX RI DQ\ LGHQWLW\´ 89) H[-
prisoner B, 2016). While Republican ex-prisoners regarded it as simply further evidence 
of the colonial oppression by the British, Loyalists were caught between accepting the 
legitimacy of the state and resisting the de-politicisation of their violence through 
criminalisation. Ex-prisoners from South Africa likewise had negative perceptions of 
criminalisation emphasising its indiscriminate nature under aSDUWKHLG ³$Q\RQH ZKR
fought the system was criminal. That was what we were irrespective of what 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ WR ZKLFK ZH EHORQJHG´ 0. H[-prisoner A, 2016). Another interviewee 
UHIHUUHGWRWKHSKUDVH³WKH\WKUHZWKHERRNDW \RX´6RXWK$IULFDQSROLWLFDOH[-prisoner, 
2016) meaning that the state would charge you with every possible crime so that at least 
RQH ZRXOG µVWLFN¶ 7KHVH FRQWUDVWLQJ SHUFHSWLRQV ZLOO EH GHYHORSHG PXFK PRUH
extensively throughout the thesis, but here they illustrate the diverse social realities 
criminalisation contributes towards (Hulsman, 1986; Quinney, 1970).  
 
The implications of the formal process of criminalisation are, accordingly, 
interdependent on the wider perceptions of those subject to it, enforcing it, and 
witnessing it; succinctly summarised by a 1RUWKHUQ ,ULVK FRPPXQLW\ZRUNHU ³People 
don't live in courtrooms around the rule of law or legal process. Quite often they make 
VHQVH WKURXJK WKHLU SROLWLFV RU OLYHG H[SHULHQFH´ &RPPXQLW\ :RUNHU $ 2016). The 
nature of formal criminalisation can be understood, therefore, as interdependent with the 
HYHU\GD\OLYHVRILQGLYLGXDOVRUDV%RXUGLHXH[SODLQV³/DZGRHVQRPRUH
than symbolically consecrate...the structure of power relation[s] between groups and 




which shapes and is shaped by the context. The diversity and complexity illustrated by 
the range of perspectives above demonstrates how this applies, as the formal process is 
understood in terms of how it operates in people¶s lived experiences.  
 
In turn this is interpreted at the level of the individual through their own habitus, the 
³VRFLDOO\ FRQVWLWXWHG V\VWHP RI FRJQLWLYH DQG PRWLYDWLQJ VWUXFWXUHV´ %RXUGLHX
1977:76), and so the social reality of crime is derived through this complex outworking 
of informal criminalisation.10 However, as habitus LV ³FRQVWLWXWHG LQ SUDFWLFH´
(Bourdieu, 1992:52) criminalisation, therefore, needs to be understood as a practice 
which both shapes and is shaped by its context. This means criminalisation is 
XQGHUVWRRG DV D VRFLDO SUDFWLFH ZKLFK GHVLJQDWHV ZKDW LV FULPLQDO EHKDYLRXU ³E\
reference to practical functions, systems of classification (taxonomies) which organize 
SHUFHSWLRQ DQG VWUXFWXUH SUDFWLFH´ %RXUGLHX  )RU LQVWDQFH FULPLQDOLVLQJ
public displays of a particular flag not only prohibits such displays, but by implication 
assocLDWHVWKHIODJ¶VDIfiliation to be illegitimate, leading to wider social ostracisation of 
those who hold allegiance towards it. Likewise, the link between a particular ideology ± 
for example communism - DQGµWKUHDW¶WRRUGHUFRQWULEXWHVWRZDUGVWKHFRQVWUXction of 
social practices which seek to defeat the ideology rather than prevent specific criminal 
acts. In this way, when criminalisation targets political expression it produces the 
FULPLQDOODEHO³DVVHOI-HYLGHQWDQGXQGLVSXWHG´UHGXFLQJDFRPSOH[FRQIOLct to a single 
characterisation (Bourdieu, 1977:164). The practice of criminalisation constructs what 
is legitimate political expression and what is crime. Analysing criminalisation as a 
social practice, accordingly, ensures that both the rules and the wider context they are 
part of are considered: formal and informal criminalisation.  
 
This complexity does not, however, preclude theoretical observations about such 
SUDFWLFHV DV ³QR VRFLDO UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG SUDFWLFHV DUH VR XQLTXH DV WR IRUHFORVH WKH
possibiOLW\RIWKHRULVDWLRQDQGFDWHJRULVDWLRQ´MXVWWKDWWKH\DUH³HVWDEOLVKHGORFDOO\´DV
LW LV ³PHDQLQJIXO FRQWH[WV WKDWJLYHSUDFWLFHV WKHLU VRFLDO HIIHFWLYHQHVV DQGJHQHUDWLYH
SRZHU´3RXOLRW&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQWKHUHIRUHUHSUHVHQWV³UHSetitive 
SDWWHUQV´ZKLFKDUHHVWDEOLVKHGORFDOO\± in their particular context ± DQGDUH³GLVSHUVHG
                                                          
10
 The debates around how habitus operates, and its implications, are beyond the parameters of this thesis. 




G\QDPLF DQG FRQWLQXRXVO\ UHDUUDQJLQJ´ EHLQJ FR-constitutive with the wider social 
FRQWH[W %XHJHU DQG *DGLQJHU  ,Q WKLV VHQVH ³>D@FFRXQWV RI SUactices are 
interpretations of interpretations; they are fundamentally reconVWUXFWLYH´ 3RXOLRW
2015:250). Making sense of these therefore involves a level of abstraction away from 
reality to identify patterns. In other words, the theoretical framework which this chapter 
goes on to explain relates to an explanatory model which helps one interpret the 
implications of CPE for conflict transformation. It is from this interpretivist 
epistemological approach that the rest of the chapter will proceed. 
 
 
Criminalising what? A typology of criminalising political expression 
  
In deeply divided societies formal criminalisation often targets political expression 
because this enables the state to place restrictions on certain out-group practices which 
threaten the status quo (Horowitz, 1985). Moreover conflict itself, when understood 
from this critical perspective, is closely related to the relationships between actors 
(Lederach, 2003), and is accordingly intertwined with the ability to communicate, with 
political expression. Criminalising political expression, therefore, can directly shape the 
nature of an intergroup conflict in DDS undermining the ability of actors to find a 
peaceful resolution to their conflict, or potentially enhancing it depending on how it 
operates. In other words, CPE involves criminalising various µW\SHV¶ of political 
expression, which can be disaggregated depending on its target and classified into an 
explanatory typology (Elman, 2005). In terms of political expression this thesis 
develops an original typology which distinguishes between three broad and interrelated 
µWDUJHWV¶WKHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQRISROLWLFDODFWLYLWLHV&3$WKHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQRISROLWLFDO
identity (CPI); and the criminalisation of political violence (CPV). The first two 
categories are exclusively focused on non-violent political expression whereas the last is 
focused solely on political violence. This first distinction is important because 
criminalisation is often designed with the very purpose of conflating political violence 
with non-violent political activity to delegitimise both (Abel, 1995; Dugard, 1978).  
 
CPA is distinct as it is targeted against specific political behaviours such as protests, 
strikes, publications and political meetings, and involving ³the re-allocation of political 
DFWV LQWR FULPLQDO FDWHJRULHV´ (Cohen, 1996:4). In contrast, CPI targets actors 
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themselves by criminalising particular ideologies, cultural practices, political views, or 
symbols. CPV relates to the criminalisation of political violence which includes any 
form of physical violence motivated by a political ideology or objective. This final 
category links closely with acts of terror, but the conceptual and definitional issues 
inherent in this term mean it will not be reduced to this concept exclusively in this thesis 
though it will be discussed (Bryan, Kelly and Templar, 2011). Each of these distinctions 
are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.Typology of criminalising political expression 
Criminalising Political 
Identity (CPI) 
Targets actors by criminalising particular ideologies, cultural 
practices, political views, or symbols 
Criminalising Political 
Activities (CPA) 
Targets political behaviours including such as protests, 
strikes, publications and political meetings 
Criminalising Political 
Violence (CPV) 
Targets violent actions committed for a political motivation; 
i.e. to advance a political cause or ideology 
 
Building on the critical conceptualisation of criminalisation, the distinction between 
CPA and CPI is the relation WR WKHLU ³QRUPDOLVLQJ SRZHUguaranteeing relations of 
GRPLQDWLRQ DQG HIIHFWV RI KHJHPRQ\´ )RXFDXOW  $FFRUGLQJO\ LQ ''6
criminal justice can be used to consolidate the power of one group over another by 
designating political expressions as illegal to delegitimise and subordinate the out-
group. Regarding CPI, a political identity becomes equated with criminal deviance, so 
that actors expressing this identity are monitored, regulated, and restricted, with the goal 
of correcting their deviance (Becker, 1963). In other words, criminalisation is designed 
³QRW WRSXQLVK WKHRIIHQFHEXW WRVXSHUYLVH WKH LQGLYLGXDO WRQHXWUDOLVHKLVGDQJHURXV
VWDWHRIPLQGWRDOWHUKLVFULPLQDOWHQGHQFLHV´)RXFDXOWHowever, this thesis 
does not argue that this removes the agency of the criminalised, just that CPI enables 
the state to regulate and subordinate out-groups, thereby consolidating its own power. 
Law enforcement accordingly regulates and isolates non-violent political identities, 
restricting any efficaciousness they may have on changing the status quo, while still 
permitting its deviance so long as it remains subdued. In this way the political 
H[SUHVVLRQRIDFULPLQDOLVHGLGHQWLW\EHFRPHVUHGXFHGWRWKHµOHJDO¶SDUDPHWHUVSODFHG
upon it, with the goal of regulating it into obscurity. The criminalised may nevertheless 
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choose to resist CPI through developing counter-hegemonic narratives of legitimacy, 
and developing social practices in opposition to those of the state. 
 
In contrast, CPA is not only to regulate and control ± as it usually will be complemented 
by CPI ± but it also seeks to eradicate the criminal deviant, widening the focus onto 
actors. By criminalising political mobilisation against the state, law enforcement 
becomes re-orientated to not only monitor and regulate, but to punish the criminal 
deviance of political actors opposed to the state. Activities challenging the political 
KHJHPRQ\ RI WKH VWDWH DUH PHW ZLWK ³VZRUG´ RI WKH VWDWH ± the law ± so that 
transgressions against the law are regarded as transgressions against the norm of justice 
(Foucault, 1976:144). By criminalising protests, strikes, political publications, and 
political gatherings, law enforcement is mandated to directly confront the very face of 
criminalised political expression, repressing rather than regulating deviance.  
 
The third category of criminalisation is distinct from the others because of its focus on 
political violence, these being violent acts committed to advance a political cause or 
ideology. State responses to such violence are frequently complemented by 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJ FKDQJHV LQ OHJLVODWLRQ ZKLFK HLWKHU FULPLQDOLVHV VSHFLILF µSROLWLFDO¶
offences supporting violence ± financing, promoting, and training ± or link what are 
usually ordinary crimes to a political motivation (Brewer et al., 1996). This enables the 
VWDWHWR MXVWLI\HPHUJHQF\VHFXULW\SRZHUVWRDGGUHVV WKHOHJLVODWLYHO\GHILQHGµWKUHDW¶
Through such criminalisation the state will try to delegitimise not just the violence 
committed, but also the political motivation underpinning it (Brewer et al., 1996:221). 
Bringing such violence under the criminal justice system ensures that it is dealt with as 
D GRPHVWLF LVVXH HVFKHZLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VFUXWLQ\ DQG FRQVROLGDWLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V
sovereignty over the criminal problem (Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2004).  
 
Even by refining the focus of criminalisation on to political expression it still embodies 
distinct types which will vary considerably depending on the context of their 
implementation. In order to account for this, this thesis applies what has been defined as 
the ³FULWLFDO WKHRU\-based approach WR FRQIOLFW´ 7RURV  FRQIOLFW
transformation, as it enables the complexity inherent in criminalisation to be built into 
the analysis through its multilevel framework, and likewise challenging statist accounts 




The trifocal lenses of conflict transformation 
 
Conflict transformation links closely with critical theory because it challenges the 
assumptions underlying other approaches to conflict analysis ± conflict management 
and resolution ± emphasising the importance of context and complexity (Toros, 
2012:65; Cochrane, 2012). For instance, it highlights how other approaches are often 
³PRUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WDFWLFV WKDQ ZLWK VWUDWHJ\´ 9l\U\QHQ  IRFXVLQJ RQ
specific acts of violence ± or in this case crime - rather than the underlying grievances 
and/or strategic utility of violence (Cochrane, 2012).  Instead conflict transformation 
seeks to develop long-WHUPUHVSRQVHVWRFRQIOLFWWKDWDGGUHVVWKH³URRWFDXVHV´/OR\G
2001), providing for intergroup reconciliation (Maddison, 2017), not just for an end to 
violence. From this perspective conflict can be considered as both an opportunity, and a 
problem to be solved. ,W LV ³a normal and continuous dynamic within human 
UHODWLRQVKLSV´ /HGHUDFKDQGZLWKRXW LW ³OLIHZRXOGEHDPRQRWRQRXVO\ IODW
topography of sameness and our relationships would be woefully superficial´
(Lederach, 2003:25). In other words, conflict should not be avoided as it forces us to 
constantly reassess our situations, seek solutions, and challenge assumptions. The 
question for conflict transformation scholars then is not how to bring an end to conflict, 
but rather how to reduce all forms of violence (Galtung, 1990). In other words, conflict 
is not the problem but rather encapsulates a problem, and frequently embodies at least 
part of the solution.  
 
When conflict is seen through this framework, responses such as criminalisation are 
understood in relation to their ability to facilitate constructive or destructive 
transformation. Constructive transformation means changing the very constitution of 
VRFLHW\ LQ VXFKDZD\ WKDW LWQR ORQJHU ³VXSSRUWV WKH FRQWLQXDWLRQRIYLROHQWFRQIOLFW´ 
(Miall, 2004:4). This means addressing the structures, practices, and even beliefs, which 
encourage violence: ³It encourages greater understanding of underlying relational and 
structural patterns while building creative solutions that improve relationships´ 
(Lederach, 2003:26). *DQGKL¶V method of non-violent conflict, satyagraha, embodies a 
clear example of how such transformation can occur through non-violent means, 
EHFDXVHLWLVEDVHGRQWKHEHOLHI³WKDWWRVXIIHUZURQJV>LV@OHVVGHJUDGLQJWKDQWRLQIOLct 
WKHP´ UHVXOWLQJ LQFRQIOLFWEHLQJVHHQ³DVDQRSSRUWXQLW\ WR WUDQVIRUPVRFLHW\´UDWKHU
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than as a process which escalates suffering (Weber, 2001:510, 494). Addressing the root 
causes of conflict, reframing actor relationships, facilitating intergroup dialogue, and 
strengthening civil society are but some of the ways such constructive transformation 
takes effect (Cochrane, 2012; Lloyd, 2001; Miall, 2004; Toros, 2012).   
 
,Q FRQWUDVW GHVWUXFWLYH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQYROYHV WKH ³LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ RI GDPDJH WR WKe 
SDUWLFLSDQWV´ DQG LW ³IXUWKHU GHVWUR\V WKHLU FRRSHUDWLYH FDSDFLWLHV´ 0LDOO 
Building on the critical approaches to crime outlined above, this means responses to 
violence must be analysed as much as the violence itself (Toros, 2012). For example, 
while the counter-terrorism powers to interrogate suspected terrorists through the use of 
physical violence may provide some intelligence, it itself embodies a form of 
destructive violence and is highly unlikely to foster cooperation. Indeed, when placed 
under physical duress, detainees are often more likely to tell the interrogator what they 
want to hear, lying to make the violence end, providing false or incomplete intelligence 
(Bellamy, 2006; Rejali, 2007). Therefore, bHFDXVH FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ DFWV DV ³a power 
ZKRVH WDVN LV WR WDNH FKDUJH RI OLIH´ )RXFDXOW  LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR FRQVLGHU 
whether this power is for the emancipation or the subjugation of actors; on the one hand 
it can act as a coercive process which undermines intergroup dialogue, while on the 
other it can deter destructive behaviours. States may respond to both non-violent 
movements and to collective political violence by criminalising political expression to 
undermine its efficaciousness, yet the nature and implementation of both contexts will 
YDU\GHSHQGLQJRQWKHVWDWHV¶REMHFWLYHVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHSURFHVVDQGWKHSRZHURI
the criminalised.  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV EHFDXVH ³ZH FDQQRW NQRZ ZKDW H[DFWO\ WKH
mechanisms cause, because mechanisms do not cause anything in and of themseOYHV´
(Pouliot, 2015:253). Framing the implications of CPE in terms of conflict 
transformation therefore builds in the necessity of context; that while certain aspects of 
formal and informal criminalisation may contribute towards constructive or destructive 
conflict transformation, the implications of this are context dependent and subjective.  
 
Conflict transformation accounts for these challenges by using a multilevel framework 
providing ³D VHW RI OHQVHV´ WKURXJK ZKLFK WR FRQVLGHU WKH YDULDEOH LPSDFW WKDW 
FULPLQDOLVLQJSROLWLFDOH[SUHVVLRQFDQKDYHRQFRQIOLFWEHFDXVH³QRRQHOHQVLVFDSDEOH
of bringing everything into focus, we need multiple lenses to see different aspects of a 
FRPSOH[UHDOLW\´/HGHUDFK-17). Because conflict is rooted in the relationships 
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between actors it is inherently subjective, with different actors perceiving the causes and 
solutions from various (often competing) perspectives. The diverse perceptions of 
criminalisation outlined above illustrate the importance of this, because a single lens 
would only provide a limited analysis and give an incomplete account of 
FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶V LPSOLFDWLRQV. Therefore, conflict transformation considers how 
transformations take place across three primary levels: issues, actors, structure (Miall, 
2004).11 For each of the three levels of transformation criminalising political expression 
has a number of potential implications, varying depending on their implementation as 






Following from the primary research conducted throughout this thesis, it develops three 
main arguments which summarise the relationship between CPE and conflict 
transformation.12 For the first, it argues that criminalising non-violent political 
expression will result in destructive conflict transformation by closing off opportunities 
for dialogue, raising the costs associated with non-violence, contributing towards 
intergroup polarisation, and dehumanising actors; with chapters three, five, six, and 
seven providing affirmative evidence to support this argument. The second argument is 
that when CPI or CPA are combined with CPV this likewise contributes towards 
destructive conflict transformation. This is because it directs law enforcement against a 
political identity as well as violent behaviours, creating new opportunities for resistance, 
embodying a form of structural violence through the criminal sanction, and contributing 
towards intergroup polarisation through retribution; evidence in chapters four and seven 
affirms this. The third argument posits that if CPV is implemented on its own it may 
facilitate constructive conflict transformation by delegitimising it as an alternative to 
                                                          
11
 Context and personal/small group levels have been omitted because they arguably overlap too closely, 
in relation to criminalisation, with the other levels. 
12
 Certain critical theory scholars would not ascribe to such causal claims such as Foucault who was 
VFHSWLFDO RI FODLPV WKDW ³VRFLDO OLIH LV VXEMHFW WR OLQHDU DQG HYROXWLRQDU\ FKDQJH´ +XQW DQG :LFNKDP
1994:6). However these arguments relate to strict mechanistic accounts which this thesis is not claiming 
to make. Instead the theoretical model is understood as an abstraction from reality in order to help make 
sense of this reality; not a reflection of it (see Pouliot 2015). 
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non-violent political expression. Chapter seven provides some tentative evidence from 
the case study of Belgium which would corroborate this, but it would require further 
research to refine its theoretical argument. This would be an area for future research and 
will be discussed in chapter seven in more depth.  
 
Accordingly the relationship between CPE and conflict transformation is disaggregated 
according to the target ± determined by formal criminalisation ± which depending on its 
implementation and perceived effects - informal criminalisation ± will contribute 
towards destructive or constructive patterns of conflict transformation. In other words, 
there are two distinctions which determine how CPE impacts conflict transformation: 
(1) the target(s) of formally criminalising a group through legislation; and (2) the 
informal social reality that this creates through the implementation of criminalisation 
embodied by law enforcement and resistance. Formal and informal criminalisation are, 
however, not measurable variables, but abstracted concepts contextually dependent ± 
the practices of CPE. Furthermore, criminalisation is also co-constitutive of conflict 
transformation ± hence the two-directional relationship ± as they both change and 











Using the multilevel framework of conflict transformation enables these theoretical 
links to be understood across the three levels of transformation (Cochrane, 2012; Miall, 
2004; Toros, 2012). The structural level represents the system which embeds violent 
forms of conflict where goals are no longer framed as incompatible, identities as 
polarised, and violence as the only - or most effective - means by which to address these 
(Cochrane, 2012; Miall, 2004; Väyrynen, 1991). This often involves a redistribution of 











power between actors, addressing underlying grievances, and opening up peaceful 
political avenues to displace violent ones. Criminal justice has a considerable role in 
such transformations, in framing not only what is legitimate, but also in establishing 
sanctions, or in providing opportunities for compromise. For instance, CPV can increase 
the costs associated with political violence reducing its utility, but this depends on the 
effectiveness of CPV and its legitimacy. The sanctioning of violent behaviours may 
undermine them, but if the state does this inconsistently - targeting only those of a 
particular group - the process may become constitutive of the conflict itself becoming 
one of the structures which contributes towards the continuation of violence rather than 
addressing it (Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2004). This is because behaviours become 
secondary to actors, as criminalisation is directed against a particular group. Such 
criminalised groups are then able to cultivate a counter-narrative of state repression 
EHFDXVHRILWVLQFRQVLVWHQF\FRQWULEXWLQJWRZDUGVDVRFLDOUHDOLW\RIVWDWHµFULPLQDOLW\¶ 
 
CPA undermines structural transformation through establishing a number of structural 
barriers which restrict non-violent political expression. Because it is controlled by the 
state CPA will particularly inhibit criminalised actors from communicating their 
SROLWLFDO YLHZV WR WKRVH LQ WKH VWDWH¶V FRPPXQDO JURXS XQGHUPLQLQJ PHDVXUHV ZKLFK
seek to encourage intergroup dialogue. The state accordingly frames these actors as the 
criminal problem, meaning dialogue is marginalised in favour of crime control 
measures. CPI embeds and reinforces this by reducing political identities to criminality. 
Consequently, criminalised groups may be forced to operate covertly restricting their 
ability to develop a non-violent political base or engage in dialogue as discussed in 
chapter three. 
 
Issue transformation involves determining which issues are more salient, moving actors 
away from zero-sum conflictual positions to areas where commonality can be found 
(Cochrane, 2012; Miall, 2004; Väyrynen, 1991). Criminalising political expression is 
closely linked to such issue framing, representing both an issue itself, and a mechanism 
through which issues are framed. Firstly, CPI and CPA represent an important issue 
which will need to be addressed because of its negative implications on dialogue 
described above. Some form of decriminalisation may therefore be required for conflict 
transformation to take place, as discussed more extensively in chapters five and six. 
With respect to CPV, decriminalisation will be much more divisive and potentially 
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undermine wider issue transformation. This is because the implications of such 
decriminalisation are contingent on their informal outworking, as although actors may 
be granted some form of formal pardon or amnesty, this will not address the embedded 
discourse of the criminal narrative and may even cause harm to victims of political 
violence. Decriminalisation, therefore, will be interpreted differently across the various 
actors, fostering agreement and trust with some, while isolating others.  
 
This is why the second aspect of issue transformation is so important, because when 
group identities are labelled as criminal this frames intergroup identities into 
dichotomies like victim/perpetrator (Bhatia, 2005). This is problematic for conflict 
transformation, because the polarised label will lead to polarised ways of addressing the 
issues themselves (Putnam, 2010), as issues are embedded in a zero-sum framework. 
Through the propagation of such terms in the media and political discourse ± informal 
criminalisation - they take hold of the imagination of the public (Zulaika and Douglas, 
1996:47; Jackson et al., 2011), making it difficult to address. Re-orientating 
criminalisation away from political expression and onto violence alone may help 
address this, but this again depends on whether groups regard the criminal justice 
system as having legitimacy, as will be discussed in chapter five. Indeed, such an 
approach would likely only work if it is complemented by a much wider bottom-up 
process which ensures the support of all major groups. 
 
Actor transformation refers to changes in leadership, goals, or power relations between 
groups in such a way that will change the nature of the conflict itself (Cochrane, 2012; 
Miall, 2004). While this may involve a change in the actors themselves, often it does 
not (Gormley-Heenan, 2006). Indeed criminalisation primarily impacts actors in terms 
of how they are perceived: their framing. Therefore individuals should be viewed not as 
isolated actors but as culturally embedded within multiple overlapping groups which 
together form D PXOWLOD\HUHG LGHQWLW\ WKDW ³exists within a ODUJHU VRFLDO V\VWHP´
(Kriesberg, 2008:404). Depending on group affiliations an individual will perceive 
criminalisation differently; some claiming it represents law and order, while others 
contending it to be a subversion of justice contributing towards intergroup polarisation. 
7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHµUXOHV¶RIRQHJURXSPD\DFWXDOO\RSHUDWHLQFRQWHQWLRQZLWKWKRVHRI
DQRWKHUSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHLQVWLWXWHGE\FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ,QRWKHUZRUGV³$SHUVRQPD\
break the rules of one group by the very act of abidiQJE\WKHUXOHVRIDQRWKHUJURXS´
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(Becker, 1963:8). Identifying and analysing such dissonance is crucial in understanding 
how actor transformation occurs; how through framing actors as criminals, their wider 
communities may informally become subject to criminalisation. For example, 
criminalising a non-state actor as a criminal may delegitimise them internationally or 
amongst pro-state groups, but it often legitimises them within their own political 
community (Buntman and Huang, 2000; Gormally, 2001).  
 
When this is understood through the typology of criminalising political expression these 
complexities become clearer. CPI frames the political ideologies of actors as illegitimate 
contributing towards the polarisation of intergroup relations. This relates to both the 
state and non-state actors, as an oppressive criminal justice system may undermine the 
legitimacy of the state within targeted communities, while the state's criminal framing 
may likewise undermine non-state actors. Furthermore, CPI reduces actor identities to 
simple characterisations as the criminal other, effectively contributing towards 
intergroup dehumanisation as it ³Ueduces them to a single identity, erasing other key 
phases and aspects of their OLYHV´ (Toros, 2012:31); presenting a diverse array of 
political and criminal groups as one homogenous illegitimate category. These 
characterisations vary considerably between and within cases because they are 
contingent on the communities whom actors derive support from and their relationship 
with the state. This is where CPA has an important role because the legitimacy of 
criminal justice will depend on its extensiveness. As CPA targets the ability of actors to 
mobilise peacefully against the state its repression will effectively place law 
enforcement in a highly politicised role. Those subject to such repression may 
DFFRUGLQJO\SHUFHLYHWKHODZHQIRUFHUVDVµWKHHQHP\¶DQGUHVSRQGWKURXJKWKHLURZQ
form of reactive resistance.   
 
CPV contrasts with these two other forms of criminalisation because it may actually 
facilitate actor transformation by raising the costs associated with destructive violent 
forms of political expression. However, this is dependent on the context because its 
ability to do so is constrained by the legitimacy of the state and the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, if CPV is implemented through repressive forms of law enforcement it 
may become a grievance around which actors mobilise against, thereby drawing the 
criminal justice system into the arena of contestation itself. Yet not criminalising 
political violence may result in the state being perceived as weak internationally ± 
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unable to respond to violence ± or be sidelined for more militaristic and violent 
approaches as discussed in chapter seven. 
 
There are a number of further more general points which relate to all the levels of 
transformation and the relationship between formal and informal criminalisation. 
Firstly, because formal criminalisation operates as a top-down mechanism it will be 
limited in its ability to actually bring about conflict transformation on its own. Indeed it 
is usually implemented as a mechanism which embeds the existing social order 
(Quinney, 1977), rather than transform it. But taking a critical approach provides a 
framework which challenges ³the social mechaQLVPV ZKLFK JHQHUDWH DOLHQDWLRQ´ 
(Kennedy, 1986:214), meaning by taking a broader conceptualisation ± as outlined 
above ± these issues can possibly be overcome.  For conflict transformation informal 
bottom-up processes have been recognised as essential to top-down mechanisms like 
criminalisation in order to build trust and support (Lundy, 2011; Mallinder, 2008). In 
other words, it is only through a more comprehensive approach involving bottom-up 
initiatives that informal criminalisation can be addressed to transform, not just the 






This chapter began by outlining the four predominant approaches towards researching 
crime in the context of political conflict: namely economic approaches to conflict, the 
crime-terror nexus, human rights approaches, and critical approaches. The first three of 
these are generally based in the same epistemological approach towards crime as a 
clearly defined and legitimate concept; implicitly ascribing to a positivist understanding 
of criminalisation as an instrumental process (Collier, 2000; Cornell, 2005; Keen, 1998; 
Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2008; Sanín, 2004). In contrast, positioning itself firmly 
within the critical approaches, this chapter argued that criminalisation should be 
understood as a mechanism of state power used to regulate and control society to serve 
the interests of those determining what is criminal (Foucault, 1975, 1976). This is 
particularly the case for deeply divided societies due to their inherent intergroup 
divisions and power dynamics (Horowitz, 1985). In such contexts criminalisation can be 
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used to consolidate the power of one group over another, particularly when it is targeted 
against political expression. In other words, the assumptions of unit homogeneity and 
state legitimacy lead to an essentialised conceptualisation of crime, which when applied 
to deeply divided societies can embed the hegemonic power of states by replicating 
their dominant framing of criminality. It was for these reasons that the critical approach 
was used as it brings the state into the analytical framework because it is also an active 
(not neutral) political actor (McEvoy and Gormally, 1997). 
 
Conceptualising criminalisation was done through an interdisciplinary approach which 
brought together critical criminological and legal research with that of conflict analysis. 
7DNLQJµFULPH¶WREHDVRFLDOFRQVWUXFW formally created by the state, it is important to 
evaluate how it also reflects the wider µVRFLDO UHDOLW\¶ RI FULPH and how these two 
processes ± formal and informal criminalisation ± interact with each other (Hulsman, 
1986; Quinney, 1970). In other words, it both shapes and is shaped by the wider context 
± in this case the conflict ± reflecting the nature of intergroup relations while 
simultaneously shaping them; it is co-constitutive. Analysing its impact on conflict, 
therefore, involves considering its experienced reality as well as its formal instrumental 
design: informal and formal criminalisation. This does not preclude the development of 
theoretical arguments as this chapter has outlined, just that these arguments are 
abstractions away from the reality in which they describe, not perfect reflections of it.  
Therefore ZKLOH WKH WKHVLV DUJXHV WKDW FHUWDLQ µW\SHV¶ RI &3( FDQ KDYH SDUWLFXODU
implications for conflict transformation, these arguments are qualified by their context, 
and recognise the numerous competing factors which likewise impact both CPE and 
conflict transformation. These points and how they are addressed will be considered in 
the next chapter on methodology.  
 
Having outlined the critical conceptualisation of criminalisation, the chapter narrowed 
the focus specifically to the criminalisation of political expression. This is because, 
from the perspective of conflict transformation, conflict is inherently based in the ability 
to communicate, as actors seek to resolve their conflict through some form of political 
expression, whether violent or non-violent (Lederach, 2003). Criminalising political 
expression can, therefore, shape the nature of conflict undermining the ability of actors 
to find a peaceful resolution to their disagreement, or potentially enhance it depending 
on how it operates. To analyse how this operates the chapter developed an explanatory 
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typology of criminalising political expression which will be applied throughout the rest 
of the thesis, mapping it on to the three levels of conflict transformation: actor, 
structure, and issue. Criminalisation from this approach can both facilitate and inhibit 
the transformation of conflict depending on the conflict context and target. The 
typology enables the target to be distinguished and analysed, while the following 
chapters consider it in relation to specific conflict contexts. In this way this chapter 
establishes the conceptual and theoretical framework outlining the relationship between 
criminalising political expression and conflict transformation. The following chapters 
accordingly explain its empirical evidence and the methodological framework through 





Researching criminalisation: A methodological framework 
 
Criminalisation poses a number of analytical challenges when it is understood from the 
critical approach outlined in chapter one due to its subjectivity and complexity. This is 
because it is conceptualised as the subjective construction of the criminal label, 
embodying a mechanism of state power, responding to and shaping conflict, varying 
depending on its target and context. As such, the interpretivist methodological approach 
will be applied as it is the most appropriate framework through which to assess and 
evaluate the central research question (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015; Leander, 2008; 
Pouliot, 2007, 2012, 2015). This chapter will explain why this is the case discussing its 
justification, challenges, and implementation. 
 
Because criminalising political expression is done in a particular context and in 
response to a particular type of political expression, it first needs to be analysed 
according to these contextual factors. Non-violent political expression may result in a 
GLIIHUHQW W\SH RI FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ WKDQ FROOHFWLYH SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH DV WKH VWDWHV¶
objectives behind it may be different. The state will be able to implement harsher 
security measures in the latter because the context will provide a clearer justification. 
Similarly as a conflict develops the process of criminalisation will change, evolving to 
account for transformations in the conflict context. Therefore, it should not be 
understood as an individual mechanism which responds to non-violent political 
expression in one way and collective political violence in another, but instead as a 
mechanism which is changed incrementally and used reactively in response to changes 
in the nature of a conflict. The first section of this chapter will explain how this thesis 
addresses these complexities through a two case comparative study of Northern Ireland 
and South Africa as in-depth typical case studies of this mechanism, comparing across 
the cases, but also across time to convey the evolving nature of criminalisation. 
Building on the theoretical framework developed in chapter one regarding practices, the 
thesis employs practice tracing (Pouliot, 2007, 2012, 2015), inductively analysing how 
the criminalisation of political expression operates in different conflict contexts within 
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and across the cases, and thereby providing new insights into practice tracing by 
extending it into the domain of domestic practices.1 
 
The second section of this chapter outlines what practice tracing involves: the data 
sources it depended upon, and the analytical framework used to analyse these. Formal 
criminalisation was assessed through in-depth reading of academic and policy sources 
from both cases to consider what the prevailing legal norms, legislative instruments, and 
judicial practices were. Then poststructuralist discourse analysis of political debates and 
legislation was used to identify how practices differed according the target of 
criminalisation and the rationale behind it. To evaluate the subjective nature of informal 
criminalisation, interview data ± both original and archival ± was considered across a 
range of key actors, as well as archival political documents and biographies. The 
research therefore provides original empirical data on criminalisation building upon 
existing research. 
 
The final section outlines the challenges of such a methodological approach. It discusses 
the legal and ethical issues of conducting interviews on such a controversial topic, and 
the practical challenges of fieldwork. Alongside engaging with other academic research 
on these challenges, the chapter outlines some personal experiences of how these 
challenges occurred and what steps were taken to address them. 
 
 
Comparing criminalisation: A conflict transformation framework 
 
&ULWLFDOFULPLQRORJ\DQDO\VHVQRWRQO\WKHEHKDYLRXURIWKHFULPLQDOLVHGEXWDOVR³WKH
interaction DPRQJ WKH VWDWH DQG HOHPHQWV RI FLYLO VRFLHW\´ 0F(YR\ DQG *RUPDOO\
1997:23HPSKDVLV LQRULJLQDO7KLVPHDQVWKDW OLPLWLQJDQDO\VLV WR WKHµFULPLQDO¶DQG
their behaviour is insufficient. Instead it is necessary to broaden the analysis to 
encompass the structures which contribute towards such behaviour and the issues which 
define and interpret it. However, because the theoretical combination of conflict 
transformation and critical theory (McEvoy and Newburn, 2003; Toros, 2012) has not 
                                                          
1
 7KH µSUDFWLFH¶ WXUQ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV WKHRU\ KDV EHFRPH D ZHOO HVWDEOLVKHG VFKROarly field 
(Bueger and Gadinger, 2015), but it predominantly focuses on the practices of states at the international 
level, whereas relatively less attention has been given to the significant role of practices within a state. 
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been previously applied to the process of criminalising political expression, there was 
no substantive theory to test or develop. It was not clear what relationship, if any, 
existed between the criminalisation of political expression and conflict transformation. 
This research, therefore, was designed as hypothesis generating contributing towards 
³the process of theory constructiRQUDWKHUWKDQWRWKHRU\LWVHOI´ (Levy, 2008:5, emphasis 
in original; Lijphart, 1971). Hence, following from the interpretativist epistemological 
DSSURDFK WKH UHVHDUFK GHVLJQ QHHGHG ³WR EH LQGXFWLYH LQWHUSUHWLYH DQG KLVWRULFDO´
(Pouliot, 2007:360), in other words, close in-depth analysis, involving a wide range of 
data sources, with temporal variation. 
 
In-depth case studies and practice tracing (Pouliot, 2015) were considered the most 
appropriate means through which to do this, enabling a close examination of the 
practices of criminalisation in context and controlling for other competing factors which 
impact upon conflict transformation (Beach and Rohlfing, 2015). Typical cases were 
chosen because they are selected on the basiVRI³D set RIGHVFULSWLYHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV´
namely the conflict context and criminalising political expression, which are then 
analysed to identify ³causaO UHODWLRQVKLSV´ (Gerring, 2007:91). Causal relationships, 
KRZHYHUUHIHUWR³HPSLULFDOUHODWLRQVKLSV´ZKLFKFRQQHFWFULPLQDOLVDWLRQZLWKFRQIOLFW
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQDVRSSRVHGWRVWDWLVWLFDORQHVEHFDXVHWKH³QXPEHURIFDVHVLWGHDOVZLWK
LV WRR VPDOO WR SHUPLW V\VWHPDWLF FRQWURO E\ PHDQV RI SDUWLDO FRUUHODWLRQV´ /LMSKDUW
1971:683, 684). Moreover, according to the interpretivist approach identifying causal 
UHODWLRQVKLSV ³follow[s]  from LQWHUSUHWDWLYH DQDO\VLV´ 3RXOLRW  HPSKDVLV LQ
original), instead of preceding it, meaning case analysis precedes theorisation. 
 
Furthermore, while individual caseV SURYLGH LPSRUWDQW LQVLJKWV ³they do not by 
themselves provide clHDUJXLGDQFHIRUJHQHUDOLVDWLRQWRRWKHUFDVHV´ (Achen and Snidal, 
1989:146, emphasis in original; Beach and Rohlfing, 2015).  Indeed while in-depth case 
studies on their own provide valuable insights about how CPE impacts conflict 
transformation, when considered comparatively this facilitates the identification of 
patterns, whereby practices are analysed in relation to one another while still accounting 
for their context and subjectivity (Pouliot, 2015).  Accordingly, a two case comparative 
framework was employed enabling a close in-depth analysis of the individual cases, but 
then also a wider comparison abstracting from these contexts in order to contribute 




Selecting cases for this comparison was done through the most similar systems design 
where the cases were similar in all but one of the inputs,2 which meant similar in terms 
of formal criminalisation but dissimilar in terms of informal criminalisation. The initial 
framework posited that these two inputs operated interactively affecting change in 
conflict transformation depending on the context. Therefore general mechanisms could 
be analysed within each case through practice tracing ± as will be explained later - 
within the cases in order to consider what factors could be attributed to this variation. 
For these reasons chapters three to six involve a two case comparison of Northern 
Ireland (1922-present) and South Africa (1950-present). This is because the cases 
provide empirically rich accounts of CPE, with temporal variation as the conflicts 
developed, and spatial variation in the cross case comparison.  
 
With reference to overcoming the 'many variables, few cases' problem, Lijphart 
(1971:687; 1975) argued that cases should be comparable, meaning they DUH³similar in 
a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as 
constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to 
reODWHWRHDFKRWKHU´. To ensure that cases were comparable the case selection needed to 
ensure that the cases had similar characteristics for a number of important constants ± as 
outlined below - but variation in relation to the processes under evaluation ± formal and 
informal criminalisation. Specifically, the cases met two important qualifications: firstly 
that they are deeply divided societies, and secondly that they have functioning legal 
systems (Horowitz, 1985).3 These attributes are essential because the theoretical 
arguments made regarding criminalising political expression are contingent on these 
FRQWH[WV DV ZLWKRXW D IXQFWLRQLQJ OHJDO V\VWHP FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶V OHJLWLPDF\ ZRXOG EH
irrelevant, or at least much harder to identify. Likewise, in deeply divided societies 
which are experiencing political unrest, criminal justice is generally under the control of 
a single ethnonational group which may use criminal justice to consolidate its own 
hegemonic position at the expense of other groups (Horowitz, 1985:22). In such 
contexts, the state will often respond to unrest by criminalising political expression to 
                                                          
2
 7KH WHUP µLQSXWV¶ LV XVHG LQ place of independent variable because of the interpretative approach 
adopted. The context and subjective nature of informal criminalisation makes it inaccurate to describe it 
as a variable due to its implicit variation. 
3
 This refers to there being a legal system which held some legitimacy with the population domestically 
and/or internationally, albeit often contested. See chapter seven for a more substantive overview of this. 
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re-establish order, but in practice, it frequently becomes a form of repression (Jung, 
Lust-Okar and Shapiro, 2005). In other words, it is when disorder itself becomes 
associated with a certain political identity that such criminalisation takes on a particular 
meaning, whereby political expression becomes subject to the criminal law.  
 
Beyond these necessary criteria there are a number of secondary factors which justify 
their comparison. Firstly, they had a number of similarities including similar temporal 
contexts (Cold War), British colonial legacies, relatively similar legal systems, and 
politicised law enforcement. Furthermore, both cases contain four conflict contexts 
which will be analysed ± non-violent movements, collective political violence, 
negotiations, and peacebuilding ± enabling them to be compared within and across the 
cases increasing the number of observations substantially. Within the case comparison it 
is also important to analyse the evolving nature of criminalisation to understand how it 
responds reactively as conflict develops. These similarities enable the complexity and 
contexts to be accounted for while then analysing the different outcomes and variation 
between the cases. Indeed because of these similarities ± as well as others - the cases 
have been compared by other studies with respect to their political polarisation (Guelke, 
2000), peace processes (Guelke, 1991; 1994; Sandal and Loizides, 2013), peace 
agreements (McGarry, 1998), criminal justice (Brewer et al., 1996; McEvoy and 
Newburn, 2003), and transitional justice (Campbell and Connolly, 2012; Hamber, 
2002). These similarities are summarised in Table 2. 
 
In terms of the variation between the cases, while formal criminalisation had a number 
of important similarities, informal criminalisation varied considerably. The target of 
criminalisation (as defined by the typology in chapter one as identity, activity, or 
violence), the nature of law enforcement practices (along the spectrum of civil policing 
to militarisation), the perceived reality this criminalisation creates (whether it is 
regarded as legitimate or not), the response of actors towards it (nature of resistance), 
and a number of other contextual factors, embody the key variation being analysed 




Table 2. Case comparison: Similarities and differences between Northern Ireland and 
South Africa 
 
However, the methodological approach also constrained the generalisability of the 
research as a two case comparison only enables ³contingent empirical generalisations´ 
(Achen and Snidal, 1989:147, emphasis in original). Because of the similarities between 
the cases and the contextual contingency of the concepts ± particularly informal 
criminalisation - findings drawn from them are not causal, but instead reflect 
generalised patterns regarding the practices of CPE and their implications for conflict 
transformation. To reinforce this, chapter seven considers typical, crucial, and 
counterfactual cases in a small-n analysis of Turkey, Sri Lanka, Canada, and Belgium. 
These cases provide further insights into the practices of CPE building upon the in-
depth analysis developed in the rest of the and considering the evolution of 
criminalisation over the course of a conflict rather than in specific conflict contexts. But 
for the sake of clarity the specific methodological framework employed will be 
discussed in the chapter itself.  
 
Analysing the variation between and within the cases meant accounting for the complex 
subjective experience and practices of informal criminalisation, which is why practice 
tracing was used. Practice tracing is distinct from the alternative of process tracing 
primarily due to its epistemological foundations. For instance process tracing ³is an 
Similarities Differences 
- Deeply divided societies with a single group 
hegemony 
- Functioning legal systems which maintained 
some domestic and/or international legitimacy 
- Conflicts included non-violent movements, 
collective political violence, negotiations, and 
peacebuilding 
- Temporal contexts (Cold War) 
- British colonial legacies 




- Nature of informal criminalisation 
(intervening variable) 
- Conflict transformation ± constructive or 
destructive ± varied over time 
- Criminalised groups represent both a 
majority and minority across the cases 
- The role of mainland British public and 
political elite 
- Constitutional status had significant 
implications for Northern Ireland 
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analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of 
evidence ± RIWHQXQGHUVWRRGDVSDUWRI D WHPSRUDO VHTXHQFHRIHYHQWVRUSKHQRPHQD´
(Collier, 2010:824), whereas practicH WUDFLQJ GUDZV RQ %RXUGLHX¶V 1977, 1992) 
conceptualisation of practices outlined in chapter one, and developed into an 
interpretativist methodology (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015; Pouliot, 2007, 2012, 2015). 
7KLVGUDZVKHDYLO\RQWKHµSUDFWLFHWXUQ¶LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVWKHRU\DQGWKHZRUN
by Vincent Pouliot (2007, 2012, 2015) in particular.4 In contrast to process tracing, it 
assumes that knowledge and social reality are socially constructed and mutually 
constitutive (Pouliot, 2007), meaning that analysing social practices such as 
criminalisatioQ LQYROYHV FRQVLGHULQJ LWV ³VXEMHFWLYH LQWHQWLRQV EHOLHIV DQG LQWHU-
VXEMHFWLYH QRUPV LGHQWLWLHV´ PDQLIHVWDWLRQV 3RXOLRW  $FFRUGLQJO\
inductive case analysis still involves in-depth analysis of a temporal sequence of events, 
but interprets GDWD GLIIHUHQWO\ SODFLQJ D JUHDWHU HPSKDVLV RQ WKH ³LQVLGHU PHDQLQJV´
which constitute social practices (Pouliot, 2015:244). There are two challenges with this 
approach which require methodological remedies ± or at least partial remedies ± due to 
the co-constitutive nature of the cause and effect; that criminalisation causes conflict 
transformation and is likewise caused by it; and identifying what the subjective social 
practices represent. Put differently, the research design needs to address possible 
endogeneity and validity.  
 
For the first challenge, it should be noted that it is not necessarily possible to always 
identify a clear direction of causality due to the mutual constitution of practices ± 
illustrated in Figure 1. This makes causal claims highly problematic as it will be unclear 
what the causal direction is or if it is linear. From this perspective it is necessary to have 
³H[WHQVLYH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FDVH LQ TXHVWLRQ´ DQG LW FDQ EH DQDO\VHG LQ FRPSDULVRQ
ZLWK ³D VPDOO QXPEHU RI FDVHV´ GXH WR WKH importance of context (Hanson, 2006:10). 
More specifically, the relationship between CPE and conflict transformation is 
³HVWDEOLVKHG ORFDOO\´ ZKHUHE\ ³PHDQLQJIXO FRQWH[WVJLYH SUDFWLFHV WKHLU VRFLDO
HIIHFWLYHQHVV´3RXOLRW7KHLVVXHRIHQGRJHneity is therefore not necessarily 
important as it the direction of causality is assumed to be contextual and subjective as 
achieved through in-depth comparative analysis. Hence the thesis focused on four key 
contexts: non-violent movements, collective political violence, peace negotiations, and 
                                                          
4
 For a wider discussion of practice theory see Bueger and Gadinger (2015). 
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peacebuilding. This is because conflict is not a static process, and so responses to it will 
be similarly evolving. Therefore as the nature of a conflict changes so will the role of 
criminalisation as its target and objectives become reformed to address new contexts. In 
this way criminalising political expression will impact upon conflict transformation in a 
particular way specific to the context (as shown in figure 1 in chapter one), but as this 
leads to transformation this will have a corresponding impact on the context and 
criminalisation itself. The individual chapters considering each specific context will, 
therefore, focus on the particular implications of the context, whereas the seventh 
chapter and conclusion will discuss its wider complexity and interaction across four 
further cases.  
 
There are a variety of theoretical models which categorise these various contexts 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011; Leatherman et al., 1999)5 but because 
criminalisation is in response to something it is more appropriate to focus on what it is 
responding towards. With respect to the case studies this meant each chapter considered 
the development of criminalisation over time as shown in Table 3. The justification for 
these specific timeframes is that they relate to changes in relation to formal 
criminalisation, primarily through the introduction, reform, or reversal of specific 
legislation. While there is obvious overlap between some of these contexts, such as non-
violent movements and collective political violence, this can be accounted for through 
the in-depth approach. Each chapter therefore builds upon the analysis of the previous 
one, coming together in the final chapter, which considers all four contexts. 
 
As a response to non-violent movements, criminalisation frames non-violent political 
expression as criminality, thereby delegitimising its political objectives, and providing 
the legal means to repress it. This is witnessed in the state responses during the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt where their respective criminal justice systems 
were all used as mechanisms of political power and subjugation to silence political 
dissent, criminalising political expression (Chertoff and Green, 2012). The objectives 
behind such criminalisation are often about enabling widened security powers, 
                                                          
5
 For instance Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011) outline the conflict life-cycle model which 
identifies the stages of conflict as: social change, conflict formation, violent conflict, conflict 




SUHYHQWLQJ IRUHLJQ LQWHUIHUHQFH DQG OHJLWLPLVLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V FRXQWHU-narrative of 
criminality. In this context criminalisation is focused on CPI and CPA, where CPI is 
used to delegitimise the criminalised identity of protesters, and deter others from joining 
a particular movement. CPA is implemented to limit the capacity of such movements 
directing the powers of law enforcement against political activities.  
 
Table 3. Within-case comparison timeframes according to conflict context 
 Northern Ireland South Africa 




Peace negotiations 1990-1998 1989-1994 
Peacebuilding 1998-2017 1991-2017 
 
As a conflict develops so too will criminalisation, and so following the onset of 
collective political violence states frequently utilise their criminal justice system to 
legitimise widened security powers, bringing the criminal justice system within a 
counter-insurgency framework through CPV (Boyle, Hadden, and Hillyard, 1980). 
Political violence is linked to a particular group or ideology, with states responding by 
criminalising this group and their associated activities because they engage in such 
violence ± linking CPV with CPI. But the implications of this vary considerably across 
cases depending on the extensiveness and legitimacy of the process, and on informal 
criminalisation. For instance, research into the proscribing of the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party 3..E\*HUPDQ\KLJKOLJKWHGKRZWKLVUHVWULFWHGWKHZLGHU.XUGLVKGLDVSRUDV¶
political options by framing them as a security threat (Baser, 2015). But this contrasts 
acutely with criminalisation in Turkey which has led to extensive restrictions on 
Kurdish political expression (Somer, 2002). Therefore it is the context of informal 
criminalisation which determines the implications that the process has for conflict 
transformation.  
 
                                                          
6 While the focus in chapter three is on the civil rights movement in the 1960s, this wider timeframe 
relates to the introduction of the legislation criminalisation political expression. Therefore it ensures 
that the civil rights movement is properly contextualised. 
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Criminalisation in the context of negotiations embodies an important incentive structure 
which can facilitate conflict transformation in particular contexts, but also undermines it 
depending on its target and implementation. For instance, the proscription of various 
&RORPELDQµWHUURULVW¶JURXSVE\WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPKDVUestricted the ability of third-
party actors in helping to facilitate intergroup dialogue as part of the wider peace 
process (Haspeslagh, 2013). Similar issues emerged in relation to Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain (Zulaika and Murua, 2017), or the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and National Democratic Front (NDF) in the Philippines (Santos Jr, 
2010). This is because CPA and CPI typically impede - or at least constrain - conflict 
transformation by restricting opportunities for dialogue, dehumanising actors, and 
embodying structural constraints. On the other hand, CPV may complement 
negotiations by delegitimising violence as an alternative form of political expression, 
although this will be dependent on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. For 
instance, redirecting law enforcement to address specific forms of political violence, 
such as that between the Inkatha Freedom Party and African National Congress in South 
Africa during the peace negotiations, rather than focus attention on non-violent political 
expression (TRC Report 5, 1998).7 
 
The final context is that of peacebuilding whereby the state will need to restore 
confidence in the institutions of criminal justice, addressing issues of historical crimes 
committed during the period of violent conflict while disconnecting the criminal 
narrative away from political expression. The prevailing narratives of culpability within 
a conflict will frame who is considered legitimate or not, polarising intergroup relations 
into polemic categories of victims and perpetrators, making their transformation integral 
to the wider peacebuilding process. However, if used as a mechanism of state power, 
reforms addressing criminalisation will likely embed intergroup polarisation and 
structural issues, potentially perpetuating the conflict. 
 
These arguments all involve a level of abstraction away from the cases they refer to, but 
follow inductively from the practice tracing methodology applied in each context. 
Chapters three to six accordingly apply the practice tracing methodology to each context 
                                                          
7
 In this case this case such violence was highly destabilising to the negotiations, and there is evidence 
WKDWWKH1DWLRQDO3DUW\*RYHUQPHQWVSRQVRUHGDµWKLUGIRUFH¶KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHOLPLWDWLRQV underlying this 
approach (Ellis, 1998). These points are developed in chapter five. 
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to ascertain what relationship exists between CPE and conflict transformation while also 
considering what variations it takes across the various contexts. The issue of reifying 
these concepts is of importance, but it is possible to mitigate against this when they are 
understood within their contextual boundaries and defined to convey their fluidity. 
Understanding how these arguments developed requires considering the two main data 
sources which were used as outlined in the following section.  
 
 
Analysing formal and informal criminalisation  
 
Data sources and data analysis 
 
Practice tracing involves considering a wide range of data sources which enable the 
researcher to analyse practices in their social context (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015; 
Leander, 2008; Pouliot, 2015). Poststructuralist discourse analysis (PDA) enables these 
SUDFWLFHV WREH FULWLFDOO\ DQDO\VHGE\FRQVLGHULQJ³IUDPLQJVRIPHDQLQJDQG OHQVHVRI
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQREMHFWLYHKLVWRULFDOWUXWKV´+DQVHQKRZµFULPLQDO¶
labels are constructed through political discourse, implemented in policy, and how they 
are assimilated or resisted in the communities subject to them. In other words, according 
to PDA the representations of identity ± criminal/terrorist, victims ± are linked to policy 
through discourse, and so by analysing the discourse of criminalisation it is possible to 
DQDO\VH SUDFWLFHV WKHPVHOYHV +DQVHQ  7KLV LV EHFDXVH ³LW LV RQO\ WKURXJK WKH
FRQVWUXFWLRQLQODQJXDJHWKDWµWKLQJV¶DUHJLYHQPHDQLQJ´+DQVHQSUDFWLFHV
themselves only become meaningful when understood in relation to discourse.  
 
Analysing formal criminalisation was primarily done through PDA which Neumann 
(2008)8 summarises into three key steps: deliminating texts, mapping representations, 
and layering discourses. Deliminating texts involved identifying sources which 
conveyed the nature and purpose behind criminalisation which was done through 
considering academic research, primary legislation, case law, legal documents, 
                                                          
8
 While Neuman is not necessarily articulating a post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis, the 
framework still applies and helpfully summarises the key processes involved. For more on the distinctions 
between different types of discourse analysis see: Fairclough, Norman (2013) Critical discourse analysis 
and critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies 7(2):177-197. 
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government reports,9 and parliamentary Hansards.10 'LVFRXUVH ³XVXDOO\ FRQWDLQV D
GRPLQDWLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI UHDOLW\´ 1HXPDQQ  DQG VR PDSSLQJ
representations involved analysing these sources to identify what representations they 
embodied, reproduced, or constructed. Narratives of criminality, dichotomies of 
perpetrators and victims, and languages of threat and order, all embody various 
examples of these representations. Layering discourses involved considering why some 
discourses remained embedded over time while others did not (Neumann, 2008). In 
other words, through practice tracing it was possible to analyse how the discourses of 
criminality constructed by criminalisation changed over time, and how counter-
narratives interacted with these, likewise evolving over the course of a conflict.  
 
This is where informal criminalisation was crucial to the analysis, identifying and 
understanding how hegemonic discourses of criminality constructed by the state 
become implemented, perceived, and resisted. Discourse analysis thus was applied 
again to informal criminalisation in relation to government reports, and court transcripts 
to convey the government practices which followed from it as well as memoirs, news 
articles, oral history records, previous interview data, and academic sources. 
Furthermore archived copies of the Republican and Loyalist publications, An Phoblacht 
and Combat respectively, were accessed from the Political Collection at the Linen Hall 
Library, and of the Africanist accessed from the University of Witwatersrand Historical 
Research Archive, all of which provided primary source material on the political 
rhetoric being propagated by proscribed groups and examples of censored material. In 
this way analysing informal criminalisation required using these sources as a starting 
point to develop a comprehensive reading of how criminalisation has been traditionally 
understood within existing academic research, policy documents, and political 
discourse. This then became applied through the second data source of semi-structured 
interviews to understand the perceived reality which criminalisation contributed 
towards, and the implications this had for conflict transformation. 
 
                                                          
9
 Various government documents, particularly from government inquiries in Northern Ireland and the 
annual prison reports, provided important information on the implementation of government policy 
10
 The South African Parliamentary hansards were unavailable remotely and so were accessed directly 
from the South African Parliamentary Library in Cape Town. 
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Deducing how the subjective perceptions of individuals and groups correspond to wider 
processes of criminalisation positions these individuals at the centre of this research. 
This means their perceptions and experiences represent relational knowledge (Hastrup, 
2004) rather than objective social facts, which can be understood through their re-telling 
RIWKHVHH[SHULHQFHV$FFRUGLQJO\WKH³thematic, topic-FHQWUHGDSSURDFK´ provided by 
semi-VWUXFWXUHG LQWHUYLHZV ZDV XVHG EHFDXVH LW LQYROYHG D ³relatively informal 
style...with the appearance in face-to-face interviewing of DFRQYHUVDWLRQRUGLVFXVVLRQ´ 
(Mason, 1998:62). They were particularly well suited to the research goals because they 
DLG LQ ³UHFRQVWUXFWLQJ WKH SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ SRLQW RI YLHZ´ WKURXJK ³LQVLGHU NQRZOHGJH´
(Pouliot, 2015:246; Bueger and Gadinger, 2015). Such an approach enables the 
UHVHDUFKHUWRDVN³RSHQ-HQGHGTXHVWLRQVIURPDSUHSDUHGOLVW´DQGGLVFXVVNH\³WRSLFVLQ
GHSWK´ :RRG  7KLV LQYROYHG GLVFXVVLQJ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ H[SHULHQFHV DQG
perceptions of criminalisation, providing original insights into the social reality it 
created, the variable nature it had across and within groups, and the implications this 
held for conflict transformation. However, respondent perceptions were analysed with a 
³IRFXV OHVV RQ ZKDW LQWHUYLHZHHV WDON about than what they talk from´ (Pouliot, 
2015:246, emphasis in original), meaning situating responses within their wider context 
and how they related to other respondents. The sources outlined above provide key 
source material to triangulate with interview data to check its reliability, while also 
informing the line of questioning, choice of interviewees, and the interpretation of 
interview data (Tansey, 2007). Indeed, concerning events which took place over fifty 
years ago there are obvious issues of recollection, so the interviews focused primarily 
on more recent events, while analysis on the early periods of conflict was based 
primarily on the discourse analysis of memoirs, policy reports, news articles, oral 





The design of the interviews was crucial to ensuring that the data collected was relevant 
to the research itself. This meant choosing who to interview, what questions to ask, how 
to analyse transcripts, and then how to disseminate this information, involving 
considerable planning before ever contacting the first interviewee. Following from the 
conceptualisation of criminalisation in chapter one it is clear that - for conflict 
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transformation - a broad range of actors have an important role, meaning that 
interviewees would likewise have to reflect as broad a cross-section of relevant groups 
as possible to triangulate their perspectives. This was also important to ensure that the 
results were as representative as possible so that WKH µGDWD¶ ZDV QRW VNHZHG WR RQH
particular viewpoint (Becker, 1967). Accordingly, the process for identifying 
LQWHUYLHZHHV ZDV SXUSRVHIXO VDPSOLQJ ZKHUHLQ ³the sample is always intentionally 
selected accoUGLQJ WR WKH QHHGV RI WKH VWXG\´ (Coyne, 1997:629). This involved 
GHYHORSLQJ D FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI LQWHUYLHZHH µW\SHV¶ - defined according to their 
relationship with criminalisation - and interviewing as representative a sample of these 
as possible. The categorisation of interviewee types is summarised in Table 4 and the 
actual number interviewed according to each type in Table 5. As these groups are not 
mutually exclusive, their categorisation served as a framework rather than as a typology, 
many individuals having overlapping roles,11 often changing over the course of time. 
 
Of these groups a number of academic interviews were conducted before the others in 
order to discuss and refine the conceptual and theoretical concepts being analysed. This 
ensured that later interviews with each of the other categories were based on a coherent 
research framework with unifying thematic questions.  As shown in Table 5 academics 
comprised a significant proportion of interviewees as they provided important feedback 
on the theoretical arguments, and frequently through these interviews further contacts 
would open up via their networks. This was particularly the case in South Africa where 
I had no pre-existing network before beginning the PhD.  
 
The process of contacting individuals and organisations involved first identifying those 
who would be relevant to the research through purposive sampling. The identified 180 
individuals and organisations were then contacted through a combination of emails, 
telephone calls, and letters depending on the recipient. This method of contact was very 
time consuming and unpredictable, but having established a number of contacts it was 
much easier to then build upon this. Of these a much smaller number responded, and an 
even smaller number again were willing to meet. Issues of access are problematic to 
RYHUFRPH LQ FRQIOLFW HQYLURQPHQWV ZKHUH DFWRUV RIWHQ UHJDUG µRXWVLGHUV¶ DV , ZDV
referred to on more than one occasion, with significant distrust and suspicion, 
                                                          
11
 For example many current political elites were former prisoners. 
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particularly in South Africa (Reed, 2012). Therefore, while purposive sampling 
involved the identification of key actors and groups, it only led to a small number of 
interviews. To address this, these initial interviews were used as part of the snowball 
VDPSOLQJPHWKRGZKHUHE\³WKHVRFLDOQHWZRUNVRILQterviewees [is used] to expand the 
researcKHU¶VSRWHQWLDO FRQWDFWV´ &RKHQDQG$ULHOL$FFRUGLQJO\ WKUHH WULSV
were planned to Northern Ireland to allow for contacts to develop who could be 
interviewed during a later visit. In South Africa such a staggered approach was 
impractical because of logistical constraints, so instead a number of Skype and 
telephone interviews were set up in advance with a similar intention.  
 
Table 4. Categorisation of interviewee types 
 
Academic Specialists in criminal justice, criminology, conflict analysis, political 
science, anthropology, and history, interviewed to discuss a number of 
the specific themes covered in the research and refine the theoretical 
framework. 
Security Senior representatives of the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
interviewed to understand the law enforcement perspective on 
criminalisation. 
Political Politicians in South Africa and Northern Ireland interviewed to 
understand the political narratives on why criminalisation was formally 
adopted, its intended purpose, and current challenges.  
Civil Service Separated from security because this relates to those involved in the civil 
government departments relating to justice, and the administration of 
justice.  
Civil Society This is a broad category including many organisations working on 
KXPDQULJKWV¶LVVXHVSULVRQUHKDELOLWDWLRQYLFWLPDQGVXUYLYRUVXSSRUW
and legal services. These groups provided substantial input regarding 
how criminalisation operates, the challenges, and the wider implications 
this has. 
Ex-prisoner Individuals from the IRA, UDA, UVF, MK, and other organisations 
were interviewed. These actors discussed their experiences of being 




Table 5. Overview of interviewees by type 
 
These issues of access, however, led to some sampling bias. Of the sixty-three original 
interviews, only eleven were female, skewing the gender demographics. In many cases 
this was simply due to access as those interviewed were the ones put forward as the 
representative of a particular organisation. The sample was more representative in terms 
of political affiliation as in Northern Ireland ten of those interviewed would identify 
with republicanism or nationalism, and eight with loyalism or unionism. Of the others 
interviewed it was not explicitly asked, known, or relevant what their political 
affiliation was. So while the issues of access inevitably led to some sampling bias, it 
also opened up research avenues which would have otherwise been unavailable. Indeed, 
acknowledging this bias meant steps could be taken to minimise its impact particularly 
through a triangulation of other data sources and cross referencing original interviews 
with archived ones.  
 
As seen in Table 5 the number of interviews from South Africa is significantly lower 
than in Northern Ireland, which was due to the limited time period ± three weeks ± spent 
on fieldwork constraining the number of interviews that could be arranged. In order to 
address this and ensure the integrity of the research quality two archives were also 
visited which contained a substantial body of interviews themselves. The Historical 
Research Archive based at the University of Witwatersrand and the Mayibuye Archive 
                                                          
12 No security personnel were interviewed because of issues of access, but the archival sources 
consulted had a wide range of interviews with security personnel to ensure their perspectives were still 
accounted for. 
 
Northern Ireland South Africa Archival Total 
Academic 12 5 0 17 
Security 2 012 16 18 
Political 4 1 15 20 
Civil Service 1 2 0 3 
Civil Society 10 12 4 26 
Ex-prisoner 11 3 26 40 
Total 40 23 61 124 
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based at the University of Western Cape provided further sixty-one archival interviews 
related to the research. These interviews were selected due to their relevance with 
criminalisation providing a more balanced range of interviewees as shown in Table 5. 
Furthermore, these interviews were conducted with a range of political elites and 
security personnel who would otherwise have been very difficult to access, and 
completed much closer to the time of the events under analysis providing important 
sources to cross reference original interview data with.  
 
The background of each interviewee was researched in advance, drawing particularly 
upon secondary interview material, to ensure that the line of questioning engaged with 
their experience. Every interview began with an explanation of the research project, 
how the interview data would be used, and what areas the interview would (not) cover, 
followed by going through the consent form (see appendix 1). From this point on the 
interview would be recorded, and an example of some interview questions from a 
cancelled interview is provided in appendix 2.  
 
As interview tranVFULSWV DUH OHJDOO\ WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V GDWD WKLV UHTXLUHV LWV usage in 
publications to be compliant with their initial consent (Israel, 2015). Following the 
interviews all recordings were therefore transcribed according to the agreed level of 
anonymity and stored securely as encrypted files. The original recording was then 
deleted to protect the identity of interviewees. Furthermore, only data relevant to the 
research project was transcribed to minimise data redundancy. Personal details of 
interviewees were recorded only when it was necessary and the interviewee had given 
their consent, otherwise a pseudonym was used. Importantly data will not be shared or 
used without the express consent of the interviewee in order to comply with the Data 
Protection Acts which govern data control in the United Kingdom. 
 
Interview transcripts were analysed to identify recurring themes or perspectives related 
to criminalisation. These were contrasted in relation to different interviewee types, 
between cases, and across demographics. The analysis did not use coding methods 
because these rely on a level of consistency across interviews which when interviewing 
such a range of actors on such a range of themes is problematic. Instead, the interviews 
were analysed according to answers on key themes covered in the thesis relating to the 
aspects of conflict, conceptualisation of criminalisation, and the perceived implications 
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of it. This provided insights into how perceptions of criminalisation differed according 
to political affiliation, cultural identity, and whether actors were the target of it or 
implementing it, contributing original primary evidence regarding CPE. 
 
 
Fieldwork challenges and limitations 
 
Conducting interviews and fieldwork poses a number of challenges to the researcher 
and is bound by several important limitations. This section will outline these in three 
categories: practical, legal, and ethical. The practical challenges relate to the logistical 
issues of doing research in a foreign country, with unknown participants, on 
controversial themes. Legal challenges arise from the topics under discussion and their 
relationship with previous crimes committed, terrorist offences, and issues of 
confidentiality. Ethical constraints inform both the practical and legal issues, but also 




Practical challenges of fieldwork 
 
My experiences of fieldwork differed significantly between the two cases. As I have 
lived the majority of my life in Northern Ireland I already had considerable local 
knowledge and support from family, colleagues, and friends. I had no issues at all with 
safety, and generally the fieldwork was straightforward to organise and carry out. In 
contrast, South Africa has one of the highest levels of ordinary crime, and on my first 
day of fieldwork in South Africa I found myself in a South African police station filing 
DFULPH UHSRUWKDYLQJ MXVWKDGP\FDU¶VKXE-caps stolen. On the second day a police-
officer stoppHG P\ FDU DVNLQJ IRU D µILQH¶ ZKLFK ZKHQ SUHVVHG IRU WKH UHDVRQ ZDV
dropped. While I had done extensive training on the practical challenges of fieldwork 
before setting off, this did not stop such challenges emerging. Plans were changed. 
Interviews were cancelled, re-arranged, and re-directed. Finances and its corresponding 




Indeed, Ganiel (2013:171) recounts how by failing to properly prepare for an interview 
in South Africa - entering an unknown neighbourhood, having no support and no 
contingency plan - she narrowly escaped a mugging due to a passing stranger's 
intervention. Knox and Monaghan (2003) refer to how they sought to address such risks 
by holding interviews in secure, neutral locations where they and the interviewees 
would feel safe, such as government or NGO buildings. Indeed, precautions taken 
through completing risk assessments (see appendix 3), establishing local contacts, 
FRQGXFWLQJ LQWHUYLHZV LQ µVDIH¶ Oocations, and doing background research on 
interviewees inevitably saved me from many potential issues. While taking these 
precautions limited the range of potential interviews, they were supplemented by the 
archival sources outlined above and secondary interview data in existing academic 
research. 
 
Interview fatigue posed a further challenge for this research as many individuals who 
were contacted had undergone interviews before, albeit on different topics. This meant 
many interviewees had (negative) preconceived ideas about the interview process and 
may have been sceptical of another researcher coming to interview them again. For 
instance Clark (2008:965) conducted research on such fatigue finding that there are a 
number of precursors to it, including D ³lack of perceptible change attributable to 
[previous] engagement; increasing apathy and indifference toward engagement; and 
practical barriers such DV FRVW WLPH DQG RUJDQLVDWLRQ´ 7R PLWLJDWH DJDLQVW WKHVH, the 
UHVHDUFK SURMHFW¶V WKHPHV REMHFWLYHV DQG IRcus were all clearly explained to 
interviewees in the initial contact email or letter, and then reiterated before the interview 
began. This was to ensure that the interviewee was aware they could end the interview 
at any stage - that it was voluntary - and that their role in the research was clear. Doing 
so was important also because the reasons behind why individuals will engage in 
qualitative research have been found to LQFOXGH DW DQ LQGLYLGXDO OHYHO ³subjective 
interest, enjoyment, curiosity, introspective interest, social comparison, therapeutic 
interest, material interest and econoPLF LQWHUHVW´ DQG DW D FROOHFWLYH OHYHO
³representation, political empoweUPHQW DQG LQIRUPLQJ µFKDQJH¶´ (Clark, 2010:399). 
Clearly establishing the purpose, design, and intent of interviews meant that the data 
was relevant to the research aims, and the engagement with interviewees was reciprocal. 
Specifically, any published material which is based upon a particular interview will be 
sent to the interview so that they are aware of the research output and included 
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throughout the research process. In this way the interviewee is not regarded simply as 
WKH µSURGXFW¶ DQG µGDWD¶ EXW DV DQ LQWHJUDO SDUticipant in the research itself thereby 
³GHPRFUDWLVLQJ´WKHUHVHDUFKSURFHVV6P\WK 2001:11). 
 
Following the advice of previous researchers (Browne, 2013; Browne and Moffett, 
2014), I kept a fieldwork diary recording the day-to-day experiences of conducting 
interviews. One of the most pressing challenges recorded was the overwhelming 
experience of conducting dozens of interviews, with such a variety of actors, and in 
such a short time period of time. Interviewing a victim of political violence, a senior 
police officer, a former political prisoner, and polarised political elites all within a 
couple of days meant it was very difficult to engage in proper reflective analysis. Indeed 
it has taken months of analysis and reflection to actually begin to understand how these 
polarised perspectives intersect. But at the time this led to a sense of paralysis and was 
overwhelming as the project felt like it was impossible to complete. Inexperience in 
conducting interviews was largely to blame for this, because as the interviews went on 
these issues largely subsided. Concerns over what the data meant were set aside until 





There is currently an ongoing debate regarding the legal implications of conducting 
interview research and questions of confidentiality particularly following the high 
profile case of the Boston College tapes (Israel, 2004; Murray, 2013; Sampson, 2016). 
A number of researchers in this case interviewed forty-six individuals who were 
engaged in the Northern Ireland conflict on the condition that all interview data would 
remain sealed until after the interviewee's death (Sampson, 2016). Confidentiality was, 
therefore, crucial to the entire process enabling participants to be more open with 
interviewers. However, the Police Service of Northern Ireland subpoenaed the tapes on 
the grounds that they held important information relevant to a murder investigation 
under the UK-US treaty, the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Murray, 
2013). The legal case challenged the confidentiality of sensitive data on the grounds of 
it providing evidence for an ongoing murder investigation. While this case illustrates 
how promises of confidentiality need to be qualified according to the wider legal 
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framework, similar cases preceded it and will likely also continue to emerge due to the 
tension between research integrity and legality (Israel, 2004). To account for this all 
interviews with ex-prisoners began where possible by explaining that confessions of 
criminal offences can be subpoenaed and disclosure of terrorist activities must be 
disclosed to the police. The justification behind such a precaution was based in the 
legislative framework which the research had to navigate and to pre-empt a number of 
legal issues from emerging (Murray, 2013; Sampson, 2016). 
 
In researching an area such as criminalisation where past offences will be discussed, 
there is a high chancH RI µguilty knowledge¶ EHLQJ GLVFORVHG.13 This is where an 
interviewee discloses the details of an offence they or someone else committed which 
has not been prosecuted previously. The current legislative framework in the United 
.LQJGRP OHJDOO\ REOLJDWHV WKH UHVHDUFKHU WR GLVFORVH DQ\ FDVHV RI VXFK µJXLOW\
NQRZOHGJH¶: 
"[Section five of the Criminal Law Act (N.I.) 1967] imposes a duty on a person 
who knows or believes that an arrestable offence has been committed and who 
has information about the offence which 'is likely to secure, or be of material 
assistance' in securing, the arrest of any person to give the information to the 
police unless they have a reasonable excuse" (Fennan, 2002:160).  
Similarly under the section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 an individual is legally 
required to disclose to the police if they have information regarding a terrorist offence. 
This is problematic considering that many interviewees may wish to discuss  prior 
offences which they believe to be inconsequential following the Good Friday 
Agreement or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but may still be subject to 
prosecution. By clearly explaining the purpose and nature of the research project 
interviewees were made aware that such disclosure was irrelevant and inappropriate to 
the project. In cases where the interviewee appeared to begin to discuss such 
information the line of questioning was diverted to forestall any incriminating details. 
These issues also apply similarly to South Africa, meaning that the same precautions 
were undertaken.  
                                                          
13
 6HHIRUH[DPSOHWKHOHJDOGHILQLWLRQRIJXLOW\NQRZOHGJHDVWKH³knowledge of facts or circumstances 
required for a person to have mens rea IRU D SDUWLFXODU FULPH´ WKDW WKH\ have the mental knowledge 








The legal and practical challenges outlined above are only indicative of a range of 
broader challenges facing such a research project, as addressing them all would take an 
entire thesis itself. But underpinning and guiding these decisions were four key 
principles defined by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) guidelines 
and my own school¶V HWKLFV SURFHVV 7KHVH DUH non-malfeasance (not causing harm), 
autonomy (treating people with respect and enabling them to make their own choices), 
beneficence (doing good), and justice (who will be advantaged and disadvantaged by 
the research). Together these principles seek to ensure that the research is conducted in 
a way which does no harm to the participants, the researcher, and wider society, and that 
its overall purpose will be for the wider beneficence of society.  
 
With regards to the first principle of non-malfeasance, in conducting interviews on 
criminalisation there arise the issues of secondary traumatisation and retraumatisation. 
The former refers to the traumatisation of the researcher from having repeatedly 
interviewed individuals who have undergone serious emotional or disturbing 
experiences. This can happen while on fieldwork conducting the interviews, or 
afterwards through their transcription and analysis. Having a strong support network 
was of great importance in preventing such issues, particularly being able to discuss the 
content without disclosing confidential information. Retraumatisation refers to how 
interviewees may find themselves re-experiencing the trauma of their experience 
through the retelling of it (McConville and Bryson, 2014:15). For many of those 
interviewed they had undergone long periods of imprisonment, were estranged from 
families, and even undergone torture in a few cases. Ensuring that the interviewee was 
discussing only topics they were comfortable with and being clear what was not to be 
discussed helped prevent such harm. Furthermore, those interviewed had been identified 
SULPDULO\ WKURXJK µJDWHNHHSHUV¶14 who should have ensured that only those with good 
mental health were interviewed. These steps were taken to reduce the risk of 
                                                          
14
 7KHVH DUH ³SHRSOH ZKR FDQ FRQWURO WKH DFFHVV ZKLFK WKH UHVHDUFKHUV DUH SHUPLWWHG WR KDYH WR WKH
subjects of researFK´ZKLFKLQWKLVFDVHZDVWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV-XSS 
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retraumatisation, albeit imperfectly. Ideally I would have undergone further training in 
how to conduct interviews on such sensitive topics from health professionals. 
 
The second principle of autonomy means ensuring that all interviewees are treated as 
people rather than subjects, recognising their own emotions, interests, and values. 
2XWOLQLQJ WKH YROXQWDU\ QDWXUH RI WKH LQWHUYLHZV DQG WKH LQWHUYLHZ¶V SXUSRVH ZDV
important to ensure interviewees were given autonomy over their participation in the 
process (Smyth, 2001). Furthermore, because the background of the interviewer shapes 
the answers respondents give (Finlay, 2001), if the autonomy of the interviewee is not 
properly established they will be more likely to either give answers they think the 
interviewer would want to hear, or else they may become evasive (McEvoy, 2006).  
 
(QJDJLQJ LQ ³FULWLFDO DQG DQDO\WLFDOO\ DFFRXQWDEOH IRUPV RI UHIOH[LYLW\´ HQDEOHV WKH
researcher to anticipate and acknowledge this perceived identity, and reduce the impact 
it has on the interviews themselves (Finlay, 2001:71; Kezar, 2005). Yet eliminating 
these perceptions altogether is unlikely, particularly in contexts such as Northern Ireland 
where, coming from a Protestant Northern Irish family, my name alone gives away my 
communal background. This meant, at least in part, that Loyalist participants were much 
more open to meet and discuss the research, perceiving me as an insider who would be 
sympathetic, whereas Republican actors were initially more reticent and cautious, but 
when they discovered I was from Northern Ireland they likewise were quite open 
SHUFHLYLQJ WKDW , µXQGHUVWRRG¶ WKH FRQWH[W. Moreover, in South Africa respondents 
perceived my identity as being an Irish researcher, leading some to emphasise their 
shared colonial past and history. These multiple perceived identities reflect the wider 
complexity of my positionality in relation to those being researched (Bourke, 2014). In 
this way interview responses will have been at least partially shaped by their perception 
of who I was.  
 
In anticipation and response to these challenges four steps were taken: firstly, from the 
first point of contact the independence of the research and its impartiality were 
emphasised in the research outline and communication; secondly, in interviews I 
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avoided questions regarding my own identity and focused on the research subject;15 
thirdly, all interviews were cross referenced with secondary interview material and other 
sources; and fourthly, I established my bona fides through working with key 
stakeholders who could then introduce me to others (Knox, 2002). While such measures 
cannot eliminate the challenges of positionality because of the relational nature of 
interview sources (Kezar, 2005), they at least mitigated against its most obvious 
problems (McEvoy, 2006).  
 
The third and fourth principles of beneficence and justice are closely related with 
regards to this research as it based on the new ethics approach to research: whereby ³the 
goal is taken to be bringing about particular VRUWVRIFKDQJHLQWKHZRUOG´ (Hammersley 
and Traianou, 2014:3.1). In analysing how criminalisation impacts upon conflict 
transformation, the research is seeking to contribute towards our understanding of how 
to bring about conflict transformation. The critical approach adopted is based in a 
normative framework which seeks to reduce all forms of violence including structures 
of violence such as those embodied in certain aspects of criminalisation (Lederach, 
2003). Furthermore, because of the key importance of informal criminalisation, 
interviewee responses shaped the wider research project albeit within a defined 
WKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUN7KURXJKVXFK³SDUWLFLSDWRU\IRUPVRILQTXLU\´ (Hammersley and 
Traianou, 2014:6.2), interviewees contributed towards the research findings. Not only 
did the interviews provide data which formed a central evidential component of the 
research, but as the interviews progressed certain themes increased in prominence while 
others were sidelined. For instance criminalisation in general was refined into the 
criminalisation of political expression, and then further into specific types of political 
expression. The distinctions between the experiences of different interviewees meant 
that the original broad conceptualisation was insufficient to account for the variable 
impact it had. 
 
In addressing these above challenges the overall integrity of the research was greatly 
improved. Setting up safeguards in anticipation of the practical challenges minimised 
their potential to disrupt carrying out the research. Risk assessments, insurance, local 
contacts, secure interview locations, all helped reduce stress and protect against harm to 
                                                          
15
 Most of the time this was not problematic as interviewees wanted to discuss the topic and generally 
made their own assumptions about my background rather than enquiring after it. 
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the researcher. Addressing the legal issues refined the research focus away from areas 
which would unnecessarily present further ethical issues with respect to disclosure of 
guilty knowledge. By identifying and responding to the ethical issues outlined above the 
quality of the research was greatly improved, as interviewees were given autonomy over 
their role in the project, the research parameters were clearly defined, and the normative 





7KLVFKDSWHUKDVRXWOLQHGWKHWKHVLV¶PHWKRGRORJLFDOIUDPHZRUN, explaining the research 
design, data sources, and the practical implications of conducting fieldwork. Building 
on the conceptual and theoretical framework established in chapter one, the 
methodology analyses the relationship between criminalising political expression and 
conflict transformation from the interpretivist approach (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015; 
Leander, 2008; Pouliot, 2007, 2012, 2015). As this relationship has not been previously 
studied the research was designed as theory building, which is why in-depth case 
studies were considered to be the most appropriate, as they enable a close and 
contextualised examination of the processes to identify how they operated. The case 
studies of Northern Ireland and South Africa were selected as typical cases of this 
process illustrating the evolving nature of criminalisation over time. Moreover they 
were analysed through a comparative framework based on the most similar systems 
design, as although the case studies enabled an inductive examination of the processes, 
the comparative framework meant these could be abstracted in order to identify general 
mechanisms (Pouliot, 2015). This chapter, accordingly, established the justification for 
the case selection, outlining their comparability in relation to their similarities and 
differences (summarised in Table 3), extending the interpretativist methodological 
approach to consider the domestic practices of criminalisation.  
 
In assessing these cases the research employed practice tracing, using discourse analysis 
and semi-structured interviews to analyse the subjective and inter-subjective meanings 
embodied in formal and informal criminalisation. Formal criminalisation was analysed 
through the discourse analysis of current academic research, historical records, legal 
documents, government reports, parliamentary Hansards, legislation, and media 
|59| 
 
sources. Informal criminalisation was analysed through discourse analysis as well but 
considered biographies, archived interview transcripts, oral history records, and 
archived publications; alongside new semi-structured interviews collected as part of the 
research. In this way the research combines a wide range of data sources, primary and 
secondary, triangulating their findings to develop new insights into the process of 
criminalisation and its implications for conflict transformation. 
 
The chapter then outlined the process of planning, implementing, and analysing the 
semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were identified according to their relationship 
with criminalisation, and the interviews were designed to discuss a number of key 
themes derived from the established understandings of criminalisation within previous 
research. The interviews were conducted with a wide range of different types of actors 
to ensure as representative a sample of perceptions as possible (summarised in Tables 4 
and 5). The logistics behind the interviews were then discussed, outlining the range of 
individuals interviewed and how this mapped across the cases. 
 
Despite careful planning fieldwork in areas experiencing high levels of crime and on 
topics of a sensitive nature pose a range of different challenges. These broadly fell 
under three categories: practical, legal, and ethical. The practical issues related to 
personal safety, logistics, and interview fatigue; the legal challenges related to issues of 
confidentiality and the diVFORVXUHRIµJXLOW\NQRZOHGJH¶DQGWKHHWKLFDOLVVXHVUHODWHGWR
WKHSULQFLSOHVRIµGRQRKDUP¶DXWRQRP\EHQHILFHQFHDQGMXVWLFH7KHVWHSVWDNHQWR
address these were discussed as were the limitations with these measures.  
 
In summary this chapter has set out the methodological framework through which the 
research questions and theoretical issues raised in chapter one are addressed. The 
following four chapters ± chapters three to six ± will consider each specific aspect of 
conflict outlined above to understand how criminalisation impacts upon conflict 
transformation, while chapter seven extends and develops these findings through a 





Criminalising conflict: Non-violent movements and the criminalisation of non-
violent political expression 
 
This chapter considers the first of the four conflict contexts analysed in this thesis: non-
violent movements. Its overarching aim is to understand what relationship exists 
between criminalising non-violent political expression and the development of non-
violent movements; thereby providing insights into the wider theoretical question of the 
thesis concerning how CPE impacts conflict transformation. Therefore this chapter 
develops specific insights into CPE in the specific conflict context of non-violent 
movements which will be brought together with those of chapters four, five, and six in 
the final chapter. 
 
In response to non-violent movements, states frequently criminalise non-violent 
political expression. In such cases criminal justice is used to consolidate the power of 
the state by reducing or eliminating the capacity to challenge the state through non-
violent political means. For instance, in 2001 in the Syrian Arab Republic the 
Government implemented the Legislative Decree 50 on the µfreedom of publications 
and libraries¶ providing for extensive measures repressing any political expression 
challenging the state XQGHU WKH SUHWH[WV RI ³QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\´ DQG ³QDWLRQDO XQLW\´ 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002; UNHCR, 2005). In this context the label of crime was 
used to legitimise state repression, consolidating the power of the state. Drawing on the 
critical conceptualisation of criminalisation developed in chapter one, this chapter 
accordingly argues that CPI and CPA create a social realit\RI µFULPH¶ which embeds 
violent forms of conflict rather than transforms them. This is because just as 
criminalisation constructs social reality, violence responds to this ³as a reflection of the 
XQGHUO\LQJ VRFLDO UHDOLW\´ (Väyrynen, 1991:3). In other words, actors may engage in 
violence in response to their perceived social reality, reacting against their 
criminalisation in order to protect or fight for their interests. 
 
Yet while criminalising non-violent political expression may impact motivations to 
engage in political violence, it remains unclear why this is the case in some cases and 
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not others1. This chapter will address this puzzle arguing that such criminalisation 
impacts upon actor motivations to engage in political violence for three interrelated 
reasons: (1) it contributes towards intergroup polarisation; (2) it collectivises repression; 
and (3) it increases the cost of non-violent collective action. These factors, however, 
depend on the specific nature of criminalisation - its target and implementation. In other 
words, applying the typology of criminalising non-violent political expression in 
chapter one, criminalisation needs to be disaggregated into the criminalisation of 
political activities (CPA) and criminalisation of political identity (CPI). While these are 
interrelated, their distinction is important in terms of the impact on actor motivations to 
engage in political violence and the implications for conflict transformation. 
 
Table 6. Implications of criminalising political expression on NVMs, group identity and 
repression 














becomes the target 














meetings are met 
with state repression 
The banning of 
communications, 
events, and funding 
pushes actors to 
operate covertly 
 
CPI frames groups as perpetrators and victims, displacing underlying political 
motivations, contributing towards intergroup polarisation. As a result, repression is seen 
to be targeting a political identity as opposed to individuals, thereby becoming a 
collective grievance around which actors may mobilise. Furthermore, non-violent 
movements (NVMs) may come under the criminal label simply because of their 
                                                          
1
 The Arab Spring is one examples of this, as in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt their respective criminal 
justice systems were all used to varying degrees as mechanisms of political power to silence political 
dissent, criminalising political expression (Chertoff and Green, 2012). However in some of these cases 
non-violent protests escalated into political violence, whereas in others it remained non-violent.  
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association with a criminalised identity, undermining their credibility and potential 
efficaciousness. On the other hand, CPA itself embodies a form of state repression 
which can contribute towards distinct law enforcement practices and varying according 
to the communal group; potentially escalating intergroup tensions. Likewise the cost of 
non-violent collective action increases when it is criminalised because resources are 
harder to mobilise, communication becomes restricted, and penalties become 
prohibitive (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). These increased costs of non-violent 
mobilisation then coincide with increased costs of inaction due to collectivised 
repression, and can encourage some actors to transition into political violence. 
Therefore, both forms of criminalising political expression have an important impact 
upon actor motivations to engage in political violence, albeit depending on their 







The first section of this chapter will develop and illustrate these conceptual distinctions 
through discussing their manifestation in the case studies of Northern Ireland (1922-
1969) and South Africa (1950-1961) prior to the outbreak of collective political 
violence.2 This section will show how CPI was evident in both cases, whereas CPA was 
much more extensive in South Africa. The significance of this is demonstrated in how 
many of the key political leaders of the South African liberation movements all pointed 
directly towards CPA as a central motivating factor behind their violent mobilisation, 
whereas in Northern Ireland it was considered as secondary to other factors. Focussing 
specifically on the context of deeply divided societies which have functioning legal 
                                                          
2
 These dates link to the primary legislation criminalising non-violent political expression.   
Collectivises Repression 





Contributes to intergroup 
polarisation 
Figure 2. Theoretical relationship between CPI/CPA and actor motivations to 
engage in political violence 
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systems is necessary in terms of the comparability of cases (Horowitz, 1985). This is 
because, in deeply divided societies which are experiencing political unrest, criminal 
justice is generally under the control of a single ethnonational group, which uses 
criminal justice, inter alia, to consolidate its own hegemonic position at the expense of 
other groups (Horowitz, 1985:22). In such contexts, the state will often respond to 
unrest by criminalising political expression to re-establish order, but in practice, it 
frequently becomes a form of repression (Jung, Lust-Okar and Shapiro, 2005). It is 
when disorder itself becomes associated with a certain political identity that such 
criminalisation takes on a particular meaning; instead of simply criminalising violent 
acts, political acts become subject to the criminal law as well. The second section of this 
chapter will therefore analyse the three processes summarised in Table 6, drawing on 
evidence from the two case studies. The case study analysis will then be followed by 
some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
Criminalising non-violent political expression: Northern Ireland and South Africa 
 
Understanding the importance of criminalising political expression first requires it being 
disaggregated into both CPI and CPA because, while interrelated, they can have 
different implications for conflict transformation as explained in chapter one. CPI is 
distinct in that it is inherently based on delegitimising the criminalised identity through 
targeting particular ideologies, cultural practices, political views, or symbols, whereas 
CPA seeks to undermine the capacity to mobilise against the state and accordingly 
involves proscribing specific behaviours of expression including protest, strikes, 
publications and political meetings. In both cases criminalisation was directed against a 
political identity, whereas in South Africa the extensiveness of CPA was much greater 
than in Northern Ireland, as summarised in Table 7. Outlining the distinctions between 







Table 7. CPI/CPA in Northern Ireland and South Africa 
 Political Identity Political Activities 
Northern Ireland Republicanism and 
loyalism 
- Limited restrictions on specific events3 
- General surveillance of political activity 
South Africa Communism and 
later all anti-state 
activity 
- All activity promoting any proscribed 
group (anti-state) ideology was banned 
 
CPI in South Africa related primarily to three laws,4 the first being the Suppression of 
Communism Amendment Act No.50 which granted the State President the power to 
SURVFULEHDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKVRXJKWWRIXUWKHU³DQ\RIWKHREMHFWVRIFRPPXQLVP´
(Mathews, 1972:55). In announcing the legislation in Parliament the Minister of Justice 
explained its purpose was ³WRFRSHZLWKWKHGHDGO\PHQDFHRI&RPPXQLVP´6$IULFDQ
Parliament, 1950b). FraPLQJ ³VXEYHUVLYH HOHPHQWV´ DV ³&RPPXQLVW´ SURYLGHG D
simplistic, yet highly effective, out-group classification through which all political 
opposition to the state could fall under (Ibid). The legitimacy of opposition to the 
Government, therefore, did not matter, so long as the person could be classified as a 
Communist agitator. This is important because of the permanence of this representation, 
as even following the peace settlement, the former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan 
Vlok (1986-H[SODLQHG WR WKH7UXWKDQG5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ³[T]he ANC-
PAC, were seen with justification as fronts and tools of the Marxist-Communist threat 
against the country...I saw it as part of my duty to fight against such thoughts, 
programmes RU LQLWLDWLYHV´ 75& 5HSRUW   The very thoughts of 
communism were considered as the enemy, as Vlok clearly links these political groups 
including their ideological basis with a security threat. Criminalising the communist 
ideology was part of the wider delegitimisation of the identity.  
 
                                                          
3
 This escalated in the 1960s as described in the section on collectivised repression. 
4
 While there were others they largely complemented these or expressed similar traits and therefore are 
not discussed here. For more detail on these see: John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Anthony S Mathews, Law, Order and Liberty 
in South Africa (London: University of California Press, 1972). 
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However, this criminalisation needs to be understood as part of the wider process of 
racial regulation, subordinating non-Whites to inferior political, social, and economic 
positions within society; XQGHUPLQLQJ WKHLU YHU\ ³FDSDFLW\ IRU VHOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ´
(Glaser, 2010:301). This was codified through the Population Registration Act 1950 
which required all persons to be arbitrarily designated into racial categories based upon 
GHVFHQW DQG VNLQ SLJPHQWDWLRQ DV ZHOO DV ³WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK RQH
V KDLU ILQJHUQDLOV
lips, and other physical features incline towards caucasian or QHJURLG´ 'XJDUG
1972:63).5 In practice its arbitrary approach led to families becoming divided between 
Coloureds and Africans due to variations in the colour of their skin, leading to 
displacement, social exclusion, eviction, and forced unemployment (Brooks, 1968). 
Introducing the Bill the Minister of the Interior explained that it would enable better 
³GHWHFWLRQRIDQGWKHFRQWURORYHUFULPH´EXWWhe problem with this is that it meant the 
regulation and control of non-White communities, reflecting their wider informal 
criminalisation (S. African Parliament, 1950a). 
 
The third pivotal legislative change during this period was the Unlawful Organisations 
Act 1960 which explicitly banned the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). While the 
Government argued that this justified to ensure WKH ³PDLQWHQDQFH RI SXEOLF RUGHU´
(Unlawful Organisations Act, 1960) it embodied the complete criminalisation of the 
political identities associated with these groups ensuring WKDW ³>W@KH WUDQVLWLRQ IURP
semi-OHJDOLW\ WR LOOHJDOLW\ ZDV FRPSOHWH´  (Magubane et al., 2005:70). The language 
used again by the Minister of Justice announcing the Bill is illustrative of this referring 
WRWKHJURXSVDV³WHUURULVWV´ and ³DQDERPLQDWLRQ´ZKRDUHHQJDJLQJLQD³EDUEDULFDQG
PHUFLOHVV UHLJQ RI WHUURU´ 6 $IULFDQ 3DUOLDPHQW . Likewise, the Minister of 
%DQWX$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQWSODFHGWKHEODPHZLWK³WKDWJURXSRIDJLWDWRUV± 
and it is a small group ± [who@ZDQWWRKDYHWKHFRQWURORIWKHFRXQWU\LQWKHLUKDQGV´
(S. African Parliament, 1960). He later clarified this explaining:  
³>7@KHVH DJLWDWRUV DUH SOD\LQJ WKH GLDEROLFDO UROH RI LQFLWLQJ WKHVH SHRSOH WR
revolt and then they issue pious statements in which they say that they are not in 
IDYRXURIYLROHQFHEXWEHKLQG WKH VFHQHV WKH µVSRLOHUV¶ DQG VLPLODUSHRSOH DUH
encouraged WRFRPPLWYLROHQFH´6$IULFDQ3DUOLDPHQW 
                                                          
5 :KLOHUDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQSUHGDWHGWKLVODZWKLV%LOOZDVWKH³FRUQHUVWRQH´RIaSDUWKHLG¶VV\VWHPRI
racial discrimination (Dugard, 1978:60). 
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Once again the representation in the legislation and political discourse is centred on the 
illegitimacy of these groups, linking their political activities directly with the terms 
terrorism and barbarism and the threat to the South African state itself. The political 
goals and identity of these actors are marginalised and framed according to the threat 
that they pose to the state. 
 
A similar case is evident in Northern Ireland which was placed under emergency rule in 
1922 through the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (SPA). This took place in a 
heightened security context with the newly established Free State of Ireland emerging 
out of the civil war (Boyle, Hadden, and Hillyard, 1975; Donohue, 1998; McConville, 
2014). In the introduction to the Act its purpose is stated as being ³to take steps for 
preserving the peace and maintaining ordeU´ 6SHFLDO 3RZHUV $FW  <et it has 
subsequently been GHVFULEHG DV ³DQ DOPRVW SHUIHFW LQVWUXPHQW RI GLFWDWRUVKLS´
(McConville, 2014:87) because of the widespread powers it granted. Specifically, 
UHVWULFWLRQV LQFOXGHGPHDVXUHVEDQQLQJ³WKH IO\LQJ of the tricolour, the wearing of the 
Easter Lily, the circulation of newspapers, the printing of nationalist or republican 
documents, the erection of republican monuments, the singing of republican songs, and 
VSHFLILF RUJDQLVDWLRQV´ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKH H[WHnsive discretionary powers granted 
throughout this period (Donohue, 1998:1113). Republican activities normally 
considered to be political were criminalised to ensure the delegitimisation of these 
actors and their political agenda. For instance, in announcing this Bill before the House 
of Commons Robert Megaw MP, who was the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister 
of Home Affairs at this time, outlined the Bill's purpose as being to ³enable us to cope 
with the terrible conspiracy with which we are confronted DWSUHVHQW´8.3DUOLDPHQW
1922)DQGVLPLODUO\8OVWHU8QLRQLVW036DPXHO0F*XIILQUHIHUUHGWR³Whe widespread 
FKDUDFWHURIFULPHDQGRXWUDJH´UK Parliament, 1922). Initially used in the immediate 
aftermath of partition to address the security threat posed by militant republicanism 
(Donohue, 1998:1092) their continuation reflects an perpetual Unionist fear towards 
Irish republicanism DV DOWKRXJK µFrime¶ZDs the justifying language, the targets were 
the Republican symbols, ceremonies, and organisations even long after the initial 
militant threat de-escalated (Donohue, 1998).  
 
Through these laws republicanism and communism are clearly linked to disorder and 
criminality, whether explicitly or implicitly, to delegitimise the actors they represented. 
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The political discourse surrounding their introduction reflects these representations, 
OLQNLQJ WKH SROLWLFDO LGHQWLWLHV WR µFULPLQDO¶ WKUHDWV Yet their wider implications are 
interrelated with CPA, because although criminalised, identity may still be expressed. 
For example, while there were some restrictions placed on certain Republican events in 
Northern Ireland under the SPA (Donohue, 1998), these were primarily focussed on 
undermining their efficaciousness, rather than eradicating their identity. Indeed CPA 
was enforced primarily in relation to nationalists living in Protestant towns and 
communities, largely leaving Catholic rural and urban areas alone, effectively restricting 
these political symbols to their own communities (Ó Dochartaigh, 2013:127). This 
reflects the important role of criminalisation in responding to the fears of a particular 
communal group.  
 
Exceptions would possibly relate to the proscription of certain Republican organisations 
whereby the state criminalised specific actors for membership of an illegal organisation 
(Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011); however this was primarily directed primarily 
against those engaged in political violence, not non-violent political expression at least 
until the mid-1960s. Likewise, criminalisation was extended to more explicitly cover 
restrictions on parades, commemorations, flags, and emblems which may disrupt the 
peace through the Flags and Emblems (Display) Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (FEA) and 
the Public Order Acts (Northern Ireland) 1936, 1951. Together these laws prohibited 
tampering with or removing the British Union Jack, providing that any other flag may 
be removed if it threatened the peace, effectively restricting the flying of the Irish 
tricolour in certain areas, as well enabling the Home Secretary to ban parades which 
threatened the peace (Bryan, 2004). However the police appear to have initially 
enforced this law infrequently and the introduction of the FEA was primarily the result 
of divisions within unionism during the 1950s rather than in response to republicanism 
(Ó Dochartaigh, 2013; Patterson, 1999). That said, during the %LOO¶V second reading the 
Minister for Home Affairs justified the FEA explaining ³,t is directed solely to 
restraining the lawlessness of a few people who have endeavoured to ride roughshod 
over the cherished symbol RI 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG
V FDUHIXOO\ FKRVHQ ZD\ RI OLIH´ later 
referring to the Irish tricolour stating ³WKDW IODJ KDV QR VWDQGLQJ LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG´
(NIA, 1954). In other words, CPA was predominantly directed against political 
expression deemed threatening to unionism, and while the measures did not explicitly 
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ban republican political expression, it placed significant restrictions on it representing a 
wider informal criminalisation of their identity. 
 
The contrast however with South Africa is significant, for under the Unlawful 
Organisations Act 1960 all persons, whether a member of a banned organisation or not, 
ZHUHEDQQHGIURP³HQJDJLQJLQDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKPD\EHGHVLJQDWHGEURDGO\VSHDNLQJ
as activities which furWKHUWKHDLPVRIWKHXQODZIXORUJDQLVDWLRQ´0DWKHZV. 
Other contributing legislation included the Black (Native) Administration Act No38 
which prohibited the fomenting of racial hatred against Whites; the Riotous Assemblies 
(Amendment) Act No19 which prohibited the publication of material which incited 
racial hatred towards Europeans; the Criminal Law Amendment Act No.8 which made 
civil disobedience a criminal offence; the Riotous Assemblies Act No.17 which 
prohibited open-air public meetings if deemed to endanger public peace; and the Group 
Areas Act No 41 1950 which made it compulsory to live in the designated classification 
area.6 Essentially all forms of political activity deemed to be subversive by the state 
were proscribed meaning any communist or anti-state activity whether violent or not 
(Dugard, 1978; Mathews, 1972). The Minister of Justice, for instance, in introducing the 
Suppression of Communism Bill, H[SODLQHGWKDWWKHVWDWHQHHGHGWRWDNH³GUDVWLFDFWLRQ
and to apply more severe means to safeguard the security of the State and of the 
FLWL]HQV´ ODWHU JRLQJ RQ WR H[SODLQ ³,W KDV EHFRPH DEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\ WR RSSRVH
[Communism] DQG LI SRVVLEOH WR HUDGLFDWH LW´ (S. African Parliament, 1950b). In this 
case, therefore, CPA was designed to not only regulate or place restrictions on political 
DFWLYLW\DVZDVWKHFDVHLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGEXWWRµHUDGLFDWH¶LWDOWRJHWKHUThis reflects 
the link between CPI and CPA, whereby the representations of republicanism or 
communism as criminality enabled the state to justify expanded security boundaries 






                                                          
6




Constructing social realities and motivations for political violence 
 
Having explained what CPI and CPA refers to, it is necessary to understand what 
implications it may have for conflict transformation, because while it pertains to a 
particular legal framework as outlined above, it is the perceived reality that this creates 
which can have implications for actor motivations to engage in political violence. In 
RWKHUZRUGVFULPLQDOLVDWLRQQHHGVWRXQGHUVWRRG³DVDVRFLDOSUDFWLFH´ its implications 
GHSHQG RQ ³ZKR criminalisHV´ DQG ³RQ ZKDW DVVXPSWLRQV DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKDW
SURFHVVHV´ /DFH\  The above representations of republicanism and 
communism construct a particular social reality through political discourse and 
legislation whereby ³ODQJXDJH LVYLHZHGDVD VRFLDOSUDFWLFHDQGGLVFRXUVH LV VHHQDV
contributing to the construction of the social ZRUOG´%DUWROXFFLThe South 
African and Northern Ireland Governments used criminalisation to help facilitate the 
construction of a particular hegemonic discourse which reflected and shaped intergroup 
relations through the enforcement of these discourses. In this way theUHZDV³SROLFLQJRI
VWDWHPHQWV´ ZKHUHE\WKHVWDWHGHWHUPLQHG³ZKHUHDQGZKHQLWZDVQRWSRVVLEOHWRWDON
about such things...in which circumstances, among which speakers, and with which 
VRFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSV´)RXFDXOW  
 
Understanding the implications of this for political violence then requires analysing how 
it contributed towards a particular social reality EHFDXVH YLROHQFH LWVHOI DFWV ³as a 
reflection oIWKHXQGHUO\LQJVRFLDOUHDOLW\´ (Väyrynen , 1991:3) which is ± at least in part 
- constructed through criminalisation. Therefore, the implications of CPI and CPA for 
actor motivations to engage in political violence require considering the social 
conditions which generated them and those in which it was implemented (Bourdieu, 
1990:56, 1977).  Put differently, analysing the social reality of crime involves 
considering how CPI and CPA in the cases became implemented and how this was 
perceived by those subject to it. From this perspective three interrelated arguments can 
be identified which outline how criminalising non-violent political expression impacts 
upon actor motivations to engage in political violence (summarised in Table 6 and 
Figure 2): contributing to intergroup polarisation, collectivising repression, and 
increasing the associated costs of non-violent political action. It is through the 
combination of these three processes that CPI and CPA will shape actor motivations. 
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Table 8. Implications of criminalising non-violent political expression in Northern 













informally framed as 
µcriminal¶ 
expressions by some 
loyalist actors 
Enforcing CPI leads to a 
wider regulation of 
republicanism and 
nationalism creating a 
SHUFHLYHGµHQHP\¶LQWKH
form of  law 
enforcement 
Protests are framed 










state identities are 
framed as 
criminality, 
embedding a wider 
perception of the 
WKUHDWHQLQJµRWKHU¶ 
Repression perceived to 
be targeted against the 
identity of the liberation 
movement, not just 
individuals, providing a 
grievance and out-group 
to mobilise against 
Due to repression 
targeting the identity 
of actors, inaction 
becomes increasingly 
costly through pass 











perceived as repressive 





increasing due to 
informal CPA by 
policing and pro-




Policing practices are 
legitimised through 
the defining of the 
Communist threat 
The expansive 
boundaries of CPA 
facilitated practices of 
repression by law 
enforcement 
Increased repression 
of NVM reduces its 
strategic utility 
relative to political 
violence for some 
actors 
 
But how they operate in practice is complex because of the distinctions between formal 
and informal criminalisation. While both cases had relatively similar legal systems and 
laws governing political expression, their enforcement differed significantly, as did the 
way they were perceived. The case comparison is therefore important in deducing how 
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CPI and CPA can operate together across differing contexts. Table 8 summarises this 
displaying how the two targets of criminalisation map onto the cases. Therefore the 
second section of this chapter will explain how each of these factors develops, applying 
them to original and archival evidence from the two case studies. 
 
Polarised identities: victims or perpetrators 
 
Research on intergroup conflict has demonstrated the importance of polarised and 
conflictual identities in terms of how they can be used by political leaders to consolidate 
in-group hegemony through the collective threat of the out-group (Horowitz, 1985; 
Lake and Rothchild, 1996), and how a common identity and shared interests are 
essential characteristics for collection action (Tilly, 1978:84). Fears of the other, in this 
case, the criminalised, become used to consolidate group hegemony and securitise 
intergroup interactions. But as a political identity becomes associated with a narrative of 
criminality, the criminalised may begin to perceive the state's communal group as the 
repressive criminaliser (Mandela, 1994a). In contrast, this criminalisation contributes 
towards the state's communal group perceiving the criminalised as the perpetrators 
threatening the stability of the state and their identity (Brooks, 1968; Todd, 1987). In 
these ways identities are further reduced to one-dimensional characterisations masking 
the political beliefs and motivations of the other group and defining their own in 
oppositional terms. While WKHVHG\QDPLFVDUHRIWHQWKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRI³ORQJVWDQGLQJ
GLVWUXVW IHDU DQG SDUDQRLD´ /HGHUDFK  FULPLQDOLVLQJ SROLWLFDO H[SUHVVLRQ
embeds and normalises this fear.   
 
Because identities are framed in opposition to another group, any concessions to that 
group can be perceived ± or at least framed - as a threat to their own identity. In-group 
cohesion may become fragmented over those who may wish to moderate their relations 
with the out-group. In other words, the criminal label facilitates a more hard-line 
narrative through which to outbid the moderate centre, reforms aimed at improving 
intergroup relations can accordingly be framed as undermining intra-group power 
(Moore et al., 2014). For instance in Northern Ireland during the early 1960s, Ian 
Paisley and the movement he stood as the figurehead of, sought to undermine the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) leader O'Neill and his brand of liberal unionism (O'Callaghan and 
O'Donnell, 2006; Walker, 2004:158)SROLWLFDORYHUWXUHVPDGHE\2¶1HLOOLQWKHV
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were accordingly framed as undermining unionism and Protestantism; such as his 
meeting with the Irish President in 1965 which ZDV IUDPHG E\ 3DLVOH\ DV µWUHDVRQ¶
(Tonge et al., 2014:11). The framing of criminalisation is important here because 
Paisley frequently used such discourse to refer to nationalism and symbols of 
nationalism; such as referring to the Irish tricolour DV WKH ³PXUGHUHUV
 IODJ´ 7D\ORU
1999b:32) and to the Irish Taoiseach as a gunman and a murderer due to his former role 
in the IRA during Irish War of Independence (O'Callaghan and O'Donnell, 2006:211; 
Tonge et al., 2014). The movement sought to force the Stormont Government to halt 
any reforms aimed at appeasing the so-called criminal Nationalists, as the language of 
criminalisation was used to reduce the Nationalist out-group to a criminal identity. For 
example, Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) MP John Hume stated in the 
Assembly ³/LVWHQLQJ WR honourable Members opposite one would think that it [the 
SXUVXLWRI ,ULVKXQLW\@ZDVDFULPH´ NIA, 1969 quoted in McLoughlin, 2006:164). In 
this way the distinctions between militant Republicans and moderate Nationalists were 
ignored by certain Unionists who perceived the collective goal of a United Ireland as 
sufficient evidence of criminal intent. 
 
The implications were of great significance, however, in terms of destabilising the 
political context. For instance, DSROLFHUHSRUW IURPVWDWHG³>7@KHIDFW LV WKDWDQ
equal or even great threat is posed at present by extremist Protestant groups [than the 
,5$@´2
&DOODJKDQDQG O'Donnell, 2006:210). The development of a salient out-group 
threat in the form of Irish nationalism increased the perception of certain Loyalist 
groups that they needed to defend their identity, even if this meant engaging in political 
violence. For instance in 1966 the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) issued a proclamation 
VWDWLQJ³>:@HVROHPQO\ZDUQWKHDXWKRULWLHVWRPDNHQRPRUHVSHHFKHVRIDSSHDVHPHQW
We are heavily DUPHG 3URWHVWDQWV GHGLFDWHG WR WKLV FDXVH´ 4XRWHG LQ Mulvenna, 
2016:35).The speeches of appeasement referred to here relate to the policies being 
LQLWLDWHGE\WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU7HUUHQFH2¶1HLOODVWKHVHZHUH³SHUFHLYHGDVOLEHUDODQG
in many senses as thUHDWHQLQJ WR 3URWHVWDQWLVP DQG 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG LQ JHQHUDO´
2¶&DOODJKDQ DQG 2¶'RQQHOO  CPI was at least an expression, if not 
contributing factor, of these perceptions, framing concessions to Nationalists as threats 
to unionism. The significance of this is evident in how shortly after this proclamation 
the UVF was proscribed following the shooting of three Catholic civilians (NIA, 1966 
c777). Moreover, the UVF was later involved in the bombing of a power station in 
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1969, which was wrongly attributed to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and 
contributed to bringing down the O'Neill Government.  
 
Paisley's minority faction of unionism7 was however not alone in adopting the discourse 
of criminality in relation to nationalism, as such views were held also by some of those 
within the UUP leadership at this time. For example, the non-violent civil rights 
movement the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which was founded 
in 1967, was described by the Home Affairs Minister (1966-8) William Craig as a cover 
IRU WKH ,5$³>7KHFLYLO ULJKWVPDUFKHVZHUH@RUJDQLVHGHQWLUHO\E\ WKH ,5$LWZDVD
deliberate effort by the IRA to play a bigger part in the politics of Northern Ireland and 
WKH,ULVK5HSXEOLF´7D\ORUD6LPLODUO\8830HPEHURI3arliament John Taylor 
VWDWHG ³,W ZDV VHHQ DV D NationaliVW SORW WR RYHUWKURZ WKH VWDWH´ ,ELG 1,&5$ ZDV
considered a threat to the peace and order of Northern Ireland, an organisation which 
served only as a cover for criminals intent on political violence. Although it is clear that 
the IRA were represented and involved in NICRA and undoubtedly sought to 
manipulate it for its own ends, reducing the organisation to the IRA was reductive for 
failing to appreciate the many organisations involved and the genuine grievances they 
represented (Purdie, 1988; Taylor, 1999b:51).  
 
Because NICRA and the wider civil rights movement it was part of were considered as 
criminals intent on the overthrow of the Stormont Government, concessions granted by 
O'Neill were perceived by Unionists ± or at least framed by some Unionists - as 
acquiescing to criminality and a threat to their very identity (Patterson, 2008:508; 
Walker, 2004:163). This, in turn, contributed towards a dehumanisation; expressed in a 
more recent interview with the former Home Affairs Minister William Craig (1966-8), 
ZKR ZKHQ TXHVWLRQHG DERXW ³SROLFH EHDWLQJ GHPRQVWUDWRUV RYHU WKH KHDG´ responded 
VD\LQJ³7KH\ZHUHD IHZWKDWFDXJKW WKHDWWHQWLRQRI WKHPHGLD ,GLGQ
W VHHDQ\WKLQJ
ZURQJZLWKLW´7D\ORU9b:53).  Because the police represented law and order and 
because these protests were organised by at least some suspected criminals, such views 
followed. Viewing protesters as criminals rather than political actors securitised state 
responses which exacerbated tensions and failed to address the underlying socio-
                                                          
7
 It is not clear what link existed, if any, between Paisleyites and militant loyalism at this time. While 
Paisley consistently contested the existence of any formal link, a number of UVF ex-prisoners all pointed 
to the discourse of Paisley as a factor behind their mobilisation (Taylor, 1999a, 1999b). 
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economic concerns (Farrington, 2008:530). This, in turn, contributed towards the 
dehumanisation of the out-group, as an IRA ex-SULVRQHU UHIOHFWHG³>7@KH\ VHHQXVDV
criminal, as scum, or as filth aQGGLUW´,5$H[-prisoner A, 2016). As will be discussed, 
this dehumanisation and intergroup polarisation embedded identities, which when 
enforced through repression, became a collective grievance to mobilise around and an 
obstacle to non-violent alternatives. 
 
In South Africa, such polarisation took place again creating a sense of the criminal 
other. While intergroup polarisation cannot be solely attributed to CPI, this process at 
least embedded and legitimised it for some, particularly those within Afrikaner 
communities. For instance, there was a deep sense of fear and the need to defend the 
state against the threat of so-called criminality, such as that expressed by the Minister of 
-XVWLFH³7KHEDUEDULFDQGPHUFLOHVVUHLJQRIWHUURU>RIWKH$1&3$&VHeks] to bring 
WKH :KLWH *RYHUQPHQW RI 6RXWK $IULFD WR LWV NQHHVZKDW WKH\ ZDQW LV RXU FRXQWU\´
(SA Parliament, 1960). The in-group - WKHµWhite¶Government - is contrasted with the 
out-group ± WKH µEDUEDULF DQG PHUFLOHVV UHLJQ RI WHUURU¶ ± as intergroup relations are 
inherently tied up in the discourse of legitimacy and order. A memorandum of the state 
VHFXULW\FRXQFLO LOOXVWUDWHV WKLVVWDWLQJ³Where it is not practically possible to refer to 
VSHFLILF FRPPRQ ODZ FULPHV GHVFULSWLRQV VXFK DV µULRWHUV¶ µER\FRWWHUV¶ µSURWHVWHUV¶
should rather be avoided and replaced where applicable with descriptions such as: 
KRROLJDQVYDQGDOV WKXJV´ 6WDWH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO0HPRUDQGXP(YHQ WKRXJK
this is from a later period it still reveals the fundamental importance of the criminal 
paradigm. The state was deliberately avoiding political terms which could potentially 
legitimise the out-group, instead using language associated with the criminalised 
identity. So CPI at least provided a framework through which intergroup polarisation 
could become embedded. For example, the White anti-apartheid activist Bernard 
*RVVFKDON UHIHUUHG WR WKH ³FOLPDWH RI WHUURU ZKLFK WKH JRYHUQPHQW LQWURGXFHG DQG
LQGXFHGLQ WKH ZKLWH FRPPXQLW\´ WKURXJK LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKHVH PHDVXUHV *RVVFKDlk, 
1995). 
 
Moreover the wider implications of this are important, because the state narrative was 
part of the wider process of regulation; a SURFHVV ZKLFK HVWDEOLVKHG WKH ³factors of 
segregation and social hierarchization...guaranteeing relations of domination and effects 
RIKHJHPRQ\´ (Foucault, 1976:141). For example, former serviceman Anthony Turton 
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referred to being socialised into such attitudes and how this isolated groups from each 
other ³>6@RFLHW\ ZDV WUDLQLQJ XV EULQJLQJ XV XS WR HYHQWXDOO\ VHUYH VRFLHW\¶V
SXUSRVHVWR ILJKW IRU D FDXVH WKDW ZH GLGQ¶W XQGHUVWDQG´ 7XUWRQ  7KH
implementation of criminalisation had contributed towards the wider socialisation and 
regulation of society in such a way that those on the µother side¶ were framed and 
understood only in terms of the state narrative, dehumanising them and reducing them 
to criminals. Mike Huxtable, an Afrikaner who used to work in Military Intelligence, 
H[SODLQHG³><@RXOLVWHQWRZKDWWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKHGD\VD\VDQGWKDW¶VMXVWLW7KHUH¶V
QR RSWLRQ RI TXHVWLRQLQJ LW´ +X[WDEOH  7KH DXWKRULW\ RI WKH VWate, and its 
representation of communism, was accordingly regarded as legitimate and unquestioned 
by such individuals, or at least this is how they have framed it. A former Officer in the 
National Intelligence Service, Steve Smit, similarly referred to his socialisation and 
XSEULQJLQJDVEHLQJFUXFLDO LQZK\KHMRLQHGWKHVWDWHVHUYLFHV³,JUHZXSLQDKRXVH
where I could have quite easily have justified being a racist...I grew up in that 
HQYLURQPHQWVRWKHZKROHWKLQJRIGLVFLSOLQHDQGODZHQIRUFHPHQWZDVSDUWRIP\OLIH´
(Smit, 2007). As there is likely an element of self-legitimisation it is unclear to what 
extend criminalisation itself determined such attitudes and practices directly, but it at 
least reflected and embedded them due to the wider social acceptance of the legitimacy 
of legal system within Afrikaner communities. 
 
On the other hand, a counter-narrative of state criminality often develops in opposition 
to the state, embedding a sense of victimhood, such as that expressed by a Republican 
FRPPXQLW\ ZRUNHU ZKR VWDWHG ³>7KH 6SHFLDO 3RZHUV $FW ZDV@ used mainly against 
SHRSOH ZKR ZRXOG KDYH FRPH IURP D QDWLRQDOLVWFDWKROLFUHSXEOLFDQ EDFNJURXQG´ DQG
WKDW³ZLWKLQWKDWSHULRGRIWLPHWKHODZVKDGEHHQVHWXSWRVXLWWKHVWDWH´&RPPXQLW\
Worker B, 2016). Also, the Republican publication An Phoblacht [Republican News] 
UHIHUVUHSHDWHGO\WRWKH63$DVUHSUHVVLYHDQGXQMXVWRQHH[WUDFWVWDWHG³,WVSXUSRVHLV
to suspend all freedom and create a police state in which the Government is allowed to 
VXSSUHVVDOOFLYLOOLEHUWLHV´$Q3KREODFKW This was likewise the case in South 
Africa, as the PAC publication Africanist expressed the view of  being ³FULPLQDOO\
oppressed, ruWKOHVVO\ H[SORLWHG DQG LQKXPDQO\ GHJUDGHG´ $IULFDQLVW  DQG
earlier stating: ³They all aim at creating a feeling of insecurity among the oppressed and 
thus making them a docile labour force which accepts resignedly its inferior status´




KLV OLIH´Mandela, 1994a:109). An uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) ex-prisoner echoed this 
VWDWLQJ ³>$partheid] was declared a crime against humanity and these people were 
GHIHQGLQJZKDWKDVEHHQGHFODUHGDFULPH6R,ZDVILJKWLQJDJDLQVWDFULPH´0.H[-
prisoner A, 2016). Resisting criminalisation itself became an essential component of 
these movements by attempting to use the state's own narrative against itself (Mandela, 
1994a; McEvoy, 2000). Therefore, the relationship between groups became framed and 
subject to the criminal narrative, whether through the state discourse or the counter-
narrative of resistance.  
 
These cases demonstrate the implications which criminalising a political identity can 
have, as the state's communal group defines itself in opposition to that of the so-called 
criminals and as defenders against criminality, embedding incompatible and conflicting 
narratives. In practice, this can result in any attempts at reform being perceived as 
acquiescing to criminality itself and to be resisted (O'Callaghan and O'Donnell, 2006). 
On the other hand, when mobilised, the criminalised will seek to overturn and counter 
such criminalisation, bringing them into conflict with the state and the state's supporters. 
The outworking of this then is closely related to the second process of collectivising 
repression, because by linking a political identity to criminality it collectivises it to that 





Criminalising political expression collectivises an offence, so that all those who hold a 
particular belief or identify with a criminalised political identity are regarded as 
criminals regardless of whether they engaged - or plan to engage - in any form of 
proscribed activity. For example, expressions of republicanism/loyalism, communism, 
or African nationalism become criminal expressions even if they are never formally 
acted upon. This matters for actor motivation because this collectivisation becomes 
realised through law enforcement, meaning the police become the criminalisers of a 
particular political identity (Brewer, 1994; Ellison and Smyth., 2000; Hornberger, 
2011). Frequently used to justify security powers, this suppression of an identity can 
easily become the repression of a community, or at least perceived as such. It is because 
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of the legitimacy that law holds which makes it particularly appealing to states, 
differentiating it from violent repression - though the two can obviously coexist. But 
this chapter is adding an extra layer to this argument to say it is not necessarily the 
presence of state repression alone that encourages actors to engage in political violence, 
but the perception that it is being targeted against their community, and in direct 
response to non-violent political expression. 
 
The alternative to collectivised repression is not necessarily individualised forms, but it 
is a generalised form of repression. In contrast to being directed against a political 
identity, it is either indiscriminate, undirected, or undefined in terms of its target. This is 
the case when political identities are not salient in terms of non-violent movements or 
are deemed irrelevant to the movement's objectives. In contrast, collectivised repression 
has a legislated target through the criminalisation of political identity. What constitutes 
an act of state repression is itself theoretically problematic as different forms can have 
very different outcomes (Davenport, 2007). Yet there is important evidence that 
repression may increase the likelihood of some non-violent actors transitioning into 
political violence (Lichbach, 1987; Mason, 1989). For example, White and White 
(1995:332) distinguish between legitimate repression - state sanctioned - and 
illegitimate repression - informal and spontaneous - but these distinctions often break 
down when applied, because the legitimate or legalised repression may provide an 
informal legitimacy to the so-called illegitimate repression. The documented evidence 
of state collusion in both cases with pro-state armed groups is illustrative of this (Ellis, 
1998; McGovern, 2015). Indeed, when considered at the level of perceptions these 
categorisations become problematic as they represent the interaction between the formal 
and informal, the legal framework and its implementation. In other words, because 
collectivised repression is not necessarily based on the type of repression, but its 
interpretation by those who identify as the repressed, it regards repression as a 
perceptual reality. Therefore this chapter is concerned only with a specific form of 
repression, whereby actors must perceive repression to be directed against their identity, 
because this then can become a collective grievance to mobilise around. 
 
In Northern Ireland the powers of the SPA have been argued as being used primarily 
³IRUWKHVXSSUHVVLRQRIQDWLRQDOLVWGLVVHQW´(OOLVRQDQG6P\WK. For example, 
the police¶V UROH LQ FKDUJLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV PHDQW WKDW &DWKROLFV ZHUH W\SLFDOO\ FKDUJHG
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with more serious offences than Protestants (Boyle, Hadden, and Hillyard, 1975), 
because when these laws were applied to UnioniVWVLW³ZDVRIWHQWHPSHUHGE\GLVFUHWLRQ
and political consideraWLRQV´ %XFNODQG  )XUWKHUPRUH, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) submitted regular reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs 
documenting the proceedings of Nationalist meetings which had not been banned 
(Donohue, 1998:1100); demonstrating a level of surveillance of moderate nationalism. 
It is this day-to-day surveillance and monitoring that Professor Walsh highlighted when 
interviewed H[SODLQLQJ³7KHPLQRULW\FRPPXQLW\ZHUHHIIHFWLYHO\VXEMXJDWHGWKURXJK
de facto criminalisation as paUWRIWKHPHFKDQLVPVRIFRQWURO´:DOVKTherefore, 
CPI resulted in law enforcement being directed against the identity of Nationalists 
monitoring and regulating their political activities. While the extent of such Nationalist 
discrimination is contested, a 1968 survey reported that 74% of Catholics perceived that 
Catholics in Northern Ireland were treated unfairly (Rose, 1971:272). Moreover during 
1922- ³PRUH WKDQ QLQHW\ PHHWLQJV DVVHPEOLHV DQG SURFHVVLRQV LQ WKH SURYLQFH´
were banned, the vast majority being Republican (Donohue, 1998:1093); whereas 
anecdotally, when trying the cases of Protestants who had attacked a Catholic 
processions on their way to the International Eucharistic Congress in Dublin in 1932, 
Magistrates predominantly granted bail rather than prison sentences because the latter 
would have negative political repercussions (Buckland, 1979:219-220). In other words, 
CPI contributed towards a wider politicisation of law enforcement, whereby political 
opposition to the state was regulated through the powers granted to the police. This is 
not to say CPI led to politicisation, but that it will have enabled, and at the very least 
given expression to it. 
 
Moreover, as the political identity of nationalism and republicanism were criminalised it 
followed that in its enforcement, so too would be Nationalist and Republican 
communities. For example an IRA ex-prisoner explained ³, SHUFHLYHG D SDUWLFXODU
sector of society as beiQJ RSSUHVVHG´ ,5$ H[-prisoner B, 2016). Not only did this 
individual link law enforcement with repression, but that they perceived this repression 
as being targeted against their identity and community (Shirlow, Tonge and McAuley, 
2008). Indeed another IRA ex-prisoner explained:  
³><@RX VWDUW WR TXHVWLRQ DQG ZRQGHU ZK\ , am living like this. What am I 
growing up in a community like this for?....Why are they treating my parents, 
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and my grandparents, and my community differently than the way they treat 
their RZQSHRSOH"´,5$H[-prisoner A, 2016)  
As perceptions of repression being targeted against a community develop, these 
individuals argue that they then started to question the whether they could do anything 
about it.  
 
These perceptions of repression being directed against an identity are then exacerbated 
by the communal composition of law enforcement. For instance in Northern Ireland the 
RUC was almost completely Protestant (Ellison and Smyth, 2000), and augmenting the 
RUC role were the auxiliary force - Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) - who were 
FRQVLGHUHG ³QRWRULRXVO\ anti-&DWKROLF´ :HLW]HU  Indeed the Republican 
publication An Phoblacht UHIHUV WR ³WKH EUXWDO YLROHQFH RI WKH RIILFLDO DJHQWV RI WKH
6WRUPRQW UHJLPH´ LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH ³SHDFH DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH &LYLO 5LJKWV PRYHPHQW´ 
(An Phoblacht, 1970). The perception of state repression was therefore connected to the 
WHUP ³6WRUPRQW UHJLPH´ DV DQ ,5$ H[-SULVRQHU OLNHZLVH UHIHUUHG WR WKH ³6WRUPRQW
*RYHUQPHQW´ DV ³WKH PDLQ RSSUHVVRUV´ ,5$ H[-prisoner B, 2016). Therefore, CPI 
contributed towards the perception that repression was being both targeted against their 
identity, but also perpetrated by the out-group. 
 
Furthermore, the perception of the courts and judiciary within certain Nationalist and 
Republican communities was that ³they were part and parcel of the Unionist power 
VWUXFWXUHDQGWKHUHIRUHXQOLNHO\WRXSKROGDQ\VHULRXVFKDOOHQJHWRWKHUHJLPH´Boyle, 
Hadden, and Hillyard, 1975:12). This was because many judges in the judiciary were 
from Unionist backgrounds, often with close ties to the Stormont regime, reinforcing 
WKHSHUFHSWLRQRISROLWLFDOFRQWURO0RUHRYHULQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG³FDVHVZHUHGHDOWZLWK
on the basis of very precise and often highly technical points rather than the broad 
LVVXHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH GLVSXWH´ HQDEOLQJ MXGJHV WR ³VLGHVWHS WKH PDLQ LVVXHV´ Boyle, 
Hadden, and Hillyard, 1975:23). While this raises a wider question of the role of the 
judiciary in a conflict, its significance here is how it reinforced the power of the status 
quo, embedding the narrative of criminality which was contributing towards intergroup 
polarisation. 7KH OHJDO FXOWXUH LWVHOI ZDV ³SHUPHDWHG E\ V\PEROV RI H[DJJHUDWHG
%ULWLVKQHVV´WKURXJKYDULRXVSURPLQHQWGLVSOD\VUDQJLQJIURPWKHIO\LQJRIWKH8QLRQ
)ODJ DW FRXUWV WR GHFODULQJ ³µ*RG 6DYH WKH 4XHHQ¶ ZKHQ D MXGJH HQWHUHG WKH FRXUW´
(McEvoy, 2011:380-1). This reinforces the perception that law enforcement is targeted 
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against the criminalised identity, as it is those in the out-group who are perceived as the 
repressors, embedding the intergroup polarisation discussed above. 
 
Not only was political identity criminalised in South Africa, but so too was political 
activities, and whereas the enforcement in Northern Ireland held some credibility even 
in Nationalist communities in the early 1960s (Prince, 2012), in South Africa law 
HQIRUFHPHQW  ZDV KLJKO\ SROLWLFLVHG DQG FRPSOLFLW LQ ³WKH PRQLWRULQJ FRQWURO DQG
regulation of race relations, specifically Black South Africans, [which] remained a 
necessity in order for political power and economic wealth to continue as the preserve 
of WKH:KLWHV´%UHZHU,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHVWDWHXWLOLVHGDFRPSOH[V\VWHPRI
social control based on racial classifications and enforced by law enforcement as a 
PHDQV RI FRQVROLGDWLQJ WKH SRZHU RI :KLWHV ³3DVV ODZV like other comprehensive 
regulatory schemes) constantly criminalize everyone, subjecting them to autocratic 
ZKLP DQG SRZHU´ $EHO  The extensiveness of this is witnessed by the 
dramatic increase in the number of prosecutions during this period as in 1948 214,000 
Africans ZHUHSURVHFXWHG³for curfew, passbook, aQG
QDWLYHSDVVODZ
YLRODWLRQV´ rising 
to 418,000 in 1959 (Greenberg, 1987:42). Freedom of movement and expression were 
severely restricted and enforced then through violence³)RVWHULQJIHDURIWKHSROLFHZDs 
VHHQDVWKHHDVLHVWZD\WRLPSRVHUHJXODWLRQVRQFLYLOLDQV´+RUQEHUJHU)RU
instance, a community practitioner with The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ LQ 6RXWK $IULFD H[SODLQHG ³>7KH 6$3@ UHOLHG QRW RQ HYLGHQFH EXW RQ
confession, and these confessions came out because people were forced to confess 
WKURXJKWRUWXUH´(Community Practitioner, 2016). By having a broader remit in terms of 
criminalisation, law enforcement was granted correspondingly wider powers in terms of 
its enforcement. The distinction between CPI and CPA is therefore important in terms 
of the implications of collectivising repression, with CPA enabling much greater powers 
and corresponding law enforcement practices. 
 
Evidence of such police brutality and repression has been well documented (Brooks, 
1968; Mandela, 1994a; TRC Report 5, 1998), but again it was its targeted nature against 
a political identity which was important for actor motivation to engage in political 
violence. For example Sipho Binda, who was an MK ex-SULVRQHUH[SODLQHG³>7@hose 
were the days of repression, harsh repression, I must say. I remember at home we were 
QRW HYHQ DOORZHG WR VLQJ 1NRVL VLNHOHOD RXU QDWLRQDO DQWKHP´ (Binda, 1993). The 
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repression of the state is linked directly here with the expression of political identity. In 
this way repression framed what would be considered legitimate political identity and 
led to normalising practices even within these communities as Sipho goes on to explain: 
³:KHQ\RXGRWKDW>VLQJWKHDQWKHP@your mother will shout you down, you know, and 
give you a spank for doing that, saying that you'll call the police. The walls have ears 
DQGVRRQ´%LQGD However on the other hand this repression also contributed 
towards the perception of state illegitimacy relative to that of the liberation movement 
as ex-political prisoner in South Africa explained³>7KH@VWDWHZDVLOOHJLWLPDWH,WZDV
using violent means to oppress and suppress, and what we were doing was a just cause. 
[Political violence] was a GHIHQVLYHUHVSRQVHWRVWDWHYLROHQFH´6outh African political 
ex-prisoner, 2016). The language used here attributes the illegitimacy of the state to the 
repressive actions carried out by law enforcement, but does so by contrasting this 
violence with the ³MXVWFDXVH´RIWKHOLEHUDWLRQIRUFHV In this way, political violence was 
argued to have become the only effective way of defending their identity. An MK ex-
prisoner similarly argued ³:HKDGQRRWKHU DYHQXH WR H[SUHVVRXU IHHOLQJV VR WKDW LV
why there waV WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI WKHVH RUJDQLVDWLRQV´ 0. H[-prisoner A, 2016). By 
repressing their identity this instilled in the criminalised a collective grievance to 
mobilise around.  
 
By linking repression to the criminalisation of an identity the state embeds a sense of 
collective victimisation as law enforcement becomes synonymous with the suppressing 
or defeat of this identity. In both cases this was evident, albeit to varying extents, as the 
police were used as an extension of the state's communal group to uphold their 
hegemonic position. This provides the criminalised with a highly salient issue 
contributing towards actor motivation to engage in political violence, as actors seek to 
resist the repression of their group identity, not simply their own. Despite intergroup 
polarisation and the collectivisation of repression, the question remains of why actors 
would take on the high risks associated with political violence as opposed to the 
alternative of non-violent political action. This is where the final process is crucial as it 








Costs of non-violent collective action 
 
Non-violent movement literature emphasises the importance of social networks for 
mobilisation in terms of trust, communication, and resources (Butcher and Svensson, 
2016; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). CPA raises the costs 
which these networks have to mobilise, whereby political communication may be 
restrained or completely proscribed, political demonstrations may lead to mass arrests 
and criminal charges, funding sources will become harder to secure domestically, and 
external support may diminish depending on the effectiveness of that state's criminal 
narrative (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978:100). Together these issues will compound the 
collective action problem as individuals will be increasingly less likely to mobilise in 
the face of increased costs (Butcher and Svensson, 2016; Tarrow, 1998). By 
criminalising political activity the costs associated with non-violent mobilisation will 
reduce the numbers willing to participate, and because movements require mass 
participation to be effective, this criminalisation can contribute towards their overall 
decline (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). Furthermore, those who are engaging in 
peaceful activities often find themselves marginalised as its efficaciousness is eroded, 
whether formally through the laws, or informally in how they are enforced. Indeed the 
informal practices of CPA are of great importance because while certain forms of 
political activity will be proscribed, they may be enforced only in relation to one 
communal group. For CPI the formal process will signify a wider message of political 
illegitimacy domestically and internationally, though the salience of this message will 
depend on its informal implementation and reception. Together CPI and CPA, therefore, 
have important implications undermining the efficaciousness of NVMs. 
 
However, the collective action problem is often overcome because while engaging in 
political action can be costly, so too can inaction (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). While 
formal CPA will target groups and particular forms of expression, the implementation 
of this in law enforcement often means communities will be criminalised whether 
politically mobilised or not, as outlined above in relation to collectivised repression. So 
as there is a decline in non-violent mobilisation, other actors will perceive that the 
increased cost of non-violence means it is no longer effective, and see political violence 
as preferable to achieve their objectives. Now, this is not to say violent or non-violent 
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action is more or less effective, but that criminalising non-violent action through CPI 
and CPA results in some actors perceiving the increased costs as a motivation to make 
the transition into collective political violence. 
 
This was particularly evident in South Africa where the extensiveness of CPA and CPI 
effectively proscribed all forms of potentially destabilising non-violent political 
activities. As the previous sections have outlined, this created a collective grievance and 
defined out-group to mobilise against. But the decision to mobilise through violence 
appears to have ultimately come done to a number of factors directly related to the costs 
of NVM and the other factors outlined above. For instance Joe Matthews from the ANC 
explained how there was a growing realisation after the non-violent Defiance Campaign 
in 1952 that non-vLROHQFH ZDV QR ORQJHU HIIHFWLYH EHFDXVH ³WKHre was a steady 
illegalisation RI RXU DFWLYLWLHV VWHS E\ VWHS DQG WKH SHQDOWLHV ZHUH KLJK´ 0DWWKHZV
1994). ANC Chairperson at the time, $OIUHG 1]R OLNHZLVH UHPDUNHG ³,W ZDV DW WKDW
point that it became clear that...the era of peaceful struggle had comHWRDFORVH´1]R
1994). Oliver Tambo also referred to this criminalisation necessitating the move from 
non-vLROHQW PRELOLVDWLRQ WR SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH VD\LQJ ³>7@KH DUPHG VWUXJJOH ZDV
LPSRVHGXSRQXVE\WKHYLROHQFHRIWKHDSDUWKHLGUHJLPH´Mandela, 1994a:618).8 Such 
views were also held by those who later joined the MK (Orkin, 1992), and were shared 
by members of the PAC; as PAC veteran Vuyani Mgaza H[SODLQHG³>:@HGLGQRWVHH
any other way of fighting except to use the very weapons they were using agDLQVWXV´
0DDED/LNHZLVH3$&OHDGHU5REHUW6REXNZHVWDWHG³:HGLGQ
WKDYHDQ\
faith in non-violence because the penalties had become too high. It was no longer a 
XVHIXO WHFKQLTXH´ 6REHNZH  7KH DVVRFLDWHG FRVWV RI non-violent collective 
action were perceived as too high, in comparison to the alternative of collective political 
violence. Not only were actors prohibited from meeting, communicating, and resourcing 
their political activities, but the penalties for doing so meant many key activists were 
facing long prison sentences, exile, and violence (Lissoni, 2009; Mandela, 1994a).  
 
These arguments are also linked to the previous points regarding collectivised 
repression, as the Walter Sisulu of the ANC/MK H[SODLQHG ³>7@KH UHJLPH ZDV
becoming desperate in its effort to suppress the movement. And that [was] why there 
                                                          
8
 Mandela here is referring to Oliver Tambo saying this at the time of the bombing of the Koeberg nuclear 
power plant in December 1982. 
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ZDV QR GLIILFXOW\ GHFLGLQJ WKDW QRZ OHW¶V WDNH XS DUPV´ 6LVXOX  +HUH 6LVXOX
directly links the repression of the state with the decision to make the transition into 
political violence, but does so linking it also to the costs of non-violence. Indeed he 
VWDWHV WKLV H[SOLFLWO\ ODWHU LQ WKH LQWHUYLHZ ³>7@KH DUJXPHQWV RI SHDFHIXO VWUXJJOH
ZDV>VLF@QRORQJHUUHDOO\VXLWDEOH´6LVXOX,QRWKHUZRUGVLWZDVQRWRQO\that he 
perceived non-violence as ineffective, but also that it was costly due to repression. 
Therefore LWZDVRQO\ DIWHU³WKHJRYHUQPHQWXQGHUWRRN WRGHVWUR\ WKHP´ that political 
violence really became perceived as strategically necessary for the main leaders of the 
MK and SACP (Landau, 2012:562).9 Moreover, it was the UHSUHVVLRQ RI ³WKH
PRYHPHQW´ UHLQIRUFLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI FROOHFWLYLVHG UHSUHVVLRQ and informal 
criminalisation. Similarly, Rusty Bernstein who was a former member of the SACP 
referred to the policing of protests in 1960 as a central mobilising factor, expressing the 
point that cost of inaction can also act as a moELOLVLQJIDFWRUDVLW³VWDUWHGSHRSOHVD\LQJ
ZHOOORRNZHFDQ¶WFDUU\RQIRUHYHULQWKLVZD\XVLQJXQDUPHGSHRSOHDJDLQVWDQDUmed 
SROLFH´%HUQVWHLQ In this way, criminalising political activity was of significant 
importance to these actors both in terms of directing law enforcement against their 
identity, as well as reducing the strategy effectiveness of non-violent political activities 
through its implementation.  
 
In Northern Ireland the transition into collective political violence was dissimilar, as 
although the IRA were involved in the civil rights campaign (Purdie, 1989), it was 
predominantly perceived as secondary to political violence (McEvoy, 2000:545). A 
police report from 1966, for instance, UHIHUUHGWRWKH,5$DVEHLQJ³UHDG\WRVHL]HDQ\
RSSRUWXQLW\WRGLVWXUEWKHSHDFH´2
&DOODJKDQDQG O'Donnell, 2006:210), and so when 
non-violent collective action was met with violence, this was reciprocated, escalating 
into collective political violence. For example, one IRA ex-SULVRQHU H[SODLQHG ³7KH
state...reacted with violence. They could not countenance this idea of people taking to 
the streets and...they attacked with YHQRPWKHSHDFHIXOSURWHVWHUV´ later going on to say 
KRZ³WKDWWKHQGUDZVLWVRZQUHDFWLRQIURPWKRVHSHRSOH´ alluding to political violence 
(IRA ex-prisoner C, 2016). The ineffectiveness of non-violence is implied, but it is the 
enforcement of criminalisation rather than the laws themselves, which are pointed to as 
                                                          
9
 There is no exact point necessarily of when violence suddenly outweighed nonviolence just that, as state 
repression intensified over this period, the calls for political violence became more frequent and 
persuasive due to the reasons outlined. 
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the crucial mobilising factor for responding with political violence. Another IRA ex-
SULVRQHUUHLQIRUFHGWKLVVWDWLQJ³>7@KDWZDVWKHJRDOWKHUHPRYDORIWKH%ULWLVK$UP\
All the stuff around the Special Powers Act...[they] were the issues that propped up 
what they were doing, what they were aOORZHGWRGR´,5$H[-prisoner D, 2016), and 
another IRA ex-SULVRQHUVXFFLQFWO\H[SODLQHG³:KHWKHULWZDVWKH(PHUJHQF\3RZHUV
Act or Special Powers $FW ZKR JDYH D WRVV" ,W
V WKHP´ ,5$ H[-prisoner B, 2016). 
While such views cannot necessarily be generalised to broader communities, they are 
indicative of a least a cross-section of the population who chose to take up arms. Indeed 
the reference to the British Army (who did not arrive until August 1969) illustrates how 
the response to the civil rights movement was secondary to the later actions by army, 
paramilitaries, and police personnel in the early 70s. 
 
This also relates to the assumption outlined at the beginning that criminalisation needs 
to be perceived as a response to non-violent collective action, and in this case, 
criminalisation itself long preceded non-violent mobilisation, which may explain why it 
is not particularly relevant. Instead, criminalisation's enforcement ± the perception of 
collectivised repression ± in response to non-violent action was directly linked to 
mobilisation by these IRA ex-prisoners. Therefore, although there was no formal CPA 
as was the case in South Africa ± at least not to the same extend ± the perception 
articulated by these IRA ex-prisoners was that it still was informally implemented.  
 
This is reinforced by accounts from Loyalist ex-prisoners, who while generally not 
involved in civil rights marches, pointed to the ineffectiveness of the state in protecting 
their identity. Again it was not the ineffectiveness of non-violent political expression 
which mobilised them, but the perception that non-violence was not an option against 
the perceived threat of violence. For instance, one UVF ex-SULVRQHU H[SODLQHG ³,
believed my community, my culture, my way of life was under attack and the powers 
that be who were charged with the responsibility of protecting my community, for 
ZKDWHYHU UHDVRQV ZHUH IDLOLQJ WR GR LW´ 89) H[-prisoner B, 2016). The UVF 
publication Combat similarly cited a UVF member explaining his motivation derived 
from this belief in being a defender of his community ³:H DLPHG DW GHIHQGLQJ RXU
DUHDVIURPWKHWKUHDWRIRUJDQLVHGDWWDFNE\WKH,5$´&RPEDW977). Political violence 
was perceived to be the most effective, indeed the only option, by many who engaged in 
it. Non-violence from this perspective was made redundant not by criminalisation, but 
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by the transition to violence by the other side. The UVF ex-prisoner Billy Mitchell 
H[SODLQHGWKLVVWDWLQJ³:HGLGQ
WJRWREHGRQHQLJKWDVRUGLQDU\IDPLO\PHQDQGZDNH
up the next morning as killers. Conditions were created in this country whereby people 
GLG WKLQJV WKH\ VKRXOGQ
W KDYH GRQH´ 4XRWHG LQ 7D\ORU 1999b:46). These statements 
are also undoubtedly attempts to justify their position in terms of acting out of defense, 
and so their validity must be qualified as such. Therefore, to say that these individuals 
chose political violence as an alternative to non-violent mobilisation was at most a 
minority position. It was not the increased costs associated with non-violent political 
expression which provided the motivation, but perceptions of threat which were firmly 
rooted in polarised identities. Indeed, the British Government did grant certain 
concessions to Nationalists (Patterson, 2008), but the problem was in how these were 
perceived by Unionist/Loyalist actors and Republicans. Republicans regarded these as 
too little too late, whereas certain Unionist and Loyalist actors perceived them as a 
threat to their own position and identity.  
 
The contrast between these cases is instructive then as the distinctions suggest that it is 
the combination of formal and informal CPA and CPI which will have a significant 
impact on non-violent movements. This would explain why in South Africa many of the 
leaders who formed armed political groups all pointed to criminalisation specifically as 
one of the integral reasons behind their decision to form these groups, whereas in 
Northern Ireland, because non-violent political activities were still legal, formal CPA 
was less important, although informally CPA was significant because of the perceptions 
of collectivised repression and politicised law enforcement. This is because these 
findings are also dependent upon the other two processes, as motivations to engage in 





This chapter contributes to the literature on conflict analysis by challenging the 
prevailing assumption of crime DV ³WDNHQ-for-JUDQWHG FRQVWUXFW´ &RKHQ 
arguing that the process of criminalisation is itself a crucial process impacting actor 
motivation to engage in political violence. Specifically, criminalising political 
expression can potentially affect actor motivation to engage in political violence ± 
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undermining conflict transformation - for three inter-related reasons: (1) by contributing 
towards intergroup polarisation; (2) collectivising repression; and (3) raising the costs 
associated with non-violent collective action. By applying the theoretical typology of 
political expression developed in chapter one, distinguishing between CPI and CPA, the 
chapter explained how these contribute towards different state responses, albeit 
interlinked, varying in their target and implementation. These are summarised in Table 
8, displaying the how the three arguments map onto CPI and CPA across the two cases.  
 
When YLROHQFH LV XQGHUVWRRG ³as a reflection oI WKH XQGHUO\LQJ VRFLDO UHDOLW\´ 
(Väyrynen, 1991:3) CPI has important implications for this by regulating and 
embedding conflicting intergroup identities. State actors and the state's communal group 
frame each other as criminal, thereby securitising their political objectives as a threat to 
their own position and identity. In response, the criminalised developed a counter-
narrative of state criminality regarding the state's communal group in like terms. In 
practice, this contributed towards a wider dehumanisation of the out-group and meant 
any attempts to address the political concerns of the non-state group could be framed as 
acquiescing to criminality limiting options for peaceful conflict resolution. In South 
Africa ± and to a lesser extent in Northern Ireland ± this was used to legitimise widened 
VHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVWRGHIHQGDJDLQVWWKHGHILQHGµFULPLQDO¶WKUHDW. 
 
Building on this, because criminalisation targets an identity its enforcement involves the 
suppression of that identity, embedding perceptions of state repression. But instead of 
repression being generalised across the population, it is perceived as being targeted 
against a specific group, contributing towards an embedding of the 'us and them' 
characterisation, and creating a tangible enemy in the form of law enforcement. This 
collectivised repression creates a shared sense of victimhood instilling in some a 
collective grievance around which to mobilise. The criminalising of political identity, 
therefore, can provide certain conditions which may increase the likelihood of actors 
engaging in political violence. Therefore the importance of collectivised repression 
depends on CPA because this determines what the legal boundaries are governing law 
enforcement. This is illustrated by the comparison between the cases as in South Africa 
the extensiveness of CPA corresponded with a much more repressive system of law 
enforcement in contrast to that of Northern Ireland. However, in Northern Ireland 
collectivised repression still applied, because while formal CPA was considerably less 
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pervasive, there was a perception within certain Republican communities that their 
ability to express political grievances was being undermined through the informal 
practices of law enforcement and non-state actors. But understanding why actors pursue 
political violence as opposed to non-violent alternatives relates to the final aspect of 
criminalisation: the criminalising of political activities. 
 
Criminalising political activities itself represents a form of state repression, and will 
accordingly embody a collective grievance to mobilise around. But it also has a 
significant impact on actor motivations by raising the costs associated with non-violent 
political expression. For instance in South Africa, the banning of meetings, protests, 
strikes, and publications, meant actors were preventing from communicating their 
objectives and mobilising dissent. The costs of non-violence were perceived as 
prohibitively high because of increasing difficulty to mobilise alongside the threat of 
criminal sanctions and the increasing costs of inaction. In contrast, in Northern Ireland 
the extent of CPA was much less significant, because political activities were largely 
not criminalised, and because criminalisation preceded non-violent collective action. 
Therefore, as CPA was more pervasive in South Africa so too was its significance, 
demonstrated by how many of the key political leaders of the liberation movements all 
pointed directly towards it as a central motivating factor behind their mobilisation into 
political violence, whereas in Northern Ireland it was regarded as secondary to 
intergroup aggression. This said, ex-prisoners in Northern Ireland pointed to 
criminalisation as a central factor for their mobilisation, indicating that formal CPA was 
not necessary for it to be informally implemented, and to similar effect. 
 
Together these three explanations contribute to research on political violence and 
conflict transformation with the two case studies providing insights into the implications 
of criminalisation for non-violent political expression. By applying criminalisation to 
non-violent political expression it contributes towards a wider social reality which 
actors respond towards, reacting against their criminalisation in order to protect or fight 
for their interests. But the distinctions between CPI/CPA and formal/informal 
criminalisation convey the complexities in how this can take effect providing new 
insights into the understanding of criminalisation. Indeed, issues around criminalising 
political expression today are of great importance in cases such as Turkey, Syria, 
Russia, amongst others, and these findings would inform wider debates on the 
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implications of state repression, regarding the implications of state practices of CPE. 
Furthermore, this chapter has focused on criminalisation domestically, but the 
international level is also important, such as when the UN General Assembly declared 
apartheid a crime against humanity in 1966. Understanding these distinctions would be 
important in determining the potential impact international law and legal norms may 
have either in preventing or responding to repression. The following chapters build 







Politicising crime to criminalise politics: Responding to collective political violence 
 
Conflict from the perspective of conflict transformation is necessary for change to occur 
(Lederach, 2003); it only becomes problematic when it involves the use of violence to 
bring about this change (Miall, 2004).1 In such a context, following the onset of 
collective political violence, states frequently implement counter-insurgency (COIN) 
measures, whereby the criminal justice system is used to legalise certain emergency 
powers (Bonner, 1992; Neal, 2012). In this sense COIN is not necessarily in 
contradiction with conflict transformation as it involves a range of strategic initiatives 
aimed at bringing an end to insurgency; the tensions are in relation to how this takes 
place and the goals behind it. Indeed, a legitimate criminal justice system is regarded as 
integral to COIN because if a state does not respond in accordance to its own law it 
³forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey 
the law´ (Thompson, 1966:52); meaning that while a legal system may undergo changes 
to adapt to a conflict sLWXDWLRQLWPXVWVWLOOHQVXUH³that each new law...be effective and 
must be fairO\ DSSOLHG´ 7KRPSVRQ  WKDW WKH FKDQJHV FRQWULEXWH WRZDUGV
conflict transformation, not further violence. Yet while a substantial body of research 
has highlighted the many tensions which exist between COIN and conflict 
transformation due to issues of state violence, the focus on defeating insurgents, and 
compromises in the rule of law (Cochrane, 2013a; Neal, 2012; Zedner, 2005), this 
chapter considers the underlying reasons behind why this is the case linked to the target 
of CPE. 
 
The politicisation of crime embodies this tension whereby ordinary criminal offences 
are linked to a political motivation, creating a criminal 'other' to normalise and justify 
expanded security powers.  In other words, ordinary crimes of political violence ± such 
as murder, theft or arson - are politicised to criminalise the political actors and as well 
                                                          
1
 However, some would argue that violence may be necessary at certain points when confronting an even 
greater form of violence such as the liberation movement in South Africa. For example see Ramio 
Väyrynen (1991) To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International 
Conflicts. In: R. Väyrynen (ed.) New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation. London: Sage, 1-25. 
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as their motivations; politicising crimes to de-politicise the motivations. In other words, 
the criminalisation of political violence (CPV) conjoins with the criminalisation of 
political identity (CPI) by linking crimes, even implicitly, to a political motivation. But 
doing this specifically through the politicisation of crime is problematic for conflict 
transformation, as instead of deterring or reducing the likelihood of violence, it embeds 
certain types of violence and frequently embodies a form of violence itself. This is 
because the predominant objectives (Hart, 2008) of criminal justice - deterrence, 
retribution, and reform ± EHFRPHGLUHFWHGDJDLQVWDQµHQHP\¶RIWKHVWDWHDVRSSRVHGWR
independently administering justice. This consequently undermines conflict 
transformation for three reasons directly linked to each of the principles of criminal 
justice: (1) it is ineffective at deterring violence because political actors perceive the 
costs of criminal sanctions differently from ordinary offenders (McEvoy and Mallinder, 
2012; Sarkin and Daly, 2004); (2) that reform becomes a site of resistance for political 
actors, as it becomes designed to break their political resolve (Buntman, 1998; McEvoy, 
2001); and (3) that punishment for offences directs moral outrage against both the acts 
of political violence, and the motivations as well (Bonner, 1992). The politicising of 
crimes, therefore, results in a miscalculation regarding the motivations behind political 
violence, the embedding of these motivations, and a further erosion of state legitimacy. 
The delivery of justice becomes compromised for wider security objectives 
undermining trust in its independence and efficiency in general. These issues can then 
continue even after their reform, as actors continue to perceive the reformed institutions 
through their historical experiences. 
 
Chapter two justified the case selection of Northern Ireland and South Africa, but it is 
worth specifying here how it relates to COIN because both represent cases of such 
politicisation, as the state responded to collective political violence by implementing 
legislation to enable concurrent COIN strategies. However the two cases vary in terms 
of extensiveness of this criminalisation and the outcomes, with variation between 
pro/anti-state paramilitaries, the exact composition of the laws, and the nature of their 
enforcement. Therefore, the similarities in terms of the politicisation of crime enable an 
effective comparison between the cases, while the differences provide an important 
contrast in terms of the potential implications. This is summarised in Table 9 to show 
the rationale behind the comparative framework for this chapter. The first section of the 
chapter accordingly conceptualises what the politicisation of crime is and its 
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relationship with COIN through a consideration of the two cases studies of Northern 
Ireland (1973-1980) and South Africa (1962-1989).2 This framework provides an initial 
theoretical investigation into the tensions between conflict transformation and COIN 
due to the politicisation of crime.  
 
Table 9. The comparison of CPV in Northern Ireland and South Africa 
Similarities Differences 
 
1. Criminalised political violence through 
counter-terrorism legislation 
2. Re-orientated policing on to a COIN 
framework 
3. Functioning legal systems 
4. Deeply divided societies 
5. Colonial contexts 
1.  The extensiveness of criminalisation, 
as in South Africa it covered non-
violent political expression as well 
2. The level of state violence through 
law enforcement 
3. Distinctions between pro/anti non-
state actors 
 
The second section of this chapter discusses the three central arguments regarding 
deterrence, reform, and retribution, exploring the tensions between their cooption into 
the COIN framework - through the politicisation of crime - and conflict transformation. 
Table 10 illustrates these tensions by contrasting the primary assumptions behind each 
of these objectives and how they differ for ordinary crime and political violence. For 
deterrence, increasing the certainty of the sanction is regarded as essential in deterring 
potential perpetrators from ordinary crime, but this does not apply effectively to those 
engaging in political violence. By engaging in such acts these individuals are already 
taking on significant risks, and so custodial sentences - or other criminal sanctions - will 
be very unlikely to act as an effective deterrent (Sarkin and Daly, 2004; McEvoy and 
Mallinder, 2012). Indeed, the attempt to deter through criminal sanctions is regarded as 
ineffective by many of these actors wKRVHH WKHLU µWLPHVHUYHG¶DVSDUWRI WKHLUZLGHU
political mobilisation (Shirlow et al., 2010). 
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Table 10. Relationship between the objectives of criminal justice and the politicisation 
of crime 
 
Following the conviction of an individual, reform seeks to correct their deviant 
behaviour to prevent them from re-offending. But again political actors perceive such 
DWWHPSWVDWµFRUUHFWLRQ¶DVDIRUPRIUHSUHVVLRQGLUHFWHGDJDLQVWWKHLUpolitical identity. 
This can result in prison becoming a new site of resistance against any attempts at 
reform. Substantial research has documented how in the absence of a political 
agreement this resistance continues even long after release illustrating the embedded 
nature of such resistance and why reform in prison is very unlikely (Dwyer, 2012; Gear, 
2002; Shirlow et al., 2010). 
 
The final objective of retribution is designed to combat impunity and ensure that crimes 
are punished as a moral requirement. But politicising crime applies this moral 
FRQGHPQDWLRQ WR ERWK WKH DFWRU¶V EHKDYLRXU DQG PRWLYDWLRQ UHVXOWLQJ LQ WKH ZLGHU
 Ordinary Crime Political Violence 
Deterrence x Increase the certainty of the 
sanction to deter actors 
committing a particular 
behaviour 
x Political actors calculate the costs 
differently and are much more 
willing to take on high risks 
Reform x Correct deviant behaviour to 
prevent criminals from re-
offending post-release 
x Political actors regard reform as 
a new site of resistance  
x Reform political actors often 
involves breaking their will 
which may result in forms of 
state violence 
Retribution x The criminal sanction is 
designed as a moral 
punishment for the criminal 
act committed 
x The punishment is part of 
justice being seen to be done 
to combat impunity 
x Politicising crime applies the 
moral punishment to the political 
motivation as well thereby 
informally criminalising the 




informal criminalisation of all those who share their political identity, even if they 
condemn their violent actions. Law enforcement accordingly becomes directed against a 
political identity - if it had not already been so ± leading to wider issues of surveillance 
and informal criminalisation. Furthermore, by applying moral condemnation to this 
wider political community this can contribute towards their alienation from the state and 
intergroup polarisation.  
 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of how these arguments relate to the 
framework of conflict transformation and the problems they present. These challenges 
are, however, not based in the criminal justice system necessarily, but in the 
politicisation of crime. The final section will outline potential areas for future and the 




Politicising crime: State responses to collective political violence 
 
An insurgency refers to an asymmetric civil war where the non-state actor(s) adopts 
guerrilla tactics to counter-balance the power of the state (Mack, 1975). As a strategic 
response to this, counter-insurgency refers to a military strategy designed at winning the 
EDWWOH RI µKHDUWV DQG PLQGV¶ VR WKDW WKH µILVK¶ ZRXOG EH OHIW ZLWK QR µZDWHU¶ 'L[RQ
2009). It is distinct from counter-terrorism aV LW QRW RQO\ VHHNV WR GHIHDW µWHUURULVW¶
groups, but also to establish a legitimate form of governance and address the 
PRWLYDWLRQVEHKLQG WKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VVXSSRUW IRU LQVXUJHQWV,3 although this is discussed 
LQ JUHDWHU GHWDLO LQ WKH WKHVLV¶ FRQFOXVLRQ. In this context, the politicisation of crime 
enables the state to delegitimise insurgents and legitimise itself while staving off 
international scrutiny by framing the insurgency as a domestic security issue. From this 
perspective and as outlined in chapter one, SROLWLFLVLQJFULPHLV³one of the many ways 
WRFRQVWUXFWVRFLDOUHDOLW\´ZLWKFULPHEHLQJ³not the object but the product of criminal 
policy´ (Hulsman, 1986:71, emphasis in original). Linking a political motivation to the 
criminal offence is seen as a means of framing political violence as a negative and 
damaging social reality as identified by the legal system. The insurgent is characterised 
                                                          
3
 For more on these distinctions see Michael Boyle (2010) Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go 
together? International Affairs 86(2):333-353. 
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as the criminal other, while the state is characterised as the protector. Accordingly 
³legal rules are often written in such a way as to permit rather than to disallow state 
GHYLDQFH´ %URgden and Nijhar, 1998:90), so that the creation of a particular social 
reality - 'the threat of crime' - legitimises extensive security powers which are seemingly 
necessary. Having defined the criminal threat, all associated issues become subsumed 
under the criminal paradigm: war becomes criminality; insurgents become hooligans, 
gangsters, and bandits; political violence becomes criminal predation and pathological. 
As a result, the complexity of a conflict becomes reduced to a criminal issue which 
requires a strong security response. How this works in practice can be seen through 




The social reality of crime: Political criminals 
 
There is an inherent tension in politicising crime between its method and purpose, as it 
seeks to de-politicise the motivations of a criminal act, by criminalising both. This 
means taking offences which are already criminal offences and linking them in 
legislation explicitly to a political motivation (Brewer et al., 1996). For instance in 
South Africa the National Party (NP) introduced the General Law Amendment Act 
(Sabotage Act) in 1962 in direct response to the armed campaigns of the uMkhonto 
weSizwe (MK), and Poqo (Feit, 1970; Johns, 1973). The Act created a new offence of 
sabotage which was essentially already criminalised under previous laws, but what is 
important is that it linked the offence to a political motivatLRQ³to further or encourage 
the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or 
HFRQRPLFFKDQJHLQWKH5HSXEOLF´ (General Law Amendment Act 1962, subsection 2e). 
Likewise, the Government later introduced the Terrorism Act 1967 linking the criminal 
DFWRIWHUURUWRDSROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQ³to further or encourage the achievement of any 
political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change, by 
YLROHQFHRU IRUFLEOHPHDQV´ (Terrorism Act 1967, subsection 2(2f)). While these laws 
defined offences so broadly they effectively criminalised all anti-state behaviour 
whether peaceful or not (Mathews, 1972:165), they demonstrate the inherent tension in 
terms of politicising crime to de-politicise the motivations. This tension is particularly 
evident in the second reading of the Terrorism Act 1967 before the South African 
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parliament, where the Minister of JXVWLFH UHIHUV WR WHUURULVWV DV ³SROLWLFDO DGYHQWXUHUV´
ZKRVH³actions are aimed principally at the overthrow of WKHUXOHRIODZLQRXUFRXQWU\´ 
(S. African Parliament, 1967 \HW VWLOO PDLQWDLQLQJ WKDW WKH\ ZHUH ³mere criminals´
(Filippi, 2011:638). 0RUHRYHUWKHSROLWLFDOµWKUHDW¶LVIUDPHGLQH[LVWHQWLDOWHUPVE\WKH
0LQLVWHU RI -XVWLFH ZKR DUJXHG WKDW ³WKH SULFH which we are being asked to pay for 
SHDFH´ZDVWR³VXUUHQGHURXUKHULWDJH´6$IULFDQ3DUOLDPHQW7KHUHIRUHWHQVLRQ
of politicising crimes is framed in the wider context of intergroup conflict which 
WKUHDWHQHGWKHYHU\H[LVWHQFHRI$IULNDQHUµKHULWDJH¶, not criminality. 
 
 
Figure 3. Ratio of security laws to 'discriminatory' legislation 
 
The importance of this is evident in the Government's reliance on such laws as 
displayed in Figure 3. This shows the proportion of security laws to all discriminatory 
legislation as defined in the 7UXWKDQG5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQV¶FRQFOXVLRQV (TRC 
Report 1, 1998:449). During the period 1961-65 this proportion dramatically increases 
as six security laws are codified; a dramatic change considering that only nine had been 
codified in the preceding five decades. Although this does not capture the content and 
breadth of these laws, just their proportion, it demonstrates the legislative agenda of the 
Government during this period. The outbreak of collective violence clearly aligned with 
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an increased reliance on such security legislation as described above, linking political 
motivation directly to criminal offences. 
 
Similarly, in Northern Ireland the British Government passed The Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA) and The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA) to address political violence, defining terrorism in both as 
³the use of violence for polLWLFDO HQGV´ The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
William Whitelaw, in the announcing the EPA before Parliament explained its purpose 
being ³the restoration of the rule of law in Northern Ireland´WRVWRS³a small number of 
vicious killers´ (UK Parliament, 1973a).  Indeed, the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Merlyn Rees stated in 1978:  
³We are dealing with a form of terrorism which has driven us to move 
marginally from the sorts of freedoms to which we are accustomed in this 
country. It is the price that we have to pay´ (UK Parliament, 1978).   
Accordingly, the EPA listed ³certain offences cRPPRQO\FRPPLWWHGE\WHUURULVWV´ (UK 
Parliament, 1973a) known as scheduled offences. These were criminal offences 
connected to proscribed organisations including: murder, manslaughter, arson, rioting, 
possession of firearms, robbery, intimidation, inter alia. Their introduction was then 
used to justify amended rules on admissible evidence, juryless courts (Diplock courts), 
and the reversal of political status in prisons (Special Category status),4 alongside 
widespread security sector reforms (Walsh, 2000). The EPA proscribed various 
organisations, while the PTA made it an offence to assist or advance the goals of these 
organisations, and extended the mechanisms to the British mainland. While the 
exceptional nature of these laws was discussed at length during their initial introduction 
with the end goal of returning to normality, WKHSUREOHPZDVWKDWWKHVWDWH¶VFRQFHSWLRQ
of normality differed fundamentally from that of many Nationalists (Taylor, 1980).5 So 
                                                          
4
 6SHFLDO FDWHJRU\ VWDWXV 6&6 JUDQWHG FRQYLFWHG /R\DOLVWV DQG 5HSXEOLFDQV ³WKH de facto status of 
SULVRQHUVRIZDU´(OOLVRQDQG6P\WKPHDQLQJWKH\ZHUH³KHOGLQVHOIRUJDQLVHGFRPSRXQGVDW
+03 0D]HDZD\ IURP µRUGLQDU\¶ SULVRQHUV DQG IURP SULVRQHUV RI RSSRVLQJ SDUDPLOLWDU\
IDFWLRQV«>DQG@KDGIUHHDVVRFLDWLRQZRUH WKHLURZQFORWKHVDQGZHUHQRW UHTXLUHG WRGRSULVRQZRUN´
(Wahidin, Moore and Convery7KH*DUGLQHU&RPPLWWHH UHJDUGHGVXFKVWDWXVDV ³D VHULRus 
PLVWDNH´ IRU OHJLWLPLVLQJ FHUWDLQ FULPLQDO RIIHQFHV DV SROLWLFDO UHLQIRUFLQJ WKH ZDU QDUUDWLYH *DUGLQHU
Committee Report, 1975:53). Thus after March 1976 SCS was no longer granted to anyone, leaving 
former SCS prisoners imprisoned alongside non-SCS ones. 
5
 7KH *DUGLQHU UHSRUW VWDWHG WKDW WKH ³HPHUJHQF\ SRZHUV VKRXOG EH OLPLWHG ERWK LQ VFRSH DQG




although the breadth and enforcement of these offences differed fundamentally between 
the cases, their purpose was essentially the same: to delegitimise collective political 
violence, legitimise the state and facilitate expanded security powers (Dugard, 1978; 
Hall, 1988).  
 
Politicising crime enables the state to enhance its relative legitimacy to that of 
insurgents domestically and internationally, thereby justifying expanded security 
powers. But beyond these political gains - albeit important - there are further 
implications for the administration of justice in relation to deterrence, reform, and 
retribution. The fundamental principles which underpin criminal justice become 
stretched beyond their ordinary context, meaning criminal justice becomes constitutive 
of the conflict itself (Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2004),  rather than transcending it 
as an independent mechanism. The following sections discuss these points drawing on 
evidence from the case studies.  
 
 
Deterrence: Calculating the costs? 
 
Criminalising an offence is generally done - at least in according to positivist legal 
theory - WR³announce to society that these actions are not to be done and to secure that 
IHZHURIWKHPDUHGRQH´ (Hart, 2008:6); in other words to deter actors from committing 
them. Deterrence theory distinguishes between specific deterrence - directed against an 
individual - and general deterrence - directed against a wider audience than those 
immediately affected (McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012:10). The effectiveness of both 
types depends on the likelihood of an actor facing the sanction, and the ability of an 
actor to calculate this. In other words, the chance of being caught, convicted, and 
punished, fits into a cost-benefit analysis determining whether an actor will commit a 
crime or not. Likewise, this assumes that actors are calculating and evaluating the costs 
and benefits. For COIN this means security powers need to be enhanced to facilitate a 
higher likelihood of convicting insurgents thereby affecting both direct and general 
deterrence. The rationale is that actors will be discouraged from joining non-state armed 
groups if they perceive that they will likely end up imprisoned (or otherwise 
sanctioned), and those who are in armed groups may be less likely to engage in actions 
which would result in higher penalties. But while increasing the likelihood of conviction 
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addresses the first aspect of deterrence, this is contingent on the second. Without 
addressing both, politicising offences may fall into what Hart (2008:7) refers to as 
³forms of undesirable behaviour which it would be foolish (because ineffective or too 
costly) to attempt to inhibit by use of the law´; and this is the very challenge which 
politicising offences often fails to address. 
 
 
Increasing the cost: The certainty of the criminal sanction 
 
The politicisation of crime was implemented in Northern Ireland concurrently with the 
security transformation known as Ulsterisation - transitioning from an army led to 
police led counter-insurgency, the so-FDOOHG³SULPDF\RIWKHSROLFH´PRGHO (Wright and 
Bryett., 1991:34-5; Jeffery, 1990). This operated as the practical outworking of the 
legislative changes legitimised through the politicisation of criminal offences.  For 
instance the EPA granted the British Army the powers to arrest and detain suspected 
terrorists for up to four hours, following which the person would either be handed over 
to the police to be formerly charged or released  (Boyle, Hadden, and Hillyard, 
1975:40). Furthermore, it gave the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) the power to arrest 
without warrant anyone suspected of being a terrorist and detain them for up to 72 hours 
(Walsh, 1983:25). MoreoverWKH37$³created a system with the potential to bring into 
custody and interrogate anyone, irrespective of whether or not there was any evidence 
DJDLQVWWKHP´+LOO\DUG-5, emphasis in original). This provided the police with 
broad discretionary powers particularly because LW ZDV EDVHG XSRQ ³WKH VXEMHFWLYH
MXGJHPHQWRIWKH>DUUHVWLQJ@FRQVWDEOH´%HQQHWW5HSRrt, 1979:22).  
 
The powers granted by the PTA and EPA, therefore, formed the basis of the COIN 
strategy (Feldman, 1991:85) and initially proved highly effective in incarcerating high 
numbers RIµFULPLQDOV¶ for scheduled offences. Between 1975 and 1979 therHZDV³DQ
average of about 1000 individuals...charged [annually] ZLWKVFKHGXOHGRIIHQFHV´RI
ZKRPZHUH³FRQYLFWHGHLWKHURQDSOHDRIJXLOW\RUDIWHUDWULDOLQWKH'LSORFN&RXUWV´
(Walsh, 2000:239). Following the introduction of this strategy there was a clear 
correlation between the politicisation of crime, and its corresponding security 
transformation, with a decline in fatalities. This is depicted on Figure 4; from a high of 




Figure 4. Ratio of conflict deaths and prison populations in Northern Ireland 1969-1979 
 
From the perspective of deterrence and COIN it could be argued that politicising crime 
was, therefore, effective in addressing the certainty of the criminal sanction by 
increasing the likelihood of a conviction through enhanced security apparatus' and 
amended rules on evidence. Indeed, in 1978 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
Roy Mason, cited the decline in fatalities and increase in convictions as the central 
factors justifying the renewal of the EPA (HC Deb 06 December 1978 vol 959 cc1499-
585), and would announce monthly to the British Parliament how many convictions 
they had achieved in the previous month (O'Dowd, Rolston, and Tomlinson, 1980:186). 
Yet because crimes became politicised, responses were likewise; resulting in the 
criminal justice system increasingly embodying the conflict itself (Bell, Campbell and 
Ní Aoláin, 2004). This meant the potential gains in increasing the number of 
convictions were undermined by a flawed understanding of the motivations of political 
actors as will be explained below.  
 
In South Africa the South African PoliFH 6$3 OLNHZLVH LQYHVWHG UHVRXUFHV ³to 
reinforce its weaponry, equipment, and skill in fire-SRZHU´ (Brewer, 1994:250); police 
officers were given training in new weapons, riot-control and later in COIN tactics; new 
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riot-control equipment was purchased including water-cannons, riot trucks, riot 
landrovers and helicopters (Ibid). Furthermore, the SAP underwent extensive 
militarisation with increasing coordination being established with the South African 
Defence Force (SADF), increased military service for White youths, and the 
enhancement of the intelligence service - Special Branch (Ibid:251). Under the 1953 
Public Safety Act the Government could declare a state of emergency, which the 
Government did for the first time following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, during 
which 11,503 peRSOH ZHUH GHWDLQHG DQG ZKHUHE\ ³the Government [was] given a 
completely frHHKDQG´ (Dugard, 1978:110).  
 
The creation of political crimes and the associated security powers caught the African 
National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP), and Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) by surprise not giving them the chance to properly prepare for the 
transition to full illegality. The Government benefited from the intelligence gathered 
during the 'semi-legal' period, identifying and profiling many of the key actors within 
these organisations (Johns, 1973:297). These reforms facilitated the arrest of the MK's 
National High Command at their headquarters in Rivonia during July 1963 followed by 
their subsequent conviction and imprisonment, leading ³to the smashing of virtually the 
wKROH RI WKH XQGHUJURXQG QHWZRUN´ /LVVRQL  DV WKH ³leadership of 
Umkhonto ZDVGHFDSLWDWHG´ (Johns, 1973:274). Similarly ³[b]y June 1963, about 3,246 
PAC members had been arrested nationally and 124 had been found guilW\RIPXUGHU´ 
(Maaba, 2004:295). Violence was sporadic and poorly planned; cells were widely 
infiltrated by informers; and the overall strategy was based on the flawed assumption 
that the masses of oppressed Africans would join up in resistance against the state 
(Plaatjie, 2006). By politicising crimes the state was able to implement widespread 
security powers, increase resources, and - as was the case in Northern Ireland - increase 
significantly the likelihood of political actors facing the criminal sanction. The Minister 
of Justice stated as much in justifying the Terrorism Act 1967 DV KH H[SODLQHG ³[I]t 
is...undesirable that there should be even the slightest possibility of a legal uncertainty. 
:H FDQQRW DIIRUG WR VWDQG DQG DUJXH LQ WKH FRXUWV´ 6 $IULFDQ 3DUOLDPHQW 
Politicising crime, therefore, was done with the direct intention of creating as expedient 
a legal process as possible, greatly increasing the likelihood of facing the criminal 





What costs? Personal versus political gain 
 
Whether the likelihood of facing the criminal sanction actually impacts deterrence is 
dependent on whether actors factor it into their cost-benefit calculation, or indeed make 
such calculations in the first place. This is problematic for COIN and has serious 
implications for the criminal justice system both in the immediate context, but also in 
the longer-term. Specifically, previous research has argued that the motivations behind 
political violence are fundamentally different than ordinary criminal acts, depending on 
³an idiosyncratic concatenation of social, SROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFIDFWRUV´ as opposed to 
a calculation of personal gain versus cost (Sarkin and Daly, 2004:715; McEvoy and 
Mallinder, 2012). Politicising crimes runs in direct contradiction to this as it seeks to de-
politicise the motivation, thereby bringing it under the simplistic cost benefit 
framework. In other words, dealing with political violence as a form of 'extreme' crime 
can embed the political motivations and counteract the deterrent effects outlined above.  
 
The motivations for engaging in political violence were complex and cannot be reduced 
simply to a single variable, but a unifying theme across ex-prisoners was that they 
nearly always rejected that their actions were criminal, or were motivated by an 
individual cost-benefit analysis (Gear, 2002; Shirlow et al., 2010). For instance a UVF 
ex-prisoner explained: 
[Ex-prisoners] that I know didn't consider themselves criminal. They didn't even 
consider their actions a crime, and I say this personally too. Of course you could 
say: 'Actually look you broke the law', but the rationale for carrying out the act 
in the first place isn't comparative to going and robbing a bank. (UVF ex-
prisoner C, 2016) 
This ex-prisoner maintained that his conviction was for a political offence and was 
motivated by political reasons, as opposed to personal gain. The ordinary crime of 
robbery is referred to symbolically as an example of ordinary criminality committed for 
personal gain, which this actor distinguishes from their own acts of political violence. 
Likewise, another UVF ex-prisoner stated:  
³I didn't view myself as a criminal...[and] a lot of people were going to jail who, 
other than what we call the Troubles, would never have seen the inside of a 
police station or DSULVRQ´89)H[-prisoner B, 2016).  
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Again, motivation is attributed to the political context, and not to any individual cost-
benefit calculations. An IRA ex-SULVRQHU UHIHUUHG WR SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH DV ³OHJLWLPDWH
ZDUIDUH´ HPSKDVLVLQJ WKDW LW ZDV ³QRW FULPLQDO´ GHVSLWH ZKDW Whe state said (IRA ex-
prisoner B, 2016), and a South African political ex-prisoner explained how when asked 
WRJHW WKHSROLFH WRYHULI\ WKDWKHKDVQRUHFRUGKHVDLG³,
PQRWJRLQJ WRJRDQGDVN
anybody to say that I'm not a criminaO DQ\PRUH , ZDV QHYHU RQH´ 6Ruth African 
political ex-prisoner, 2016). Indeed an IRA ex-prisoner referred to how it was his 
³RFFXSDWLRQ´ ZKLFK ³JRW PH SXW LQ MDLO´ 0RUULVRQ  In eulogising an IRA 
member who died carrying out an attack, the Republican publication An Phoblacht 
H[SODLQHG³>+@HGLHGILJKWLQJIRUKLVQDWLRQ¶VIUHHGRPGLHGLQWKHUDQNVRIÓglaigh na 
h-Éireann [Irish volunteers], fighting the self-same Huns who came to µkeep the peace¶´ 
(An Phoblacht, 1976:3). 7KHODQJXDJHHPSKDVLVHVWKHZLGHUSROLWLFDOJRDORIµIUHHGRP¶
contrasting this with the invading power of British colonialism. Accordingly, the cost-
benefit analysis underpinning ordinary crime breaks down when applied to these actors. 
They adamantly rejected any claims that their motivations were in any way guided by 
personal gain, instead emphasising their political goals whether these were ideological 
or more often about protecting their identity. 
 
Furthermore, politicising crime can lead to the development of a counter-narrative, as 
actors not only resist their criminalisation but ascribe 'criminal' illegitimacy to the state. 
For instance, an MK ex-SULVRQHU H[SODLQHG ³I was fighting against a crime against 
crime. The justice system of this country under apartheid was rotten and controlled by 
WKHPLOLWDU\´ (MK ex-prisoner A, 2016). In this context not only was the legitimacy of 
the label rejected, but so to was the sanction. An IRA ex-prisoner explaineG ³You 
know a blind man on a galloping horse wouldn't have stopped me from doing what I 
wanted to do at thDWSDUWLFXODUWLPH´ (IRA ex-prisoner A, 2016), referring here to how, 
no matter what the deterrent, this individual would have committed the offence 
regardless of the sanctions. This is because these actors understood that by engaging in 
political violence they were already taking on the greater risk of being killed. For 
H[DPSOH ³all new recruits to the IRA were told that the most likely consequences of 
joining XSZHUHHLWKHUSULVRQRUGHDWK´ (McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012:12); and a UVF 
ex-prisoner explained: ³LI \RX
UH SUHSDUHG WR JR RXW DQd bomb, to get shot or blown 
up,GRQ




Moreover in South Africa, because of the level of repression that actors were already 
experiencing many did not even consider the criminal sanction to be relevant. For 
example Martin Ramokgadi, an MK ex-prisoner, referred to how many were willing to 
die rather than suffer:  
³-XVW QRZ ZKHQ ZH ORRN >EDFN@\RX¶OO ILQG WKDW SHRSOH KDG GHFLGHG WR
die....[The police] come to the location, children stone them, and they are being 
VKRWNLOOHGEXW WKH\GRQ¶WUHWUHDW<RXFDQVHHRQHZRXOGFDOO LWDVXLFLGHRQ
WKHVLGHRIWKHEODFNSHRSOH´Ramokgadi, N.D) 
For these individuals the costs of criminal sanctions were almost irrelevant because they 
already faced widespread repression as outlined in chapter three. Instead of deterring 
these individuals this repression had the opposite effect for at least some, such as the 
former MK member, Cornick Ndlovu, who explained:  
³[I]f [the police] find you, they were using these knobkerries, sticks, and then 
bash your head and arrest you. So that is [the] situation that made me...realise 
WKDW OLYLQJXQGHU WKHVH FRQGLWLRQVZDV UHDOO\ XQEHDUDEOH6R WKDW¶V ZKDW PDGH
me get into...deI\LQJDOOWKHVHXQMXVWODZV´1GORYX 
From this perspective, the extensiveness of the politicisation of crime meant that simply 
being of a particular skin colour put you at risk. In other words, the criminal justice 
system itself was regarded as repressive, meaning that regardless of whether you 
actually committed a crime or not you were at risk of the sanction. For instance a former 
gang leader H[SODLQHG ³Because of our colour we were always guilty until you can 
SURYH\RX
UHQRWJXLOW\´)RUPHU gang leader, 2016).  
 
Although the security powers increased the likelihood of being caught for political 
offences, because of the level of repression, actors had already taken on a cost. Inaction 
in such contexts is perceived as just as costly, perhaps even more so, than action 
(Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Therefore increasing the likelihood of being caught and 
imprisoned ± the certainty of the criminal sanction - is considerably less important for 
these actors than it would be for ordinary criminals. Politicising crime may facilitate the 
certainty of a conviction by increasing security powers, but its potential as a deterrent is 
based on a flawed understanding of the motivation for acts of political violence. Instead 
of contributing towards conflict transformation, dialogue itself which becomes deterred, 
DV WKH VHFXULW\ REMHFWLYHV RI FDWFKLQJ µFULPLQDOV¶ VXSSODQWed the complex political 
motivations underpinning the conflict. 
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Reform: Correcting political deviance 
 
For those who do commit an offence they will then face the two other objectives of 
reform and retribution.  While UHIRUP³DVDQREMHFWLYH LVQRGRXEWYHU\YDJXH´+DUW
2008:26), it essentially refers to measures which seek to correct the deviant behaviour of 
criminals to decrease the likelihood of them reoffending. It accordingly includes a wide 
range of measures such as ³the inducement of states of repentance, or recognition of 
moral guilt, or greater awareness of the character and demands of society, the provision 
of education in a broad sense, vocatLRQDO WUDLQLQJDQGSV\FKRORJLFDO WUHDWPHQW´+DUW
2008:26). Indeed from a critical perspective these practices apply the categorisation of 
³WKHQRUPDODQGDEQRUPDO´DVGHILQHGE\WKHVWDWHDSSOLHGWKURXJKWKHFDUFHUDOV\VWHP
and determined by a judge, ZLWK WKHJRDORI ³FXULQJRU UHKDELOLWDWLQJ´ WKHSHUSHWUDWRU
(Foucault, 1977:304). The abnormal behaviour of political crime is used to identify 
delinquency, justify corrective measures, and cure the threat it poses to the established 
political order. Prison is the main institution through which this takes place, whereby 
WKHLQWHQWLRQLV³WRVXSHUYLVHWKHLQGLYLGXDOWRQHXWUDOLVHKLVGDQJHURXVVWDWHRIPLQGWR
DOWHU KLV FULPLQDO WHQGHQFLHV´ )RXFDXOW . Having entered prison as a 
perpetrator the aim is that the criminal will leave eschewing such behaviours.6  
 
However, politically motivated prisoners challenge the assumptions of reform because 
their motivations are distinct from those of ordinary prisoners as outlined above. 
Politicising crime means reform is directed against not only the criminal behaviour, but 
also the political identity behind it. Accordingly the very system of reform is identified 
as an extension of state power to be resisted, meaning political prisoners will often not 
engage with the process of reform. As a result, the state through their prison services 
frequently attempts to break the political resolve of prisoners using other ± usually 
violent - means. But doing so ensures that prison itself becomes a further site of 
political resistance, as prisoners regard the correctional system as an embodiment of 
state repression. Moreover, as their identity is threatened this can actually foster the 
politicisation of prisoners as a form of counter-resistance increasing, rather than 
correcWLQJWKHLUµGHYLDQFH¶ 
 
                                                          
6
 While this summary emphasises individual criminal responsibility not structural, and reduces reform to 
the carceral system, this is because it relates to the objectives adopted within the two cases.  
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Imprisoning resistance, resisting imprisonment 
 
In Northern Ireland the reversal of Special Category Status (SCS) in March 1976 
represented a clear rejection of the political nature of the violence committed by 
Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries. Whereas previously political prisoners enjoyed 
'special' privileges and freedoms even to the extent that propitious dialogue was taking 
effect between the paramilitaries (Crawford, 1999:47-8); this all changed with the 
replacement of the compound system by a more traditional penitentiary. Indeed, under 
the politicisation of crime as engineered through the Criminalisation7 strategy of the 
British Government, LPSULVRQPHQWEHFDPH³DQDWWHPSWWRV\VWHPDWLFDOO\XQGHUPLQHWKH
very characteristLFV WKDW GHWHUPLQHGDSROLWLFDOPRWLYHDQGHWKRV´ 0RHQ%\
incarcerating paramilitary actors and removing their sense of identity, the Government 
sought to both punish and reform actors of their political violence. However, as the 
prison service was increasingly being stretched to manage extensive political violence, 
its founding principles became eroded; as McEvoy (2001:249) explained: ³The 
increasingly rigid adherence to the principles of criminalisation as the prisoners stepped 
up their protest in the late 1970s obscured the origins of the policy as a means of 
PDQDJLQJSROLWLFDOYLROHQFH´. The dual system of ordinary decent criminals (ODCs) and 
scheduled offence prisoners, the rapid increase in prisoner numbers, the politicisation of 
prisoners, and the lack of prison resources, together undermined criminalisation within 
the prisons and enabled prisoners to effectively continue their political campaign from 
behind the prison walls. 
 
By imposing reform onto these prisoners the British had played into their hands, as this 
enhanced the narrative of Republican victimhood, providing them with a fresh political 
platform. Initially, however, this was not the case, when many Republican and a 
minority of Loyalist prisoners8 opposed the withdrawal of SCS as a symbolic denial of 
their political campaigns (Walsh, 2000:242), protesting the change by refusing to wear 
                                                          
7
 Criminalisation strategy was directly linked to the politicisation of crime and the corresponding security 
changes. However this chapter does not discuss it at length because the term itself refers to a discursive 
framing of the conflict and reproduces a narrative of the British state. Instead this chapter focuses on the 
mechanisms that the strategy consisted of to consider their implications.  
8
 Loyalist prisoners were in the complex position of being a pro-state militia, and so resistance within the 
prisons from their perspective was based on issues regarding personal safety due to integration of 
Republican and Loyalist prisoners (Page, 1998:61). 
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prison clothes. These protests ± subsequently named the blanket and dirty protests ± 
were largely unsuccessful as they were ignored by the British Government and failed to 
garner substantial beyond certain Republican and Nationalist communities. As a result, 
Sinn Fein and the IRA did not prioritise these protests in their overall campaign, instead 
focusing on the primacy of military operations (Ross, 2006:339).  
 
Recognising that these protests were ineffectual Republican prisoners embarked upon a 
number of hunger strikes9 with the first strike in 1980 ending without any concessions 
DQGDFFXVDWLRQVRI%ULWLVK³GHFHLWDQGGRXEOH-GHDOLQJ´ (Ross, 2006:344; O'Rawe, 2005). 
Changing tactics so that only one prisoner would strike at a time ± rather than all 
concurrently ± the prisoners began a second hunger strike with the first striker being 
Bobby Sands. Seeking to maximise the potential of this strike, Sinn Fein and the IRA 
emphasised the prison conditions and abuse to create a platform of humanitarianism 
with a large political base across Nationalists (Wright and Bryett, 1991:33). Indeed, 
Bobby Sands' election victory - elected as the Member of Parliament for Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone days before his death ± greatly undermined the legitimacy of the British 
policy towards Northern Ireland within many Nationalist communities. Through 
mobilising support for a Republican 'criminal' the IRA were able to continue their 
political activities from within the prisons and unite a broad coalition of republican, 
Socialist, and Nationalist organisations represented on the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee. These individuals became symbolic representations of resistance, and such 
themes were then propagated through murals and graffiti, and used to facilitate further 
recruitment, as noted by a community worker: ³[Following the hunger strikes the] 
murals portrayed...defenders, freedom fighters, rebels, or Loyalists. It's a dark image, 
but it's almost for soPH \RXQJ SHRSOHDQ DVSLUDWLRQ´ (Community worker C, 2016).  
Whereas reform sought to transform the political motivations of these actors, in practice 
it provided new opportunities for it to be developed. Its significance was summarised by 
D IRUPHU3ULVRQ*RYHUQRU³[The prison system] became inextricably bound up in the 
political difficulties of Northern Ireland. It didn't cause the Troubles but, it became part 
of them anG LWFRQWULEXWHG WR WKHP´'XQFDQ0F/DXJKOLQTuoted in Irwin, 2003:473). 
By politicising the prison system it became fixed as a central component of the wider 
FRQIOLFWLQVWHDGRILVRODWLQJDQGUHIRUPLQJWKHSROLWLFDOµFULPLQDOV¶ 
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The reasons behind the political success of these campaigns are complex, but using the 
prison system to break the political resolve of prisoners was certainly an important 
factor. This is evident in interview transcripts with former prisoner officers and ex-
prisoners who give disturbing accounts of a culture of brutality amongst certain prison 
officers, linking it specifically to the logic of criminalisation (Crawford, 1999: 163-175; 
O'Rawe, 2005; Wahidin, 2012). In seeking to dehumanise prisoners, these particular 
prison officers seemingly relied on brutality to inspire fear and discipline. This played 
into the narratives of British oppression, exhibiting the very thing Republicans were 
fighting to overthrow; SURYLGLQJWKH,5$ZLWK³its most nourishing and rich propaganda 
WKHPHV´ (Wright and Bryett, 1991:26) DQG ³sustaining one of [their] most important 
SV\FKRORJLFDO ZHDSRQV´ +DGGHQ %R\OH DQG &DPSEHOO . Indeed, the 
Republican movement's history is steeped in political resistance in the prisons 
(Moloney, 2007; McConville, 2014) and the IRA capitalised on this through 
propaganda. For instance its weekly publication An Phoblacht [Republican News] drew 
direct parallels from historical RepublicDQ ILJXUHV IURP WKH ³GD\V RI WKH )HQLDQV´ DV
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Interestingly Loyalist prisoners likewise sought to resist criminalisation as well, albeit 
to a much lesser extent, DVRQHH[SODLQHG³The problem for us with the wider Unionist 
population was you couldn't have engaged in a protest because you would have been 
seen to be sharing a Republican objective´89)H[-prisoner A, 2016). Because prison 
protests were predominantly considered as a Republican political strategy Loyalist 
parallel protests were regarded in like terms by many within Unionist communities. 
Despite this extracts from the UVF publication Combat are indicative of their political 
rationale UHIHUULQJWRKRZWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRI6&6ZRXOGQRW³IRUFHXVWRVXUUHQGHURXU
ULJKWV DV SULVRQHUV RI ZDU´ (Combat, 1976a:16). The system of reform was unable to 
address the political motivations underpinning political violence, and so by adopting 
violent alternatives the state incorporated the prison system into the wider COIN 
framework as well. But this created a contradiction between the rhetoric of politicising 
crime, and the practice of politicising criminal justice. It is this contradiction which 




Figure 5. An Phoblacht [Republican News]  November 8 1980 
 
Source: Linen Hall Library Political Collection 
 
In South Africa reform was synonymous with repression as order was maintained 
WKURXJK³the use of dogs, teargas and tonfas (short batons of wood or rubber)´ (Filippi, 
2011:633, emphasis in original). Punishments took place through a denial of access to 
news, no remission of sentence or parole, and poor classification (Gready, 1993:498).10 
Just as was the case in Northern Ireland each political group regarded prison as another 
arena for resistance as: ³The white regime was personified by the warders and the 
militarised prison hierarchy and therefore, in the logic of this political identity, had to be 
confURQWHGDW HYHU\ WXUQ´ (Buntman, 1998:433). As was the case in Northern Ireland, 
prison was considered part of the political oppression to be overcome, so by resisting it 
personally and collectively political prisoners were able to serve as a symbols of the 
resistance to those on the outside. For example, a former political prisoner explained:  
So we turned the whole thing against them saying: 'Okay these are your laws. 
We want these conditions to prevail in the prison. We want access to study; to 
                                                          
10
 The prisoner classification system split prisoners into one of four groups from D to A. It was designed 
to encourage 'good' behaviour as prisoners would receive additional privileges as the moved from D to A. 
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do sports'...You turn their own laZV WR IXUWKHU \RXU RZQ VWUXJJOH´ (South 
African political ex-prisoner, 2016).  
Because reform was directed against political identity these individuals were not 
included in the ordinary rehabilitation programmes and discriminated against within the 
prisons, thereby providing an opportunity for resistance. Using the legal system to 
campaign for fairer treatment these prisoners could still resist the state even while 
imprisoned.  
 
However, iQFRQWUDVWWR1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGµSROLWLFDO¶FULPHVZHUH defined so expansively 
that the boundaries between ordinary and political offences became increasingly blurred 
(Gready, 1993:492). This meant that many ordinary criminals adopted the narrative of 
politically motivated prisoners framing their crimes as a form of political resistance 
against apartheid, manifesting itself through prison gangs such as The Number with the 
REMHFWLYH EHLQJ ³to attack the prison system...to challenge apartheid's economic and 
UDFLDOLQMXVWLFH´ (Filippi, 2011:634). However, political prisoners were careful to try and 
distance themselves from such parallels maintaining that there were clear boundaries 
between their political resistance and ordinary crime (Filippi, 2011:639). Indeed, a 
former anti-apartheid lawyer stated this H[SOLFLWO\³7KHUHZDVQREOXUULQJZKDWVRHYHU
LQ P\ YLHZ DQG WKHUH VWLOO LVQ
W´ Daniels, 2016). Those in the liberation movement, 
accordingly, were careful to distinguish themselves from criminal actors, although there 
is evidence of some convergence (Gear, 2002; Kynoch, 2005; TRC Report 5, 1998). 
Despite this prisons functioned as important political arenas where the politicisation of 
crime expanded the batWOHILHOG RI SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH LQWR WKH SULVRQ V\VWHP DV ³the 
boundaries between crime, normality, politics and insanity shifted and were constantly 
reshaped to be used against the very authorities tKDW KDG RULJLQDOO\ GHILQHG WKHP´ 
(Filippi, 2011:643). Politicising crime reframed the boundaries of resistance bringing 
the state into further contestation with the same actors it sought to undermine. 
 
Alongside these new opportunities for resistance WKH DWWHPSW WR µUHIRUP¶ WKHSROLWLFDO
identity of these actors actually had the opposite effect in at least some cases. For 
instance Lerumo Kalako from the ANC explained: ³[W]hat kept us...not to break there 
ZDVPRVWO\SROLWLFVDQGWKDWZDVDYHU\ELJPRWLYDWLQJIDFWRUIRUXVRQ5REEHQ,VODQG´
(Kalako, 1993). The political identity of prisoners was important in resisting the wider 
system of reform. Indeed Nelson Mandela refers to how his resistance in prison served 
|111| 
 
an important psychological purpose of believing that there was still hope that their 
struggle could achieve its goal (Mandela, 1994a). In order to facilitate this, political 
prisoners developed a political education system within the prisons, as the MK ex-
prisoner Sipho Binda explained:  
³:H >KDG@ SROLWLFDO FODVVHVIURP 0RQGD\ WR 6DWXUGD\DQG WKRVH SROLtical 
classes [were] conducted by experienced comrades. We deal with issues that 
have been raised by our leadership in prison. There were articles that were 
written...on our struggle, our history, political economy, on Marxism-Leninism, 
you name it, trade XQLRQLVPDQGVRRQ´%LQGD1993). 
Instead of depoliticising them, the system of reform therefore increased the political 
resolve of at least a section of political prisoners as they developed their own political 
education system (Gready, 1993). Similarly in Northern Ireland prison debates amongst 
RepublicDQ SULVRQHUV ³SURYLGHG D YRFDEXODU\ WKDW H[SODLQHG JULHYDQFHV DQG DQWL-state 
DFWLYLWLHV´ DQG KHOSHG QXUWXUH ³LGHQWLWLHV RI UHVLVWDQFH´ 6KLUORZ et al., 2010:15). For 
Loyalist prisoners such politicisation also occurred, albeit to a lesser extent, particularly 
for those within the UVF, as one ex-prisoner explained:  
³[T]he regime created by Gusty Spence within prison to oppose criminalisation 
made it easier for young men like myself coming in at 17 years of age to think 
differently about your incarceration, because he encouraged self-reflection and 
he encouraged being self-directed to learn...And all that was about opposing this 
UHJLPHRIFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ´89)H[-prisoner C, 2016). 
Here again political education within prison is directly linked to resisting reform. By 
having reform directed against their political identity these actors began to question the 
reasons behind it, seeking answers to the wider political context. Therefore, rather than 
reforming the political identity of these actors, politicising crimes actually helped 
consolidate and embed it for at least some prisoners. 
 
 
Retribution: Punishing deviance 
 
If deterrence fails to prevent an offence being committed, the objective of retribution is 
then applied following from the understanding that the offence results in an imperative 
to punish because of its moral cost. From this perspective retribution refers to ³[t]he 
application of the pains of punishment to an RIIHQGHU ZKR LV PRUDOO\ JXLOW\´ (Hart, 
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2008:10). Punishment is based on a moral requirement, that if an individual commits an 
RIIHQFH RI WKH ³cognitive and voOLWLRQDO FRQGLWLRQV RI PHQV UHD´ there is a moral 
requirement to enforce a punishment against them (Sterba, 1977:355). Punishing 
offenders is regarded as necessary to prevent impunity, ensuring that justice is seen to 
be done (Clark, 2008). This goes beyond deterrence by not only ensuring the likelihood 
of a sanction, but also satisfying the moral requirement whereby criminals are held to 
account for their criminal behaviour. The importance of this should not be marginalised 
due to the harm caused to victims of crime and the desire of many to see that harm 
punished. But when applied through the politicisation of crime this objective takes on a 
number of characteristics which are problematic for conflict transformation. This is 
because politicising criminal offences applies this moral outrage to both the acts of 
violence and the motivations as well. This has an impact on the enforcement of such 
laws as policing becomes directed not only against criminal acts, but also the political 
communities these actors come from. Hillyard (1993) and Breen-Smyth (2014) refer to 
such practices as creating suspect communities, but it is this politicisation of crime 
which legalises and normalises such practices. The contrast between the two cases is 
particularly insightful in understanding this complexity, demonstrating how the 
implications of the politicisation of crimes are dependent on informal criminalisation 
(Lacey, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, by broadening moral outrage on to the motivations it undermines many of 
those who may hold similar political beliefs, but reject the resort to violence. Alongside 
WKHIRUPDOFULPLQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHµFULPLQDO¶WKHUHLVWKHUHIRre, a corresponding informal 
criminalisation of those espouse the political motivation regardless of whether they are 
engaged in any form of proscribed behaviour. This is highly problematic for conflict 
transformation due to how this then leads to a wider dehumanisation of these 
individuals and their respective communities (Bastian, Denson, and Haslam, 2013). 
Because the criminal motivation is understood through the prism of retributive justice, 








Informal criminalisation and law enforcement 
 
In implementing the politicisation of crime in Northern Ireland the RUC were not 
simply concerned with convictions, but rather were utilised as part of the wider counter-
insurgency strategy in intelligence gathering.11 From November 1974 until 1991, of 
those arrested under the PTA, 86% were subsequently released without charge 
(Hillyard, 1993:86). In interviews conducted by Walsh (1983:39) he found that the 
majority of those arrested under this power were questioned not about an offence but 
³DERXW WKHLU SHUVRQDO OLYHV PHPEHUV RI WKHLU IDPLO\ DVVRFLDWHV DQG VRPHWLPHV WKHLU
SROLWLFDO YLHZV´ /LNHZLVH XQGHU WKH (3$ WKH SROLFH XVHG WKHLU SRZHUV SULPDULO\ IRU
intelligence gathering: ³,QD WZHOYH-month period during 1977±78, 2,800 people were 
arrested under the three-day detention powers, of which 35 per cent were subsequently 
FKDUJHGXVXDOO\RQWKHEDVLVRIFRQIHVVLRQVH[WUDFWHGGXULQJLQWHUURJDWLRQ´(OOLVRQand 
Smyth, 2000:99). However, being arrested and detained often resulted in individuals 
losing jobs or benefits as they would have unexplained absences which would be 
difficult and socially incriminating to justify, thereby affecting their wider families and 
communities (Walsh, 1983:63). These practices consequently served to reinforce the 
discourse of victimisation within these communities further undermining the legitimacy 
of state. For instance the Committee on the Administration of Justice concluded that the 
HPHUJHQF\SRZHUVZHUH³alienating and disproportionate to the problem´ (Committee 
on the Administration of Justice, 1983:3), with widespread social and political 
consequences for these communities (Irwin, 2003:473). The former Sinn Fein Chairman 
Mitchel McLaughlin likewise referred to this describing the role that proscription had in 
³FRUUXSWLQJWKHMXGLFLDOSURFHVV´because by broadening the criminal label to all those 
associated with republicanism ³[the British Government] criminalised an entire 
community. Ultimately it had the seeds of its own destruction built into it because the 
community wasn't going to be criminalised...whilst the IRA...were simply feeding from 
LW DQG JHWWLQJ VWURQJHU DQG VWURQJHU´ (McLaughlin, 2016). Instead of applying moral 
condemnation solely to criminal behaviour, politicising crime broadened its target, 
informally criminalising an entire political identity. 
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Moreover IRA ex-prisoners referred to how these practices served to confirm their 
political narrative of a colonial occupation. For instance, one referred to LWDV³a method, 
just another weapon in their arsenal to defeat...the RepXEOLFDQ PRYHPHQW´ (IRA ex-
prisoner A, 2016), and another IRA ex-SULVRQHUH[SODLQHG³[F]or them it's part of their 
war arsenal....I mean they set the rules in a sense, so they decide what's breaking the law 
DQGZKDWLVQ
WEUHDNLQJWKHODZ´ (IRA ex-prisoner D, 2016). For these IRA ex-prisoners 
law is viewed as a strategic pillar of the British state, one which held little, if any, 
legitimacy at all (McEvoy, 2000). An IRA ex-prisoner expOLFLWO\ VWDWHG WKLV ³The 
justice system was already undermined from the foundation of the state´ (IRA ex-
prisoner A, 2016). Therefore the politicisation of crime only served to embed the 
illegitimacy of the criminal justice system as it existed. 
 
Whereas for Loyalist ex-prisoners they referred to their respect for the rule of law and 
the legitimacy of the legal system, as one UVF ex-prisoner explained ³Apart from 
whatever laws I broke in the conflict, other than that I was upstanding, law-abiding 
citizen´ (UVF ex-prisoner B, 2016) and a UDA ex-prisoner stated: ³I'm no threat to 
anybody in a criminaOZD\DQGQHYHUZDVEHIRUHKDQG´ (UDA ex-prisoner B, 2016). Yet 
on the other hand they were highly critical of the politicisation of crimes as a UVF ex-
prisoner UHIHUUHG WR LW EHLQJ ³about thH GHKXPDQLVDWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDOV´ (UVF ex-
prisoner C, 2016), another UVF ex-SULVRQHUH[SODLQHGKRZ³[i]t was to...break the will 
RI SDUDPLOLWDULHV´ (UVF ex-prisoner B, 2016), and a UDA ex-prisoner stated that its 
purpose was ³to delegitimise the authority that the paramilitaries had first and foremost 
within the community and to water WKDWGRZQDQGFRQWDPLQDWH>LW@´ (UDA ex-prisoner 
A, 2016). By applying the moral condemnation associated with ordinary crime to 
political violence this politicised the criminal justice system and undermined its 
legitimacy even with those who supported the state. For example the UVF publication 
&RPEDWUDQWKHKHDGOLQH³%ULWLVK-XVWLFHY'LSORFN,QMXVWLFH´ (Combat, 1976b) arguing 
against the politicisation of crime ODWHUVWDWLQJ LQDQRWKHUSXEOLFDWLRQ³7KHHQGLQJRI







This politicisation, however, also had longer term implications as a former UVF ex-
prisoner argued:  
³[T]he problem that I see is that they tried to treat the conflict as a massive crime 
wave, and it's coming back to haunt them now because really what they 
succeeded in doing was corrupting the criminal juVWLFH V\VWHP´ 89) H[-
prisoner A, 2016).  
Determining exactly what implications this has had in the longer-term context is 
problematic considering the range of competing factors, but at the very least it 
undermined the legitimacy of criminal justice for some of these actors and continued to 
do so until its reform. For instance Brian Gormally - Director of the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice - H[SODLQHG ³>7@he repair job on the rule of law was that 
much more extensive because of the discrediting of the normal criminal justLFHV\VWHP´ 
(Gormally, 2016). By politicising crime the criminal justice system was politicised 
itself, and continued to be perceived as such even after the peace agreement. A 
Republican community worker similarly UHIHUUHGWRKRZ³the style, the method, and the 
delivery of policing DFWXDOO\H[DFHUEDWHGSUREOHPV´ODWHUJRLQJRQWRVD\³all of which 
done irreparable damage to the rule of law, and confidence in the rule of 
law...particularly in the Republican community´ (Community worker A, 2016). Because 
policing and criminal justice applied this moral condemnation against a political identity 
this led to practices which isolated and marginalised the very communities they needed 
to build trust with. Even following the reform of these institutions and practices, they 
leave a legacy of distrust which will need to be addressed in order to ensure its 
OHJLWLPDF\ ³You see it's also about that historical memory that goes with it 
because...context becomes very important, and the context is one that is handed down 
thrRXJK IDPLOLHV´ (Community worker A, 2016). Instead of transforming relationships 
and building trust this politicisation of crime and its corresponding practices in law 
enforcement exacerbated them. 
 
In contrast in South Africa politicising offences facilitated a legal veneer over what 
were otherwise highly repressive practices. In other words, ³ODZKDG [an] instrumental 
XWLOLW\´SOD\LQJWRDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVVDQGSROLWLFDODXGLHQFHDORQJVLGHDQLQWHUQDO
White HOLWHHQVXULQJ³WKDW6RXWK$IULFDZDV a country distinguished from much of the 




of the reason for the longevity of apartheid was the VXSHUILFLDO DGKHUHQFH WR µUXOH E\
ODZ¶ E\ WKH 1DWLRQDO 3DUW\´ 75& 5HSRUW 4, 1998:101). Abiding by a legal system 
served to detract from otherwise oppressive practices in law enforcement and 
delegitimise non-state resistance. Political resistance was framed as criminal to prevent 
condemnation from the international audience and the Afrikaner community as legal 
norms were seen to be respected.  Indeed the former SADF General Constand Viljoen 
H[SODLQHGWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKLVVWDWLQJ³I think you must bear in mind that the rank 
and file Afrikaner people were politically inactive.  They sort of trusted unconditionally, 
the National Party in WKLVUHJDUG´9LOMRHQ 
 
This legal veneer enabled repressive policing practices to continue (or develop) justified 
on the basis of the moral threat of criminality. But this obviously posed direct issues for 
conflict transformation, as rather than the police seeking to prevent criminal acts, their 
role increasingly became part of the problem, as thH\ ³deliberately reproduced 
traditional social cleavages rather than [attempt@WRPHGLDWHWKHPLPSDUWLDOO\´ (Brewer, 
1994:334). Unrest was met with police brutality due to poor training, equipment, and 
under-staffing stretching the capacity of the SAP in handling public order situations. 
This led to a reliance on lethal force to foster an environment of fear as the best means 
of imposing regulations (Hornberger, 2011:36). What had previously been isolated 
incidents of excessive violence, develRSHG LQWR ³V\VWHPDWLF EUXWDOLW\´ (Brewer, 1994: 
PHDQLQJ³EUXWDOLW\ZDVDGHILFLHQF\PDGHLQWRDGHIDFWRVWUDWHJ\OHJLWLPLVHGDQG
normalised by the law and the legal syVWHP´ +RUQEHUJHU  For instance an 
MK ex-prisoner outlined his own experiences of arrest and detention ³I was then 
arrested. I was severely tortured...they kept kicking and beating...put me against the 
ZDOO WKUHDWHQLQJ WR VKRRW PH ZLWK WKHLU OLYH SLVWRO´ 0. H[-prisoner A, 2016). Such 
accounts are corroborated by the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
ZKLFK GRFXPHQWHG DQG LQYHVWLJDWHG PDQ\ RI WKHVH FODLPV FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW ³JURVV
YLRODWLRQVRIKXPDQULJKWVZHUHSHUSHWUDWHGRUIDFLOLWDWHGE\´WKHVWDWHVHFXULW\DQGODZ
enforcement agencies (TRC Report 5, 1998:209). For instance in referring to public 
order policing the TRC remarked that it ³GLVSOD\HGDJURVVGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHOLYHVDQGRU
physical well-being of both those engaged in political activity as well as the general 
SXEOLF´75&5HSRUW:182). This is evident in how non-violent actors were often 
made explicit targets in the use of lethal force (Haysom, 1987), the extent and nature of 
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detentions,12 and the use of fear and torture (Hornberger, 2011; TRC Report 2, 1998). In 
practice many subject to such criminalisation never made to the courts, were detained 
for prolonged lengths of time, or tortured into giving confessions.  
 
Politicising crime underpinned these practices by broadening the legal boundaries of 
what such agencies could do, whereby being of a particular skin colour itself made you 
a suspect. This same MK ex-SULVRQHU H[SODLQHG ³7KH V\VWHP ZDV VR EDG WKDW LI DQ\
crime has been committed in that area and they saw a black women or black man 
SDVVLQJ >WKH\ ZRXOG VD\@ µ7KH\
UH WKH FULPLQDO¶´ 0. H[-prisoner A, 2016). Such 
practices were not necessarily caused by politicising crime, but it became constitutive of 
them with distinctions between political actors and criminals being blurred. This is 
witnessed particularly in political trials, such as the Rivonia Treason Trial, where 
George Bizos H[SODLQHG³The propaganda of the State at the time...was that these were 
JDQJVWHUV >DQG@ WHUURULVWV´ (Bizos, 2007). Such views contrast acutely with that of the 
Minister of Justice who, when introducing thH7HUURULVP %LOO  VWDWHG ³[We] are 
going to try [the terrorists] in our courts in accordance with the norms of a civilised 
FRPPXQLW\´ (Hansard, 1 June 1967, col 7024). So the politicisation of crimes in South 
Africa was not really about creating new offences, but legitimising widened security 
powers, further embedding the illegitimacy of the criminal justice system for those 





Politicising ordinary crimes ± linking CPV with CPI - is often done by states in 
response to the onset of collective political violence in order to broaden the legal 
boundaries and enable expanded security powers. This chapter has argued that this 
politicisation is problematic for conflict transformation because of the cooption of 
criminal justice into the COIN framework. Considering each of the three main 
objectives of criminal justice ± deterrence, reform, and retribution - demonstrates this, 
                                                          
12
 It has been estimated that 80,000 were detained at some point during 1960-DVLW³UHSUHVHQWHGWKH
ILUVWOLQHRIGHIHQFHRIWKHVHFXULW\IRUFHV´75&5HSRUW'HDWKVLQSROLFHFXVWRG\ZHUHQRW




as the way in which they apply to ordinary offenders breaks down when applied to 
political actors for three reasons: (1) it is ineffective at deterring violence because 
political actors perceive the costs of criminal sanctions differently from ordinary 
offenders; (2) that reform becomes a site of resistance for political actors, as it becomes 
designed to break their political resolve; and (3) that punishment for offences directs 
moral outrage against both the acts of political violence, but also the motivations as 
well. Table 10 summarises this by contrasting how these approaches fundamentally 
differed for ordinary crime and political violence. 
 
While increasing the certainty of the criminal sanction increases deterrence for ordinary 
crime, for those engaging in political violence they are already taking on significant 
risks, and so custodial sentences - or other criminal sanctions - will be very unlikely to 
act as an effective deterrent (Sarkin and Daly, 2004; McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012). 
Attempts to reform political actors are often perceived by them (and their political 
community) as a form of repression directed against their political identity, and may 
lead to prison becoming a new site of resistance. Retribution involves preventing 
impunity and responding to the moral imperative to punish criminal acts. But when 
DSSOLHG WR ERWK WKH DFWRU¶V EHKDYLRXU DQG PRWLYDWLRQ WKLV Fan result in an informal 
criminalisation of all those who share their political identity. Furthermore, law 
enforcement consequently becomes directed against this criminalised political identity - 
if it had not already been so ± and the moral condemnation of the criminal act becomes 
applied to this wider political community. 
 
These issues do not challenge the fundamental importance of criminal justice in 
UHVSRQGLQJWRSROLWLFDOYLROHQFHLQGHHGIRUFRQIOLFWWUDQVIRUPDWLRQSHDFHLV³HPEHGGHG
LQ MXVWLFH´ /HGHrach, 2003:10). But this chapter specifically problematises the 
assumptions underlying the politicisation of crime because it undermines conflict 
transformation. This is based on the understanding that state responses towards political 
violence can be just as problematic for the transformation of a conflict as the political 
violence itself (Toros, 2012). Instead of promoting justice, politicising crime can 
become a form of structural injustice for all the reasons outlined above, and accordingly 
operate against conflict transformation (Lederach, 2003; Maddison, 2017). Violent 
conflict will not be resolved by such an approach, only reproduced.  It will only be once 
³WKHQHHGVDQGLQWHUHVWVRIWKHSDUWLHVLQFRQIOLFWDUHOHJLWLPised and the relationships are 
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reVWUXFWXUHG WRZDUGV LQFUHDVHG HTXDOLW\ DQG MXVWLFH´ (Lloyd, 2001:304) that the 
underlying root causes will not perpetuate violence. Linking political motivation to 
crimes undermines this by closing down opportunities for dialogue and framing the 
political iVVXHVDVDµFULPLQDO¶SUREOHP 
 
These findings have a number of important implications for contemporary cases. Firstly 
PDQ\ FRQWHPSRUDU\ UHVSRQVHV WRZDUGV µWHUURULVP¶ DUH GHYHORSHG LPSOLFLWO\ IURP WKLV
COIN framework in the UK, the USA, and many other states (Cochrane, 2013; Dixon, 
2009). Indeed the convergence between COIN and counter-terrorism has been the 
subject of academic debate (Boyle, 2010). If conflict transformation is to occur in these 
contexts the continuing reliance on politicising crime runs the risk of reproducing these 
same issues. While important changes have been made to address the issues of human 
rights abuses (Dickson, 2012), there continues to be research documenting the informal 
criminalisation (McGovern and Tobin, 2010. It is important, therefore, that further 
research applies this theoretical framework to contemporary cases to evaluate the extent 
to which these same problems are emerging. Also it would be important to consider to 
what extend criminal justice could or should be used to bring about conflict 
transformation. This chapter has focussed on the challenges and not directly provided 
solutions. The following chapters build upon this to provide examples of where this 





Why negotiate when you can criminalise? Criminalising political expression and 
peace negotiations 
 
While the previous chapters have focused on criminalising political expression during a 
violent conflict, it is unclear how it operates when transitioning away from collective 
political violence. While there are various processes in this phase of a conflict, peace 
negotiations are closely interlinked with criminalisation due to their focus on the 
legitimacy of actors and their ability to communicate with each other. Therefore this 
chapter develops the theoretical arguments already established to consider how they 
relate to decriminalisation and how this may impact upon conflict transformation. 
 
Research on negotiating with the criminalised has predominantly accepted the criminal 
or terrorist label as a given even while the problems of definition and heterogeneity are 
acknowledged (Bapat, 2006; Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2011; Pruitt, 2006; Zartman, 
2003).1 However these labels represent a much broader and under-researched process of 
(de-)criminalisation shaping actor relationships, structural constraints, and issue 
salience with direct implications for negotiations. Likewise, research on conflict 
transformation has discussed the potential for negotiations to facilitate possible 
transformation whereby ³parties reach new understandings of their situation´ (Putnam, 
2004:276) and move towards resolving the ³root causes´ (Lloyd, 2001:303); yet it is not 
particularly clear what the mechanisms are which brings this about. This chapter seeks 
to draw together these bodies of research to explore how (de)criminalisation in the 
context of negotiations can facilitate conflict transformation. The intersection between 
these processes is important because they initially appear to be in tension. By 
negotiating with criminalised actors the state's ³high symbolic capital´ may enhance the 
³national and international´ legitimacy of a criminalised group (Toros, 2012:46; Toros, 
2008), whereas criminalisation is inherently a process designed to delegitimise these 
same actors (Gormally, McEvoy and Wall, 1993; Super, 2010). Furthermore, conflict 
                                                          
1
 In terms of those criminalised as terrorists and those as political criminals, the distinctions between these 
labels can often be more of design rather than substance, because whether it is done specifically under 
counter-terrorist legislation or other 'security' laws, the implications in terms of negotiation are of similar 
effect. What this chapter is discussing then is not the specific labels themselves, but the process through 
which these labels become applied. 
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transformation advocates for the resolution of underlying causes whereas negotiations 
often involve parties seeking to maximise their bargaining power and achieve the best 
outcome for their interests (Walter, 1997; Putnam, 1988). Therefore understanding 
where these processes intersect is important to understand how criminalisation affects 
negotiations and conflict transformation.  
 
This chapter accordingly argues that criminalisation embodies an important incentive 
structure which can facilitate conflict transformation in particular contexts, but also 
undermines it depending on its target and implementation. Specifically, focusing on the 
criminalisation of non-violent political expression, this typically impedes, or at least 
constrains, conflict transformation. This is because it undermines dialogue, 
dehumanises actors, and embodies structural constraints. Therefore conflict 
transformation may be facilitated through some form of decriminalisation; the timing 
and nature of which varies depending on the wider context. However, this needs to be 
qualified, because decriminalisation can contribute towards intergroup polarisation, 
alienating actors who perceive justice as being compromised. In other words, what is 
needed for conflict transformation to occur is not necessarily decriminalisation or 
criminalisation in general, but a reorientation of criminalisation away from actors and 
on to specific acts, thereby legitimising non-violent political expression and 
negotiations. Of course, while this may help facilitate wider conflict transformation, on 
its own it will have limited impact on a peace process unless it is accompanied by the 
bottom-up buy-in of communities into the reorientation itself.  
 
Building on the typology of criminalising political expression developed in chapter one, 
non-violent political expression2 needs to be disaggregated into two categories: (1) the 
criminalisation of political identity (CPI); and (2) the criminalisation of political 
activities (CPA). This is because, while interrelated, they can have different 
implications for negotiations. This focus is also important to distinguish the 
criminalisation of political expression from ordinary crime, because criminalising 
political expression collectivises an offence beyond those who commit it, both formally 
and informally, criminalising the political ideology itself and those who support it 
(Breen-Smyth, 2014). Because of the subjective and informal nature of such a process, 
                                                          
2
 This chapter is not discussing the criminalisation of political violence (CPV) because the implications of 
this are different to non-violence and would extend the discussion beyond the limits of the chapter. 
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this chapter utilises the multilevel framework of conflict transformation to understand 
the ³complex and evolving conflict relationships´ which characterise peace negotiations 
(Cochrane, 2012:184). This is done across the three primary levels of transformation 
within a conflict (actor, issue, and structure) discussing how criminalisation constrained 
or facilitated transformation for each of these levels.3 From this perspective negotiations 
are part of a wider process of transformation. This chapter is evaluating what impact 
criminalisation may have in the transformation of the underlying causes of violent 
conflict across these levels. This is summarised in Table 11 and broken down across 
each of the levels of transformation for CPI and CPA.  
 
The first section of this chapter will, therefore, explain the relationship between 
criminalisation and negotiations through the framework of conflict transformation. The 
following sections will then apply this for each of the levels of conflict transformation 
through a two case comparative study of Northern Ireland and South Africa building 
upon the analysis of chapters three and four. This is specifically in terms of the formal 
negotiations leading up to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the 1994 South African 
elections. These periods and peace negotiations were chosen because they relate to key 
changes in terms of CPI and CPA whether through de-proscribing organisations or 
prisoner releases. They therefore represent important typical cases of how CPE can 
impact upon peace negotiations. The variation between the two cases in terms of the 
extensiveness of criminalisation/decriminalisation enables the formal legal processes to 
be contrasted in relation to their distinct implementation and consequences (see Table 
12 for more). This analysis will be followed by a discussion of possible policy 







                                                          
3
 Context has not been included because criminalisation is contingent upon changes in the context and so 
these will be taken into account in analysing the other three levels of transformation. 
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Table 11. Relationship between CPI/CPA and negotiations across the levels of conflict 
transformation 
 Criminalisation of Identity (CPI) Criminalisation of Activity (CPA) 
Structure - Intergroup interaction is 
restricted as the communities 
associated with criminalised 
groups are alienated from the 
state 
- Forces groups underground, 
restricting opportunities to 
develop a political base 
- Exacerbates the credible 
commitment problem due to 
ongoing sanctions for 'political' 
acts  
Issue - Contributes towards issue 
polarisation along polemic 
'criminal' narratives which in 
turn leads to challenges of 
audience costs 
- (De-)Criminalisation embodies 
an issue itself to be negotiated 
in terms of political prisoners, 
reform of criminal justice and 
decriminalisation 
Actor - Frames actor legitimacy for 
both state and non-state actors 
- Contributes towards actor 
dehumanisation whereby 
reforms are framed as giving in 
to criminality creating 
opportunities for ethnic 
outbidding 
- The enforcement of such 
criminalisation may alienate 
law enforcement from targeted 
communities as they are 





Labelling crime or the crime of labelling 
 
Negotiation at its most fundamental level is a process whereby multiple actors engage in 
communication to resolve one or more issues. In the context of civil conflicts this may 
be over any number of issues, but this chapter is solely concerned about formal 
QHJRWLDWLRQVRYHUDSHDFHVHWWOHPHQW )RUVXFKQHJRWLDWLRQV WREH µVXFFHVVIXO¶ IURPD
conflict transformation approach it has been argued they must address ³root causes´ 
(Lloyd, 2001:303), rather than simply the immediate causes of the conflict. Setting aside 
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the challenge of identifying root causes, this arguably places too much responsibility on 
negotiations alone, and arguably a more effective framework would be that negotiations 
simply contribute towards a wider process of transformation. Single processes such as 
negotiations do not themselves complete conflict transformation, only contribute 
towards it. Table 10 summarises how such interactions take place, but it is worth 
explaining first how this theoretical link is developed, before then considering it through 
the discussion of the case studies.  
 
The structural level represents the system which embeds violent forms of conflict, 
where goals are no longer framed as incompatible, identities as polarised, and violence 
as the only - or most effective - means by which to address these (Cochrane, 2012; 
Miall, 2004; Väyrynen, 1991). This often involves a redistribution of power between 
actors, addressing underlying grievances, and opening up peaceful political avenues to 
displace violent ones. Criminal justice has a considerable role in such transformations, 
in framing not only what is legitimate, but also in establishing sanctions, or in providing 
opportunities for compromise. Yet the criminalising of non-violent political expression, 
particularly CPA, embeds a number of structural barriers to negotiations, such as 
censorship and restrictions on movement, which may require some form of 
decriminalisation before actors may be willing, or even able, to engage in negotiations. 
CPI embeds and reinforces this by restricting opportunities for intergroup dialogue as 
expressions of political identities are reduced to criminality.  
 
Moreover, so long as non-state actors face the threat of sanctions for non-violent 
political expression, they will be unlikely to trust the state's commitment to negotiations 
(Kirschner, 2010; Lake and Rothchild, 1996). This embodies the issue of credible 
FRPPLWPHQWDV³FRPEDWDQWVDUHXQVXUHZKHWKHUWKHLURSSRQHQWZLOOXSKROGWKHWHUPVRI
a peace deal if future FLUFXPVWDQFHV FKDQJH´ DV LW UHTXLUHV DFWRUV EHLQJ DEOH WR
³FRQYLQFH WKHLURSSRQHQWV WKDW WKH\ZLOO UHPDLQ WUXVWZRUWK\ LQ WKH IXWXUH´ .LUVFKQHU
2010:747). CPI and CPA together exacerbate these credible commitment issues as they 
signal an unwillingness or incapability ± due to audience costs as will be explained 
below ± to commit to the terms of a peace negotiation. Accordingly, criminalised 
groups may be forced to operate covertly restricting their ability to develop a non-
violent political base or communicate their political objectives. Furthermore, it relates to 
the importance of enabling actors to return from exile or to be released from prison in 
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order to engage in the negotiations themselves. However, while this may facilitate a 
more equitable distribution of power, it can also undermine the bargaining power of the 
state by giving away important concessions. Therefore, on the one hand providing 
concessions in terms of CPI and CPA can foster necessary trust and cooperation for 
negotiations, on the other it represents an important bargaining device. Understanding 
how these two challenges are reconciled relates to the level of issue transformation. 
 
Issue transformation involves determining which issues are more salient, moving actors 
away from conflictual positions to issues where commonality can be found (Cochrane, 
2012; Miall, 2004; Väyrynen, 1991). Criminalising political expression is closely linked 
to such issue framing, representing both an issue itself in terms of CPI, and a 
mechanism through which issues are framed because of CPA. Firstly the reverse of such 
criminalisation - decriminalisation - may be used as a bargaining tool to incentivise 
movement on other issues. Releasing prisoners, reforming law enforcement, de-
proscribing organisations, all represent important bargaining issues which the state may 
use to leverage concessions.  
 
The implications of such decriminalisation, however, are contingent on their informal 
outworking, as, although actors may be granted some form of formal pardon or 
amnesty, this will not address the embedded discourse of the criminal narrative as 
outlined in chapters three and four. While decriminalisation may address the structural 
issues described above, it will be unlikely to address informal criminalisation. 
Specifically for negotiations this means that decriminalisation will be interpreted 
differently across the various actors, fostering agreement and trust with some, while 
isolating others. This links into the second point, whereby the salience of the criminal 
'issue' will frame how decriminalisation actually takes effect, as polemic criminal 
narratives determine how actors perceive the negotiation process itself. When group 
identities are labelled as criminal, this frames intergroup identities into dichotomies like 
victim/perpetrator (Bhatia, 2005). Negotiations in such contexts are defined by these 
identities, with actors framing their positions along these polarised lines - for example 
that they will not negotiate with terrorists. This is because narratives of victimisation 
tend to ³minimise the context and extend the time frame of the event forward and 
backward in time´, whereas perpetrators tend to ³attribute the event to outside causes, 
minimize the impact on the victim and see the event as a moment in time´ (Pemberton 
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and Aarten, 2017:6).  Indeed, reflecting on the conflict in Northern Ireland, the former 
%ULWLVK 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU 7RQ\ %ODLU H[SODLQHG ³[H]uman nature being what it is, the 
victim group regards the perpetrator group, not just the perpetrators, as resSRQVLEOH´
(Blair, 2010:153).  
 
These challenges of informal criminalisation contribute towards the further problem of 
DXGLHQFH FRVWV %\ IUDPLQJ WKH µRWKHU¶ JURXS DV FULPLQDO WKURXJK &3, DQG &3$ WKH
state signals its commitment to the discourse of criminality whereby reversing it would 
LQFXUD³FRVWIRUEDFNLQJGRZQ´0RRQDQG6RXYD,QWKLVZD\QHJRWLDWLRQV
are themselves perceived as potentially threatening to group identity, requiring the state 
WRVRPHKRZFRPPXQLFDWHWKDW WKHµWKUHDW¶KDVWUDnsformed  and be prepared to justify 
why these criminalised actors are now legitimate negotiating partners. Otherwise, issues 
under negotiation will be defined by the label - terrorist or criminal - and so a polarised 
label will lead to polarised ways of addressing them (Putnam, 2010:148). This can be 
problematic for negotiations, as issues under negotiation are embedded in a zero-sum 
framework, so some reframing of these identities away from criminals or terrorists 
towards political actors may help facilitate the development of trust and dialogue 
(Fierke, 2009; Fisher and Ury, 2011). 
 
The transformation of actors refers to changes in leadership, goals, or power relations 
between groups in such a way that will change the nature of the conflict itself 
(Cochrane, 2012; Miall, 2004). While this may involve a change in the actors 
themselves, criminalisation primarily impacts actors in terms of how they are perceived: 
their framing. CPI frames their political ideologies as illegitimate and polarises 
intergroup relations, determining which actors are deemed legitimate or not. This relates 
to both the state and non-state actors, as an oppressive criminal justice system may 
undermine the legitimacy of the state within certain communities, while the state's 
criminal framing may likewise undermine non-state actors (Bhatia, 2005). The 
significance of CPI and CPA therefore depends on how it is perceived and 
implemented, for instance for actors who regard the state as illegitimate already 
criminalisation will only serve to reinforce this perception, whereas for those non-state 
actors who may support the state, these powers may have a significant impact on their 




Conversely the reverse of these powers may undermine support for the state by actors 
who are in favour of their continuation, providing opportunities for more extreme actors 
to emerge through ethnic outbidding (DeVotta, 2005; Moore et al., 2014). Groups who 
are unwilling to compromise on the issues of CPI and CPA may use the concessions 
granted by the state or non-VWDWH DFWRUV DV HYLGHQFH RI WKHLU EHWUD\DO RI WKHLU JURXS¶V
interests. This ethnic outbidding reflects the wider challenges associated with informal 
criminalisation as explained in chapters three and four, that CPI and CPA embed a 
SDUWLFXODU VRFLDO UHDOLW\ RI WKH µFULPLQDO RWKHU¶ ZKLFK FRQWULEXWHV WRZDUGV LQWHUJURXS
polarisation. Concessions from this perspective are perceived as threats to group 
identity. Therefore, in order to address this, political leaders must ensure that they have 
bottom-up support for the negotiated agreement, otherwise they may be unable to 
actually deliver upon it, thereby leading to the credible commitment issues discussed 
above. 
 
Secondly, CPI reduces actors to simple characterisations as the criminal other, 
effectively dehumanising individuals and groups, rather than recognising their inherent 
emotional, political, and social identities (Toros, 2012). These characterisations vary 
considerably between and within cases because they are contingent on the communities 
whom actors derive support from and their relationship with the state. Entering 
negotiations with such actors therefore requires reframing these identities according to 
their wider political motivations. In other words, while negotiations may build empathy 
and trust between the various parties, a wider informal decriminalisation will need to 
take place in order to secure the buy-in from the communities elites represent. This does 
QRWPHDQWKDWWKHµFULPHV¶RISROLWLFDOYLROHQFHZKLFKKDYHEHHQcommitted by all sides 
should be forgiven or forgotten, just that these actors should not be defined solely by 
these single identities. Indeed these crimes will need to be addressed as part of the wider 







Table 12. Comparison of CPI/CPA between Northern Ireland and South Africa in 
relation to negotiations 






- Proscription or restricting 
of certain cultural symbols 
(i.e. flags and emblems) 




- Most political 
organisations opposed to 
the state were banned 
- Meetings, publications, 





- Political (non-violent) 
republicanism and loyalism 
delegitimised as criminal 
because of links with 
paramilitaries to varying 
extents 
- Decriminalisation 
embodied a crucial 
issue itself to be 
negotiated in terms of 
political prisoners and 




- Communism label used to 
delegitimise many non-
state political groups 
Actor Northern 
Ireland 
- Linkages between political 
groups and violent 
counterparts embedded the 
terrorism/criminal label for 
both 
- Law enforcement 
perceived as a Unionist 
institution and 





- Dehumanisation of groups 
through the communist 
label 
- Non-Whites and anti-
state activists feared 






Individually each of these levels identifies specific ways the criminalisation of political 
expression may impact upon negotiations which, when brought together, illustrate the 
complexity of the relationship. This chapter is not seeking to resolve these complexities, 
but merely consider their development and potential implications for negotiations. 
Taking conflict as an opportunity and viewing negotiations as an important mechanism 
of transformation, conflict transformation provides an effective framework through 
which to consider the complexities of criminalisation through the case studies of 
Northern Ireland and South Africa. The two cases are themselves distinct with respect to 
the level of criminalisation, but both provide typical examples of how CPI and CPA 
may operate in the context of negotiations. Table 12 summarises these issues in relation 
to the two case studies. The remainder of this chapter will consider each these 
arguments across the levels of transformation. 
 
 
Structural transformation: Criminalisation as a barrier or enabler 
 
South Africa prior to the formal negotiations which began in 1990 represents a context 
in which there was widespread criminalisation of political expression. As explained in 
chapters three and four, at this time it was illegal to be a member of any proscribed 
group, communicate their political views, meet together, finance, or support in any 
form, punishable with custodial sentences (Dugard, 1978). For this reason the African 
National Congress (ANC) made the unbanning of itself alongside other political groups 
- the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) - 
a non-negotiable prerequisite to formal negotiations as it was considered a clear and 
unassailable impediment. For example, ³from around late 1986 onwards´ almost every 
uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) operative entering South Africa from Zimbabwe was 
allegedly ³killed or arrested within 24 hours´ (Simpson, 2009:508-9).4 The ANC 
vocalised their position in the Harare Declaration where they put forward their 
preconditions for entering into formal negotiations with the National Party (NP). It 
explained that the ANC would go on ceasefire if the State ended the state of emergency, 
released political prisoners, de-proscribed political organisations, and withdrew troops 
from Black townships (Simpson, 2009:511). 
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These conditions were based in the fear of being arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise 
punished, as it was an ever-present reality for ANC negotiators. Joe Slovo referred to 
this explaining ³I would say that quite a proportion [of the ANC National Executive 
Committee] felt that we could be led into a trap´ (Slovo, 1994). Likewise, Nelson 
Mandela explained their rationale in his response to being offered conditional release if 
the MK went on ceasefire:  
³What freedom am I being offered while the organisation of the people remains 
banned...What freedom am I being offered when my very South African 
citizenship is not respected? Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter 
into contracts´ (Mandela, 1994a:623).  
So long as non-state actors face the threat of imprisonment they will face issues of 
credible commitment distrusting the state. Entering negotiations incurs a risk for these 
groups, so unless they trust that they will not end up imprisoned, or otherwise 
sanctioned - that they can be sure they will survive their ³initial vulnerability´ - they 
will be unlikely to engage in negotiations (Bapat, 2005:699). This is particularly 
relevant when conflicts are protracted, as actors will be even less likely to trust their 
opponents (Kirschner, 2010:760), and criminalising political activities presents one 
mechanism through which this distrust becomes embedded. This is because the very 
structure of criminal justice was designed to engage with these groups as criminals, not 
as political actors. Indeed, when announcing the reversal of the proscription of these 
groups De Klerk implied as much - even while he denied such an implication - stating: 
³The unconditional lifting of the prohibition on the said organisations places everybody 
in a position to pursue politics freely´ (S. African Parliament, 1990a). The inference 
was that previously the liberation organisations had been unable to pursue politics freely 
because of the criminal sanctions and restrictions. Later De Klerk made this even more 
explicit stating:  
³7KH *RYHUQPHQW HPEDUNHG RQ D GHOLEHUDWH SURJUDPPH RI UHPRYLQJ
impediments perceived to have been standing in the way of full participation in 
the political process....Opportunity for peaceful protest within the law was 
broadened. In October last year eight persons serving life sentences were freed 
unconditionally´ (S. African Parliament, 1990b).  
The impediments referred to are linked directly to the opportunities for peaceful protest 
and political imprisonment, acknowledging that these were barriers to the negotiations, 
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DOEHLW ZLWK WKH TXDOLILFDWLRQ RI WKHP EHLQJ ³SHUFHLYHG´ By removing these structural 
barriers it helped facilitate trust and signify a symbolic shift. For instance Dennis 
GoldbHUJ H[SODLQHG ³7KH ORJLF RI WKH VLWXDWLRQ ZDV JRLQJ WR UHTXLUH YDULRXV DFWV RI
PRUHRUOHVVJRRGIDLWK%HFDXVH\RXFDQ
WQHJRWLDWHZLWKRXWJRRGIDLWK´DQGEHFDXVHRI
KLVUHOHDVHIURPSULVRQ³LWVHHPHGWRPHWKDWZHZHUHHQWHULQJDSKDVH- a new phase of 
SROLWLFV´*ROGEHUJ The release of political prisoners and concessions relating to 
the de-proscription of the political organisation, were therefore regarded as key trust-
building measures which helped facilitate the next stage of the negotiations. 
 
But decriminalisation also served a more pragmatic end, as it facilitated a re-balancing 
of power relations between the ANC and the National Party whereby ³ANC leaders 
could legitimise the move to negotiation in terms of its position of strength´ (Lieberfeld, 
2000:32).5 As they no longer faced the same level of political repression, it became 
significantly easier to mobilise political support and communicate their goals beyond 
their immediate communities. Indeed de-proscription enabled the ANC to raise 
awareness of its political position in White communities, as previously censorship had 
meant many still viewed them as a criminal organisation (Lieberfeld, 2002:366). 
Furthermore, CPA has previously forced many anti-apartheid activists to operate in 
exile, externalising their voice and developing an international communicative strategy, 
as had similarly taken place in Northern Ireland, evident in the anti-apartheid movement 
and Irish-American critique of the British policy (Cochrane, 2007; Gurney, 2000).  
 
Removing the criminal sanction began the process of challenging intergroup 
characterisations, opening up opportunities for dialogue where previous criminalisation 
had closed them off. Conflict transformation was, therefore, partially facilitated through 
this transformation of criminalisation, as the structural barriers embodied in the criminal 
sanctions were addressed, and as new opportunities emerged for non-violent political 
expression. The threat of sanctions were removed so that issues of credible commitment 
could be partially addressed (others still remained as will be discussed later). 
                                                          
5
 It is worth noting that the NP may have also seen these compromises as necessary in order to 
consolidate their own political power at this time due to mounting domestic unrest and international 
sanctiRQV)RUH[DPSOH-RH6ORYRDUJXHG³I think he concluded that the longer they wait before taking an 
LQLWLDWLYH WKHZHDNHUSRVLWLRQ WKH\ZRXOGEH LQ´ 6ORYR/LNHZLVH'HQQLV*ROGEHUJDUJXHG WKDW




Furthermore, the power imbalance between actors was partially ameliorated as many 
key actors who had been forced into exile, and others imprisoned for political offences, 
could now participate in negotiations. 
 
Conversely in Northern Ireland negotiations took place without any formal 
decriminalisation of political groups, but this was because the British Government had 
not formally criminalised political organisations, as had been the case in South Africa. 
While the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and (after 1992) 
the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) were all criminalised, the communities they 
represented also had political, non-violent organisations to which each of these 
proscribed groups were unofficially affiliated: Sinn Fein, the Progressive Unionist 
Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party (Spencer, 2008). Not criminalising those 
engaged in political violence would have potentially risked the state being viewed as 
weak, or potentially resulted in a more repressive militarised response, but by limiting it 
to violent groups this kept open important political channels.6 Non-violent political 
groups were not only legal, but they also had varying electoral mandates, providing a 
legitimate alternative to political violence. These groups provided the British 
Government with alternatives to terrorist groups, albeit informally affiliated, meaning 
they could enter into negotiations without the same backlash associated with audience 
costs (Byman, 2006). For instance, an IRA ex-prisoner explained: ³[T]hey didn't need to 
de-proscribe the IRA in order to have negotiations, because they could negotiate with 
Sinn Fein and that was the way around it´ (IRA ex-prisoner D, 2016). Peaceful political 
expression was not restricted in the same way it was in South Africa in terms of having 
political representation enabling groups to enter negotiations without formally being 
decriminalised.  
 
It is important to contextualise this, however, as although these organisations were not 
decriminalised at this point, they had been earlier in the conflict. Three organisations 
had actually been de-proscribed, beginning with Republican Clubs in 1972, followed by 
Sinn Fein and the UVF in 1974, although the UVF was later re-proscribed. These 
examples provide an interesting contrast to South Africa, as de-proscription in the case 
of Republican Clubs was done to enable members to participate in local elections (UK 
                                                          
6
 The problem was it was not limited to political violence alone particularly regarding restrictions on 
cultural symbols and censorship. See Table 12. 
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Parliament, 1973b), whereas for Sinn Fein and the UVF it was ³to encourage political 
GLDORJXH WR WDNHSODFH ZLWKLQ WKH3URYLQFH´ 8.3DUOLDPHQW  c288). In this way 
deproscribing the organisation removed a number of legal barriers to political 
participation as was similarly the case in South Africa. Indeed while there had been 
consistent pressure on the British Government to re-proscribe Sinn Fein they resisted 
WKLV E\ H[SODLQLQJ ³I believe that it is better to deal with terrorists by pursuing and 
prosecuting people for criminal offences that they commit rather than for the views that 
WKH\KROGRUWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQVWRZKLFKWKH\EHORQJ´ (UK Parliament, 1984). While this 
argument is not entirely consistent with the actual policies of CPI and CPA at the time 
(see chapter four), it at least reflects the understanding that proscription would have 
closed off important avenues for dialogue, or at the very least been counterproductive in 
terms of propaganda. Focusing on the criminal behaviours of political violence meant 
that when it came to the negotiations the barriers were not as significant as was the case 
in South Africa. 
 
While political activities were not criminalised to the same extent in Northern Ireland, 
there were still restrictions on political expression in terms of censorship, evident in the 
censorship of Sinn Fein publications and public statements from 1988 until the IRA 
ceasefire in 1994 (Kingston, 1995; Powell, 2008). This was done through the 
broadcasting ban whereby the British Government censored political expression of both 
illegal and some legal organisations. Instead of engaging with the men and women 
responsible for continuing violence, censorship ³demonised´ them and their 
organisation so that sections of the public were not really aware of their political goals 
(Powell, 2008:166). This was problematic for conflict transformation because while 
many rejected the political violence of the IRA, a significant proportion of the Catholic 
population shared at least some of the political aspirations of Sinn Fein (Moxon-
Browne, 1981). Mitchel McLaughlin, the former General Secretary of Sinn Fein, 
explained: ³[The British Government] silenced the voice of controversy so that all you 
got was a kind of a monologue EXW HYHQ WKDWGLGQ¶WZRUN ,W REYLRXVO\ FUHDWHGKXJH
difficulties and challenges. People overcome it´ (McLaughlin, 2016). Resisting this then 
took the form of murals and other symbols, as an IRA ex-prisoner described: 
³[G]raffiti...was important at the time because the state were in total control of all other 
expressions of citizenship´ (IRA ex-prisoner E, 2016). Therefore, decriminalising 
political activities was important for conflict transformation in terms of legitimising 
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dialogue as an alternative to political violence. So long as censorship was enforced it 
would be difficult for Sinn Fein to actually communicate their political objectives 
beyond their immediate communities, enabling others to frame them instead and usually 
in less favourable terms.7 But it played a further - perhaps more important - symbolic 
role as this censorship represented a wider denouncing of their political identity.  
 
Following the 1994 IRA ceasefire the British Government decided to end the 
broadcasting ban. Previously censorship had been justified on the basis of criminalising 
ongoing political violence,8 but once a ceasefire was announced, amongst other 
FRQWH[WXDOIDFWRUVOLNH*HUU\$GDPV¶YLVLWWRWKH86$LWEHFDPHSROLWLFDOO\SUREOHPDWLF
to maintain. Criminalisation's role in constraining negotiations was supplanted by wider 
political pressures domestically and internationally. This meant that those involved in 
the negotiations would be able to communicate their positions openly ending years of 
censorship. So while CPI and CPA can be in tension with dialogue and negotiations, its 
reform is contingent upon the state's ability and willingness to separate peaceful or 
legitimate political activities - providing the means for this to take place - from violent 
or illegitimate alternatives. 
 
 
Issue transformation: Criminality or political identity  
 
Criminalisation as a bargaining issue 
 
Criminalisation serves an important role as an issue itself, not simply in its ability to 
frame issues, but acting as an incentive structure shaping negotiations. The state will 
usually have imprisoned a number of political actors representing a barrier to 
negotiations as described above, but on the other hand its reversal has the potential to 
foster trust and provide considerable movement on other issues. For instance in 
Northern Ireland prisoner releases were used strategically as a bargaining chip by the 
British Government ³to try and prise concessions from the two sides´; a third of the 
                                                          
7
 For example the Basil Brooke the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland referred to Sinn Fein as having 
³FRQWHPSWIRU SROLWLFDO GHYHORSPHQW ZLWKRXW WKH XVH RI YLROHQFH´ +& 'HE  -XQH  YRO 
cc1100-3).  
8
 For instance Prime Minister John Major linked illegal IRA violence directly to Sinn Fein: 'Sinn Fein has 
been challenged to give up violence - it has not done so' (HC Deb 03 February 1994, vol 236 col 1024). 
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discussions during the initial meetings between the paramilitaries and the British 
Government were focussed on prison and prisoner issues (Spencer, 2008:469). 
Likewise, Republicans had resisted criminalisation since its inception, and so shortly 
after the 1994 IRA ceasefire Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams called for the 
abandonment of ³the whole range of repressive legislation´ and the release of all 
political prisoners (An Phoblacht, 1994a). In the same way the Republican publication 
An Phoblacht [Republican News] later published a list of all ³Irish Republican Political 
Hostages´ calling for their release (An Phoblacht, 1994b). Indeed a comparative study 
completed by the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of 
Offenders (NIACRO) in 1995 concluded that: ³[W]e would argue that, until the 
question of prisoners is agreed then nothing, that will create a final solution, is agreed´ 
(Gormally and McEvoy, 1995:43). Such was the prominence of political prisoners as a 
key issue in the negotiations that if not properly addressed the likelihood for a 
sustainable peace agreement would greatly diminish. Similarly, for Loyalists ³a review 
of prison sentences would have been a way to counter the overall perception that there 
has been no real movement´ (Schulze, 1997:106; Powell, 2008). The UVF publication 
Combat reflected this, DUJXLQJ WKDW ZKLOH ³WKH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQW DUH Fontemplating 
sending IRA prisoners...back to Ireland....Loyalist prisoners welfare groups have been 
WU\LQJWRDFKLHYHWKHUHWXUQRIWKHLUPHQIRUVRPHWLPHEXWWRQRDYDLO´&RPEDW
Prisoner issues were accordingly of great importance to both sides, but concessions 
granted to one were perceived relative to the other. For these reasons the key security 
legislation - the Emergency Powers Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act - were 
repealed on 25 August 1996 and 19 February 2001 respectively, and rules on remission 
were revised.9  Such concessions signalled a willingness to reach a mutually acceptable 
agreement contributing towards inter-party trust in the negotiations.  
 
This prioritisation of decriminalisation is not surprising considering the key role which 
prisoners played in the negotiations themselves. For example in 1997, following the 
assassination of Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) leader Billy Wright, the UDA 
prisoners took a vote in prison and two thirds voted against the peace process. The 
significance of the vote is evident in how both Ulster Unionist Party leader, David 
Trimble, and later the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, visited the 
                                                          
9
 However many of the powers and aspects of these laws became rewritten in the Terrorism Act 2000, 
raising questions about whether the repeal of these laws was anything more than symbolic. 
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Maze Prison to negotiate with the prisoners (Mitchell, 1999; Powell, 2008; Shirlow et 
al., 2010). A UVF ex-prisoner emphasised the significance of this for at least certain 
/R\DOLVWJURXSVDUJXLQJ³+DGLWQRWEHHQIRUWKHUROHRIIRUPHUSULVRQHUVZHZRXOGQ
W
be sitting here with the Good Friday Agreement....All the key protagonists within the 
89) DQG WKH 3URJUHVVLYH 8QLRQLVW 3DUW\ DUH DOO IRUPHU SROLWLFDO SULVRQHUV´ 89) H[-
prisoner C, 2016). A UDA ex-SULVRQHUVLPLODUO\UHIOHFWHGVWDWLQJ³.HHSLQJLQPLQGWKDW
I was one of those prisoners at that point, I think we were given too much of a say from 
D /R\DOLVW SRLQW RI YLHZ´ UHIHUULQJ WR KRZ WKH\ ZHUH FRQVXOWHG RQ ZKHWKHU WR JR RQ
ceasefire or not in 1993 (UDA ex-prisoner B, 2016). From these perspectives, Loyalist 
prisoners were given considerable input in the negotiations, whether as active 
negotiators themselves, or being consulted on key policy issues. Likewise an IRA ex-
prisoner explained how instrumental prisoners were in the negotiations, not necessarily 
from inside the prisons but as ex-prisoners:  
³6XEVHTXHQWO\ LQ \HDUV ZKHQ WKHSHDFH WDOks - the majority of the talking was 
being done outside [of prison] - but I mean the majority of the people who 
would be leadership of the Republican family outside had all at one stage been 
SROLWLFDOSULVRQHUV´,5$H[-prisoner B, 2016). 
In these ways the release of prisoners and prison issues were critical components of the 
wider peace negotiations. By leveraging concessions in relation to criminalisation, the 
British Government were able to foster agreement on a wider range of other issues. The 
British GRYHUQPHQW¶V FKLHIQHJRWLDWRU IURPRQZDUGV -RQDWKDQ3RZHOO UHIOHFWHG
RQWKLVH[SODLQLQJ³>3@ULVRQHUUHOHDVHLVDFUXFLDOSDUWRIDQ\SHDFHSURFHVVRIWKLVNLQG
with prisoners usually being the members of a terrorist movement most in favour of a 
lastLQJ SHDFH´ 3RZHOO  7KHUHIRUH LW ZDV important to leverage the 
concessions relating to criminalisation against wider support for the peace agreement.  
 
Furthermore, the participation in the negotiations itself was used to leverage issue 
transformation through the Mitchell Principles; requiring all negotiating parties to 
commit to non-violence and democratic resolution of conflict. Doing so set the non-
violent process of negotiations as a clear alternative to political violence; the two would 
not coincide, although this was implemented later on in the peace talks with the entry of 




Similarly in South Africa issues relating to CPI and CPA were used to facilitate trust 
and encourage dialogue. As alluded to above, this included the unbanning of various 
political organisations, release of numerous political prisoners, and amendments to 
VHFXULW\UHJXODWLRQVZKLFKZHUHMXVWLILHGE\'H.OHUNDVUHIOHFWLQJ³WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
declared intention to noUPDOLVH WKH SROLWLFDO SURFHVV LQ 6RXWK $IULFD´ (S. African 
Parliament, 1990a). By granting these concessions, therefore, the state not only removed 
the material barriers of CPA to negotiations, but was also able to signal a willingness to 
negotiate. Indeed over the course of the subsequent negotiations various other issues 
were granted. For example, during 1990-91 indemnity was granted to various categories 
of offenders; sentences were shortened for others; and others were simply released with 
no clear legal justification (Mallinder, 2009:30). The NP also had serious concerns over 
state actors being taken to court over past actions under the Apartheid regime evident in 
the Further Indemnity Act 151 (1992), which De Klerk argued was ³to level the playing 
field between the government and opposition group´ (Mallinder, 2009:40). In this way 
the issues of CPA and CPI framed a considerable amount of the negotiations and were 
used by all sides to leverage concessions on other issues. Eventually the debate moved 
towards the proposal that became realised in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
of conditional amnesties granted in exchange for truth recovery. In this way, 
negotiations reframed what criminalisation meant, as all sides sought to resolve the 
issues of criminalisation historically, presently, and also for the future. For example 
Nelson Mandela emphasised the importance of consistency; that state crimes should be 
dealt with in the same way as those of non-state actors:  
³You have people who committed offence in their opposition to apartheid and 
vice versa, you have people who committed offences in defence of 
apartheid...We want to be consistent. To apply the same guidelines to those who 
committed the same offence in defence of apartKHLG´0DQGHODE 
This was important for the ANC as it required disclosure of such offences so that they 
too would have to be transparent about what they did in defence of apartheid. Therefore, 
while concessions on decriminalisation can build trust, acting as ³a radical new political 
opportunity structure´, they also embody a narrative ³battlefield´, as actors on all sides 
seek to legitimise their narrative through decriminalisation (Campbell and Connolly, 
2012:11). Conflict transformation in this sense is constrained by the inter-party 
bargaining dynamics. But the role it has in reframing the issues themselves is arguably 





While decriminalisation can be used as a bargaining issue facilitating movement at the 
negotiation table, this must be understood in the context of its implications beyond the 
negotiators themselves. The framing of non-state actors as criminals or terrorists 
contributes towards a narrative of conflict which denies the political legitimacy of the 
actors involved. As explained in earlier chapters this contributes towards the 
polarisation of actors along polemic lines embedding fundamentally divergent 
perspectives. This is problematic for conflict transformation in respect of CPI and CPA, 
because it delegitimises not only non-violent political expression, but also the political 
ideology and actors themselves. In other words, when an actor then enters negotiations 
with the criminalised other this can undermine their own legitimacy because dialogue is 
perceived as threatening to in-JURXSLGHQWLW\1HJRWLDWLQJZLWKWKHFULPLQDOµRWKHU¶FDQ
VLJQDO ZHDNQHVV E\ µEDFNLQJ GRZQ¶ IURP SUHYLRXVO\ HVWDEOLVKHG WKUHDWV 7KH
negotiations may be perceived as giving into terrorism or criminality, directly relating to 
the challenge of audience costs (Moon and Souva, 2016).  
 
To address this, actors will frequently enter into secret negotiations to overcome these 
challenges, at least initially. Indeed in Northern Ireland secret parallel negotiations took 
place with the paramilitaries, albeit often indirectly, and indeed had done so periodically 
since the 1970s (Ó Dochartaigh, 2011; Craig, 2014). These back-channel contacts were 
particularly important in the context of such criminalisation because they ³permit 
negotiation on the question of legitimacy without conceding legitimacy´; taking effect 
similarly in South Africa between Mandela and representatives of the NP (Ó 
Dochartaigh, 2011:768; Lieberfeld, 2000).  Furthermore, the former SADF General 
Constand Viljoen referred to secret negotiations conducted between a number of 
JHQHUDOVDQGWKH$1&LQZKHUH³WKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\WKHQVDLGµ:HZLOOQRW
participate ourselves. It is too politically sensitive. But you generals, please do so, you 
FDUU\ RQ WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV¶´ 9LOMRHQ  While the Conservative Party themselves 
could not openly engage in negotiations ± due to these issues of audience costs ± these 
generals were able to facilitate secret negotiations instead. But the challenge of moving 
out of these negotiations remains, as although certain points can be addressed in secret, 




Criminalisation itself was only one mechanism contributing towards the 
delegitimisation of these actors; others - not least political violence - make it difficult to 
deduce precisely its direct implications on intergroup relations. But at the very least it 
had a significant role as its reversal ± decriminalisation - was seen by some to be selling 
out justice for peace; letting 'criminals' get away with their crimes. Hazlett Lynch, a 
former project co-ordinator with the victims' group for security force personnel called 
West Tyrone Voice, explained that he felt certain individuals are ³above the law´ 
(Lynch, 2016), and a community worker of a victims and survivors NGO explained how 
many are asking: ³How much more do we need [to give up] to buy peace?´ 
(Community worker D, 2016) By bargaining the ability to prosecute, or for lower 
sentences, it gives rise to perceptions of justice being compromised for at least some 
individuals. Indeed this decriminalisation process will be constrained by a wider 
discursive battleground as each side seeks to legitimise its own position.  
Decriminalisation may, therefore, be perceived as both a mechanism facilitating a 
transition towards peace by some, while simultaneously as acquiescing to criminality by 
others. Indeed an IRA ex-prisoner implied the challenge this presented to the 
negotiations stating: ³Luckily for us whenever we were doing the heavy lifting in the 
QHJRWLDWLRQV LW ZDVQ
W ZLWK WKH 8QLRQLVWV LW ZDV ZLWK WKH %ULWLVK´ FODULI\LQJ WKLV E\
VD\LQJ³,ILWKDGEHHQXSWRWKH8QLRQLVWVWKHUHZRXOGQ
WKDYHEHHQDQ\SRZHUVKDULQJ´
(IRA ex-prisoner C, 2016). From this perspective Unionist actors were less likely to 
compromise and grant concessions in comparison to the British Government because 
they had much more at stake. Measures such as power-sharing were perceived as direct 
threats to their group identity not simply because it involved relinquishing power, but 
EHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHSHUFHLYHGDVµUHZDUGLQJ¶YLROHQFH)RUH[DPSOHWKH89)SXEOLFDWLRQ
&RPEDWVWDWHG³>7@KH*RYHUQPHQW LVJUDQWLQJ WKHP>WKH ,5$@FRQFHVVLRQVKDQGRYHU
ILVW LQ WKHLU DWWHPSWV WR NHHS WKHP VZHHW DQG DZD\ IURP WKH ERPE DQG WKH EXOOHW´
(Combat, 1997). As the IRA had since reneged on its ceasefire, these Loyalist actors 
SHUFHLYHGFRQFHVVLRQVJLYHQDWWKLVVWDJHDVGLUHFWO\UHZDUGLQJYLROHQFHZKHUHDV³>Q@RW
RQHFRQFHVVLRQZDVJUDQWHGWRRXUPHQ´&RPEDWIn this sense, the commitment 
to peace is contrasted to the violence of the out-group, whereby political measures 
continue to be defined in zero-sum terms. Whether it is possible or even necessary to 
address these perceptions is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it conveys how 




This was echoed in South Africa where individuals raised frustration over an elite-
driven approach resulting in many historical crimes going unaddressed. Majorie Jobson, 
Director of the victims' organisation Khulumani, explained: ³The reason the state won't 
pursue these prosecutions of Apartheid criminals is that they've got too much to hide 
themselves´ (Jobson, 2016). The perception is that justice for state crimes was traded 
away, whereas many of those who were criminalised under the Apartheid system 
continue to suffer the consequences in terms of trauma and widespread poverty. While 
the challenge of addressing such issues should not be underestimated, many feel that the 
task has never been properly acknowledged, and so will never be addressed: ³[...] the 
people who've carried all the sacrifices and damage [are unable] to get a foothold in the 
economy; as a result, you can just be ignored´ (Jobson, 2016). Decriminalisation, 
therefore, can have serious long-term implications, especially on the post-settlement 
phase, and actually undermine conflict transformation in the long-term.10 These points 
are developed more extensively, however, in chapter six. 
 
 




As explained in the introduction, there is considerable debate around the importance of 
legitimacy for negotiations, particularly in relation to terrorism (Bapat, 2006; Cronin, 
2010; Pruitt, 2006; Spector, 2003; Toros, 2008; Zartman, 2003), but for actor 
transformation this legitimacy needs to be understood as an interactive process. For on 
the one hand criminalising political expression is often explicitly about delegitimising 
the target; ruling out any form of formal dialogue because from the state's perspective. 
Brian Gormally explained, referring to the state's rationale: ³[Y]ou don't negotiate with 
criminals, you subject them to the criminal law´ (Gormally, 2016). The state will use 
criminalisation to legitimise itself, contrasting its 'legal' practices with those of the 
criminalised. For example the Minister of Justice in South Africa stated, when 
announcing the Terrorism Act: ³We are not going to reply to their violent assault with 
machine guns, but are going to try them in our courts in accordance with the norms of a 
                                                          
10
 For more discussion on this see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colm Campbell, 'The Paradox of Transition in 
Conflicted Democracies', Human Rights Quarterly, 27(2005), pp. 172-213. 
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civilised community´ (S. African Parliament, 1967). Likewise, in announcing the 
introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 
stated: ³These powers...are Draconian. In combination they are unprecedented in 
peacetime. I believe they are fully justified to meet the clear and present danger´ (UK 
Parliament, 1974b). Because of the ³campaign of indiscriminate murder´ these powers 
were deemed necessary to ³protect the innocent public´ (UK Parliament, 1974a). 
 
Yet by using the criminal justice system in this way, it can develop or reinforce the 
state's illegitimacy for those subject to it.  This is because ³the state can only confer 
legitimacy upon an entity for itself´ (Toros, 2008:413), so it is often unable to extend it 
beyond this, and may actually contribute towards the reverse. While the state may label 
a non-sWDWH DFWRU µFULPLQDO¶ WRGHOHJLWLPLVH WKHP LWV LPSDFWZLOO EHFRQWLQJHQWRQ WKH
enforcement of this labelling and the wider legitimacy the state holds. This is 
particularly problematic when linking a political identity to a criminal narrative, as it 
informally criminalises those communities which espouse these identities (Breen-
Smyth, 2014). 
 
As explained in chapter four in Northern Ireland the legitimacy of the state was 
contested from its inception by many of those from within the Republican community 
as it embodied ³WKH2UDQJHVWDWH´ (IRA ex-prisoner A, 2016).11 Therefore, rather than 
delegitimising these actors, criminalisation ZDV SHUFHLYHG DV ³FRUUXSWLQJ WKH MXGLFLDO
SURFHVV´EHFDXVH LW ³FULPLQDOLVHGDQHQWLUH FRPPXQLW\´ 0F/DXJKOLQ Loyalist 
paramilitaries similarly rejected the label of criminalisation but from a different 
perspective, as they regarded the state as legitimate, but it was the enforcement of 
criminalisation and its denial of their identity which they rejected. For instance a UVF 
ex-SULVRQHUH[SODLQHGKRZVXFKFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ³ZDVWRVWULS\RXRIDQ\LGHQWLW\´ and 
WKDW WKHSUDFWLFHVRIVHFXULW\SHUVRQQHO³XQGHUPLQHGP\VRUWRIYLHZRIP\RZQVWDWH
DQGWKHSROLFH´89)H[-prisoner B, 2016). What is interesting is how similarly those 
criminalised in South Africa regarded the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, as 
an MK ex-prisoner explained: ³IQWKLVFRXQWU\WKHUHZDVQRMXVWLFH´0.H[-prisoner A, 
$QRWKHUIRUPHUSROLWLFDOSULVRQHUHFKRHGWKLVVWDWLQJ³:HGLGQ
WHYHQLQDVHQVH
think about...whether [political violence] was legitimate or not; this state was 





LOOHJLWLPDWH´ (South African political ex-prisoner, 2016). As was the case for 
Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, the criminal label ± 
when applied through CPI or CPA - held no legitimacy and actually served to embed 
state illegitimacy.  
 
For negotiations legitimising both the state and non-state actors may, therefore, require 
some form of decriminalisation, formal and informal. In South Africa this was enabled 
partially by the ending of the Cold War, as terrorism had nearly always been expressed 
in terms of the Communist threat. The NP needed some way to 'sell' decriminalisation, 
as 58% of the White population opposed Government-ANC negotiations as reported in 
a survey from 1988 (Lieberfeld, 2000:22). Therefore the decline of communism was 
IRUWXLWRXVDVQRWHGE\-XVWLFH0LQLVWHU.RELH&RHWVHHDV³DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRQRUPDOLVH´
(Lieberfeld, 2000:23), enabling the NP to frame decriminalisation as the result of the 
decline of communism: the ANC was QR ORQJHU WKH µFommunist WKUHDW¶ LW KDG EHHQ
Displacing the communist characterisation of CPI facilitated the humanisation of the 
ANC and other groups, as they were no longer defined principally by the single 
criminalised ideology, but by their wider political goals and objectives. But in order to 
consolidate support for the process the NP still needed to communicate these reframing 
to their political base; otherwise they may not have been able to actually deliver upon an 
agreement involving significant concessions to the ANC. To address this, De Klerk 
implemented a mandate referendum in March 1992 amongst White-only voters asking 
WKHP³WRUHMHFWRUHQGRUVHKLVUHIRUPSROLFLHVWRQHJRWLDWHDQHQGWRZKLWHPLQRULW\UXOH
WKURXJKWDONVZLWKWKHEODFNPDMRULW\´/RL]LGHVDe Klerk reflected on the 
UHIHUHQGXP H[SODLQLQJ WKDW WKURXJK LW ³ZH UHDOO\ VSHOW RXW D SROLF\ ZKLFKZDV WRWDOO\
devoid of any remnant of race or colour RU UDFLDO GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ´ WKHUHE\ VKLIWLQJ WKH
political discourse of CPI (De Klerk, 1994). In this way De Klerk was able to secure 
bottom-up support for the negotiations which at least partially helped address the wider 
challenges of ethnic outbidding.12  
 
This in turn complemented the negotiation process as Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at the time, explained: ³[P]eople did get to know each other for the first time as 
human beings, as fellow South Africans [and] that their struggle from their point of 
                                                          
12
 For a wider discussion on this see Loizides (2014). 
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view [was] driven also by their love for their country´ (Botha, 1994). Instead of 
characterising those across the table as Communists, their political objectives were 
defined in their own terms, as Botha continued: ³This is also their country and not just a 
country for the Whites. They want a fair share in it´ (Botha, 1994). Similarly, Nelson 
Mandela reflected on his meetings with Botha explaining:  
³<RX UHVSRQG WR LQGLYLGXDOV LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK KRZ WKH\ LQWHUDFW ZLWK \RX ,
have heard a lot of stories about PW Botha and I don't challenge them but my 
own attitude must be determined by how he responded to me and the problems I 
SXWWRKLP´0DQGHOD. 
Instead of demonising the other Mandela reinforces the importance of actually meeting 
µWKH RWKHU¶ VR WKDW KH FRXOG GUDZ KLV RZQ FRQFOXVLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ UHO\ RQ WKH
characterisations put forward by others. Indeed he went on to explain in this interview 
KRZ%RWKDZDV³NLQG´ ³FKDUPLQJ´ DQG³UHOD[HG´DQG³WKDW LVKRZP\RZQDWWLWXGH
WRZDUGVKLPLVGHWHUPLQHG´0DQGHODReframing identities contributed towards 
this building of empathy and shared understanding which are both understood to be 
important foundations for conflict transformation. 
 
In Northern Ireland this reframing was more problematic because the links between 
political republicanism and loyalism and the 'terrorist' or 'criminal' elements were 
perceived as intertwined, and in some ways were.13 If any of the illegal organisations 
had been de-proscribed it may have been perceived as legitimising political violence 
across both communities, alienating many especially within Unionist political parties 
who would have regarded such a concession as a sign of acquiescing to criminality and 
terrorism, a pattern which is common for most proscribed groups (Pruitt, 2006:381; 
Browne and Dickson, 2010). An IRA ex-prisoner referred to this stating: ³In terms of 
negotiations...the British obviously had to keep them very secret because they couldn't 
be seen to be speaking to people they were labelling as terrorists´ (IRA ex-prisoner D, 
                                                          
13
 For instance a senior UDA ex-prisoner stated: 'I've no doubt there are people within Loyalist 
paramilitaries who have always been criminals if you like under a flag of convenience' (UDA ex-prisoner 
C, 2016); a UVF ex-prisoner explained: '[Criminality's] probably been going since the paramilitaries first 
started because, sadly human beings being what they are, once people see there's a means of making 
money or whatever people come in' (UVF ex-prisoner B, 2016). In contrast republican ex-prisoners 
explicitly denied any form of criminality, but some referred to unjustifiable incidents, albeit ones linked 
to warfare not crime: 'That is not to say that everything that the IRA were involved in was right because it 
patently wasn't and there was all sorts of slaughter and mayhem...so I wouldn't even attempt to justify any 
of those horrendous actions by the IRA' (IRA ex-prisoner C, 2016). 
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2016). This is indicative of the challenge criminalising politics embeds; framing 
political activities as criminal and embedding this over decades not only impacts elite 
discourse and policy, but also intergroup perceptions throughout communities 
(McAuley and Ferguson, 2016). Another IRA ex-prisoner explained: ³You even heard 
political leaders talking about periods of decontamination and the need to be 
housetrained´ (IRA ex-prisoner E, 2016). Indeed during the previous decade the 
political approach towards the IRA had been centred around their criminality, not 
political objectives, as former Northern Ireland Office Minister - Richard Needham -
H[SODLQHG ³7KH ,5$ DUH QRW D VHW RI 
PLQGOHVV FRZDUGV
 DV 3ROLFH 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG
2IILFHDQG*RYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVVRRIWHQFDOO WKHP´1HHGKDPTherefore, 
because of the embeddedness of the criminal identity, the 'housetraining' of actors refers 
as much to the normalisation of Republican politicians as it does their renunciation of 
violence. 
 
This is why decriminalisation is the focus as opposed to de-proscription specifically; the 
latter proffers a contextually-bound proscriptive solution, whereas decriminalisation 
allows for a much wider range of options. The formal de-proscription of a group will 
not necessarily reverse the informal perception of that group as criminal as it does not 
need to be accepted, whereas an informal decriminalisation requires much more 
comprehensive transformation and support from the bottom-up. For instance there 
needed to be a more informal process of un-labelling these groups in order to facilitate 
trust and re-legitimise non-violent republicanism. Negotiations themselves play a role in 
this as the Northern Ireland Office Political Director at the time, Quentin Thomas, 
explained that they ³de-demonised´ Sinn Fein beyond the Republican community 
(Toros, 2012:125). Negotiations conferred a level of legitimacy on to the political 
credentials of these actors. Bottom-up support was in part achieved through the building 
RISXEOLF VXSSRUW IRU WKHDJUHHPHQWDVDZKROH HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH³SROLWLFVRIFRQVHQW´
(Tonge, 2000:58).  Yet it was balanced with the continuing criminalisation of their 
violent counterparts in the IRA, UDA, and UVF. Instead of reversing the political 
discourse of criminalisation, a half-way measure was pursued to balance the political 
divide whereby the political elements within these groups were given legal means to 




Such legitimisation affected Loyalist paramilitaries differently from Republicans, as 
many within Unionist and Loyalist communities continued to view them as illegitimate 
(Mitchell, 2010; Shirlow et al., 2010). While some Loyalist communities viewed the 
paramilitaries with some legitimacy, for many it was the police and army who 
represented the legitimate defenders of their community, with paramilitaries being 
viewed as undermining the rule of law. For instance a Unionist politician explained: 
³[Y]ou grew up to respect...law and order...and that's why the UDA, which had at one 
time 50,000 people, couldn't get anybody elected´ (Unionist politician, 2016). The 
relative legitimacy that Loyalist paramilitaries held, therefore, did not necessarily 
translate into electoral support. While the reasons behind this are complex, the 
implications are quite clear, as a senior UDA ex-prisoner explained: ³You know we're 
there for a specific thing. We're there to do the dirty work. We're the skeletons in the 
cupboard. But it's the suit and the tie that they vote for and that's the way it's always 
been´ (UDA ex-prisoner C, 2016).  However, this was not the case for all in these 
communities as certain Unionist actors had a very uneasy relationship with the police. 
This was evident for instance around the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and then again at the 
Drumcree protests. Indeed in some communities Loyalist actors developed an electoral 
mandate, evident in the support for the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster 
Democratic Party (Bruce, 2001). Actor transformation through informal 
decriminalisation, therefore, varied considerably across Unionist and Loyalist 
communities. For instance, a UDA ex-prisoner referred to how he and the Loyalist 
community were side-lined during the negotiations while Republican actors were 
included³Loyalism was put out to their right hand side...while the British Government 
was negotiating with Sinn Fein and the IRA´ (UDA ex-prisoner A, 2016). However, 
such perceptions were not necessarily representative, as the UVF publication Combat 
DIILUPHGDIWHUWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH*RRG)ULGD\$JUHHPHQW³:HKDYHQRWEeen sold down 
the river and neither are we, Mr Ervine, Mr Trimble or Mr McMichael traitors...Of the 
DJUHHPHQWLWVHOIZHKDYHQRWKLQJWRIHDURUGUHDG´&RPEDW,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH
article highlights how the leaders of the UUP, PUP, and UDP all endorsed the peace 
agreement because of their involvement in the negotiations. Transforming the political 
identities of actors was therefore variable, demonstrating how the impact of 





Balancing these issues of legitimacy is crucial for the wider legitimisation of criminal 
justice following a negotiated settlement in fostering the buy-in of the main political 
groups. Decriminalising non-violent political expression resolves a number of 
fundamental formal barriers, but must also be accompanied by the informal support of 
communities. Without entering the debate within transitional justice over how such re-
legitimisation should take place, in terms of negotiations there is an important link 
between building support for decriminalising non-violent political expression and the 
re-legitimisation of the criminal justice system. The challenge, which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, is how do you then ensure this elite level narrative is translated 
down through to the communities they represent, and on the other hand, how you 
reconcile the old narrative with the new without alienating large sections of the state? 
These are questions for further research, but this chapter provides an introduction to 





This chapter has discussed the potential implications which the criminalisation of non-
violent political expression can have on negotiations, and consequently for conflict 
transformation. It argued that the processes of criminalisation and decriminalisation 
embody important incentive structures affecting peace negotiations, and that for conflict 
transformation to effectively occur criminalisation needs to be orientated away from a 
criminalisation of actors and on to specific acts; thereby legitimising non-violent 
political expression and negotiations. Put differently, if the state continues to criminalise 
non-violent political expression this will undermine its credible commitment to the 
wider process, embedding intergroup hostilities. However, these arguments are 
qualified by the challenges of audience costs and ethnic outbidding which are linked to 
the issues of informal criminalisation. The embedded social reality of criminalisation 
constructed by CPI and CPA will be extremely difficult to reframe particularly in the 
short-term context of peace negotiations. 
 
These arguments relate to the particular nature of criminalisation, because its 
implications depend on its target and implementation. By distinguishing the 
criminalisation of political identity (CPI) from the criminalisation of political activities 
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(CPA) these implications begin to become clearer. Table 11 outlines these distinctions 
across the levels of conflict transformation, and Table 12 maps them across the two case 
studies.  Specifically, CPA appears to function as a barrier to peace negotiations, as 
non-state actors will fear possible sanctions, and be forced to operate covertly, 
distrusting the state's commitment to dialogue. These issues then come to embody 
bargaining issues, themselves to be negotiated, but if left unaddressed, their 
enforcement will likely contribute to the greater alienation of the state from within 
targeted communities. Similarly, CPI may undermine the negotiations by polarising 
intergroup identities into oppositional categories. Identities are reduced to simple 
characterisations which frame political beliefs and ideologies as criminality or 
terrorism. This polarisation displaces underlying political objectives, embedding 
negotiations into zero-sum terms which dehumanise participants and limit the potential 
for a stable agreement. Therefore, from a policy perspective, criminalising political 
expression in a civil conflict presents a serious challenge for formal negotiations to take 
place. It compounds the credible commitment of the state, creates information 
breakdown, and increases audience costs associated with political compromise, 
effectively increasing the costs of negotiations for both the state and non-state actors. 
These are very general points because of the inherently complex processes under 
discussion, but they provide at least an initial theoretical framework for considering this 
complexity. 
 
In many ways these findings are intuitive; that by criminalising non-violent political 
expression the state restricts opportunities for negotiation. But the implications of this 
are of great importance for conflict transformation. Table 13 summarises a number of 
ways (de)criminalisation can facilitate conflict transformation which follow from the 
discussion above. Instead of arguing for a binary reliance on criminalisation or 
decriminalisation, the findings suggest that the two processes can complement one 
another if orientated away from actors and on to actions. In other words, decriminalising 
non-violent political expression (both CPI and CPA) can open up opportunities for 
negotiation, and reorienting criminalisation on to violent acts delegitimises violence as 
an alternative to negotiation. But this central argument needs to be qualified by a 








- Decriminalise non-violent political activities to remove the 
structural barriers they represent for negotiations; removing the 
deterrent of sanctions, and the restrictions on communication and 
non-violent mobilisation 
- 2SHQXSLQWHUJURXSSROLWLFDOGLDORJXHWRDGGUHVVµFULPLQDO¶
characterisations both at the elite level and at the grassroots 
Issue 
Transformation 
- Decriminalising political identity to re-humanise groups so that 
they are no longer defined solely by their 'crimes', but by their 
political objectives 
- Use decriminalisation to build trust between groups and a 
willingness to reach a mutually beneficial agreement 
- Negotiate an intergroup policy of criminalising political violence 
to ensure the buy-in of all (or at least most) parties 
Actor 
Transformation 
- Decriminalise political groups so that they can openly engage in 
non-violent political dialogue 
- Maintain the criminalisation of violent acts to delegitimise it as a 
form of political expression 
- Transition away from using criminal justice to delegitimise 
political actors, and seek to develop political support for these 
institutions 
 
The comparison between the two cases was important, as it unpacked how the variation 
in the nature of criminalisation may constrain its implications for conflict 
transformation. For instance in South Africa decriminalising political groups was 
regarded as a non-negotiable prerequisite to negotiations because of the oppressiveness 
of sanctions and extensiveness of restrictions on political expression, whereas in 
Northern Ireland political groups were generally able to operate with greater freedom, 
as non-violent groups were not formally criminalised - albeit there were some 
restrictions in terms of censorship. In other words, so long as there are viable and 
favourable alternatives to political violence, the importance of criminalising political 
expression will likely diminish. Furthermore, the variation across pro- and anti- state 
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groups in Northern Ireland illustrates the contingency of criminalisation upon the 
communities it seeks to impact. Pro-state communities will be much more inclined to 
incorporate and accept the state narrative of criminalisation due to the legitimacy they 
ascribe to law and order, whereas communities alienated from the state may view it as a 
further intrusion on their identity. This means criminalisation needs to be regarded not 
simply as a legal top-down process, but also as a bottom-up one. For conflict 
transformation, therefore, the above reorientation will depend on the bottom-up buy-in 
of communities, otherwise the reorientation itself might be resisted by those who 
accepted the prior status quo. However, this should be qualified as achieving the buy-in 
of all actors is unlikely due to the complexity behind why actors engage in or support 
political violence. The continuing existence and support of so-called dissident 
Republicans illustrates this, as a significant minority in Northern Ireland still rejects the 
political settlement of the GFA (Evans and Tonge, 2012; Tonge, 2004).  
 
These arguments demonstrate the importance for peace negotiations to focus not only 
on the formal mechanisms of decriminalisation, but also address informal 
decriminalisation. Failing to do so may result in the issues of credible commitment, 
whereby concessions agreed upon are unable to be enacted because of lack of bottom-
up buy-in, or due to ethnic outbidding. It would therefore be important to develop this 
through further research into how local actors perceive such mechanisms and the 
negotiated agreements after they have had time to become implemented. Indeed the 
following chapter addresses one aspect of this in terms of criminal record expungement, 
considering how the way it was negotiated and implemented reflects the relative 






Expunging criminal records and conflict transformation: Trading peace for 
justice, or just restoring peace 
 
Following a peace settlement societies emerging from a violent conflict will face a 
number of challenges in terms of addressing historical crimes and patterns of political 
violence, which from the perspective of conflict transformation, means transforming 
what are destructive patterns of violent conflict into positive non-violent ones (Miall, 
2004:71; Kriesberg, 2009). This chapter considers how the process of criminalising 
political expression can impact upon this post-settlement phase through the framework 
of conflict transformation. Having criminalised political expression throughout a 
conflict ± as outlined in chapters three and four ± it is important to analyse how this can 
impact the transformation of the conflict as it emerges out of a peace settlement. Indeed 
the importance of this phase of conflict is evident due to the high number of recurrent 
conflicts, as of ³WKLUW\-nine conflicts active in the past ten years, only eight were new 
conflicts, thirty-one being resurgent conflicts in areas where they had been dormant for 
DWOHDVWD\HDU´5DPVERWKDP, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011:71). How processes such as 
criminalisation impact conflict transformation in this context is therefore crucial in 
addressing at least one contributing factor to conflict resurgence. 
 
3UHYLRXV UHVHDUFK KDV KLJKOLJKWHG WKH µSRVLWLYH¶ FRQWULEXWLRQ PDQ\ H[-prisoners have 
made to peacebuilding, while also highlighting the ongoing issues they face in terms of 
stigma and criminal sanctions (Dwyer, 2012; McAuley, Tonge, and Shirlow, 2009; 
McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009a, 2009b; Mitchell, 2008; Rolston, 2006; Shirlow et al., 
2010). Others cautiRQDJDLQVWVXFKµSRVLWLYH¶DVVHVVPHQWVRIH[-prisoners emphasising 
the harm they may continue to cause to victims, that these individuals are often 
SHUFHLYHGDVEHLQJUHZDUGHGIRUWKHLUYLROHQWSDVWVRUWKDWWKHLUUROHDVµSHDFHEXLOGHUV¶
may replicate former paramilitary power dynamics within certain communities 
(Edwards and McGratten, 2011; Holland and Rabrenovic, 2017; McGratten, 2014; 
Steenkamp, 2011). Debates around the issue of criminal record expungement (CRE) 
illustrate these tensions, as the criminal record represents a material and social barrier to 
reintegration for ex-prisoners, alongside a central pillar of retributive justice for certain 
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victims. In these ways it is initially unclear how it should be addressed to help facilitate 
conflict transformation, as on the one hand its expungement could enable a smoother 
process towards ex-prisoner reintegration, while on the other hand this could signify a 
reward for violence and denial of retributive justice contributing to intergroup 
polarisation. 
 
To address these tensions this chapter proposes a wider theoretical framework than has 
been previously applied; focusing not only on criminal records for political violence, 
but those of all individuals convicted for offences relating to political expression. This 
enables the issues of rewarding violence and dealing with outstanding historical cases to 
be distinguished from those convicted of non-violent political offences. In other words, 
the chapter draws on the typology developed in chapter one which distinguishes the 
criminalisation of political violence from the criminalisation of non-violent political 
expression.1 By including non-violent political expression in the analysis this provides 
an important contrast to the issues associated with criminal records for political 
violence. These distinctions are important because the legitimacy of the criminal record 
will be linked directly to what it criminalised.  
 
Furthermore, drawing on critical criminological and legal approaches to crime, CRE 
itself needs to be understood beyond its formal nature to account for its informal 
implementation and experienced reality (Hulsman, 1986; Lacey, 2009; McEvoy and 
Gormally, 1997; Shiner, 2009). While µH[SXQJHPHQW¶ FRYHUV D UDQJH RI SRVVLEOH
processes, in this chapter formally it refers to the destruction or sealing of a record so 
WKDW WKHRIIHQGHUPD\³UHJDUGKLVRURWKHU UHFRUGDVQR ORQJHUH[LVWLQJ´ (Thomas and 
Hebenton, 2013:237). Allowing for a range of possible processes is necessary because 
this chapter will discuss a number of these in comparison to analyse their implications 
(these are summarised in Table 14). But while it is necessary to understand what 
constitutes the formal process of expunging a criminal record, the implications of this 
are based in the experiences of the criminalised, the perceptions and behaviours of 
wider society towards them, and the variable ways in which this takes effect across 
groups. This informal criminalisation is realised through the prevailing conflict 
narratives (Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2004; Campbell and Connolly, 2012),  
                                                          
1
 The distinctions between political identity and activity are not essential to this discussion and so will not 
be discussed in this chapter. 
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stigmatisation (Gear, 2002; Shirlow et al., 2010), and practices of law enforcement 
(Brewer, 1994; Ellison and Smyth, 2000). In other words, while politically motivated 
destruction of property may be criminalised, only non-state actors may be charged for 
such crimes, or even just a particular identity group. Some actors may even claim that 
such acts are not crimes but legitimate tactics of war. Therefore, the legitimacy and 
relevance of such a criminal label, and by extension the criminal record, is dependent on 
its wider informal context. 
 
Table 14. Relationship between the criminalisation of political expression and the 
multilevel framework of conflict transformation 
 Criminalisation of political 
identity and activity 
(CPI/CPA) 
Criminalising Political Violence 
(CPV) 
Structure x Shapes power relations in 
favour of the state in relation 
to the criminalised 
marginalising their voice; 
x Places structural barriers on 
finding employment 
x Depending state legitimacy this 
can delegitimise spoiling 
behaviour deterring future 
violence 
x Can isolate criminalised actors due 
to social ostracisation 
x Constrains the reintegration of 
armed groups by restricting 
opportunities for employment 
Issue x Displaces political identity by 
equating it with criminality 
x As an issue it is often 
marginalised because these 
actors are themselves 
marginalised 
x Frames political violence as 
criminal to de-politicise and 
delegitimise it 
x The restrictions often become an 
issue themselves to be resisted 
Actor x Dehumanises actors by 
framing them as criminals 
leading to social stigmatisation 
which will vary across groups 
x Those engaging in political 
violence are labelled as criminals 
x If perceived as illegitimate law 




Conflict transformation again provides an effective analytical framework to account for 
this complexity across the levels of actor, issue, and structure transformation (Lederach, 
2003). With regards to issue transformation, criminal records both embody an issue and 
a mechanism which can affect the salience of other issues. For actor transformation, 
actor legitimacy is linked to their criminal record, but this is constrained by the 
legitimacy of the label. Accordingly, while the structural barriers associated with 
criminal sanctions can be removed, ongoing informal issues may continue in terms of 
societal stigmatisation, trauma, and violence, and can lead to an intergenerational 
transference of the sanction. These arguments are summarised in Table 14 to show how 
across each of these levels, and depending on the type of criminal record, criminal 
records will often have different implications. This is because in societies which have 
recently undergone an intrastate conflict many actors will have been convicted of 
offences which they would contest; whether due to the process by which their 
convictions were reached, the acts which have been criminalised, or the authority 
overseeing the criminal justice process; all embodying sites of political contestation 
(Abel, 1995; McEvoy, 2000). Ongoing implications associated with criminal records, if 
unaddressed, will perpetuate these issues, compounding other political challenges in the 
post-settlement context of a conflict.  
 
Drawing these complexities together this chapter advances two arguments: (1) that 
criminal record expungement for non-violent political offences helps facilitate conflict 
transformation across all levels, but the extent of this depends on whether it addresses 
informal criminalisation; and (2) that criminal record expungement for violent political 
offences may undermine conflict transformation if only formally implemented without 
addressing informal criminalisation. This is because the prevailing narratives of 
culpability within a conflict will frame who is or is not considered legitimate, polarising 
intergroup relations into polemic categories of victims and perpetrators, which when 
applied to non-violent acts results in political identities being criminalised, making their 
transformation integral to the wider peacebuilding process. However, if used as a 
mechanism of state power, criminal record expungement will likely embed intergroup 
polarisation and structural issues, potentially perpetuating the conflict. As a mechanism 
of state power it will often be applied as a political device to protect the state, even 
implicitly, or it may not address the concerns of victims of political violence. 
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Table 15. The criminalisation of political expression (formal and informal) in Northern 
Ireland and South Africa in the post-settlement context 
 
 Criminalisation of political identity 







x Restrictions in employment, insurance, travel, and other areas. 
x Those convicted of minor 
offences related to illegal parades, 
flags, and publications, can have 
their records expunged 
x &HUWDLQSURYLVLRQVIRUµVSHQW¶
convictions under The 
Rehabilitation of Offenders 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1978 
x Those criminalised during the 
conflict still retain a criminal 
record; still labelled as 
criminals/terrorists 
x Ongoing debates over how to 
address outstanding cases of 
historical political violence  
Informal x Ongoing stigmatisation and issues 
in finding employment 
x Ongoing (possibly increased) 
stigmatisation of loyalism, 
and continuing narrative 
linking non-violent 






x Those with criminal records can 
now have these expunged as since 
2009 under provisions in the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
x Employment opportunities are 
greatly restricted by criminal 
records 
x The TRC and subsequent 
mechanisms have partially 
addressed issues of historical 
political violence 
x Victims of political violence 
are often marginalised due to 
the top-down nature of 
addressing historical crimes 
Informal x Many previously criminalised 
under apartheid suffer social 
stigmatisation and socioeconomic 
issues. 
x There is a narrative 
battleground over the 
legitimacy of the use of 
political violence historically. 
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The case studies of Northern Ireland and South Africa after their respective peace 
agreements in 1998 (Belfast Agreement) and 1991 (National Peace Accord) illustrate 
these complexities. As summarised in Table 15, political violence was criminalised in 
both cases, but only in South Africa were these criminal records expunged. Likewise, 
the extensiveness of CPI and CPA in South Africa was of a different level altogether to 
Northern Ireland. The case selection therefore enables a comparison between the 
relative importance of criminal records for non-vLROHQW SROLWLFDO µFULPHV¶ WR WKRVH IRU
political violence, as well as a comparison of the expungement processes. These 
variations are instructive because in both cases the issue of criminal record 
expungement was, and is, highly politicised, and focuses primarily on the formal 
process; with informal criminalisation continuing to create numerous challenges for 
conflict transformation. Analysing the cases, therefore, provides important insights into 
how criminal records can impact upon conflict transformation. However the chapter is 
not seeking to definitively establish the relationship between conflict transformation and 
criminal record expungement, but instead draw out a number of implications for conflict 
transformation from how criminal records have been used in these cases, and how this 
has impacted upon these contexts. By contrasting two examples of how criminal records 
impact conflict transformation the cases provide an important contribution to the theory 
and practice of conflict transformation, broadening analysis onto the criminal records 
for all forms of political expression, highlighting their inherent interdependency with 





As an analytical framework conflict transformation provides multiple lenses through 
which to see the same thing (Lederach, 2003), in this case CRE. So while CRE may 
facilitate constructive transformation for one level, it may undermine it in another. 
Individually each level provides specific insights, but collectively the levels enable the 
complex outworking of criminal records to be assessed in relation to conflict 
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transformation.2 Table 14 summarises this, but it is worth elaborating upon this first 
before discussing it in the context of the cases. 
 
Structure transformation relates to how criminal records are themselves mechanisms of 
power, shaping the relative distribution of power between actors. For conflict 
transformation to be effective it needs to contribute towards the rebalancing of power 
relations between groups, meaning criminal sanctions must be applied impartially 
across groups, not disproportionately assisting one side over another. This is particularly 
important because frequently criminalisation functions as a mechanism of state power 
during violent conflict used to facilitate repression and empower state forces; 
embodying a symbolic pillar to be resisted and defeated. If it continues in such a 
pattern, or is perceived to be, this will undermine wider efforts at transforming the 
conflict. Yet criminal records embody only a single mechanism in a much wider context 
and must be understood in relation to their limited role. For an individual a record will 
have significant implications for employment and other areas, but its ability to 
transform intergroup power dynamics is much less significant. For instance, many who 
have records for non-violent acts will continue to be marginalised even if their records 
are expunged because of wider issues of socioeconomic subjugation.  
 
Furthermore, the criminal sanctions which follow from the record ± particularly for 
those convicted of non-violent offences - may embed structural injustices which 
perpetuate conflict through poverty, trauma, and collective stigmatisation. These issues 
are not isolated to individuals, but also their families and communities, often leading to 
an intergenerational transference of the sanction. The expungement of the record, 
therefore, needs to be complemented with a process which seeks to also address the 
consequences of the sanction in the first place - at least partially - whether through 
counselling, reparations, or some other support. However, how this works in practice 
will vary depending on the nature of the 'crime', the 'criminal', and the process of 
criminalisation. 
 
                                                          
2
 Maddison (2017) outlines three different levels of conflict transformation ± constitutional, institutional, 




As was the case for negotiations in chapter five, the expungement of criminal records 
relates to issue transformation as an issue itself and a mechanism shaping the salience of 
other issues. Firstly as an issue itself, those criminalised for political offences will seek 
to have their records removed, while those who implemented it and agreed with the 
criminal justice approach will contest this. This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the nature of the offence, as criminal records for non-violent political offences 
will be substantially less contentious than those for political violence due to there not 
EHLQJ D FOHDU µYLFWLP¶ H[FHSW SHUKDSV WKH FULPLQDOLVHG LQGLYLGXDO WKHPVHOYHV ,QGHHG
support for the expungement of these records may actually draw groups together as they 
seek to de-politicise the criminal justice system going forward. Yet because those 
engaged in political violence are usually included as part of a peace settlement they will 
frequently have substantially more political power than those engaged in non-violence. 
The relative importance of their criminal records will, therefore, often result in the 
marginalisation of those less powerful.  
 
Secondly, the expungement of criminal records affects the salience of other issues. If 
implemented, removing the criminal label associated with non-violent political offences 
could open opportunities for greater intergroup dialogue and understanding, as the 
political identities of actors will no longer be formally reduced to the criminal label.  
However, if implemented for cases of political violence this may contribute towards 
LQWHUJURXSSRODULVDWLRQDVLWPD\EHSHUFHLYHGDVµUHZDUGLQJ¶WKHLUYLROHQFH7KLVLVQRW
to say it should not be done for political offences, but that the formal process on its own 
would likely undermine issue transformation. Instead, informal decriminalisation needs 
to complement the formal mechanism ± particularly for offences of political violence ± 
to address the narratives of criminality which exist within and between groups - 
particularly those expressed through the media and political discourse - which constrain 
CRE. In other words, criminal records themselves are a highly contested issue subject to 
political debates, meaning their potential to transform conflict will be constrained by 
these wider narratives and perceptions.  
 
The final level of actor transformation involves transforming the legitimacy of actors 
and the relationships between them, and is inextricably bound up in debates over 
criminality. Indeed, research into implications of criminal records predominantly 
focuses on actors discussing the negative issues associated with them, whether for 
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ordinary offenders (Ispa-Landa and Loeffler, 2016; Mujuzi and Tsweledi, 2014), or 
specifically for politically motivated ex-prisoners (Dwyer, 2012; Jamieson, Shirlow and 
Grounds, 2010; Shirlow et al., 2010), in restricting access to employment, travel 
restrictions, and social stigmatisation, to name but a few of the challenges. Implicit in 
many of these studies is the inherent illegitimacy certain actors continue to face 
IRUPDOO\ WKURXJK ³residual criminaliVDWLRQ´ and informally through ongoing 
stigmatisation (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009a). The impact of the criminal label, 
however, varies considerably and will create complex implications for the wider process 
of conflict transformation. This is because criminalising an actor is a diffuse process 
which is only partially implemented through legal mechanisms alongside wider 
processes in society; the social construction of the criminal identity (Becker, 1963; 
Hulsman, 1986; Quinney, 1977). In this way the criminal label can simultaneously be 
implemented and reversed, accepted and resisted. Expunging records may address the 
criminal sanction, but the criminal identity often remains socially embedded through 
ongoing stigmatisation. This is important as these identities affect actor behaviour 
determining their actions and motivations (Lederach, 2003:63-64; Miall, 2004). Conflict 
may, therefore, perpetuate so long as polarised identities frame intergroup interaction in 
³an endless replay of the meta-conflict´ (Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin, 2004:316).  
  
Informal criminalisation embodies this process of identity construction and polarisation, 
as actors define their identity into binary categories of victims and perpetrators, 
focusing on the actions of actors rather than their motives, and viewing the future in 
oppositional zero-sum terms. This is problematic because although the behaviours of 
actors may change - as witnessed with many of those ex-prisoners in both cases (Gear, 
2002; Shirlow et al., 2010) - the attitudes towards them remain embedded (Galtung, 
1996:71), and indeed this may be due to continuing violent behaviour (Steenkamp, 
2011). Accordingly, the formal mechanisms of expunging criminal records will only 
ever address manifestations of conflict, not the underlying causes. Deconstructing these 
identities so that actors no longer rely on ³the past divisions of winners versus losers, 
YLFWLPV YHUVXV SHUSHWUDWRUV µXV¶ DQG µWKHP¶´ (Mani, 2005:512), means actors are no 
longer defined solely according to past crimes, but this will depend on the prevailing 
narratives, demands for legal accountability for past actions, and the actions of 




The two case studies demonstrate a number of these challenges contrasting the two 
different types of CRE which developed over time. The type of record expunged, the 
power dynamics shaping expungement, and the challenges of informal criminalisation, 
present important observable aspects of the cases to consider. The remainder of this 




Structural transformation: Reshaping power structures 
 
The power of the criminal record 
 
Criminal records embody a form, albeit limited, of state power which can be used to 
delegitimise the criminalised. Maintaining such records places material constraints on 
those subject to them, but also serves as a symbolic constraint on these actors. 
Expunging these records would initially address these issues and potentially contribute 
towards a re-balancing of the power relations between the state and non-state actors. But 
this depends on whether the mechanism is applied impartially and proportionately, 
otherwise it will likely only contribute towards intergroup polarisation. The comparison 
between the cases demonstrates this, as the partisan way which criminal records were 
addressed in South Africa, prioritising those convicted of political violence, contrasts 
with Northern Ireland, where narrative battlegrounds constrained what was politically 
possible. Furthermore, even within the cases there were a series of different mechanisms 
implemented which allowed for CRE but varying in terms of their target, context, and 
process. This is summarised in Table 16. The following section will discuss how each 








Table 16. Mechanisms of criminal record expungement in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa 
 Formal Mechanism Provisions 
South Africa - TRC Amnesty 
Hearings 
- Expungement for all political offences 
in return for full disclosure of the facts 
 - Presidential 
Pardons 
- Expungement for all political offences 
as determined by the State President 
 - Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Bill 
- Automatic expungement for non-
violent political offences committed 
during apartheid 
- Application process for the 
H[SXQJHPHQWRIRWKHUµSROLWLFDO¶Dnd 
minor criminal offences 
Northern 
Ireland 




- 0LQRURIIHQFHVDUHµVSHQW¶± not 
expunged - after varying time periods 
- Criminal Cases 
Review 
Commission 
- Investigates cases of unsafe convictions 
providing for them to be quashed if 
successful 
 
In South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established 
primarily to address issues of truth recovery and provide amnesties WR ³SHUVRQV ZKR
made full disclosure of relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
REMHFWLYH´ 75& 5HSRUW   $FFRUGLQJO\ DOO WKRVH FRQYLFWHG RI ERWK non-
violent and violent political offences could apply to have their records expunged on the 
condition they disclose all relevant details. CRE was provided for under Section 20(8) 
and (10) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1996 meaning in 
cases where amnesty was granted for past or current offences their respective records 
ZRXOG EH UHPRYHG VR WKDW WKH RIIHQFH ZRXOG ³EH GHHPHG QRW WR KDYH WDNHQ SODFH´
(Section 20(10)). However despite the provision for this, many did not realise it was the 
case, nor fully comprehended the necessity of it (TRC Report 6.3, 2003:268). This 
meant that the vast majority of those convicted during apartheid for non-violent political 
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crimes did not actually apply, resulting in the TRC only really addressing the issue of 
CRE for political violence, not for non-violent activities. Indeed the TRC recommended 
in its concluding report that a mechanism needed to be established to address this very 
LVVXH ³0DQ\ YLFWLPV UHFHLYHG FULPLQDO VHQWHQFHV IRU SROLWLFDO DFWLYLWLHV ,W LV
recommended that mechanisms to facilitate the expunging of these records be 
HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH DSSURSULDWH PLQLVWU\´ 75& 5HSRUW  :189). An uMkhonto 
weSizwe (MK) ex-SULVRQHUUHLWHUDWHGWKLV³)RU WKHPDMRULW\RIWKHpeople, they didn't 
JR WR WKH75&DQG WKH\
YHVWLOOJRW WKDW >FULPLQDO@ UHFRUG´ MK ex-prisoner B, 2016). 
Understanding why this was the case requires seeing CRE in the wider conflict context 
of informal criminalisation. 
 
,Q 6RXWK $IULFD ³ODZ FRQWLQXHG WR EH DQ DUHQD RI SROLWLFDO FRQWHVWDWLRQ´ 0DOOLQGHU
2009:134), with the African National Congress (ANC) seeking to protect its own actors 
and criminalise those of the Apartheid state, and vice versa. The wider peace process 
FDQEHYLHZHGDV³Dradical QHZSROLWLFDORSSRUWXQLW\VWUXFWXUH´HPERG\LQJDQDUUDWLYH
³EDWWOHILHOG´&DPSEHOOand Connolly, 2012:11) which enabled both sides to reframe the 
social reality of historical 'crime' according to their own narrative. Liberation became 
HTXDWHG ZLWK WKH $1& FUHDWLQJ ³D sanitised version of historical events...depicting an 
often good-and-HYLO QDUUDWLYH´ 9LFWRU -85). Accordingly, this led to an elite-
driven focus which prioritised those individuals connected to positions of power, 
embedding asymmetric power relations rather than addressing them. 
 
This became particularly evident in the subsequent decade from 1998-2008 whereby 
Presidential Pardon functioned as a central mechanism of CRE, investing its power in 
the hands of the Presidency under the Constitution in section 84(2J). The President 
could, therefore, use pardons as a mechanism of political power to serve their interests, 
rather than an independent process connected to the wider objectives of structural 
transformation. These pardons were not linked to any form of truth recovery, 
commitment to reconciliation, non-recidivism, or public apology, instead being afforded 
WR LQGLYLGXDOV IRU³WKHLU UROH LQ WKH OLEHUDWLRQVWUXJJOH´0DOOLQGHURU ODWHU
IRU WKRVH FRQYLFWHG IRURIIHQFHVZKLFKZHUH FRPPLWWHG IRU ³DSROLWLFDOPRWLYHDQGRU
SROLWLFDOREMHFWLYH´ZZZMXVWLFHJRY]D,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSUHGRPLQDQFHRID
particular historical narrative constrained the actual implementation of CRE, resulting in 
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what was an elite-driven process3 prioritising combatants over victims (Hamber, 2002), 
and serving to consolidate the discursive hegemony of the new state over competing 
narratives (Victor, 2015). It was not until 2008 that these issues began to be properly 
addressed.  
 
By 2008 iQ6RXWK$IULFD3UHVLGHQWLDOSDUGRQVZHUHEHLQJDSSOLHGIRUE\³KXQGUHGV LI
QRW WKRXVDQGVHDFK\HDU´IRU³PLQRURIIHQFHV´FRPPLWWHGRYHUWHQ\HDUVSULRU6RXWK
African Parliament, 2008). To address this, an automatic expungement process was 
established whereby the records pertaining to offences resulting from the discriminatory 
legislation of apartheid ± covering nearly all crimes related to non-violent political 
expression - would be automatically expunged. For those not covered there would be an 
administrative mechanism established so that these individuals could apply manually to 
have their records expunged (Mujuzi, 2014). Records for violent political offences 
would continue to be addressed through Presidential pardons. These changes were 
implemented in 2008 under section 271C of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977. But 
while this formal mechanism of CRE was designed to positively transform the conflict, 
many of the informal challenges associated with criminal records continued. 
 
For those not covered by the process but who still retained criminal records, they could 
apply to have these expunged through an administrative process. However the  
bureaucratic and limited nature of this process restricts applicants ability to engage, as a 
representative from the National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of 
Offenders 1,&52 H[SODLQHG ³7KH DSSOLFDWLRQ SURFHVV LV DGPLQLVWUDWLYHO\ D
QLJKWPDUH´ EHFDXVH ³WKHUH
V MXVW D VWULFW VFKHGule of who qualifies and who 
GRHVQ
WZLWKRXWWKHKXPDQHOHPHQWVLQLW´3DGD\DFKHH%HFDXVHWKHPDMRULW\RI
those with such records are predominantly of low educational achievement and will 
have limited resources, they are forced to try and pay a legal professional to complete 
the application typically costing between R2,000-R7,500 (Muntingh, 2011), or they 
simply do not know that there is such a process available. Without proper legal support 
for the application process it is unlikely that it will effect significant transformation. The 
contrast of Northern Ireland provides an illustrative comparison where records were 
again subject to these wider tensions of informal criminalisation. 
                                                          
3 The elite-driven nature of the process is shown in terms of issue transformation which is considered in 




In Northern Ireland the issue of criminal records was used to the opposite effect, as a 
ZD\WRµVHOO¶ZLGHUWUDQVIRUPDWLYHPHDVXUHVLQSDUWLFXODUWKHSULVRQHUUHOHDVHV7KLVZDV
because the most contentious issue of the Good Friday Agreement was that of the Early 
Prisoner Release Scheme (EPRS). It provided for the partial rescinding of the criminal 
sanction - early release from prison ± but was conditional on non-recidivism; that their 
paramilitary organisation renounces violence, and that those released early would be 
released on licence. In this way the EPRS operated as a mechanism of structure 
transformation in respect to violence granting prisoner releases in return for a 
commitment to non-violence. Those eligible could have their sentences reduced 
depending on the nature of their offence and prior sentence served (McEvoy, 2001:337; 
Mallinder, 2008:158). Accordingly, the mechanism did not expunge the criminal 
records of political prisoners, but rather granted a limited withdrawal of the criminal 
sanction, reflecting the British Government's official position that these individuals had 
committed a criminal offence and that a full pardon would undermine the rule of law. 
But this does not mean the criminal record was irrelevant, indeed it was crucial to EPRS 
in securing support for the proposed scheme.  
 
By maintaining and pointing to the continuing presence of criminal records the British 
Government tried to reassure those concerned about the issue of prisoner releases, as 
DOWKRXJK  SHUFHQW YRWHG LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH %HOIDVW $JUHHPHQW RQO\ ³ percent of 
Catholics and only 3 percent RI 3URWHVWDQWV´ VXSSRUWHG SULVRQHU UHOHDVHV 0LWFKHOO
2008:5). To address this the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland described these 
UHOHDVHVDVSDUWRI³DSDFNDJH´ZKLFK³LVDZKROHDQGQRWWREHFKHUU\-SLFNHG´before 
going on to emphaVLVHWKHVDIHJXDUGVSXWLQSODFHWKDW³>L@IUHOHDVHGSULVRQHUVEUHDNWKH
OLFHQFHLQDQ\ZD\WKH\ZLOOEHWDNHQEDFN´0RZODP. Accordingly, the records 
were used as a symbolic message that, although released, these individuals ± as far as 
the British Government was concerned ± are still considered to be criminals. As was the 
case in South Africa, criminal records were used as a mechanism of state power, but in 
this case they did go some way to addressing the asymmetries by enabling the prisoner 
releases. The distribution of power between actors was, therefore, partially rebalanced 
as those released could be framed as political prisoners within their communities, while 
the state and Unionist actors were able to maintain their competing narrative of 
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criminality without imposing the custodial sanction. This transformation was however 
only partial, as many of the wider challenges of informal criminalisation remained.  
 
But while criminal records were used to reassure individuals, there were still 
mechanisms established to address certain aspects of the criminal record, the difference 
with South Africa is that these were for all offences, not just political. Firstly, under the 
current legislative framework those sentenced to less than 48 months may have this 
record µVSHQW¶ subject to various conditions under The Rehabilitation of Offenders 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1978. However most ex-prisoners are not eligible to have their 
record µVSHQW¶ because of the length of their sentences being over the two and half year 
threshold. Moreover, most of those convicted of terrorism-related offences refuse to 
even acknowledge their record because they regard it as recognising their conviction as 
a crime (Dwyer, 2013; McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009b:37; Rolston and Artz, 2014). For 
instance a UVF ex-prisoner referred to how he would not acknowledge his criminal 
record and believed that even disclosing it in job applications was a form of 
recriminalisation, as he explained ³I'm not a criminal, I'm not going to criminalise 
myself...I've got political convictions [not criminal ones´ (UDA ex-prisoner B, 2016). 
The current legal framework, therefore, often places ex-prisoners in the position of 
either saying they were criminals and admit culpability, or lie about their convictions, 
denying the criminal identity.  
 
Instead, some ex-prisoners have turned to the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(CCRC) which refers cases to the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICA) if it is 
likely that the conviction or sentence will be overturned following a new legal argument 
or evidence (Quirk, 2013).4 In these cases the NICA may quash a conviction if it is 
IRXQGWREH³XQVDIH´PHDQLQJHLWKHUWKDWWKHSHUVRQLV³IDFWXDOO\LQQRFHQW´KDYLQJEHHQ
wrongfully convicted, or that due process was not properly followed (Roberts, 
2003:446). Republican ex-prisoners in particular have used this mechanism as a 
³SRWHQWLDO FRXQWHUZHLJKW´ WR WKH %ULWLsh narrative (Quirk, 2013:951), enabling these 
actors to apply to have their convictions overturned challenging the narrative of 
paramilitary criminality. In this way the CCRC as a mechanism of CRE has provided 
                                                          
4
 )RUPRUHRQWKHEDFNJURXQGRIWKHPHFKDQLVPVHH+DQQDK4XLUN'RQ¶W0HQWLRQWKH:DU7KH
Court of Appeal, the Criminal Cases Review Commission and Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland. 
The Modern Law Review 76(6):949-980. 
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for a limited re-balancing of the power relations between the state and non-state actors, 
albeit incomplete. Indeed issues of resourcing have become a serious challenge for the 
CCRC following austerity measures resulting in a backlog of cases (McGuinness, 
2016). Furthermore, although convictions may be quashed, the process provides no 
apology for wrongful conviction, as it is silent on the question of innocence, frustrating 
many successful applicants (Quirk, 2013). But its provisions for quashing wrongful 
convictions proffer an important opportunity for structure transformation, and while the 
legal positivist approach limits its remit, it also enhances its legitimacy particularly for 
those from within Unionist communities.  
 
Each of the formal mechanisms of CRE outlined above highlight a number of potential 
opportunities and challenges for structure transformation. But their potential is only the 
beginning of a much more comprehensive process needed to address issues of informal 
criminalisation, and it is constrained by it being centred in state control as a mechanism 
of state power. Its transformative power is, therefore, limited and conditional, which is 
why it is important to consider the wider reasons for this embodied in the levels of issue 
and actor transformation.  
 
 
Issue transformation: Narrative battlegrounds 
 
Criminal records as µDQLVVXH¶ 
 
In the context of peacebuilding criminal records represent a crucial issue themselves 
particularly for those convicted of political violence, because these criminalised actors 
often seek to (re)define their identities as political actors, seeking to no longer be 
GHILQHG E\ WKHLU SDVW µFULPHV¶ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH IRUPDO SURFess of CRE serves an 
important symbolic role in addressing informal criminalisation, enabling actors to 
(re)define the historical narrative. As explained above, this can lead to CRE being used 
to assert and establish power relations in favour of those in control of the mechanism, 
rather than trying to re-balance them. Gains made with respect to CRE for one side are 
DFFRUGLQJO\SHUFHLYHGDV ORVVHVE\ WKHRWKHU DV RQH VLGHKDV WKHLU µFULPHV¶ H[SXQJHG




In South Africa the issue of CRE for non-violent offences received widespread political 
support when put before the South African Parliament in 2008 as part of the  271C of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 illustrating its potential to bring opposing factions 
together (Mujuzi, 2014:289). There was a cross party consensus on the issues addressed 
by the Bill due to the acknowledgement of the issues arising from these records. For 
example in announcing the measure the Deputy Minister for Justice and Correctional 
6HUYLFHV H[SODLQHG ³7KHUH ZHUH KXQGUHGV RI WKRXVDQGV RI XQIRUWXQDWH SHUVRQV ZKR
were stigmatised and subjected to criminal sanctions under these so-FDOOHG ³apartheid 
RIIHQFHV´$SURYLVLRQRIVXFKDQDWXUHLVORQJRYHUGXH´6$IULcan Parliament, 2008). 
/LNHZLVH 'U 'HOSRUW RI WKH 'HPRFUDWLF $OOLDQFH UHIHUUHG WR KRZ WKH %LOO ZDV ³QRW
FRQWURYHUVLDO´DQGJonas Sibanyoni of the ANC affirmed their support for the measures. 
The united stance on the issue by all the major political parties demonstrates just how 
important addressing CRE for non-violent offences can be, and the potential it has in 
facilitating issue transformation. But this contrasts with the ongoing issues associated 
with records for political violence which are processed through the mechanism of 
Presidential Pardons. Because of the nature of these offences and their politicised 
contexts, their expungement is constrained by wider challenges of compromising 
retributive justice and causing harm to victims. In other words, the formal mechanism of 
CRE could undermine issue transformation if it is not complemented by a 
corresponding process of informal decriminalisation.  
 
On the 27th November 2007 President Thabo Mbeki addressed the South African 
Parliament to announce the creation of a cross party Reference Group tasked with 
FRQVLGHULQJSDUGRQDSSOLFDWLRQVIRURIIHQFHV³DPRQJWKHFDWHJRU\RIRIIHQFHVWKDWZHUH
considered by the TRC Amnesty Committee....in the interest of promoting the critical 
objectives of national reconciliation and nation-EXLOGLQJ´ 0EHNL  )ROORZLQJ
their consideration the Reference Group produced a list of 149 cases deemed to be 
politically motivated, nearly all of which were for the post-1994 period. This cross-
party approach to pardons could be regarded as signalling a positive transformation of 
the issue of CRE away from the partisan challenges it previously suffered from, albeit 
with the final decision still being maintained by the President. But no matter how 
balanced and representative the process was, because it focused solely on the issue of 
criminal records and not informal criminalisation it had a number of adverse 




Instead of addressing the concerns of victims, these were initially not taken into 
consideration, leading the South African Coalition for Transitional Justice to launch a 
successful legal challenge against this process (Kesselring, 2017:36), and later the 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWDOVR UXOHG WKDW³YLFWLPVKDGD ULJKW WREHKHDUG´ 6$&7-
Indeed the Director of the victims organisation Khulumani referred to the process as 
³SROLWLFDOPDQLSXODWLRQRIWKHZRUVWNLQG´-REVRQ, and the Vice President of the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice descrLEHGLWDV³DVHFUHWSURFHVVIURPZKLFK
YLFWLPV ZHUH HQWLUHO\ H[FOXGHG´ 6HLOV  Because the initial pardoning process 
only engaged with the applicant, this marginalised all others. In this way the pardoning 
mechanism was never properly utilised to address the challenge of issue transformation, 
rather only embodying an issue itself.  
 
The mechanism of criminal record expungement in Northern Ireland was much more 
limited than in South Africa, because while it embodied a highly contentious issue 
itself, this was based in competing interpretations of what it actually represented. 
Measures which addressed the issues associated with ex-prisoners were framed to allow 
competing narratives to co-exist. For instance, the EPRS and the wider agreement it was 
part of - the Belfast Agreement - was itself written to ³deliberately adopt language that 
is vague and can, simultaneously, mean different things to different people´, termed as 
³constructive ambiguity´ (Bell and Cavanaugh, 1999:1355). Whereas on the one hand it 
was framed by some Unionists political leaders as bringing an end to political violence 
and defeating the Irish Republican Army (IRA), on the other is was framed by certain 
Republican political leaders as a victory for republicanism and the beginning of British 
withdrawal from the North of Ireland (Dixon, 2002:736). But the challenge with such 
ambiguity is that ³it postpones real agreement until some future date´ (Bell and 
Cavanaugh, 1999:1355) as conflicting narratives continue to embed conflicting 
identities; meaning issues continue to remain polarised through two (or more) opposing 
narratives. Moderate interpretations are marginalised by more hard-line positions 
embedding, rather than resolving, intergroup conflict. Indeed, criminal records were 




The significant differences in public opinion around issue of prisoner releases were not 
necessarily about the formal mechanism, but with what it signified. A Senior Civil 
Servant referred to this explaining:  
[Politicians] deal in the political sphere, and political factors are not just about 
what makes the most sense; it's also about political symbolism and what makes 
the best sense for their constituents and how they can present themselves in the 
best light´ (Senior civil servant, 2016).  
Ex-prisoners were for many - particularly within Unionist communities - the visible 
representations of the conflict, reminders of the violence and destruction which took 
place (McAuley, Tonge and Shirlow, 2009:32). Therefore, the EPRS was perceived by 
many as giving into those responsible for the violence, the perpetrators. For instance, a 
former project coordinator for West Tyrone Voice (WTV) - a security services victims' 
group - explained:  
And what has been happening here for the last 40 years has been a process of 
sanitisation of what all the terrorist groups have done. And that sanitisation has 
gone on in order to bring all these people in from the cold (Lynch, 2016).  
A Unionist politician echoed these concerns stating: ³In the Unionist community, I 
think part RI WKDW LV WKH DWWLWXGH WKDW µYou've done the crime so you do the time¶´ 
(Unionist politician, 2016). From this perspective, the EPRS was framed as a 
concession, but one which maintained the criminal records of those released to preserve 
some support from within Unionist communities for the wider process. Through the 
EPRS, therefore, the British Government did not address the criminal records of ex-
prisoners, but instead used them as a symbolic message to reassure those particularly 
within Unionist communities.  
 
In contrast some Republican ex-prisoners expressed pride at having been imprisoned 
regarding it ³as a badge of honour´ (IRA ex-prisoner C, 2016); criminal records being 
just being the tacit recognition of their political status HYHQ SURYLGLQJ ³OHJLWLPDF\ LQ
LWVHOI´ 6KLUORZ 7RQJH DQG 0F$XOH\  On the other side, Loyalists often 
regarded their imprisonment as a sacrifice for their wider community: ³You weren't 
there for any self-gain or self-gratification´ (UVF ex-prisoner A, 2016). This is 
important because resisting criminalisation was an inherent Republican strategy and a 
marginal Loyalist one, and so for some, particularly Republican ex-prisoners, criminal 
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records continue to represent a site of resistance. For instance an IRA ex-prisoner 
explained:  
Even today the media and civil service are probably two of the major elements 
that still are, to a large extent, fighting the war here as they find it very hard to 
come to terms with people like myself (IRA ex-prisoner C, 2016). 
Bell (2009:25) refers to this in terms of the 'battlefield' of transitional justice whereby 
mechanisms like pardons are used to ³enable victory in the metaconflict´, that is to 
control the narrative over culpability for the conflict itself, and ultimately to shape the 
direction of the transition. In other words, stigmatisation persists to ensure the 
dominance of one narrative over another, which from the perspective of Republican ex-
prisoners meant: ³[The state] attempted to deprive the public out there of any 
understanding of what was going on, and this is particularly evident even today´ (IRA 
ex-prisoner C, 2016). In this way the criminal narrative persists through ³the informal 
mechanisms of the media´ and wider society, framing ³ideas of what is a crime and who 
is a criminal´ (Shiner, 2009:175), as a Republican community worker explained: ³Lots 
of power structures in society apply the term criminal and terrorist and it's almost like 
they are interchangeable now´ (Community worker E, 2016). This means that the 
sanction for an offence does not end upon release, instead, through the criminal record 
and the constant reminders of this record in the media and applications for jobs and 
insurance, ex-prisoner identities are framed as criminals throughout their entire post-
release lives (Ispa-Landa and Loeffler, 2016). For instance, a UVF ex-prisoner 
remarked how ³society never lets you forget´ (UVF ex-prisoner B, 2016), that because 
of their previous convictions, these actors continue to be referred to by the media and 
political elites according to the homogenised identities of criminals and gangsters.5 
 
These ex-prisoner perspectives, much like those of the state in South Africa, contrast 
with those of victiPV7KLV LV EHFDXVH ³the voice and agency of victims is often both 
publicly and legally bound up both with the innocence of the victim and the capacity to 
blame the perpetrator´ (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013:494). Who qualifies as a 
victim has become subsumed in the wider political debate over the nature of the conflict 
itself, drawing strict boundaries between the categories of victims and perpetrators, 
                                                          
5 Political elites here primarily refers to all the main political parties in Northern Ireland, although Sinn 
Fein is much less vocal on these issues, and some within the DUP are more cautious with their language 
because of their links to former UDA members (indeed some have been former UDA members). 
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which while at times valid, may become permeable in particular contexts (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2013:493). Certain victims' groups have accordingly become polarised 
³[m]irroring the conflict divisions´, ³have become engaged in political posturing, and 
have been manipulated by political actors´ (Lynch and Argomaniz, 2015:2). Debates 
over who qualifies as a victim frequently descends into debates about the narrative of 
the conflict itself, not distinguishing between the wrongful act and the consequences of 
the act (Hamber, 2002:1090). Focusing primarily on the acts, groups aligned 
particularly with the Unionist community have adopted a hierarchy of victimhood, 
distinguishing between 'innocent' victims - referring to civilians, state combatants and 
their families - from 'guilty' victims - non-state actors and their families (Brewer and 
Hayes, 2015:746; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013:500). Such terminology has been 
met with criticism from some within Republican communities, such as one community 
worker who explained: ³7KHUH
VQRWKLQJDVRIIHQVLYHDVWU\LQJWRSOD\RQHIDPLO\
VJULHI
off another family's grief, whethHU WKDW IDPLO\ ZRUH XQLIRUP RU GLGQ
W ZHDU XQLIRUP´ 
(Community worker A, 2016). Elevating the status of some victims over others for 
political purposes embodies how narratives frame not only how the conflict is 
perceived, but also what solutions are acceptable.6  
 
These tensions are illustrated by how the EPRS was regarded by those subject to it as an 
implicit recognition of their political status, legitimising their political identity, as an 
IRA ex-prisoner explained: ³The British Government have acknowledged that we 
weren't criminal because they let us all out of jail´ (IRA ex-prisoner B, 2016); and a 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) ex-prisoner similarly remarked: ³They did accept the 
political nature of the people that went to prison when there was an early release 
mechanism built into the Good Friday Agreement´ (UVF ex-prisoner A, 2016). 
However, these perspectives are widely contested, as just because a political offence 
was committed does not necessarily mean a criminal offence was not, and the 
boundaries between these two categories are not as straightforward as is made out 
(Silke, 1999a, 1999b). Moreover, as explained above, the release from prison was 
framed by the British Government as part of a package, maintaining that these 
                                                          
6
 While there are important differences between the suffering of victims and variations in the causes of 
victimisation, the problem is that these are often tied to wider debates of the metaconflict. For more on 
these nuances see: Luke Moffett, 'Reparations for 'Guilty Victims': Navigating Complex Identities of 




individuals were still criminal. Indeed, the dominant Unionist narrative is that these 
people are ³terrorist murderers´ (Stalford, 2017), and the wider Unionist community 
were victims of their campaign of violence. Therefore, the divisive nature of the debate 
on victimhood reflects the wider challenge of informal criminalisation because 
³victimhood is inevitably mapped onto competing narrative´ (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2013:504), and so as long as there remains no agreement on the 
narrative, such divisions are likely to remain, limiting the possibilities for issue 
transformation. 
 
When used in these ways CRE will replicate the prevailing narratives of victimhood and 
perpetrators embedding conflicting historical accounts of the conflict rather than 
transforming them. The prevailing narratives in both cases framed the willingness and 
ability to address the criminal records of those convicted of political offences. While 
norms of justice, reconciliation, and peace were all integral to these approaches, they are 
qualified and used to justify these particular narratives. Other voices are sidelined and 
marginalised to ensure the dominance of the hegemonic narrative (Hamber, 2002; 
Rolston, 2006), undermining efforts at conflict transformation and embedding the 
polarised identities which limit the potential to overcome communal divisions. 
Therefore, unless the formal mechanism is complemented by a corresponding 
transformation in the informal narrative of criminalisation, it will be unlikely to address 
issue transformation, and may even undermine it.  
 
 
Actor transformation: Transforming actor legitimacy 
   
Legitimising the criminalised? 
 
Criminal records frame the identity of actors to varying degrees depending on the nature 
of the offence (violent or non-violent), the nature of the associated sanctions, and the 
legitimacy of the criminalisation process. These identities are important because how 
they are perceived will have an impact on the way actors relate to one another. The 
above discussion of issue transformation illustrated many of these challenges whereby 
criminal records are subject to considerable debate within the two cases. But beyond 
this, criminal records often lead to psychosociological and socioeconomic issues for the 
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criminalised and their families. While attempts have been made to address the formal 
record in South Africa the informal implications are still highly problematic, whereas in 
Northern Ireland, as the records of ex-prisoners remain, the issues of informal 
criminalisation are of a different nature. Considering these mechanisms with regards to 
actor transformation, therefore, highlights the variable relationship they can have. 
 
In South Africa, while the criminal record expungement process provided for the 
expungement of criminal records absolving individuals of wrongdoing, it was unable to 
address the structural implications associated with the prior sanction in terms of trauma 
and violence: informal criminalisation. Previous research has documented a number of 
the challenges ex-prisoners and ex-combatants7 have faced (Merwe and Lamb, 2009; 
Gear, 2002; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001). Regardless of whether these individuals have 
a criminal record or not they continued to face informal criminalisation in their 
everyday experiences. For instance ³>I@RUPHU FRPEDWDQWV IURP DFURVV Whe political 
VSHFWUXP FRPSODLQ WKDW WKH\ DUH WDUJHWV RI FULPLQDOLVLQJ VWHUHRW\SHV´ EXW LWV VRXUFH
varies for differing categories of ex-combatants: for former South African Defence 
Force (SADF) members it is the media and the new government, whereas for former 
MK members it is the police (Gear, 2002:46). A former SADF Special Forces member 
H[SODLQHG WKDW ³>Q@RZ WKH UROHV KDYH FKDQJHG WKH KHURHV RI \HVWHUGD\ DUH QRZ WKH
YLOODLQV´ 4XRWHG LQ *HDU  During the conflict they were regarded as 
defending the state at least from within their own communities, since they were seen as 
symbols of repression. Likewise, MK ex-combatants UHSRUWHG EHLQJ ³SURILOHG DV
criminal suspects because of their ex-FRPEDWDQW VWDWXV´ *HDU   ZLWK WKH
police targeting them as potential suspects rather than treating them as ordinary 
civilians.8 However, while this was particularly problematic in the early period of 
transition after 1991, it lessened significantly over time as the police became reformed 
and the context shifted. The formal implementation of CRE would be largely irrelevant 
for these individuals as many did not get convicted of specific offences, but the issues 
associated with the informal narrative are evidently fundamental. Indeed an MK ex-
                                                          
7
 The term ex-combatants is used here to differentiate those who went to prison ± labelled throughout the 
thesis as ex-prisoners ± from the wider spectrum of those who engaged in political violence but did not 
necessarily get convicted of an offence. 
8
 There is some evidence to suggest that some of these ex-combatants have transitioned in ordinary crime 





the community, and others ex-prisoners explained that their communities regarded them 
as criminals who belonged in prison (Gear, 2002:42) ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH µFULPLQDO¶
label continues to be applied to these individuals mirroring the wider challenges 
associated with the narratives of criminalisation discussed above with respect to issue 
transformation. 
 
One example which illustrates these issues is that of the MK ex-prisoner Shirley Gunn, 
who was detained in 1989 accused of blowing up Khotso House, a crime she had been 
framed with, and whiFK WKH 75& ODWHU FRQFOXGHG ZDV ³a deed which...was actually 
performed by agents of the then government´ (TRC Report 4, 1998:307). Having been 
cleared of any criminal wrongdoing by the TRC, and having had her named legally 
exonerated, still she finds that she is associated with the framed crime, as she explained: 
³I may be in a queue, I hand over my credit card or debit card, and they see my name, 
and then the teller looks up and says: 'Are you that SHUVRQWKDWGLGWKDW>FULPH@"
´ (MK 
ex-prisoner B, 2016). Despite being found innocent of the offence, still, she remains 
associated with the criminal label by some within the wider public. Reflecting on this 
she e[SODLQHG ³It just shows you how effective the disinformation was, and how 
powerful the media is in shaping public opinion´ (MK ex-prisoner B, 2016). While the 
TRC and the CRE it provided for addressed the formal sanctions of the criminal record, 
in this case the informal implications persisted through the embedded social reality it 
constructed (Hulsman, 1986). 
 
Beyond these issues of narrative and stigmatisation, however, are the more direct 
challenges directly linked to the legacy of the criminal sanction, as individuals who 
have been sent to prison may have suffer from trauma, lack of education,  and family 
breakdown (Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, 2016; Mujuzi & Tsweledi, 2014; Myrick, 2013; 
Pager, 2003; Thomas & Hebenton, 2013). Therefore the sanctions associated with prior 
criminalisation were not simply the custodial sentence or criminal record, but also the 
psychosociological issues this has created. The silent penalty imposed upon many of 
these individuals, therefore, does not end upon the expungement of their records. 
 
The prison experience itself was often traumatic with prison authorities using fear and 
violence to maintain order as was explained in chapter four. Despite no longer suffering 
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the sanction of imprisonment, those who underwent periods of imprisonment may 
continue to struggle with the wider challenges of trauma (Gear, 2002). These challenges 
are important for actor transformation as they will directly impact whether actors are 
able to assimilate back into civilian life. For instance Marjorie Jobson, the Director of 
Khulumani, explained how ³one of the consequences of trauma is that it atomises 
people; it disconnects them...it creates incredible problems with interpersonal 
relationships´ (Jobson, 2016). Likewise a Community Practitioner explained how this 
can impact ex-prisoner reintegration:  
³Some of them are not able to maintain their relationships. They're not able to 
stay in jobs. They resort to self-medicating, taking drugs or alcohol. So they are 
violent. They are still carrying this stigma of having not completed opportunities 
of going to school. They are not educated. They are not working´ (Community 
practitioner, 2016). 
The criminal sanction therefore does not end with the expungement of the record, but 
continues long after through a range of complex socio-psychological issues.  
 
Yet while this atomises the individual, the consequences are collective, as a community 
worker referred to how ³the fear is that there is intergenerational transference of 
trauma´ &RPPXQLW\SUDFWLWLRQHUZKereby these issues have a wider effect on 
families and communities. For instance a community worker who works with ex-
offenders explained: 
³We normalise violence in South Africa. We don't acknowledge violence, and 
many of our young people are victims of some kind of crime, and because that's 
not addressed, they become the perpetrators´ (Community worker F, 2016). 
The violent experiences individuals have suffered can lead actors to repeat them, 
whether in their interpersonal relationships, or on a societal level. So when you have a 
generation of individuals of whom many were unjustly and violently criminalised, this 
leads to ³shame and a lack of dignity, and that's where the violence starts inside you´ 
(Padayachee, 2016). Therefore expunging records only represents the beginning of actor 
transformation, to be followed by substantial psychosociological and socioeconomic 
community based projects. Such projects are already being carried out (Clark, 2011; 
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Kappler, 2013),9 but until these issues are addressed actor transformation will continue 
as a pressing challenge. 
 
In Northern Ireland, the issue of criminal record expungement continues to present 
challenges for ex-prisoners convicted of serious offences during the conflict. Although 
WKHUHDUHSURYLVLRQVIRUµspeQW¶FRQYLFWLRQVDVGLVFXVVHGDERYH WKHVHJHQHUDOO\GRQRW
apply to those with criminal records for political violence. The practical implications of 
this have been well established by previous research in terms of posing significant 
issues for these actors in terms of reintegration (Dwyer, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Jamieson, 
Shirlow & Grounds, 2010; Rolston, 2007). Indeed both Republican and Loyalist ex-
prisoners emphasised these issues, with Republican actors referring to the criminal 
UHFRUGVDVEHLQJ³retrospeFWLYHO\SXQLWLYH´,5$H[-prisoner B, 2016), emphasising that 
³IRUPHU SROLWLFDO SULVRQHUV DUH WKH RQO\ JURXS LQ VRFLHW\ WKDW FDQ EH OHJDOO\
GLVFULPLQDWHGDJDLQVWLQHPSOR\PHQW´5HSXEOLFDQFRPPXQLW\ZRUNHU). Similarly 
a UDA ex-prisoner H[SODLQHG ³,
m always walking on eggshells...because people are 
trying to criminalise me....ZH DUH QRW WUHDWHG DV IXOO FLWL]HQV´ 8'$ H[-prisoner B, 
2016).   
 
But beyond the immediate barriers criminal records pose, as was the case in South 
Africa, there were the wider issues of social stigmatisation and intergenerational 
challenges. Although, while there was some concerns raised by Republicans, it was 
primarily an issue for Loyalists as the challenges of informal criminalisation vary in 
many ways across the communal divide. For instance, some within Loyalist 
paramilitaries explained how the narrative of criminality persists through stigmatisation 
of their collective identity, as many are now actively engaged in conflict transformation 
projects (McAuley, Tonge and Shirlow, 2009) yet this continues to be regarded with 
scepticism. For instance a senior civil servant remarked:  
³Even in things like restorative practice where people have been trying to do 
good things, it's taken quite a while for some of the communities to actually 
accept their intention is actually honourable and not just developing a new way 
of exploiting the community´ (Senior civil servant, 2016). 
                                                          
9
 For a more holistic overview of the challenges facing peacebuilding in the South African context see 
Colin Know &Pádraic Quirk (2000) Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: 
Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
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The language used in the media reinforces this, as witnessed in the controversy over 
funding for CharterNI (Belfast Telegraph, 2016), or previously with the decision to cut 
£1m of funding from the Conflict Transformation Initiative (BBC News, 2007). As a 
result, those subject to such characterisations are arguing that their future is being 
criminalised because of past actions, as an Ulster Defence Association (UDA) ex-
prisoner stated: ³What's currently happening is the criminalisation of individuals who 
were involved in the political struggle, to delegitimise their future going forward so they 
don't have a future´ (UDA ex-prisoner A, 2016). The potential for these actors to 
engage in conflict transformation projects, or indeed in ordinary jobs, is constrained 
formally then through the criminal record, but informally also through this ongoing 
narrative of illegitimacy.  
 
This reinforcing of the criminal identity can then become a self-fulfilling prophecy as 
ex-prisoners seeking to move away from past actions are continually defined by them, 
as one UDA ex-prisoner explained: ³You will only be an ex-prisoner as long as society 
lets you be. I want to move away from that but society still blocks me´ (UDA ex-
prisoner B, 2016). So while the EPRS removed an aspect of the criminal sanction, the 
continuing criminal record continues to delegitimise actors and inhibit the redefinition 
of their identity. As a result this reinforces the very structures which are being 
condemned, as ex-prisoners continue to rely on support from their paramilitary 
organisations, as a UVF ex-prisoner explained: ³[I]f you continuously [criminalise], 
people are going to band together, it is going to have a unifying effect on these 
organisations and make them more likely to stick around´ (UVF ex-prisoner A, 2016).  
The reliance on these organisations appears to confirm issues of ongoing 
paramilitarism, embedding the criminal narrative further. This is not to deny the clear 
issues of criminality which persist in some of these organisations, but to highlight the 
challenges many ex-prisoners face in disassociating themselves from it. 
 
Furthermore, as time goes on these identities become memorialised through the 
narratives put forward by the media and political elites, which is particularly the case 
for Loyalist groups who raised concerns that their role in the conflict will be 
remembered through such narratives. For instance a UDA ex-prisoner explained:  
³My family knows the sort of person I am. But my grandkids won't know. 
They'll read the Sunday papers or they'll hear some of the reports about this 
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LR\DOLVW FULPLQDOLW\ DQG WKLQN µWas my granddad part of that?¶´ (UDA ex 
prisoner C, 2016) 
These narratives apply simplistic homogeneous characterisations to frame the entire ex-
prisoner community, focusing on the specific acts committed, but not the motivations 
behind the acts. The narrative, therefore, becomes one of self-interest and pathological 
violence, not the political objectives. Indeed this ex-prisoner went on to explain how he 
believes that the criminal record is maintained to continue to delegitimise ex-prisoners: 
³8QLRQLVWSROLWLFLDQVDUHDIUDLGRIXVEHFoming...respectable and electable. And there's 
WKLV ROG FOLFKp RI WKH ODVW WKLQJ 8QLRQLVP ZDQWV LV HGXFDWHG /R\DOLVWV´ 8'$ H[-
prisoner C, 2016). Regardless of whether this is a fair representation of unionism or not, 
it illustrates how for these actors the record continues to represent an important 
mechanism of delegitimisation inhibiting actor transformation. 
 
Furthermore, this relates to a wider challenge for actor transformation of the 
intergenerational transference of the criminal sanction; as not only are these actors 
criminalised, but their families likewise face stigmatisation, as a UVF ex-prisoner 
reflected:  
³My wee boy is a decent football player - just decent - but he says he's going to 
play for Liverpool, and I say: 'That's great son'. And I often say to his mommy: 
'Wouldn't it be terrible if he got playing for Liverpool because of within a week 
of him signing it would be [in the headlinHV@ µ+LV 'DGG\ :DV D 0XUGHUHU¶´
(UVF ex-prisoner B, 2016). 
These ex-prisoners are worried not solely about their own identity and reputation, but 
how this identity is transferred onto those around them. Indeed, there is evidence that 
the stigmatisation that they face is impacting their children, and even their 
grandchildren (Alderdice, McBurney and McWilliams, 2016). Republican ex-prisoners 
DOVR HPSKDVLVHG WKLV DVSHFW VWDWLQJ ³[T]here's children of ex-political prisoners and 
WKH\
UH EDUUHG IURP JHWWLQJ SDUWLFXODU W\SHV RI ZRUN´ ,5$ ex-prisoner B, 2016). 




(IRA ex-prisoner D, 2016). Moreover the importance of this was emphasised by the ex-
SULVRQHUV ZKR H[SODLQHG ³1RZ LI \RX ZDQW WR JLYH µIRRG¶ RU H[FXVH RU UHDVRQ WR
SHRSOHWREHRSSRVLQJWKHVWDWHHYHQDWDPLQLPXPOHYHOWKHUH
VWKHIDPLOLHV´,5$H[-
prisoner B, 2016). In other words, the significance of the criminal record does not stop 
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ZLWK WKH µFULPLQDOLVHG¶, but has implications for those connected to them. While it is 
unclear from this to what extent the formal criminal record can be linked to political 
mobilisation against the state, its significance in informally undermining state 





This chapter has discussed how CRE represents an important mechanism of conflict 
transformation, yet one which can both undermine and facilitate it depending on the 
nature of the records ± whether they were for violent or non-violent political expression 
± and whether it addresses the accompanying challenges of informal criminalisation. 
Across the two cases there were a range of CRE mechanisms (summarised in Table 16) 
which highlight the complexity and variation such formal mechanisms can take. 
However, their potential to contribute towards conflict transformation was constrained 
by a number of factors linked to each of the three levels of transformation: structure, 
issue, and actor.  
 
For structure transformation, because the state is in control of the criminal justice 
system, often CRE becomes utilised as a form of state power embedding its own power 
rather than rebalancing the power relations between actors. This, however, related 
primarily to the records for political violence with the record symbolising a wider 
battleground over culpability. On the other hand, CRE for non-violent political offences 
in South Africa represented an important mechanism to effect structure transformation 
drawing support from across all parties, although the delayed time it took to become 
implemented reflects the tendency to marginalise such potential transformations. In 
Northern Ireland, the process for addressing wrongful convictions likewise helped 
counter-balance state power, but it too suffered from limited political support evident in 
a lack of funding. Instead, the continuation of criminal records was used to reassure 
certain Unionist actors that prisoner releases were conditional as part of the EPRS. 
 
These challenges are due to the criminal records themselves representing a highly 
contested issue perceived differently across communities and contexts. Whose 
perspective gets listened to or ignored constrains their ability to contribute towards, or 
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undermine, conflict transformation. While this is highly complex, what the cases show 
is how if the formal mechanism of CRE is not accompanied by measures to address the 
informal narratives of criminalisation it will marginalise and contribute towards 
intergroup polarisation. This was particularly the case for victims of political violence in 
both cases who are often marginalised in favour of more expedient measures. In other 
words, CRE will reflect the social realities of criminalisation which have become 
normalised and embedded over the course of the conflict ± as outlined in the previous 
three chapters ± and while it can contribute towards their reframing, it is more likely 
that it will act as an expression of these social realities particularly if implemented as a 
top-down mechanism.10  
 
These issues are compounded by the final level of actor transformation. While 
expunging a criminal record will address certain formal barriers in employment, travel, 
and other areas, informal stigmatisation and ongoing psychosociological and 
socioeconomic issues continue to undermine the wider transformation of these actors 
and their families. Indeed in South Africa ex-combatants and ex-prisoners reported 
experiencing such issues regardless of having a criminal record or not due to the wider 
challenges of informal criminalisation ± that they continued to suffer from a lack of 
education, social ostracisation, and personal trauma because of their experiences in 
prison and/or at war. This illustrated an important issue whereby the nature of the 
offence ± violent or non-violent ± was not necessarily important in determining the 
implications, as both groups of individuals reported similar challenges. The significance 
of criminalisation alone, however, should be qualified as it is difficult to extricate it 
from the socio-economic context, and in many ways it reflects the wider issues of 
economic inequality, poor education, and unemployment. Likewise in Northern Ireland, 
while ex-prisoners emphasised the importance of CRE due to the barriers it created in 
terms of employment, insurance, and travel, they also highlighted its wider implications 
on society and their families. Expunging records, therefore, only reflects one (albeit 
important) part of the wider process of conflict transformation and needs to be followed 
                                                          
10
 For an example of a bottom-up approach see the Prison to Peace programme which took place in 
Northern Ireland. For a good example of both the benefits and challenges such an approach can contribute 
towards see: Lesley Emerson, Karen Orr and Paul Connolly (2014) Evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
µSULVRQ WR SHDFH OHDUQLQJ IURP the experience of political ex-SULVRQHUV¶ HGXFDWLRQDO SURJUDPPH
OFMDFM/HVOH\(PHUVRQ&RQIOLFWWUDQVLWLRQDQGHGXFDWLRQIRUµSROLWLFDOJHQHURVLW\¶OHDUQLQJ
from the experience of ex-combatants in Northern Ireland. Journal of Peace Education 9(3):277-295. 
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or accompanied by wider measures aimed at addressing trauma, skills, and social 
stigmatisation. 
 
For these reasons, if CRE is to address conflict transformation its conceptualisation 
needs to be broadened to encompass a wider spectrum of potential options beyond the 
formal expungement of a record. This spectrum relates to the distinctions between 
µWKLFN¶ DQG µWKLQ¶ FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV RI MXVWLFH 0F(YR\  ZLWK WKH IRUPHU
addressing a much wider range of issues than the latter. Yet the thin approach is usually 
the one adopted, at least initially, because the records themselves are seen to be the 
µSUREOHP¶ %XW EURDGHQLQJ WKH IRFXV WR HQFRPSDVV WKH EURDGHU UDQJH RI LQIRUPDO
challenges may provide opportunities for agreement even when there is no agreement 
on the formal process of expungement. For instance, it may be possible to not expunge 
criminal records but allow ex-prisoners to not have to declare it in certain 
circumstances. This is summarised in Figure 6.  
 
 
Recent policy developments in Northern Ireland illustrate these issues in regards to 
what is euphemistically termed 'dealing with the past'. Under the Fresh Start Agreement 
£150million was agreed ³to help fund the bodies to deal with the past´ (Fresh Start 
Agreement, 2015:Section D 1.1), but the majority of this will go towards the truth 
recovery and accountability mechanisms - the Historical Investigations Unit and 
Independent Commission on Information Retrieval - as a senior civil servant explained:  
Thick Thin 
- Bottom-up processes of 
narrative deconstruction 
- Reparations to compensate for 
criminal sanctions 
- Counselling, education, and 
training programmes designed 
IRUµSROLWLFDO¶H[-prisoners and 
their families 
- Elite driven process of 
expungement 
- Permit criminalised actors to no 
longer declare political 
convictions even if they retain 
their record 




Figure 6. Spectrum of criminal record expungement 
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Establishing the legacy inquests system and the HIU (Historical Investigations 
Unit) we reckon would cost around £30-40million [per year]...Politically there is 
already a problem because I could spend all the money and that doesn't give you 
your oral history archive (Senior civil servant, 2016). 
Moreover the role of these mechanisms will be foremost about addressing historical 
accountability: ³Its role will ultimately be primarily truth recovery but in fact, its 
orientation will actually be towards prosecutions´ 6HQLRU Fivil servant, 2016). While 
not disputing the importance of such mechanisms, the challenges associated with 
conflict transformation remain. Instead of addressing the polarised narratives of conflict 
these mechanisms will more likely embed them, or else redefine them according to a 
particular political position as was the case in South Africa. The challenges of conflict 
transformation and criminal records have, therefore, been side-lined for the more visible 
and tangible alternative of formal retributive mechanisms. 
 
The issues of WKH µWKLQ¶ approach are, therefore, evident in these policies as there 
continues to be a prioritisation of formal mechanisms without sufficient support or 
resources addressing the challenges associated with informal criminalisation. So long as 
this continues the potential for CRE to effect conflict transformation will be very 
limited. Indeed the opposite may actually be the result as polarised narratives become 
embedded. Broadening the conceptualisation of criminal record expungement may go 
some way to addressing thisPRYLQJDZD\IURPVLPSO\VHHLQJWKHµUHFRUG¶DVWKHLVVXH





Criminalising transformation or transforming criminalisation 
 
Throughout the thesis it has EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶V LPSDFW RQ FRQIOLFW
transformation is dependent on its target ± political identity, activity, or violence ± and 
the experienced reality it contributes towards through informal criminalisation.1 In each 
of the conflict contexts examined in chapters three to six it was argued that 
criminalisation takes on a particular role designed by the state, perceived variably across 
the population, and constrained by its enforcement. Specifically, three arguments follow 
which explain how each type of criminalisation, defined according to its target, will 
impact conflict transformation: (1) if it targets the political identity of a group this will 
contribute towards intergroup polarisation framing groups in opposing terms as victims 
and perpetrators reducing their political identity to criminal characterisations; (2) by 
targeting political activity this closes off opportunities for non-violent political 
expression reducing the likelihood of accommodative strategies and intergroup 
dialogue; and (3) the targeting of political violence may both facilitate or inhibit conflict 
transformation depending on whether it is enforced impartially, targeting the behaviour 
of violence not political identities, and whether it is applied proportionately, not 
becoming a form of state repression. These three arguments are derived from the 
analysis in the preceding chapters. However, as criminalising political expression (CPE) 
is contextually dependent it is important to consider a range of other cases to analyse 
how different contexts may shape these arguments.  
 
To develop this, this chapter considers the arguments through a small-n comparative 
analysis of four cases: Sri Lanka, Turkey, Canada, and Belgium. These cases provide 
important insights, not only confirming and developing many of the specific findings 
from the previous chapters, but also into the evolving nature of criminalisation over the 
course of an entire conflict. Before explaining what this would entail it is worth 
clarifying why a small-n analysis is the most appropriate approach as opposed to a 
large-n framework. The primary reason for this is due to the epistemological approach 
                                                          
1
 Informal criminalisation refers to how ± although not legislatively criminalised ± DJURXS¶VLGHQWLW\LV
targeted as a threat by law enforcement and discursively delegitimised, whether through the media or 
politics, as if it were criminal. See chapter one for a fully explanation. 
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adopted throughout the thesis which regards crime as a socially constructed 
phenomenon, not an objectively defined concept (McEvoy and Gormally, 1997). 
Likewise, because its construction is dependent on the perceived reality this creates 
(Hulsman, 1986) it is not possible to analyse this on a global scale as quantified 
indicators would require an inappropriate level of abstraction. While they may be able 
to analyse the formal nature of CPE and even capture the distinctions between the 
various targets, the findings would be still undermined due to its interdependence on 
informal criminalisation as depicted in figure 1 in chapter one. In other words, because 
informal criminalisation emphasises the contextuality and complexity of the process it is 
necessary to account for these factors. Indeed, building on the interpretativist 
PHWKRGRORJ\GHYHORSHGLQFKDSWHUWZRLW³UHTXLUHVextensive knowledge of the case in 
TXHVWLRQDQGFDQ WKHUHIRUHRQO\EHXQGHUWDNHQ LQD VPDOOQXPEHURIFDVHV´ +DQVHQ
2006:10).   Therefore, the structured, focused comparison (Lustick, 1993) enables 
patterns of CPE to be considered across a wider range of case types, including typical 
crucial and counterfactual cases, demonstrating the interaction between formal and 
LQIRUPDOFULPLQDOLVDWLRQYDU\LQJDFFRUGLQJWRWKHµWDUJHW¶&3,&3$RU&39 
 
This said, the cases still need to meet the two essential requirements set out in chapter 
two, whereby the cases must have a legal system which commands at least some 
domestic and/or international legitimacy because criminalisation is inherently tied to 
legitimacy, whether legitimising the state or delegitimising non-state actors, and so the 
mechanism itself needs to command at least some legitimacy if it is to be relevant. From 
the perspective of legal positivism, for instance, laws derive their validity from their 
effectiveness in regulating the society to which they apply (Patterson, 1952:7). In other 
ZRUGV WKH OHJDO V\VWHP ZLOO RQO\ EH UHJDUGHG DV OHJLWLPDWH LI LW ³LV JHQHUDOO\
HIILFDFLRXV´+DUWDVGHWHUPLQHGE\³DVHWRIsocial facts, in particular, the 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of a populatioQ´ *UHHQ , emphasis in 
original). If the population in its entirety rejects the legitimacy of the legal system it will 
be unable to command obedience or respect. Therefore, only cases whose legal system 
has at least some domestic or international legitimacy are considered. 
 
Secondly, the cases must also be deeply divided societies as in such cases the 
criminalisation of political expression can directly frame intergroup relations as outlined 
in the above three arguments (Horowitz, 1985). Without clearly defined group divisions 
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it is unlikely that these findings would be relevant with no clear political identity to 
target. This relates to the puzzle articulated in chapter three, as although deeply divided 
societies have WKH³SRWHQWLDOIRUYLROHQFHEHWZHHQWKHVHJPHQWV´*XHONH2:30), it 
only escalates into violence in some cases and not others. The reasons behind this are 
undoubtedly complex and dependent on various factors, but this chapter will build on 
earlier sections to consider how CPE is related to it. This is because in the context of 
deeply divided societies the issue of security poses one of the most significant 
FKDOOHQJHV IRU FRQIOLFW WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ DV ³SHUFHSWLRQV RI WKH VRXUFHV RI WKH WKUHDW WR
security tend to divide along communal OLQHV´ *XHONH 2:10). The divisions 
between communal groups map onto divisions regarding what the greatest threats are to 
WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH JURXS¶V VHFXULW\ &ULPLQDO MXVWLFH UHSUHVHQWV DQ LPSRUWDQW PHFKDQLVP
WKURXJKZKLFKWKLVµWKUHDW¶EHFRPHVGHILQHGand addressed. Who controls this process 
will, accordingly, shape how this threat comes to be defined in legislation and regulated 
through law enforcement. 
 
In order to minimise selection bias in small-n studies it is necessary to carry out 
³careful, theory-JXLGHG VHOHFWLRQ RI QRQUDQGRP FDVHV´ /HY\ 2008:8). This first 
required identifying those cases which actually met the necessary requirements of being 
deeply divided societies (DDS) with semi-legitimate legal systems. In order to measure 
this the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset was used to identify all cases which had 
two or more ethnic groups which were over 10% of the population in size (except in 
cases where the group was regionally, and not nationally, significant).2 The 10% 
threshold was used to include only cases which were deeply divided societies,3 of which 
there were ninety-two from 1945 until 2013. The purpose of this was not to create a 
definitive list of DDS but to exclude those which were irrelevant; those with almost no 
communal divisions. To address the second criteria, the World Bank rule of law 
measure was used4 to include only those cases which had a legitimate legal system. This 
                                                          
2
 All cases had to have two or more groups whose size was equal to or greater than 10%  and whose status 
was not classed as 'irrelevant' to governance. 
3
 This relates to the definition from chapter one of contexts where ³DVFULSWLYHWLHVJHQHUDWHDQDQWDJRQLVWLF
VHJPHQWDWLRQRIVRFLHW\EDVHGRQWHUPLQDOLGHQWLWLHVZLWKKLJKSROLWLFDOVDOLHQFH´/XVWLFN 
4
 If a state had a score of 0 or higher (the score ranged from -2.5 to 2.5) in any of the 17 years coded 
(1996-2015, omitted 1997, 1999, 2001) they would be included, thus maintaining a low threshold. 
However even with this low threshold some notable cases fell outside of the criteria such as Colombia. 
Therefore the cases noted in Table 17 convey those which are most relevant in terms of the theory, but 
not exclusively, as the findings also apply to a much wider range albeit in a more qualified way. 
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criterion was likewise set at a very low threshold as only a minimal level of legitimacy 
was necessary, but still only twenty-nine had a legitimate legal system in at least one 
year from 1996 until 20155 as summarised in Table 17.6 Identifying cases on this basis 
HQDEOHV D ³UHVWULFWHG UDQJHRIGLIIHUHQFH´QDUURZLQJ WKHQXPEHURI FRPSHWLQJ IDFWRUV
and focusing only on those which are relevant to the analysis (Horowitz, 1985:17; see 
also Lustick, 1993).  
 
Selecting cases from this list was done on the basis of case type, whether they were 
typical, counterfactual, or crucial, linking their selection directly to the purpose of 
theory development. This was to address a number of issues relating to selection bias. 
Firstly, it was necessary to include at least one counterfactual case which did not have 
the criminalisation of political identity or activity (with respect to the communal 
conflict), to consider whether the same findings could be observed in the absence of 
formal criminalisation. If so this would challenge arguments made indicating that the 
changes in conflict transformation may be linked to competing factors, however, if they 
were not observed this would provide an important counterfactual to compare the other 
cases with. Belgium was chosen for these reasons as it did not criminalise the political 
identity of either of the two main communal groups. To further develop this, Canada 
was chosen as a crucial case because while the state did criminalise certain political 
activities and identities, it was limited in doing so and it did not result in a protracted 
violent conflict (Levy, 2008). The implications of these two cases, therefore, provide 
important insights for conflict transformation, developing the theoretical claims 
established throughout the rest of the thesis.  
 
Secondly, typical cases are important in order to consider how CPE operates in different 
contexts and whether the same arguments can still be made. The cases of Sri Lanka and 
Turkey act as such cases similar to Northern Ireland and South Africa in terms of the 
conflict contexts and usage of criminal justice, as in both cases criminalisation was 
targeted against all three types of political expression. Interestingly, the cases extend the 
findings to international actors highlighting the significance of criminalisation at the 
international level to delegitimise political activity in another state.  
                                                          
5
 While this later timeframe of 1996 to 2013 is problematic in terms of validity ± the analysis is focused 
on 1945 onwards ± it is due to data availability. 
6
 Of these twenty-nine cases 72% have experienced at least one year of armed conflict since 1995 and 




                                                          
7
 As classified by the EPR dataset. This draws on the definition of ethnicity developed by Horowitz 
(1985). 
Table 17.  Deeply divided societies with µlegitimate¶ legal systems (1995-2013) 
Country Ethnic Groups7 
Bahrain Shi'a Arabs, Sunni Arabs  
Belgium Flemish, Walloons 
Bhutan Sharchops, Ngalops (Drupka), Lhotsampa (Hindu Nepalese) 
Canada English Speakers, French Speakers 
Cyprus  Greeks, Turks 
Egypt Arab Muslims, Coptic Christians 
Estonia Estonians, Russians 
Fiji Indians, Fijians 
Ghana Other Akans, Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi), Asante (Akan), Ewe 
India Hindi (non-SC/ST), Other Backward Classes (Castes), Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Other Muslims 
Israel Palestinian Arabs, Ashkenazim (Jewish), Mizrahim (Jewish), Israeli Arabs, Russians (Jewish) 
Jordan Palestinian Arabs, Jordanian Arabs 
Kuwait Kuwaiti Sunni (Arab), Kuwaiti Shi'a (Arab) 
Latvia Latvians, Russians 
Malaysia Malays, Chinese 
Mauritius Hindi-speaking Hindus, Creoles (Black Creoles), Muslims, Tamils and Telugus 
Montenegro Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniak Muslims, Croats 
Morocco Arabs, Berbers 
Northern 
Ireland Protestants, Catholics 
Philippines Christian lowlanders, Indigenous, Moro 
Rwanda Hutu, Tutsi 
Saudi Arabia Sunni Wahhabi (Najdi) (Arab), Sunni Shafii/Sofi (Hijazi) (Arab), Ja'afari Shia (Eastern Province) (Arab) 
Senegal Wolof, Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur), Serer 
South Africa Blacks, Afrikaner, Coloured 
Spain Spanish, Catalans, Basques 
Sri Lanka Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils 
Taiwan Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese 
Trinidad and 
Tobago East Indians, Blacks 





The case comparison is illustrated in Table 18 which shows the primary legislation 
responsible for CPE in each of the cases. This structured, focused comparison of CPE 
across the cases therefore enables various patterns to be compared to understand what 
conditions shape whether CPE facilitates or undermines conflict transformation 
(Lustick, 1993). The chapter, accordingly, considers the typical cases first 
demonstrating how the findings from Northern Ireland and South Africa apply beyond 
their immediate contexts. The second section develops these arguments through 
counterfactual case of Belgium and the crucial case of Canada, highlighting the 
importance of informal criminalisation. Moreover, as each of the cases consider 
criminalisation over the course of the conflicts ± not specific phases ± they provide 
insights into how CPE operates as a reactive and evolving process responding to 
particular conflict contexts as they arise, as well as being shaped by these contexts as 
well. The final section summarises the implications of these cases for conflict 
transformation and concludes with discussion of the potential areas for future research.  
 
Table 17. Legislation responsible for criminalising political expression in Belgium, 
Canada, Sri Lanka, and Turkey 
 CPI CPA CPV 
Belgium   - The Terrorist 
Offences Act 
2003 
Canada  - War Measures Act 
1914 




Sri Lanka - The Official 
Language Act 1956 
- The Constitution of 
Sri Lanka 1972 
- Public Security 
Ordinance No. 25 
of 1947 





Turkey - Various restrictions 
on Kurdish language 
and identity 
- Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey 
1961, 1982 
- Anti-Terror Law 





Criminalising political expression and conflict transformation: Sri Lanka and 
Turkey 
 
Criminalising non-violent political expression can exacerbate intergroup relations for 
the three reasons outlined in chapter three: by collectivising repression, contributing 
towards intergroup polarisations, and raising the costs of non-violent movements. 
Turkey and Sri Lanka develop these findings, as in Turkey the Kurdish political identity 
was formally criminalised similarly to Northern Ireland and South Africa (Aydinli and 
Ozcan, 2011); whereas in Sri Lanka, although not formally criminalised, the Tamil 
political identity was informally criminalised through the practices of law enforcement 
and subordination of Tamil nationalism (Vittachi, 1958). Furthermore, following the 
escalation of these conflicts into armed violence both states resorted to politicising 
criminal offences ± again reflecting similar practices to Northern Ireland and South 
Africa as outlined in chapter four ± which, in the context of criminalised non-violent 
political expression, further exacerbated intergroup relationships, because it not only 
WDUJHWHGWKHYLROHQWEHKDYLRXUVRIµWHUURULVP¶EXWWKHSROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQVEHKLQGWKHP 
(Bacik and Coskun, 2011; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005; Selvadurai and Smith, 
2013). Conflict transformation was undermined by these approaches, and continues to 
be, as criminal identities become embedded resulting in intergroup dialogue and 
accommodative reforms being perceived as giving in to terrorism and criminality by at 
OHDVW VRPH ZLWKLQ WKH VWDWH¶V FRPPXQDO JURXS 7KHUHIRUH FRQVLGHULQJ KRw the two 
cases developed provides important comparative examples to extend and refine the 
theoretical arguments developed in earlier chapters.  
 
Criminalising non-violent political expression 
 
The Turkish case reflects many of the characteristics of Northern Ireland and South 
Africa with respect to criminalisation as the state sought to criminalise the Kurdish 
identity, associated political activities, as well as political violence. In other words, the 
political LGHQWLW\ RI WKH ³.XUGLVK´ ZDV UHGXFHG WR ³D WHUURULVP LVVXH´ $\GLQOL DQG
Ozcan, 2011:441). To briefly set the context, the Kurds are a transnational ethnic group 
with significant minorities across the Middle East in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. It is 




(Loizides, 2010:514).  
 
The emergence of modern Kurdish political activism is generally dated to the early 
1960s as a socialist PRYHPHQW ³DQWDJRQLVWLF WR 7XUNLVK µVWDWH¶ QDWLRQDOLVP´ *XQHV
7KLVLVEHFDXVH7XUNLVKQDWLRQDOLVPGHSLFWHG³.XUGVDVHVVHQWLDOO\7XUNLVK´ 
*XQHVRUDV³IXWXUH-7XUNV´<H÷HQ rather than acknowledging 
their political identity. Indeed the development of the Kurdish movement during this 
period is attributed to their links with left-ZLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQVWKDWKHOSHG³disseminate 
DQ DOWHUQDWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI VRFLDO UHDOLW\ FKDOOHQJLQJ 7XUNH\¶V RIILFLDO LGHRORJ\´
(Gunes, 2013:251). In other words, the emergence and development of Kurdish 
opposition was done in opposition to the social reality constructed by the Turkish state 
framing intergroup relations in polarising terms. For example the Turkish constitution 
referred WR³WKHLQGLYLVLEOHXQLW\RIWKH6XEOLPH7XUNLVK6WDWH´emphasising the salience 
of the Turkish identity, while not mentioning Kurdish identity once (Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey, 1982: Preamble). Moreover, the Turkish language was exclusively 
designated as the official language, DQGXQGHUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLWVWDWHGWKDW³>Q@R
language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at 
DQ\ LQVWLWXWLRQ RI HGXFDWLRQ´ 6HFWLRQ ,, $UWLFOH  Indeed the Turkish Government 
FKDQJHG WKHZRUGLQJRI WKH³QDWLRQDOLVP´ LQ WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ WR³QDWLRQDOLVPRI
$WDWXUN´ LQ WKH  &RQVWLWXWLRQ WR UHPRYH DQ\ DPELJXLW\ UHJDUGLQJ ZKDW this 
nationalism referred to (Sencer, 1985-6). Therefore, legal restrictions on the Kurdish 
identity were codified in the central legal instruments of the Turkish state.  
  
Furthermore, non-violent political activities were likewise restricted as even though the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQVWDWHG³>W@KHSUHVVLVIUHHDQGVKDOOQRWEHFHQVRUHG´LWZHQWRQWRVWDWHWKDW
WKLVGLGQRWDSSO\WRWKRVHZKRZULWH³DQ\QHZVRUDUWLFOHVZKLFKWKUHDWHQWKHLQWHUQDORU
external security of the State or the indivisible integrity of WKH6WDWH´6HFWLRQ;$UWLFOH
28) effectively referring to any form of Kurdish nationalist political expression.8 
)UHHGRP RI PRYHPHQW ZDV VLPLODUO\ TXDOLILHG ³IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI LQYHVWLJDWLRQ DQG
SURVHFXWLRQRIDQRIIHQFHDQGSUHYHQWLRQRIFULPHV´6HFWion V, Article 23) essentially 
UHQGHULQJ WKH HQWLUH µIUHHGRP¶ WR EH FRQGLWLRQDO RQ VWDWH LQWHUHVWV Restrictions on 
                                                          
8
 This section of the Constitution was notably repealed 3 October 2003 and restrictions have been 
SDUWLDOO\UHOD[HGDVSDUWRI7XUNH\¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWR(8Dccession (May, 2012:180). 
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communication have also been TXDOLILHG RQ WKH ³grounds of national security, public 
order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and public morals, or protection 
of thH ULJKWVDQG IUHHGRPVRIRWKHUV´ 6HFWLRQ ,9$UWLFOHHIIHFWLYHO\JUDQWLQJ WKH
state extensive powers in censoring political expression.9 
 
In practice this has enabled non-vLROHQWSROLWLFDODFWLYLWLHV WREHµOHJDOO\¶ UHSUHVVHGE\
WKH7XUNLVKVWDWHIRULQVWDQFHZLWK³WKHDUELWUDU\DUUHVWDQGGHWHQWLRQLQ0D\RI
485 Kurdish tribal leaders and other high-profile personalities and the subsequent exile 
RI  RI WKHP WR VRXWKHUQ DQG ZHVWHUQ 7XUNH\´ RU ³WKH DUUHVW and detention of 23 
.XUGLVK DFWLYLVWV LQ 6HSWHPEHU ´ *XQHV  &ULPLQDOLVLQJ non-violent 
political expression was, accordingly, an important factor undermining the possibility of 
FRQIOLFW WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ DV LW OHG WR ³WKH VSDFH IRU QRQ-violent ethnic politics [being] 
UHVWULFWHG´/RL]LGHVFORVLQJRIIRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUWKHSHDFHIXO resolution of 
the conflict. Moreover this led to the eventual reductive framing of Kurdish nationalism 
DV µWHUURULVW¶ %DUULQKD  DQG WKHLU JRDOV EHLQg the break-up of Turkey 
³EOXUULQJWKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ PLQRULW\ ULJKWV DQG VHFHVVLRQLVP´ /RL]LGHV
2010:522). Indeed, during the mid-1990s Turkish parliamentary debates regarding the 
LVVXH IUDPHG LW DV DQ ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQVSLUDF\´ QRW RI D JURXS Iighting for self-
determination (Loizides, 2016:81; Ye÷HQ, 2007); and later during the 1998 crisis over 
the extradition of the PKK leader Öcalan from Italy some of these views also filtered 
down to civil society, evident in its mobilisation in support of extradition (Loizides, 
2016).  
 
In Sri Lanka formal criminalisation initially did not have a significant role in the 
conflict due to the anglicised composition of criminal justice (Vittachi, 1958). Instead it 
was informal criminalisation operating through the practices of law enforcement which 
shaped intergroup relations. Following independence in 1948 Sri Lanka was divided 
between the Sinhalese (72%), and three ethnic minorities - the Sri Lanka Tamils 
(11.2%), Indian Tamils (9.3%), and Sri Lanka Moors (7.1%) (Fernando and Kearney, 
1979:6)10 ± that initially coexisting with relative political stability. However, one area in 
                                                          
9
 These provisions relate to the current Constitution so not all of the provisions will have been expressed 
in exactly the same way during the 1960s and 70s. For more regarding these distinctions see Sencer 
(1985-6). 
10
 These figures were derived from the 1971 census. 
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particular drew sharp distinctions between these ethnic groups, that of language. Having 
been ruled under the British colonial system the English language persisted as the 
language of governance; for instance with the legal system operating completely in 
English despite 95% of the population being unable to speak or read it (Vittachi, 
 7KLV UHSUHVHQWHG D YLWDO LVVXH ZLWK ³ODQJXDJH EHLQJ FRQQHFWHG WR XSZDUG
mobility in the most fundamenWDO ZD\V´ 'H9RWWD  KDYLQJ VLJQLILFDQW
implications on the socio-economic development of each linguistic group. 
 
While initially there was political cooperation in making both Sinhalese and Tamil the 
official languages, the struggle for political control between Tamils and Sinhalese, as 
well as between Sinhalese elites (Gaul, 2017; DeVotta, 2005), led to the highly divisive 
µ6LQKDOHVH2QO\¶RUThe Official Language Act of 1956 (Samaranayake, 1991) which 
not only subordinated Tamil culture but also excluded them from the civil service for 
QRWPHHWLQJDFHUWDLQSURILFLHQF\LQWKHµRIILFLDOODQJXDJH¶+RURZLW]As the 
political conflict escalated, instead of addressing the political divisions, the Government 
response entrenched these with The Constitution of 1972 recognising only Sinhalese as 
the official language. Indeed the 1978 Constitution maintained this, but included Tamil 
DVD³QDWLRQDO´ODQJXDJHDORQJVLGH6LQKDOD6UL/DQNDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQ,WZDV
not until 1987 with the 13th Amendment to the Constitution that Tamil was recognised 
as one of the official languages of Sri Lanka. While it did not formally criminalise the 
Tamil identity, in practice it led to its political marginalisation, as Tamils were 
subordinated to secondary status within the state. Moreover, this then contributed 
towards a wider ethnic polarisation evident in the Government response to Tamil non-
violent responses.  
 
Following the introduction of the Sinhala Only Act, Tamils responded with non-violent 
protest (satyagraha) WKUHDWHQLQJ DQ ³DQ LVODQG-wide Satyagraha´ 9LWWDFKL 
emphasis in original) if linguistic parity was not implemented. Yet by framing 
intergroup relations in zero-sum terms such reforms were perceived as losses by many 
Sinhalese who responded to the protests with anti-Tamil riots, in which over 150 Tamils 
were killed (Vittachi, 1958:20). However, instead of addressing the threat posed by 
extremist Sinhalese, the Government imposed emergency rule on the Tamil dominated 
northeast. Under a state of emergency ± provided for by the provisions of the Public 
Security Ordinance No. 25 of 1947 (Omar, 1996) - the Prime Minister could issue 
|192| 
 
curfews and permit detention, which, when enforced, severely restricted the ability to 
engage in non-violent protest and mobilisation. ,Q SUDFWLFH LW HQDEOHG ³WKH PLOLWDU\ WR
operate in a ham-ILVWHGIDVKLRQDQGZLWKLPSXQLW\´UHVXOWLQJLQ7DPLOVEHLQJ³VHDUFKHG
in humiliating fashion, beaten, stoned by soldiers...and women occasionally raped so 
that by the mid-1960s the army especially was seen as a Sinhalese occupation force bent 
RQVXEMXJDWLQJWKH7DPLOV´'H9RWWD$OWKRXJKWKH7DPLOSROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\
and activity were not formally criminalised, Tamil non-violent resistance had been 
allowed to be met with extremist violence, which when reciprocated was met with state 
repression. The reason why formal criminalisation remained insignificant at this stage 
may be due in part to the legal system operating primarily in English, thereby being 
inaccessible, and accordingly irrelevant, to the vast majority of Sinhalese. Changes in 
WKH OHJDO IUDPHZRUN LWVHOI ZRXOG QRW QHFHVVDULO\ KDYH HQKDQFHG WKH 6LQKDOHVH VWDWH¶V
power. Although as the nature of governance shifted, so too did the significance of such 
legal measures.  
 
Language issues in these cases were inherently intertwined the national identity of each 
communal group. But instead of accommodating the concerns of the Tamil and Kurdish 
minorities, they were legally marginalised through the respective constitutional and 
legal frameworks. When protesting such repression these actors were met with further 
limitations on political activity. This not only limited the ability to engage in political 
dialogue ± by making it unlikely to succeed ± it essentially eliminated it as an option by 
contributing towards intergroup polarisation and state repression. The escalation into 
political violence was not necessarily directly linked, but at the very least such 
criminalisation presented serious obstacles to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
State responses to this political violence further illustrate this, whereby the focus 
remained on the political identity of actors and not violent behaviours. 
 
 
Criminalising political violence 
 
Following the initial unrest between Sinhalese and Tamils in the 1960s a number of 
militant Tamil organisations developed, although it was not until 1976 that the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was officially founded and not until 1983 that 
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widespread communal political violence took place.11  In this initial period the LTTE 
SULPDULO\ ³FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ DVVDVVLQDWLQJ 7DPLO PRGHUDWH SROLWLFLDQV DQG H[HFXWLQJ
SROLFH LQIRUPHUV´ Samaranayake, 1999:116). This emerging Tamil militancy was, 
accordingly, labelled by the Government as terrorism, enabling the Government to link 
³WHUURULVPZLWK WKH7DPLOSROLWLFDOSURMHFW´1DGDUDMDKDQG6ULVNDQGDUDMDK
In other words, the Sinhalese Government associated the political identity of Tamils to 
WKHZLGHUµWKUHDW¶RI7DPLOSROLWLFDOYLROHQce. This was enshrined in the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1979 providing for substantial security powers 
WRDGGUHVVWKH³WKHXVHRIIRUFHRUWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIFULPH´ZKLFKVHHNV ³governmental 
FKDQJH ZLWKLQ 6UL /DQND´ 3UHYHQWLRQ RI 7errorism Act, 1979: Preamble). This is 
particularly important as it contrasts closely with the cases of Northern Ireland and 
South Africa, whereby the criminalisation of political violence was used to delegitimise 
DZLGHUSROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\³HQDEOLQJWKHµVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶RIWKHLVVXH´VHFXULQJ6LQKDOHVH
support for the regime, and assuaging international criticism of state repression 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005:91).   
 
/LQNLQJWKHµWKUHDW¶RISROLWLFDOYLROHQFHWR WKHSROLWLFDOSURMHFWRI7DPLOVHFessionism 
³OHJLWLPDWHG 6UL /DQNDQ VWDWH YLROHQFH DV FRXQWHU-WHUURULVP´, leading to the wider 
repression of the Tamil identity itself (Sentas, 2012:99). In practice, however, this led to 
D ³KHDY\-KDQGHG DQG LQGLVFULPLQDWH´ DSSURDFK 6HOYDGXUDL DQG 6PLWK 13:554) 
exhibiting the very repression that the LTTE were claiming to fight against. For 
instance EHWZHHQ -DQXDU\  DQG 'HFHPEHU  WKHUH ZHUH ³DW OHDVW  RI
HQIRUFHG GLVDSSHDUDQFHV´ .KDOLO 82), and while most of these were directed 
against the JVP they at least illustrate the scale of state repression. Indeed, in the 
northern and eastern Tamil regions the security forces perpetrated a number of war 
FULPHV DQG FULPHV DJDLQVW KXPDQLW\ LQFOXGLQJ ³WKH GLVFULPLQDWH ERPELQJ RI FLYLOLDQ
areas; attacks on medical facilities and places of worship; forced displacement of 
FLYLOLDQVDQGWRUWXUHDQGH[WUDMXGLFLDOH[HFXWLRQ´.KDOLO,W was because of 
the context of criminalising political identity and activity ± albeit informally - that the 
criminalisation of political violence became so problematic for conflict transformation, 
                                                          
11
 However there was a significant revolutionary insurgency in 1971 which was orchestrated by the 




because, instead of targeting violent behaviours, it resulted in the wider criminalisation 
of Tamil separatism.  
 
,Q 7XUNH\ WKH .XUGLVWDQ :RUNHUV¶ 3DUW\ 3.. ZDV HVWablished in 1978 with the 
mission of establishing a separate Kurdish state through guerrilla warfare, launching its 
LQVXUJHQF\LQ7KHHQVXLQJSURWUDFWHGFRQIOLFWUHVXOWHGLQ³FORVHWROLYHV
destroyed thousands of villages, displaced millions of people, and consumed hundreds 
RIELOOLRQVRIGROODUV´%DFLNDQG&RVNXQ'HVSLWHWKHSROLWLFDOWKUHDWSRVHG
by the PKK it was not until 1991 that the Turkish state officially implemented the Anti-
Terror Law Act No. 3713.12 Under this legislation terrorism was essentially defined as 
DQ\DFWZKLFKVRXJKWWRFKDOOHQJHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRU7XUNLVK6WDWHWKURXJK³SUHVVXUH
IRUFH DQG YLROHQFH WHUURU LQWLPLGDWLRQ RSSUHVVLRQ RU WKUHDW´ $FW 1R  $UWLFOH
1.1).13 By politicising these criminal offences this once again provided for expanded 
security powers, stricter sentences, and a legally defined threat in the form of 
µWHUURULVP¶But as explained in chapters three and four, politicising crime directs law 
enforcement against the political identity of actors as well as against violence, and this 
ZDVHYLGHQWLQ7XUNH\DV³7XUNLVKOHDGHUVWHQGHGWRLQWHUSUHWDQ\SROLWLFDOXQUHVWLQLWV
.XUGLVKDUHDVDVVHFHVVLRQLVP´DQG³UHDFWHGZLWKUHSUHVVLRQ´%UDWKZDLWH-4). 
Therefore, in practice these measures essentially legalised what were already unofficial 
state practices. Yet by 1992 it was estimated that the supporters and actors within the 
PKK number around 10,000 (Criss, 1995:20). The reasons for the growing numbers are 
complex, but what is clear is that counter-terrorism policies were not preventing their 
rise. As was the case in Sri Lanka, by criminalising the political identity and activities 
of the Kurds this contributed towards their marginalisation, linking terrorism to this 
identity ensured that law enforcement was targeted against it as well. While this was 
taking place long before the formal politicisation of crime, the attempt to legalise it 
served to further inhibit the possibility of conflict transformation. 
 
                                                          
12
 There was however a three year state of emergency declared in 1980 whereby many of the restrictions 
on political expression became even greater alongside state repression (Brathwaite, 2014). 
13
 7KHH[DFWZRUGLQJLVDVIROORZV³$Q\FULPLQDODFWLRQFRQGXFWHd by one or more persons belonging to 
an organisation with the aim of changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, 
the political, legal, social, secular or economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its 
territory and nation, jeopardizing the existence of the Turkish State and the Republic, enfeebling, 
destroying or seizing the State authority, eliminating basic rights and freedoms, damaging the internal and 
external security of the State, the public order RUJHQHUDOKHDOWKLVGHILQHGDVWHUURULVP´ 
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Furthermore, once enacted the criminalisation of political expression became extremely 
difficult to reverse. In Turkey the political discourse of criminality had become 
HPEHGGHG WR WKH SRLQW WKDW LW ZDV ³SROLWLFDOO\ ULVN\ RIWHQ VXLFLGDO HYHQ´ WR WU\ DQG
reconstruct the social reality created by criminalisation (Loizides, 2010:521). In other 
words, the process of criminalisation framed the issue of identity ± in this case the 
Turkish identity ± in opposition to the threats of Kurdish nationalism. Compromises to 
Kurdish nationalism are accordingly perceived as threats to the Turkish identity and the 
state. This relates closely to the challenge of audience costs as backing down from a 
threat will have a significant bearing on the fate of the political leader doing so (Moon 
and Souva, 2016). This is important in relation to criminal justice because Turks have 
UHVSHFWIRUWKHLUOHJDOV\VWHPDQGDQDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHODEHOVWKH\FRQVWUXFW³DVORQJDV
WKHUHLVDJRYHUQPHQWGHHPHGFDSDEOHRIHQIRUFLQJWKHP´%DODQG/DFLQHU
meaning D VLJQLILFDQW UHYHUVDO ZLWKLQ WKH OHJDO V\VWHP UHJDUGLQJ .XUGLVK µWHUURULVP¶
runs the risk of jeopardising a wider respect for the state itself, or at the very least its 
SROLWLFDO OHDGHUVKLS  )RU LQVWDQFH LQ  ³D 7XUNLVK SURVHFXWRU LQLWLDWHG D FULPLQDl 
inquiry against former President Kenan Evren for suggesting that Turkey become a 
IHGHUDWLRQ´ /RL]LGHV  HIIHFWLYHO\ HTXDWLQJ SROLWLFDO DFFRPPRGDWLRQ ZLWK
criminal activity.  
 
A similar challenge was evident in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan Sinhalese political 
parties sought to outbid each other on the issue of language. Parity between Tamil and 
Sinhalese had been campaigned on by all political parties during 1952, but recognising 
the substantial political capital in a Sinhala-only policy S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who 
was the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), campaigned in 1956 with the 
VORJDQ µ6LQKDOD RQO\ DQG LQ WZHQW\-IRXU KRXUV¶ 'H9RWWD  As a result the 
incumbent United National Party lost the election to the SLFP despite a last minute 
switch to the Sinhala-only policy itself. By taking a more hard-line approach to 
ODQJXDJH WKH 6/)3 ZHUH DEOH WR µRXWELG¶ WKH *RYHUQPHQW DV WKH GHIHQGHUV RI WKH
Sinhalese identity. 
 
While ethnic outbidding gave rise to this outcome, it also made subsequent 
accommodative measures highly controversial and political costly due to the further 
challenge of audience costs (Moon and Souva, 2016). Having campaigned on a platform 
of ethnic dominance the Government had defined this dominance in opposition to the 
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VRFLDO UHDOLW\ RI µWKH RWKHU¶ Once the dominance of the Sinhalese language was 
established any measures to accommodate Tamil were perceived, or at least framed, as a 
threat to the Sinhalese identity (Vittachi, 1958). For instance the Bandaranaike-
Chekvanayakam (B-C) Pact of 1957, which granted regional language rights to the 
Tamil Provinces in the North,  was met by significant Sinhalese protests, eventually 
escalating into further race riots and resulting in the deaths of between 300 and 400 
Tamils (DeVotta, 2005:151). Although the political identity of Tamils was not formally 
criminalised at this stage, its subordination facilitated a wider informal criminalisation 
which contributed towards heightened intergroup tensions. Reversing this subordination 
became tantamount to challenging the Sinhalese identity itself. Loyalist resistance in 
Northern Ireland to reversing such informal criminalisation mirrors these challenges, 
with such attempts being perceived as losses through a zero-sum framework.14 
 
These cases demonstrate how the findings from Northern Ireland and South Africa 
extend beyond their immediate contexts. The issues of criminalising political expression 
undermined wider conflict transformation in each of the cases due to its target being the 
political identity and non-violent activities of a particular communal group. When 
enforced this amounted to the subordination of this group contributing towards 
intergroup polarisation and closing off opportunities for non-violent peaceful resolution 
of intergroup conflict. These issues then became entrenched as the discourse of 
criminality was linked to a political threat, politicising crimes to delegitimise a wider 
political identity whether intentionally or not. Due to the embeddedness of these labels, 
their reform or reversal becomes extremely difficult resulting in their ongoing 
perpetuation of intergroup conflict as each side is reduced to simplistic categorisations 
of victims and perpetrators.  
 
 
Normalising non-violent conflict: Belgium  
 
Criminalising political expression in the above cases reaffirms the complex and 
problematic interaction between conflict transformation and targeting criminalisation 
                                                          
14
 For instance a UVF ex-prisoner explained: "[P]eople [in Loyalist communities] are saying now: '....See 
all them ones, them peelers, they're all Nationalists. It's gone the other way. They want to come in and 
pay us back. They want to hammer our community'" (UVF ex-prisoner A, June 2016).  
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against political identities and activities. But the case of Belgium provides an important 
contrast because, firstly, CPE was directed almost exclusively against political violence, 
not political activity or identity. Unlike in Sri Lanka and Turkey, the criminal justice 
system was not used by any particular group to directly alter the intergroup power 
dynamics. Secondly, the criminalisation of political violence was not necessarily 
µWDUJHWHG¶DJDLQVWDFRPPXQDOJURXSEXWLQVWHDGDSSOLHGUHODWLYHO\LPSDUWLDOO\IRFXVLQJ
on the criminal behaviour of violent acts, not on the identities of actors. This is not to 
say that there are not other challenges in this case, just that the counterfactual absence of 
CPI and CPA corroborates the findings from the other cases.  
 
 
Alternatives to criminalising political expression 
 
Belgium is an important counterfactual case because, while it was sharply divided 
between Walloons and Flemish, it never implemented policies directly criminalising 
non-violent political expression. Providing such a case is valuable for two reasons: 
firstly it helps to understand why such criminalisation is sometimes not implemented, 
and secondly, what alternatives there are to it. This is important because, unlike the 
other cases, Belgium never faced communal or separatist groups engaged in political 
violence (Jenkins, 1990:300) with confliFW QHYHU HVFDODWLQJ ³LQWR H[SUHVVLRQV RI
YLROHQFH´0XOOHDQGWKLVLVGHVSLWHWKHWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKH:DOORRQVDQG
Flemish remaining embedded (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2015). 
 
Understanding why criminalising political identity or activity was never implemented 
requires considering the intergroup context. Initially the state was divided along 
Catholic and secular cleavages, before the linguistic ones, with consociational 
governance predating the rise of the linguistic conflict (Mulle, 2016:111). However as 
the conflict developed neither side utilised criminal justice to consolidate their political 
power. Instead consociational structures were developed over time responding to the 
demographic changes and demands of either side, eventually resulting in a system of 
segmental autonomy, most significantly through the constitutional reform of 1970. This 
meant both communities had relative political autonomy with neither side being able to 
dominate the other at the centre (Deschouwer, 2006). In other words, unless both 
communities consented, CPI and CPA could not be implemented, and so it never was, 
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as obviously neither side would have agreed to the targeting of its own identity. So 
while such powers have contributed towards political deadlock, especially in more 
recent years (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2015), they have also reduced, possibly even 
eliminated, the possibility for criminal justice to be used by one community to 
subordinate the other. In terms of conflict transformation, this provides an important 
example of why a relative equilibrium in intergroup power within the state itself is 
important, as it restricts the ability of any single group being able to employ formal CPE 
in a way that would undermine political expression. 
 
Furthermore, by devolving political power to the two linguistically homogenous regions 
LWHQVXUHGWKDWERWKJURXSVFRXOGPRVWO\³OLYHWKHLUGD\-to-day lives with little contact 
ZLWK WKH µRWKHU¶´ 0QRRNLQ DQG 9HUEHNH   7KHUHIRUH HYHQ LI &3, ZDV
formally implemented its target would have had little impact on the everyday existence 
RI PRVW RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ DV WKH WKUHDW RI µWKH RWKHU¶ ZDV JHRJUDSKLFDOO\ UHPRYHG
rendering it ineffectual. This meant that the conflict ± unlike that in the above cases ± 
was not existentiDODVLWGLGQRWWKUHDWHQ³WKHLUFRUHLGHQWLW\RUWKHLUDELOLW\WRVXUYLYHDV
D SHRSOH´ 0QRRNLQ DQG 9HUEHNH  %H\RQG WKLV ERWK FRPPXQLWLHV KDG D
strong distrust of intrusive security powers, having experienced their abuse throughout 
the Second :RUOG:DUXQGHU WKH1D]LV DQGVRZHUHDYHUVH WR ³DQRYHUO\ FHQWUDOLVHG
SROLFHDSSDUDWXV´6KHSW\FNL 
 
But not only were the different groups unwilling to implement such criminalisation, 
they HYHQZHQWWKHRSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQDVVLQFH³TXHstions concerning the language 
spoken by Belgian residents have been legally prohibited in the official population 
FHQVXV´ 0XOOH   +RZHYHU DOWKRXJK WKLV PD\ LQLWLDOO\ DSSHDU WR QHXWUDOO\
address the question of political identity, in practice it serves a status quo embedding 
intergroup relations as they are. This is characteristic of the wider approach of conflict 
PDQDJHPHQW 7KH SUREOHP ZLWK WKLV DSSURDFK LV WKDW ZKLOH LW PD\ ³HIIHFWLYHO\
accommodate political conflicts that are currently on the agenda...it renders the process 
RI LQWHUVHJPHQWDOFRQIOLFW DFFRPPRGDWLRQ LQFUHDVLQJO\PRUHGLIILFXOW LQ WKH ORQJ UXQ´
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(Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2015:279). In other words, the mechanism provides short-
term solutions which come at the cost of long-term conflict transformation.15  
 
The case is even more compelling when the relative absence of CPI/CPA is considered 
in the context of non-violent movements during this time. For instance in the 1966 and 
1968 there were two student revolts by Flemish students in Leuven regarding linguistic 
reforms, VLQFHWHUPHGWKHµ/HXYHQ4XHVWLRQ¶ (Vos, 2008). The issue initially arose when 
Belgian Bishops of the Catholic University in Leuven proclaimed that the Francophone 
section of the University would remain, despite being located in what was legally a 
monolingual Flemish town. Flemish students and staff responded through mass protests. 
But instead of the protests escalating into political violence, or being policed through 
repression: ³>S@URWHVWRUV JHQHUDOO\ IROORZHG WKH OLne of nonviolent resistance, and 
DUUHVWHGGHPRQVWUDWRUVZHUHXVXDOO\UHOHDVHGWKHVDPHGD\´9RV CPA was 
avoided and instead the state responded to the tensions through political 
DFFRPPRGDWLRQ DGMXVWLQJ ³WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH VWDWH WR WKH QHZ QDWLRQDOLWLHV´ 9RV
1998:94). In other words, the structure of the state was reformed to reflect intergroup 
identities rather than criminalise them. However, as mentioned above with respect to 
FRQIOLFW PDQDJHPHQW WKLV DOVR PHDQW WKDW WKH ³DQWDJRQLVP EHWZHen Flemings and 
:DOORRQV)UDQFRSKRQHV´EHFDPHHPEHGGHGLQWKHVWUXFWXUHVDVZHOO9RVSo 
while CPI/CPA was never implemented, this did not mean conflict transformation took 
effect. It is the presence of CPI/CPA, not its absence, which will have implications for 
conflict transformation.  
 
This leads to the final aspect of criminalisation ± CPV ± and whether it has impacted 
upon conflict transformation in Belgium. Having experienced relatively low levels of 
political violence from 1970-2000, BelgiuP¶V FRXQWHU-terrorism framework was less 
developed than many other states resulting in substantial criticism (Lefebvre, 2017). 
The complexity and fragmentation of %HOJLXP¶V FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHP DQG VHFXULW\
sector likely contributed towards this inefficiency (Daems, Maes and Robert, 2013; 
Mnookin and Verbeke, 2009; Sheptycki, 1999), as well as issues in the level of funding 
received by security forces (Bartunek, 2015) and the lack of political oversight 
                                                          
15
 This chapter is unable to fully consider the significance of different institutional structures for 
criminalisation; such as consociationalism and majoritarianism. For more on these see Loizides (2015, 
2016). The conclusion highlights this as an important area for future research. 
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particularly in the 1980s (Lasoen, 2017). In responding to these criticisms and the wider 
SROLWLFDO FRQWH[WRI WKH µZDURQ WHUURU¶ WKH%HOJLXPVWDWH UHVSRQGHG LQZLWK7KH
Terrorist Offences Act creating the offence of terrorism.  It defines a terrorist offence as 
DQDFWZKLFKFDQ³FDXVHVHULRXVKDUP´with the intention of intimidation, or the goal of 
³VHULRXVO\ GHVWDELOLVLQJ RU GHVWUR\LQJ WKH IXQGDPHQWDO SROLWLFDO FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation´ 
(CODEXTER, 2014). While this may appear similar to the definitions of the other 
cases, what distinguishes it from them is how it has been qualified.  
 
Belgium approaches towards criminalising political violence is distinct from the other 
cases as it qualifies its counter-terrorism legislation with a provision in Article 141ter 
Criminal Code:  
³Zhich stated that no provision of Title Iter could be interpreted in such a 
manner as being intended to reduce or restrict rights or fundamental freedoms, 
such as the right to strike, the freedoms of assembly, of association or of 
H[SUHVVLRQ´'HZXOI 
Some have argued that this provision is superfluous and possibly even problematic 
(Dewulf, 2014) because it adds an unnecessary human rights clause to the criminal 
code. In contrast, others have criticiVHG%HOJLXP¶VFRXQWHU-terrorism framework for not 
consistently abiding by the provisions (Vervaet, 2015). Yet its presence stands in 
dramatic contrast to the other cases. Specifically, it recognises that acts of political 
violence are not necessarily analogous with a homogenous political identity. The 
practical outworking of this in the counter-terrorism framework demonstrates this as it 
is predicated on three key principles of empathy, addressing root causes, and 
safeguarding fundamental rights (Coolsaet and De Swielande, 2007). In other words, 
MXVWDVWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIµFULPH¶VKDSHVVRFLDOUHDOLW\+XOVPDQVRWRRGRHVLWV
qualification. Therefore, arguing that it is superfluous fails to recognise the significant 
role it can have in wider social construction. Indeed it encapsulates, at least formally, 
the need for criminal justice to target violent behaviours rather than identities both 
formally and informally. This is not to say such an approach is sufficient for conflict 
transformation ± it will still be dependent on the nature of informal criminalisation - but 
that it certainly helps by contributing towards the delegitimisation of violence as an 
alternative to non-violent political expression. A much clearer distinction is therefore 
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drawn between the behaviours and identities of actors than was exhibited in the other 
cases. 
 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that CPV ± in Belgium this primarily relates to 
those of Islamist or left-wing groups16 ± can contribute towards political cohesion as 
coalitions form to address the shared threat of political violence (Indridason, 2002). 
Because neither communal group pursued political violence, CPV presents a potential 
shared interest which may transcend the linguistic cleavages. In this way, the political 
leadership of both groups would take on shared audience costs, whereby the failure to 
address the external threat of terrorism would undermine them both. The extent to 
which such commonality exists is, however, unclear and would depend on both groups 
agreeing on the nature of the threat and how to address it. The likelihood of 
commonality developing is therefore dependent on wider contextual factors, such as the 
perceived severity of the security threat (König and Finke, 2013). Moreover, if political 
violence escalates or is perceived to be poorly addressed this can undermine the 




Constrained criminalisation: Canada 
 
From the above cases it is clear that the presence of CPI, CPA, and CPV are all relevant 
for conflict transformation. Canada develops this by demonstrating how dependent the 
formal processes are on their informal outworking through law enforcement and 
discourse. This is because, while Canada introduced CPA and CPV, this did not lead to 
the escalation of conflict as occurred in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Northern Ireland, and South 
Africa. In other words, Canada acts as a crucial case where the presence of CPA and 
CPV would be predicted to undermine conflict transformation, but in practice they had 
a comparatively minor impact. Because they were targeted against a specific 
manifestation of Québécois nationalism, contained to a narrow timeframe, and 
coordinated alongside political accommodation, their implications were much less 
significant than those of the other cases. 
                                                          
16
 Combatant Communist Cells was the major terrorist threat in the late Cold War period, and more 




The conflict in Canada is based on the communal divisions between the anglophone and 
francophone communities. The francophone community made up about 25% of the total 
population throughout the twentieth century. The foundations of the modern separatist 
PRYHPHQW ZKLFK HPERGLHV WKH UHFHQW LQWHUJURXS FRQIOLFW GHYHORSHG LQ WKH µ4XLHW
5HYROXWLRQ¶ LQ WKH V ZKHQ ³4XHEHF H[SHULHQFHGHFRQRPLF SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO
FKDQJH´ 'XWWHU  7he primary militant organisation was the Front de 
Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) which emerged in 1963 lasting until 1972, and was 
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU ³VRPH  ERPEV DQGWKH GHDWKV RI HLJKW SHRSOH DQG LQMXULHV WR
GR]HQV´ 'XWWHU  ZLWK RYHU  RI DOO WHUrorist attacks between1960 and 1985 
taking place in the four years 1968-71 (Ross, 1988:220). Political violence was, 
therefore, primarily contained to this period and perpetrated by the FLQ, culminating in 
what has been termed the October Crises. 
 
On October 5th 1970 the British diplomat James Cross was abducted by the FLQ, and 
within twelve days the provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte was abducted and 
DVVDVVLQDWHGUHVXOWLQJLQ³EURDGHUVRFLDOWXUPRLO´DV³WKRXVDQGVRIVWXGHQWVZDONHGRXW
of universLWLHVLQSURWHVW´0XQURH)ROORZLQJWKHLQLWLDODEGXFWLRQWKH)/4
made a series of demands, primarily involving the release of a number of imprisoned 
)/4PHPEHUVIURPZKDWWKH\FDOOHG³WKHDQFLHQWUDFLVWDQGFRORQLDOLVW%ULWLVKV\VWHP´
(FLQ Communiqué A, 1970). The language used was of liberation from the repression 
of the British colonial system. Their propaganda explicitly sought to advance their 
political aims ± Québécois secessionism ± by drawing parallels between themselves and 
the Palestinians, black Americans, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and WKH µOLEHUDWLRQ¶
movements in Latin America. But the contrast between the cases here is instructive, as 
while political violence in Sri Lanka and Turkey was in the context of widespread 
repression, this was not the case in Canada.  
 
The FLQ were not fighting against government repression, but fighting for 
independence and their identity. This was an important factor, albeit one amongst many 
others,17 in limiting wider support for political violence, aV³DFFHVVWRWKHSROLWLFDODUHQD
DQG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI FKDQJH´ XQGHUPLQHG WKH QHHG IRU SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH 'XWWHU
                                                          
17
 See for instance David Charters (1997) The amateur revolutionaries: A reassessment of the FLQ. 
Terrorism and Political Violence 9(1):133-169. 
|203| 
 
2012:72). So while the absence of criminalising political identity does not prevent 
political violence from developing, its absence means those engaging in political 
violence will not be able to use it to increase their support base pointing to it as a 
JULHYDQFH 7KLV LV IXUWKHU VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH )/4 QRW KDYLQJ VWURQJ OLQNV ZLWK ³D
OHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDOµ)URQW¶´DVWKHLUYLROHQFHZDVSUHGLFDWHGon non-violent alternatives 
being ineffective (Smith, 1993:87). In fact, political accommodation was forthcoming, 
albeit slowly, with Canada becoming officially bilingual in 1969, and later through the 
referendums on independence in 1980 and 1995 (Dutter, 2012). 
 
In response to the abduction the Government invoked the War Measures Act 1914 
which provided for extensive security powers, and it was based on the belief that they 
were facing a situation which could quickly escalate into a wider insurrection (Munroe, 
7KLVHQDEOHGWKH*RYHUQPHQWWR³VXVSHQGFLYLOOLEHUWLHVLPSRVHPDUWLDOODZRQ
WKH SURYLQFH DQG UXOH E\ GHFUHH´ 'XWWHU  HQDEOLQJ PDVV FHQVRUVKLS
detention, restrictions on movement, and seizures of property. While in the first four 
GD\VRIWKHFULVLV WKHUHZHUHILIW\DUUHVWVDQGDWKRXVDQGVHDUFKHV³WKHLQWHQVLW\RIWKH
police effort escalated until the very laws the police were trying to uphold became a 
OLPLWLQJIDFWRU´HVFDODWLQJLQWRWKHPDVVGHWHQWLRQVRIVRPHSHRSOHPRVWRIwhich 
were subsequently released without charge and an estimated 31,700 searches overall 
(Munroe, 2009:299). In other words, instead of this being a political measure designed 
WRUHSUHVVWKHIUDQFRSKRQHFRPPXQLW\LWZDVWKHUHVXOWRIWKHSROLFHVHHNLQJ³Oegalise 
RSHUDWLRQV HLWKHU FRQWHPSODWHG RU DOUHDG\ WDNLQJ SODFH´ 0XQURH  7KLV
reinforces the importance of informal criminalisation, as although the War Measures 
Act enabled the suspension of civil liberties and emergency powers, it was the poliFH¶V
HQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHVHWKDWUHVXOWHGLQD³KDP-ILVWHGLQWHUQPHQWFDPSDLJQ´DQGRIZKLFK
WKH ³SROLWLFDO OHDGHUV LQYROYHGH[SUHVVHG WKHLU VXUSULVH DW KRZ WKH GHWHQWLRQ HIIRUW
HVFDODWHG VR TXLFNO\ LQWR VRPHWKLQJ IDU ODUJHU WKDQ WKH\ KDG H[SHFWHG´ 0XQURH, 
2009:300). Even in introducing the Proclamation the Minister of Justice recognised this 
GDQJHUGHVFULELQJWKHSRWHQWLDO³WUDS´LWUHSUHVHQWHGDVLWPD\JLYHWKH)/4³HYLGHQFH
RIDOOHJHGDXWKRULWDULDQLVP´+&'Hbates, October 16 1970:193-4).  
 
The FLQ diGH[DFWO\WKLVVHHNLQJWRFDSLWDOLVHRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHSUHVVLYHUHVSRQVH
by releasing a communiqué on October 17 1970 stating:  
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³The present authorities have declared war on the Quebec patriots. After having 
pretended to negotiate for several days they have finally revealed their true face 
as hypocrites and terrorists´. 
7KHFRPPXQLTXpFRQWLQXHGUHIHUULQJWR³PDVVLYHDQGLOOHJDO´DFWLRQVFRQGXFWHGE\³WKH
IDVFLVW SROLFH´ )/4 &RPPXQLTXp %  Indeed, the October Crisis continues to 
represent the colonial oppression which the FLQ claimed to be fighting against, and 
while this did not lead to the mass mobilisation they had hoped for, it further 
undermined the legitimacy of Canadian state for many within the Quebec nationalist 
movement (Charters, 1997; Munroe, 2009). In other words, Quebec nationalism itself 
was perceived by some as the target of this repressive response, not the FLQ, leading to 
an informal criminalisation of their political identity. This demonstrates the close 
relationship between CPI and CPA whereby even in the absence of legislation targeting 
political identity it can still be criminalised informally by directing CPA against it. This 
said, the French media in particular were accused of exacerbating the situation. For 
instance Québec-Presse called for passive resistance in response to the security 
PHDVXUHV VWDWLQJ ³ZH PXVW UHVLVW WKH UHSUHVVLRQ ZKLFK LV VWULNLQJ HYHU\ZKHUH LQ
4XHEHF´4XRWHGLQ&RKHQ-Almagor, 2000). Therefore, the media also had an important 
role in contributing towards WKH VLWXDWLRQ DV RQH FRPPHQWDWRU FRQFOXGHG ³[T]he 
behaviour of some organs of the French media exacerbated the crisis and forced the 
JRYHUQPHQW WR FRQWHPSODWH SRVVLEOH SURFHGXUHV IRU PRQLWRULQJ WKH PHGLD´ &RKHQ-
Almagor, 2000). Though whether CPA was the solution to this challenge is a much 
wider debate, but this at least demonstrates the complex outworking of informal 
criminalisation particularly in terms of provoking political resistance. 
 
5HFRJQLVLQJWKDWWKH:DU0HDVXUHV$FWZDV³WRREOXQWDQLQVWUXPHQW´LQWKHZRUGVRI
the Minister of Justice (HC Debates, November 4 1970:879), the Government moved to 
replace the proclamation with new legislation, passing the Public Order Temporary 
Measures Act 1970, proscribing the FLQ and all associated groups. Membership and all 
forms of support for the FLQ were criminalised on the basis that the threat was 
collective not individual, therefore requiring new legislation rather than the ordinary 
criminal code (HC Debates, November 4 1970:883). Mass arrests could accordingly be 
conducted on the grounds that these were suspected members or supporters of the FLQ. 
The Act notably included a sunset clause expiring on 30 April 1971 making it clear that 
the intention was to respond to the current crisis and not act as a permanent measure. 
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Indeed, following the murder of Pierre Laporte and recovery of James Cross the 
Government withdrew the military from Quebec on January 5 1971. In this way the 
Government sought to minimise the political repercussions of the security practices in 
response to the October Crisis. While the above issues of informal criminalisation had a 
QHJDWLYH LPSDFWRQ WKH VWDWH¶s legitimacy, by containing their presence to the specific 
period of the crisis this minimised the long-term implications. 
 
Although Quebec nationalists have since used the imagery of state repression during the 
October Crisis to evoke support for separatism (Charters, 1997), this has been through 
non-violent political expression. Due to the public outrage which was directed at the 
FLQ following the murder of Laporte, their support quickly diminished, with The 
2FWREHU &ULVHV HIIHFWLYHO\ PDUNLQJ ³WKH HQG RI YLROHQW UHYROXWLRQDU\ SURWHVW LQ WKH
SURYLQFH´ &OHPHQW  Therefore, while CPA and CPV did lead to some 
negative repercussions in terms of state legitimacy and human rights abuses, it did not 
escalate into widespread political violence as was the case in Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
Northern Ireland, or South Africa. For instance, following the October Crisis the 
separatist Parti Québécois ± only founded in 1968 - had a dramatic rise in electoral 
support, from 23% in 1970 to 41% in 1976 in the Quebec provincial elections, whereas 





These cases reinforce the theoretical arguments developed in the earlier chapters, that 
FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶V WDUJHW and the nature of informal criminalisation have significant 
implications on whether it will facilitate or undermine conflict transformation. Utilising 
the multilevel framework of conflict transformation again (Lederach, 2003), with the 
levels of structure, issue and actor transformation, enables these complexities to be 
aggregated across each level as summarised in Table 19. The remainder of this chapter 
will discuss each of these by analysing the comparison between the cases across the 
three levels. 
 
Firstly, structure transformation is frequently undermined by both CPI and CPA. Rather 
than contributing towards a re-balancing of intergroup power relations, the criminalised 
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are disproportionately disempowered due to criminalisation being under state control. 
For example, in Turkey Kurdish political expression was effectively outlawed through 
the Constitution to ensure that the territorial integrity of Turkey could not be legally 
challenged, reducing Kurdish nationalism to the issue of separatism. While in Sri Lanka 
the Sinhalese Government did not formally use criminalisation until the late 1970s, 
when it did, it likewise reduced Tamil nationalism to political violence through counter-
terrorist legislation, legitimising the state particularly in the international arena 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). Furthermore, international states in both of these 
cases similarly proscribed groups as a means of denouncing their wider political aims 
(Baser, 2015; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005) making it more difficult for these 
actors to mobilise externally. For instance, the proscribing of the PKK by Germany 
UHVWULFWHGWKH.XUGLVKGLDVSRUDV¶SROLWLFDORSWLRQVEy framing them as a security threat 
(Baser, 2015), DQGLWKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWWKHLUSURVFULSWLRQE\WKH8.KDVPHDQW³WKRVH
who support Kurdish self-determination are unable to be recognised as legitimate 
SROLWLFDO VXEMHFWV LQ WKH JOREDO OHJDO RUGHU´ 6HQtas, 2016:915). Similarly, the US 
proscription of the LTTE appears to have been designed more to undermine the Tamil 
political project rather than defeat the LTTE (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005:96). 
Indeed there are further examples of this, such as the proscription of various Colombian 
µWHUURULVW¶JURXSVE\WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP, which has restricted the ability of third-party 
actors in helping to facilitate intergroup dialogue as part of the wider peace process 
(Haspeslagh, 2013). Therefore, CPI not only operates domestically but also 
internationally, though the implications of this require further research.  
 
Furthermore, the identity of non-state actors can become marginalised and persecuted 
E\ODZHQIRUFHPHQWDVLWWDUJHWVERWKWKHLUµFULPLQDO¶EHKDYiours and identities. Indeed, 
even in the absence of formal CPI, law enforcement may still be targeted against a 
JURXS¶VSROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\WKURXJK&3$DVZDVWKHFDVHLQ6UL/DQNDDQGWRDPXFKOHVVHU
extent in Canada. This is why informal criminalisation can be more important than the 
legislation framework for conflict transformation, because the efficaciousness of non-
YLROHQWSROLWLFDOH[SUHVVLRQZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHH[WHQVLYHQHVVRI&3$¶VHQIRUFHPHQW)RU
instance, the costs associated with non-violent political expression in Turkey were 
comparatively much greater than in Canada, where non-violent political activity was 
only periodically targeted and for a comparatively small section of the entire communal  
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Table 18. Implications of criminalising political expression for conflict transformation 
 
 Destructive transformation Constructive transformation 
Structure x If targeted against an identity 
criminalisation will exacerbate 
intergroup power dynamics 
generally in favour of the state 
who controls the criminal justice 
system 
x CPI/CPA reduce opportunities for 
non-violent political expression 
by raising the associated costs, 
while informal criminalisation 
can raise the costs inaction 
through repressive security 
measures 
x The same processes which 
FUHDWHWKHµVRFLDOUHDOLW\¶RI
crime can also be used to 
qualify this reality so that 
political violence is targeted 
against the behaviours of 
perpetrators not the identities 
Issue x CPI can be informally 
implemented by law enforcement 
targeting the political identity of a 
group through CPA 
x The criminal label created by 
criminalisation reduces complex 
political issues to a single 
µFULPLQDO¶SUREOHP marginalising 
shared interests 
x By only criminalising political 
violence it can provide a 
uniting issue which transcends 
the communal divisions if 
both sides seek to undermine 
it together 
Actor x The social reality created by 
CPI/CPA can undermine long-
term accommodative measures 
due to audience costs and ethnic 
outbidding 
x CPI and CPA contribute towards 
intergroup dehumanisation 
x If applied evenly across all 
actors CPV can contribute 
towards the delegitimisation 
of political violence in 




group. In this way Canada did not undermine non-violent political expression in the 
long-term because of its limited approach.  
 
However, while criminalisation can contribute towards this power imbalance, it does 
not necessarily cause it. The inverse may actually be the case.  For instance, in Belgium 
because neither communal group had complete control of the criminal justice system, 
amongst other factors outlined above, they were unable and unwilling to try and direct it 
against the opposing group. A relative equilibrium in intergroup power would therefore 
appear to be conducive with there being a lower likelihood of the implementation of 
CPI or CPA. This does not necessarily mean it will facilitate conflict transformation just 
that CPE will not undermine it. Indeed the alternative of consociationalism in Belgium 
partially facilitated the embedding of polarised identities, characterising a conflict 
management approach. 
 
For issue transformation, CPI contributes towards intergroup polarisation reducing 
political identities to simplistic criminal narratives. In Turkey the Kurdish identity was 
linked directly to the threat to the territorial integrity ± and by extension security ± of 
Turkey and was therefore dealt with as a criminal problem rather than a political issue. 
Likewise in Sri Lanka, despite there not being legislation formally criminalising Tamil 
identity (at least until the Prevention of Terrorism Act) the subordination of the Tamil 
language represented a wider informal criminalisation of Tamil nationalism. The 
FUHDWLRQRI WKH µFULPLQDO¶RWKHU LQ WKHVHFDVHV WKHUHIRUH FRQWULEXWHG WRZDUGV WKe wider 
challenges of audience costs and ethnic outbidding discussed in chapter five. Shared 
interests are displaced as issues are framed in zero-sum terms. The identity of one group 
is, accordingly, perceived as the threat to another.  This reduces accommodative 
measures and concessions to the out-JURXSWRWKHµVRFLDOUHDOLW\¶RIWKUHDWFRQWULEXWLQJ
towards intergroup polarisation which becomes embedded as the conflict develops.  
 
But once CPI is implemented CPA becomes its manifestation acting as an expression of 
intergroup animosity with state forces and pro-VWDWH PLOLWLDV WDUJHWLQJ WKHVH µWKUHDWV¶
and in response, criminalised actors may respond in kind in a tit-for-tat escalation of 
violence. The issue of criminality can, therefore, become the overriding paradigm 
shaping intergroup relationships reducing all other issues to this single threat. For 
instance, in Sri Lanka, despite there being significant threats from Sinhalese dominated 
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JVP in the 1970s and 80s, evident in the insurgencies in 1971 and 1987, the Sinhalese 
Government focused its attention on Tamil nationalism and emerging Tamil militancy 
proscribing the LTTE in 1978 and the JVP only later in 1983 (Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005). Political violence against Tamil protests was permitted, at times 
even encouraged or facilitated by state actors, whereas Tamil militancy was met with 
severe repression (De Votta, 2005, Vittachi, 1958).  
 
On the other hand, Québécois nationalism was never framed as a threat to Canadian 
security, only FLQ political violence. This meant violent political expression and non-
violent alternatives were clearly distinguished so that the latter could be targeted 
without undermining the former. While the enforcement of CPA led to some 
perceptions of state repression, by containing it to the period of political violence 
surrounding the October Crisis and providing effective non-violent alternatives to 
political violence, it was able to minimise the negative repercussions (Clement, 2008). 
Indeed the October Crisis signified the end for the FLQ and Québécois nationalism 
instead developed through Parti Québécois (Dutter, 2012). In Belgium WKH µFULPLQDO¶
label was never used as part of the intercommunal conflict, and so CPE was of marginal 
significance in terms of issue transformation.  
 
In contrast to this, a limited approach towards criminalisation which only targets 
political violence presents an opportunity for conflict transformation. If neither group is 
engaging in political violence this means violence external to their conflict presents a 
potential shared threat and a collective interest. Agreeing on measures to address such 
violence provides opportunities for cooperation and there is some evidence suggesting 
that it increases the likelihood of coalition formation (Indridason, 2002). This would 
have important implications for conflicts emerging from violence, with both sides 
committed to non-violent dialogue criminalising the shared threat of violence could act 
as a confidence building measure as both will take on the associated audience costs, 
albeit constrained by agreement over what this would mean in practice. 
 
Actor transformation is undermined through CPI and CPA because it contributes 
WRZDUGVDFWRUGHKXPDQLVDWLRQ7KH IXQGDPHQWDO LPSRUWDQFHRINQRZLQJ µWKHRWKHU¶ LV




all those associated to that group with individual acts of political violence. This 
securitises the context at the expense of political accommodation. This is due to a wider 
issue of ethnic outbidding where moderate voices are marginalised by extremes who 
DGYRFDWH IRU H[WUHPHSRVLWLRQVRQ WKHJURXQGVRI WKHUHEHLQJDQ HTXLYDOHQW µWKUHDW¶± 
ZKLFK &3, DQG &3$ µLGHQWLI\¶ %\ IUDPLQJ WKH LVVXH RI 6LQKDOHVH OLQJXLVWLF
subordination in terms of Tamil domination, this meant the Tamil language was itself 
framed as the threat to Sinhalese identity. Accommodative measures previously 
advanced by the Sinhalese political elite where therefore no longer feasible. Moderate 
positions gave way to the extremes as the threat was defined in like terms. Similarly, in 
Turkey measures aimed at political accommodation were framed as being tantamount to 
criminality for threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish state (Loizides, 2010). 
Canada was more limited in its measures dealing with the FLQ targeting only the 
organisation and explicitly limiting the threat of political violence to the FLQ, not the 
wider nationalist movement.  
 
If re-orientated, however, criminalisation may also enable wider actor transformation. 
By targeting only specific behaviours, criminalisation may be able to re-distribute actor 
legitimacy away from political violence and onto non-violent alternatives. For instance 
by singling out the political violence of the FLQ in Canada, the state was able to 
undermine violence as a means of achieving political transformation while providing 
alternative political opportunities. In this way it was political violence, not Quebec 
nationalism, which was undermined. However, this would only facilitate transformation 
if the criminal justice system holds legitimacy across all actors, which is unlikely in 






This chapter has brought together and developed the theoretical arguments established 
throughout the rest of the thesis, employing a small-n study of the conflicts in Turkey, 
Sri Lanka, Belgium, and Canada, to build upon the earlier findings. Considering the 
evolution of the conflicts in these cases was important as it enabled the chapter to map 
the fluid development of CPE and identify the distinctions between formal and informal 
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criminalisation over time. This chapter, therefore, develops the theoretical arguments 
through its extension beyond Northern Ireland and South Africa, considering different 
conflict contexts to analyse how it impacts conflict transformation. This was achieved 
through selecting the cases on the basis of their case type: as typical cases Sri Lanka and 
Turkey extend the external validity of the research; as a crucial case Canada refines the 
arguments by providing a least likely outcome of non-violence following CPA and 
informal CPI; and as a counterfactual case Belgium enables these arguments to be 
considered in relation to the absence of CPE. By being selected according to case type 
this ensured that the cases were able to provide valuable new insights through in-depth 
analysis while still accounting for the subjectivity and complexity of the cases (Hansen, 
2006; Levy, 2008). 
 
The overall findings are summarised in Table 19 illustrating how constructive and 
destructive conflict transformation map onto the three levels of transformation. In 
summary, considering the four cases over the course of their conflicts demonstrated 
how CPE operates as a reactive and evolving process responding to particular conflict 
contexts as they arise, as well as being shaped by these contexts as well. Rather than 
representing a specific mechanism of state power, these cases show just how variable 
the impact of CPE can be due to the interaction between informal and formal 
criminalisation. The examples of extensive state repression facilitated through CPA in 
Sri Lanka and Turkey contrast with the contained approach to the FLQ in Canada with 
corresponding outcomes in terms of political violence; protracted violent conflicts in Sri 
Lanka and Turkey, and democratic mobilisation in Canada. CPE alone cannot account 
for the entirety of these outcomes, but from the evidence discussed above it was clearly 
an important contributing factor. Furthermore, despite an absence of formal CPI in 
Canada and Sri Lanka (until 1979) informal criminalisation still took place through the 
implementation of CPA demonstrating the interaction between the formal and informal 
processes. The contrast of Belgium is effective in qualifying these points whereby the 
absence of CPE does not necessarily result in a more effective approach to conflict 
transformation. It is the presence of CPE, not its absence, which has significant 
implications for conflict transformation.  
 
The chapter also develops a number of further arguments which follow from the cases. 
While the focus has been on CPI domestically, the international dimension has 
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important implications for conflict transformation as well. The proscription of the LTTE 
and PKK by international actors led to a number of challenges in mobilising 
international support for the wider political objectives of these groups particularly in 
terms of fundraising and political lobbying (Baser, 2015; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 
2005; Sentas, 2016). While it was beyond the parameters of this chapter to properly 
consider these implications for conflict transformation, this would be an important area 
for future research to consider. Furthermore, the Belgium case highlights how a relative 
equilibrium in intergroup power within the state reduces the likelihood of the state 
implementing either CPI or CPA. In such contexts it would be unclear which identity 
criminalisation would target, and it would require both sides risking the abuse of the 
powers by the other.  This demonstrates the important role of institutional designs, such 
as the consociational institutions in Belgium. Therefore it would be important for future 
research to consider the link between institutional design and CPE, and whether certain 
institutional systems are more likely to facilitate any of the different types of CPE.  
 
These findings reinforce the argument that targeting non-violent political expression 
through CPI or CPA is counter-productive for short and long-term conflict 
transformation. On the other hand, instead of using criminalisation to consolidate in-
group power through construFWLQJ WKH VRFLDO UHDOLW\ RI WKH µFULPLQDO RWKHU¶ LW FDQ
potentially be used to the opposite effect. By qualifying CPV to focus on specific 
YLROHQW EHKDYLRXUV LW PD\ EH SRVVLEOH WR UHIUDPH WKH µWKUHDW¶ VR WKDW LW QR ORQJHU
contributes towards out-group dehumanisation and intergroup polarisation. For instance 
the Belgium example of counter-terrorism legislation illustrates how such an approach 
could take effect formally. The crime of terrorism is qualified so that directed against 
expressions of political violence, not the identity of the actors.  This does not preclude 
legislation which targets certain forms of support for terrorism, such as financial or 
logistical, but instead suggests that such proscription would benefit from qualifications 
like those evident in the Belgium case. But this is still dependent on the wider 
implementation of such legislation. These points are developed further in the conclusion 







The central research question guiding this project was: What implications does 
criminalising political expression have for conflict transformation? The thesis began by 
FRQVLGHULQJ WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V µFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\ZKLFKKDGDSURIRXQG
impact on the direction of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Crawford, 1999; McEvoy, 
2001). But as the research progressed it became clear that British strategy was 
emblematic of various other iterations even within the conflict in Northern Ireland, not 
to mention beyond. What this criminalisation strategy embodied was, therefore, only 
one example of a particular mechanism of state power used to delegitimise opposing 
actors. Drawing on the substantial body of research on WKH µFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ VWUDWHJ\
(Boyle, Hadden, and Hillyard, 1975; Hillyard, 1993; Ellison and Smyth, 2000; 
Gormally, McEvoy and Wall, 1993; McEvoy, 2000, 2001; Walsh, 1983; Wright and 
Bryett, 1991), the empirical analysis in the thesis shows how this reflects a wider 
pattern of state behaviour. Indeed some have previously argued that there was 
considerable continuity across many of these policies (Walsh, 1983, 2000), but this 
thesis develops this into a theory of how criminalising political expression impacts 
conflict transformation. 
 
Linked to this were the conceptual and epistemological issues underpinning traditional 
approaches to conflict analysis, which assumed a level of state legitimacy and unit 
homogeneity (McEvoy and Gormally, 1997; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). 
These assumptions are problematic when applied to the process of CPE, and in 
particular to deeply divided societies, because in such cases order becomes equated with 
a political status quo which can often mean the hegemony of one group at the expense 
of others (Guelke, 2012; Horowitz, 1985; Lustick, 1993). While previous research has 
clearly outlined the important role states have in shaping intergroup relations 
particularly through identity construction and polarisation, this thesis builds upon this 
by examining a specific mechanism through which this has been achieved. In other 
words, CPE embodies a mechanism of state power which is used to consolidate the 
VWDWH¶V hegemonic position, rather than as a neutral instrumental process protecting 
society from harm. The criminal label accordingly applies to the political identity of 
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actors, reducing their political aspirations to criminal intent. In such cases any 
assumption of the legitimacy of the label will therefore assume the illegitimacy of these 
political actors. This thesis, accordingly, sought to address both these issues considering 
whether CPE represented a pattern of state behaviour through a comparative framework 
and developing a critical conceptualisation of CPE. 
 
Theoretically the thesis has developed a critical conceptualisation of CPE building on 
critical criminological and legal studies distinguishing the formal legal system from its 
informal implementation and experienced effects (Hulsman, 1986; Lacey, 2009; 
Quinney, 1977; Shiner, 2009). This was necessary in order to challenge the statist 
assumptions underpinning legal positivist approaches, instead viewing criminalisation 
to be a mechanism of state power which constructs the social reality of crime (Becker, 
1963). From this post-structuralist perspective, the construction RIWKHµFULPLQDO¶ODEHO in 
legislation is interdependent with the wider perceptions of those subject to it, enforcing 
it, and witnessing it. For instance, the implications of criminalising the display of 
political flags depends on who enforces it, which flags it applies to, the extent of its 
enforcement, the perceived legitimacy of the state, and the salience of flags as symbols 
of political identity. It was necessary therefore to consider not just the laws which 
criminalise political expression, but their implementation and the perceived social 
UHDOLW\ WKH\ FRQWULEXWHG WRZDUGV LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WKH µSUDFWLFHV¶ RI FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1992). 
 
As the research developed it became clear that even focusing on CPE encompassed a 
wide range of different processes. Therefore the thesis developed an original 
explanatory typology of CPE based on its target, GLVDJJUHJDWLQJ LW LQWR WKUHH µW\SHV¶: 
namely identity, activity, and violence. This was because each of these types pertains to 
different implications particularly in relation to informal criminalisation. Criminalising 
political identity in isolation was linked to a form of state regulation often permitting 
µFULPLQDO¶ GHYLDQFH VR ORQJ DV LW UHPDLQHG EHQLJQ (Foucault, 1975, 1976); whereas 
criminalising political activity involved directing law enforcement to confront and 
repress this threat. Criminalising political violence relates to targeting political violence 
usually by politicising criminal offences to de-politicise the actor motivations, building 
on the distinction by Brewer et al. (1996). While interrelated, these distinctions were 
applied throughout the thesis to demonstrate how they each can have varying 
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implications. Indeed their interrelated nature was something that the thesis emphasised 
throughout, but distinguishing between them enabled the thesis to draw comparative 
distinctions with particular relevance for conflict transformation.  
 
To account for the complex and subjective nature of criminalisation the thesis applied 
the multilevel framework of conflict transformation (Cochrane, 2012; Miall, 2004). 
Theoretically this framework was chosen as it challenges the two central problems of 
statism and unit homogeneity which pervade throughout traditional conflict analysis 
scholarship providing what has been termed ³the critical theory-based approach to 
FRQIOLFW´7RURV7KHUHIRUHWKHWKHVLVDLPHGWRDVVHVVZKDWUHODWLRQVKLS&3(
had with conflict transformation, whether it contributed towards the constructive or 
destructive transformation of conflict (Lederach, 2003; Miall, 2004). This meant 
considering criminalisation in a number of specific conflict contexts to deduce how it 
operated (formal instrumental process), its perceived reality and implementation 
(informal criminalisation), and what implications these two aspects had for the wider 
conflict. 
 
Empirically the thesis draws extensively on original interviews and archival material 
providing new insights into the perceived reality which CPE contributed towards and 
the ongoing implications it continues to have. The range of interviewees from across 
two conflict contexts provides an important empirical contribution towards the wider 
field of conflict analysis. Moreover, the combination of original and archival sources 
also enabled new material to be cross-referenced with archived accounts improving its 
overall validity. These interviews were cited throughout the thesis and were integral to 
the overall framework in understanding how different actors perceive criminalisation 
and how this corresponds to its informal nature.  
 
The rest of this chapter will summarise the extent to which the thesis achieved these 
aims, outlining the research findings, limitations, and implications. Following the 
WKHVLV¶ DQDO\VLV it developed three main arguments relating to the target of CPE: (1) 
targeting the political identity of a group contributes towards intergroup polarisation by 
framing groups in opposing terms as victims and perpetrators, reducing their political 
identity to criminality; (2) targeting political activity closes off potential opportunities 
for non-violent political expression reducing the likelihood of political accommodation 
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and intergroup dialogue; and (3) targeting political violence may both facilitate or 
inhibit conflict transformation depending on the nature of its enforcement, and how it is 
perceived. Therefore, following on from the critical conceptualisation of 
criminalisation, the implications of the formal target of CPE are dependent on their 
informal manifestations, with actors experiencing the same formal process in very 
different ways even from within the same communal group.  
 
Following from this analysis there are several potential research implications with 
respect to criminalising non-violent extremism, counter-terrorism, peace negotiations, 
and criminal record expungement for political offences. This chapter will discuss how 
the theoretical findings may inform these different policy areas, particularly focussing 
on the United Kingdom because of its proximity to the case selection. The policy 
GLVFXVVLRQ KRZHYHU ZLOO EH VHW LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH UHVHDUFK¶V OLPLWDWLRQV DQG
suggesting a number of areas for future research which could provide clearer 





Building on the critical conceptualisation and interpretativist methodology outlined in 
chapters one and two, it was important to analyse CPE to account for its subjectivity 
and complexity. Therefore, chapters three through to six considered how CPE operated 
in particular conflict contexts through a two case comparison of Northern Ireland and 
South Africa. This section will accordingly outline the significant contribution which 
these chapters make to the wider field of conflict analysis with respect to nonviolent 
movements, counter-insurgency, peace negotiations, and peacebuilding, in terms of 
reframing understandings of CPE and its implications for conflict transformation. 
 
Chapter three focused on the context of non-violent movements to consider why states 
respond towards such movements through CPE, and the implications this may have for 
the conflict context. In such contexts, limiting the analysis solely to deeply divided 
societies, non-violent movements often represent a challenge to WKHVWDWH¶VKHJHPRQLF
position, and so a state may use CPI and CPA to undermine it. But as criminalisation 
contributes towards the social reality of crime and indeed conflict (Hulsman, 1986; 
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Quinney, 1977), this has important implications for actor motivations to engage in 
political violence as violence responds to this ³as a reflection of the underlying social 
UHDOLW\´ (Väyrynen, 1991:3).   
 
In summary, the chapter argued that state responses of CPI and CPA can have three 
crucial implications: (1) it contributes towards intergroup polarisation; (2) collectivises 
repression; and (3) it raises the costs of non-violent mobilisation. In Northern Ireland 
and South Africa CPI contributed towards a wider securitisation of intergroup relations 
with the political objectives of the out-group being framed as a threat to the in-group. 
Formal criminalisation was justified on the basis of public order, but because the state 
ZDV GRPLQDWHG E\ D VLQJOH FRPPXQDO JURXS WKLV µRUGHU¶ ZDV V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK WKH
political hegemony of the state. As such, CPI came to regulate non-violent political 
activity through politicised law enforcement, albeit varying considerably in its 
extensiveness between the cases. But as non-violent political activity developed ± 
SRVLQJ D WKUHDW WR WKH VWDWH¶V KHJHPRQ\ ± CPA was implemented to undermine its 
effectiveness, and because CPI directed law enforcement against an identity, state 
repression was perceived as directly targeting this identity, thereby creating a collective 
grievance to mobilise against. Furthermore, raising the costs of non-violent political 
activity through criminal sanctions reduced its strategic effectiveness encouraging a 
small number to pursue alternatives including political violence, albeit acting as only 
one among many factors. Together these issues reflect the first argument developed by 
the thesis that CPI and CPA generally undermine conflict transformation, as in these 
cases they contributed towards a wider de-stabilisation of the conflict context and 
escalation into collective political violence. Therefore, these findings contribute new 
evidence and theoretical insights into issues of state repression and nonviolent 
mobilisation.  
 
Chapter four considered how states employ CPV following the onset of collective 
political violence. Theoretically this is linked to a wider counter-insurgency framework 
whereby ordinary crimes ± such as murder, theft, or arson ± are linked to a political 
motivation; politicising crimes to criminalise the political motivations (Brewer et al., 
1996). The reasons behind why states do so are well researched (Dugard, 1978; Ellison 
and Smith, 2000; Gormally, McEvoy and Wall, 1993; Walsh, 1983), but the 
implications for conflict transformation remain unclear. Specifically this cooption of a 
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criminal justice system into a counter-insurgency framework is problematic because the 
predominant objectives of criminal justice - namely deterrence, retribution, and reform - 
EHFRPHGLUHFWHGDJDLQVWDQµHQHP\¶UDWKHUWKDQLQGHSHQGHQWO\DGPLQLVWHULQJMXVWLFH 
 
The chapter summarises this by considering three tensions between politicising crime 
and criminal justice: (1) it is ineffective at deterring violence because political actors 
perceive the costs of criminal sanctions differently from ordinary offenders (McEvoy 
and Mallinder, 2012; Sarkin and Daly, 2004); (2) that reform becomes a site of 
resistance for political actors, as it becomes designed to break their political resolve 
(Buntman, 1998; McEvoy, 2001); and (3) that punishment for offences directs moral 
outrage against both the acts of political violence, and also the motivations (Bonner, 
1992). Deterrence is undermined through this politicisation of crime as those who 
engage in political violence calculate the costs differently to ordinary offenders; they are 
often willing to die or suffer great harm for what they believe to be a greater goal 
(McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012; Sarkin and Daly, 2004). This means the attempts at 
deterring political violence by increasing the likelihood of facing a criminal sanction are 
unlikely to have a significant impact, and may even become counterproductive if 
implemented through state repression. Indeed the inaction of non-state actors in such 
contexts may be perceived as costly, perhaps even more so, than action (Kalyvas and 
Kocher, 2007). Attempts at reform are similarly problematic because by targeting the 
political motivations behind violent behaviours it seeks to reform actor identities 
themselves. In both cases, therefore, politically motivated prisoners resisted 
criminalisation in the prisons extending the arena of contestation and conflict (Buntman, 
1998; McEvoy, 2001). Furthermore, politicising crimes directs moral condemnation 
against both the motivation and behaviour of prisoners and can contribute towards a 
wider dehumanisation of their political communities. It also politicises the criminal 
MXVWLFH V\VWHP E\ EULQJLQJ TXHVWLRQV RI µSROLWLFDO¶ DIILOLDWLRQ LQWR MXGLFLDO decision-
making and law enforcement, which when applied undermined its legitimacy even with 
certain pro-state actors in Northern Ireland. In these ways this chapter argues that CPV 
can undermine conflict transformation when implemented through the politicisation of 
crime. It is therefore not arguing CPV undermines conflict transformation, just a 




The third conflict context considered by the thesis is that of peace negotiations. Through 
an analysis of the peace negotiations in the two cases, this chapter argues that 
criminalisation operates as an important incentive structure shaping negotiations and 
wider conflict transformation. Its impact depends on the specific target and 
implementation of CPE, as CPI and CPA typically undermine negotiations by 
embodying structural constrains, closing down opportunities for dialogue, and 
dehumanising actors. Some form of decriminalisation in such cases can therefore 
facilitate conflict transformation, but this depends on the context. Moreover, if 
implemented as a top-down mechanism without support from local communities it can 
actually contribute towards intergroup polarisation, alienating actors who perceive 
MXVWLFH DV EHLQJ FRPSURPLVHG 7KHUHIRUH WKH FKDSWHU¶V RYHUDOO DUJXPHQW LV WKDW
criminalisation will need to be orientated on to specific acts, not actors, in order for it 
facilitate conflict transformation, as this will legitimise non-violent political expression 
and negotiations as an alternative to political violence.  
 
The chapter develops these arguments across the three levels of structure, issue, and 
actor transformation to show how CPI and CPA impact upon each level. For structure 
transformation decriminalising identity and activities is important in opening up 
intergroup communication and building trust. This may mean de-proscribing political 
groups like the ANC, as this was a pre-requisite to entering negotiations, but as Sinn 
Fein were not proscribed it instead meant removing certain restrictions on censorship. 
Indeed, going further to de-proscribe the IRA would have possibly de-stabilised the 
context by alienating Unionist actors altogether. Issue transformation was directly 
impacted by criminalisation framing the salience of issues and representing an issue 
itself. In this way it was used to leverage concessions as part of the wider negotiations 
in terms of prisoner releases and institutional reforms. But it also has a significant role 
in shaping intergroup narratives of the negotiation process, as decriminalisation may be 
necessary in order to remove the homogenous criminal narrative attributed towards the 
out-group. However this is constrained by the challenges posed by audience costs, as 
the social reality of criminalisation will usually have been embedded over the course of 
the conflict making it politically costly to reverse. For actor transformation, CPE has a 
considerable role in redistributing legitimacy. Criminalised actors may need to undergo 
some form of decriminalisation, whether formally or informally, in order to legitimise 
their involvement in the negotiation process. But this again depends on whether it is 
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employed as a bottom-XS SURFHVV WR HQVXUH FRPPXQLWLHV µEX\-LQ¶ WR WKH SURFHVV DQG
thereby reverse informal criminalisation. Together these findings provide insights into 
the challenges CPE can present to conflict transformation in the context of peace 
negotiations linking into the wider theoretical debates on secret negotiations, audience 
costs, and credible commitment issues. 
 
Chapter six considers the context of peacebuilding focusing specifically on the 
mechanism of criminal record expungement as illustrative of how CPE can operate in 
this context. The chapter broadens the theoretical debate on criminal records by 
distinguishing between the records for violent and non-violent offences as is it 
important to understand how record expungement differs according to the target of 
CPE. Moreover, the implications of criminal record expungement relates to a wider 
debate within peacebuilding research where on the one hand they are argued as 
facilitating ex-prisoner reintegration, yet on the other represent a denial of retributive 
justice. Specifically the chapter has two central arguments building on those of earlier 
chapters: (1) that criminal record expungement for non-violent offences facilitates 
conflict transformation but its extent will depend on whether it addresses both the 
formal and informal issues associated with the record; and (2) that whether expunging 
the records for violent offences facilitates conflict transformation depends on whether it 
can address informal criminalisation. In other words, CRE for violent offences can 
undermine conflict transformation if it is implemented as a top-down processes without 
bottom-up buy-in from communities.  
 
These arguments reflect the wider conceptual issues of CPE between formal and 
informal criminalisation alongside the distiQFWLRQ LWV µWDUJHW¶ )RU LQVWDQFH Hxpunging 
the records of violent offences could exacerbate the conflict by not addressing the 
concerns of victims, and polarising groups once again into perpetrators and victims. In 
other words, the expungement process will often map onto the wider conflict narratives 
as has been the case in Northern Ireland, and until these are addressed it is unlikely 
expunging criminal records would contribute towards the positive transformation of the 
conflict. Furthermore, South Africa demonstrates how records for violent offences can 
take precedence over non-violent ones because those with these records have 
proportionately more power in the negotiation process. This can result in victims being 
sidelined and record expungement representing another mechanism of state power. The 
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chapter concludes by suggesting a number of areas for further research particularly 
DURXQG DOWHUQDWLYH DSSURDFKHV WR µIRUPDO¶ H[SXQJHPHQW 7KH IRFXV RQ HOLWH OHYHO
expungement processes has marginalised less polarising alternatives. For example, it 
would be possible to maintain the records for violent offences but not require 
individuals to declare these for insurance or certain job applications. These points will 
be addressed in more detail below regarding their policy implications. 
 
Together these chapters provided in-depth analysis of the conflicts in Northern Ireland 
and South Africa providing a close examination of the relationship between CPE and 
conflict transformation. Chapter seven builds upon these findings to analyse how this 
relationship evolves over the course of a conflict through a further small-n framework. 
Four cases were selected on the basis on case type determined according to the nature of 
CPE in the cases, and thereby adding an additional layer of analysis to that developed in 
the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa. The cases included: Belgium as a 
counterfactual case because it never implemented CPI or CPA; Canada as a crucial case 
because while it did implement CPA the conflict did not escalate further into political 
violence; and Sri Lanka and Turkey act as typical cases. Analysing four cases ensured 
that complexity and subjectivity of CPE could still be accounted for, while also 
developing the theoretical findings. 
 
As a counterfactual the Belgium case illustrated how, when there is a relative 
equilibrium in intergroup power, this appears to be lead to a lower likelihood of CPI or 
CPA. This is because neither group is able or willing ± because they do not have sole 
control of the legislature - to criminalise the out-group due to more favourable 
alternatives; in this case consociational institutions. Moreover, because neither 
communal group was engaged in political violence CPV presented a potential 
opportunity for conflict transformation. By focusing on the shared threat of political 
violence it represented a potential common interest transcending the linguistic cleavage 
complemented by the absence of CPI. In contrast, the implementation of CPA in 
Canada as part of the October Crises demonstrates the significance of informal 
criminalisation, because although it did undermine state legitimacy, it did not escalate 
into further violence. This was because it was complemented by political 
accommodation, was contained to a particular timeframe, and was predominantly 
targeted against political violence and not political identity. Furthermore, Sri Lanka and 
|222| 
 
Turkey demonstrated how both formal and informal CPI undermined conflict 
transformation in the short and long-term through the challenges of audience costs and 
ethnic outbidding.  %\IUDPLQJLQWHUJURXSLGHQWLWLHVLQWHUPVRIµWKUHDW¶WKLVXQGHUPLQHG
the possibilities for political accommodation, and through ethnic outbidding led to 
increased intergroup polarisation. Additionally, by considering the development of CPE 
over the course of these conflicts they illustrated its reactive and evolving nature, as it 
shapes and is shaped by the wider conflict context. These cases, therefore, both develop 
and corroborate the findings of the earlier chapters providing further theoretical insights 





The findings outlined above have a range of potential implications, for the study and 
practice of conflict transformation and criminalisation. The more general arguments 
which abstract from the cases regarding the relationship between CPE and conflict 
transformation can be generalised beyond the immediate cases, but the implications 
would therefore require further research in order to understand their contextualised 
implications (Pouliot, 2008). Instead this section will discuss their relevance primarily 
for the United Kingdom because of its proximity to the cases themselves to illustrate a 
number of specific areas of particular importance. 
 
 
Criminalising non-violent extremism 
 
Firstly, the analysis of state responses towards non-violent movements in chapter three 
relates closely to current policies regulating the freedom of expression and assembly. 
Specifically the issue of freedom of expression has recently been raised in relation to 
criminalising non-violent extremism in the United Kingdom. In 2015 the then Home 
Secretary Theresa May ± now Prime Minister - ZURWH WKDW ZKHUH ³QRQ-violent 
extremism goes unchallenged, the valXHVWKDWELQGRXUVRFLHW\WRJHWKHUIUDJPHQW´ (May, 
2015:7). Following this the Conservative Party sought to introduce new regulations on 
non-violent extremism through the Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, but this 
has not come to pass due to issues in defining extremism, as reflected in the conclusion 
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by a cross party committee: ³7KH *RYHUQPHQW JDYH XV QR LPSUHVVLRQ RI KDYLQJ D
FRKHUHQWRUVXIILFLHQWO\SUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQRIHLWKHUµnon-vioOHQWH[WUHPLVP¶RUµ%ULWLVK
YDOXHV¶´ -RLQW&RPPLWWHHRQ+XPDQ Rights, 2016:8). Yet again in the 2017 election 
PDQLIHVWR RI WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\ LW VWDWHG ³:H ZLOO FRQVLGHU ZKDW QHZ FULPLQDO
RIIHQFHVPLJKWQHHGWREHFUHDWHGWRGHIHDWWKHH[WUHPLVWV´&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\
Therefore, the policy of criminalising non-violent extremism appears to still be ongoing.  
 
But the problem with this approach is reflected in the findings of chapters three and five 
in particular, because targeting political expression ± no matter how undesirable it is ± 
closes down opportunities for dialogue, contributes towards a wider demonisation of 
associated communities, and makes these individuals even harder to engage with, and 
thereby further contributing towards their isolation. Such an approach then becomes 
counter-productive with alienation having been identified as important factor for some 
of those who choose to resort to political violence (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010). While 
µIRUPDO¶ FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ of non-violent extremism is unlikely due to insufficient 
political support, informal criminalisation represents a serious challenge (McGovern 
and Tobin, 2010). Therefore, this research would suggest that criminal justice needs to 
be orientated against the criminal behaviours of political violence, not ideologies, or 
else it is likely iVVXHVVXFKDVWKH³UDFLDOLVHGSUDFWLFHVRI0XVOLPSURILOLQJ´0RQDJKDQ
and Molnar, 2016:410) will become increasingly problematic. 
 
 
Politicising crime through counter-terrorism 
 
The convergence between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism policies means that 
the contradictions discussed in chapter four have likewise a number of implications for 
contemporary counter-terrorism policies (Boyle, 2010). This is because, like the 
counter-insurgency policies discussed in chapter four, contemporary cases of counter-
terrorism continue to politicise criminal offences. For instance, under the UK Terrorism 
$FW WKHRIIHQFHRI WHUURULVP UHTXLUHV D ³SROLWLFDO UHOLJLRXV UDFLDO RU LGHRORJLFDO
FDXVH´OLQNLQJWKLVWRSDUWLFXODUIRUPVRISROLWLFDOYLROHQFH:KLOHVignificant measures 
have been implemented to ensure human rights have greater protections than was 
historically the case (Dickson, 2009), this politicisation continues to embody the same 
theoretical contradictions as previous policies. For example, it is unclear whether this 
|224| 
 
politicisation contributes towards deterrence because of the complex and diverse 
motivations behind current political violence (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Ilardi, 2013). In 
other words, increasing the certainty of conviction may deter some, but not those who 
already are willing to die, as is the case for many (Long and Wilner, 2014). Retribution, 
in directing moral condemnation against the ideological basis behind political violence, 
relates directly to the issues of profiling and wider informal criminalisation (McGovern 
and Tobin, 2010). This particularly affects those within Muslim communities as law 
enforcement is directed against the criminalised political identity.  
 
But these issues come together with respect to the principle of reform which continues 
WREHSUREOHPDWLFLOOXVWUDWHGE\WKHFKDOOHQJHVRISULVRQµUDGLFDOLVDWLRQ¶+RPH$IIDLUV
Committee, 2016). The Government has tried to respond to these issues through 
establishing the Extremism Unit as part of the National Offender Management System 
WR³PDQDJHWKHULVNWKHVHRIIHQGHUVSRVH´RIIHQGHUVUHIHUULQJWR³WHUURULVWVH[WUHPLVWV
DQGUDGLFDOLVHUV´1206(YHQDFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHFKDOOHQJHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
what constitutes an extremist or a radicaliser (Sedgwick, 2010), the JRDO RI µUHIRUP¶
appears to have been displaced for a securitised focus on risk management. But 
UHGXFLQJ WKHVH DFWRUV WR WKHLU µULVN¶ IDLOV WRSURSHUO\ DGGUHVV WKHLUXQGHUO\LQJSROLWLFDO
objectives. Not engaging with the political motivations, therefore, means these 
individuals will continue to advance them through whatever opportunities they can 
develop. While criminal justice itself is unlikely to address these issues as outlined in 
chapter four, the current security focus will only ever be able to manage, not address, 
them. The analysis in chapter four cannot unfortunately offer solutions, just aid in 
diagnosing the issue, which is why further research into these areas would be of 
important policy relevance.  
 
A reasonable objection to these challenges is that there are no better alternatives. From 
this perspective the security risk posed by these individuals ± framed as terrorists - 
necessitates not only strong security responses, but also clear political ones as well. This 
raises the issue of audience costs once again, as for political leaders to be regarded as 
µVRIW¶RQLVVXHV of terrorism would greatly undermine their own legitimacy, so instead 
they take on the audience costs of politicising crime (Bhatia, 2005). But there are two 
reasons why this is counterproductive. Firstly, assuming the main reason behind 
counter-terrorism is to prevent acts of terror then responses need to be considered as 
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part of the overall framework; they themselves can therefore contribute towards the 
problem as much as the solution. In other words, if politicising crime undermines 
counter-WHUURULVP¶V PDLQ REMHFWLYH WKLV ZRXOG LQGLFDWH WKDW LW LV QRW HIIHFWLYH and 
requires to be reformed at the very least. Secondly, there are alternatives to politicising 
crime, but these would likely be unacceptable politically because they would involve 
UHPRYLQJ WKH µHQHP\¶ IUDPLQJ IURP FRXQWHU-terrorism discourse undermining the 
political salience of security measures. But if adopted, a de-politicised approach to 
counter-terrorism would direct security practices against criminal behaviours, not 
political ideologies, and involve a wider reorientation of law enforcement onto 
FRPPXQLW\ HQJDJHPHQW 7KH 8.¶V FXUUHQW FRXQWHU-terrorism strategy CONTEST 
(2016), and in particular the Prevent component (2011), emphasises the necessity of 
such engagement, but so long as crime remains politicised it will continue to be 





Peace negotiations represent a complex process and the research provided in chapter 
five is by no means able to generalise to all cases. But the theoretical points made 
reaffirm wider academic research on negotiations with important policy implications, 
namely that the process of labelling, denouncing adversaries, or in this case 
criminalising them, greatly inhibits potential opportunities for dialogue and subsequent 
negotiations (Bhatia, 2005; Haspeslagh, 2013; Toros, 2008, 2012). However this relates 
primarily to CPI and CPA, and if a state signals a willingness to compromise through 
decriminalisation ± reversing CPI and CPA ± this could enhance the credible 
commitment of the state (Kirschner, 2010). On the other hand, such decriminalisation 
will be constrained by informal criminalisation as the reversal of criminalisation is often 
IUDPHG DV µJLYLQJ LQ¶ WR WHUURULVP RU FULPLQDOLW\ XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH VWDWH VLJQDOOLQJ
audience costs associated with the label (Moon and Souva, 2016); for example with the 
DUP in Northern Ireland or the Conservative Party in South Africa. In such cases 
decriminalisation needs to be understood both as a top-down and bottom-up process to 
ensure it does not alienate political elites from their support base and destabilise the 




The current negotiations over the reforming the Northern Ireland Executive illustrate a 
QXPEHURIWKHVHFKDOOHQJHVZLWKWKHµLVVXH¶RIFULPLQDOLVDWLRQVWLOOUHPDLQLQJILUPO\RQ
the agenda in terms of the prosecutions of former state personnel, or more informally in 
terms of the debates over the Irish language. The recent speeches of Arlene Foster, 
leader of the DUP, and Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, illustrate these points. For 
instance, speaking at the DUP party conference, Foster accused Sinn Fein of glorying 
³LQWKHPXUGHURIWKH,5$´EHIRUHJRLQJRQWRUHIHUWRWKH³PDQ\WKRXVDQGVRILQQRFHQW
YLFWLPV´ZKRVXIIHUHGEHFDXVHRIWKHP)RVWHU7KHUHIRUHWKHFULPLQDOIUDPLQJ
still remains firmly embedded in political discourse and its impact is framed in terms of 
ongoing intergroup conflict: ³>6LQQ)HLQ@KDYHVKRZQQRWKLQJEXWGLVGDLQDQGGLVUHVSHFW
for the national flag, the Royal Family, the Armed Forces, British symbols, the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO UHDOLW\ DQG WKH YHU\ QDPH RI WKLV FRXQWU\´ )RVWHU  In contrast, 
Gerry Adams reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Republican struggle stating: 
³Republicans had been at the heart of a culture of resistance - correctly standing strong 
DJDLQVWWKHEUXWDOLW\RIWKH%ULWLVKVWDWH´EHIRUHWKHQDOVRDFFXVLQJ the DUP of the same 
obstructionism with respect to language rights ³7KH'83¶VRSSRVLWLRQ WR WKHVHEDVLF
ULJKWV PHDQV WKHUH LV QR ([HFXWLYH´ $GDPV  The issues being negotiated are 
accordingly framed within the wider context of continuing intergroup polarisation. Even 
since CPE has been formally reformed the informal social reality it created remains. 
CPE at least gave expression to these tensions contributing towards the perception of 
intergroup threat, and so long as the informal framing continues to dominant the wider 
narratives it will be unlikely to get resolved.  
 
 
Criminal record expungement and informal decriminalisation 
 
Chapter six has already outlined a number of recommendations in relation to criminal 
record expungement in Northern Ireland and South Africa, arguing that the criminal 
records for non-violent offences typically represent a marginalised opportunity for 
conflict transformation. The high political costs associated with the records for violence 
offences are significantly lower for non-violent ones providing a potential opportunity 
for shared interests transcending intergroup rivalries. Moreover, if not addressed these 
records can contribute towards wider socio-economic issues which can undermine post-
agreement peacebuilding, as has been the case in South Africa (Gear, 2003) and in 
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Northern Ireland (Jamieson, Shirlow and Grounds, 2010; McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009a). 
Therefore, this research would suggest that the expungement of records for non-violent 
offences should be raised as an important trust building measure in peace negotiations. 
This would apply to cases such as Sri Lanka where many individuals have criminal 
records for offences relating to their political opposition to the state.1  
 
On the other hand, the records for violent offences are much more contentious. Such 
records are often mapped onto the political divisions and result in victims being played 
off one another. The victimhood debate in Northern Ireland demonstrates this with 
distinctions being drawn between legitimate and illegitimate victims (Brewer and 
Hayes, 2015; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013). But the problem with this is that it 
reduces criminal record expungement to binary zero-VXP µVROXWLRQV¶ ,QVWHDG WDNLQJ
FULPLQDO UHFRUGV WR UHSUHVHQW D VSHFWUXP D µWKLFNHU¶ FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ FRXOG HQDEOH
many opportunities for political compromise which would increase the likelihood for an 
agreeable solution, at least for the main actors. Therefore, while the issue of criminal 
records for violent offences may not be resolved, its impact could be partially mitigated 
through, for instance, no longer making ex-prisoners declare their records in insurance 
or job applications. Psychosocial and socioeconomic issues could likewise be addressed 
without necessarily having to compromise on the formal record. However, this research 
acknowOHGJHV WKDW WKH µOLQH¶ EHWZHHQ YLROHQW DQG non-violent offences is not 
straightforward and will itself represent a central point of contention. For instance, is 
someone who finances an armed group guilty of a violent offence by association or in 
writing an article calling on people to engage in political violence? This thesis does not 








                                                          
1
 This could have been in relation to offences under Chapter XV of the Penal Code which criminalising 
³XWWHULQJZRUGVZLWKGHOLEHUDWHLQWHQWWRZRXQGUHOLJLRXVIHHOLQJV´RUXQGHUWKH3UHYHQWLRQRI7HUURULVP





³,KDYHGLVFRYHUHGWKHVHFUHWWKDWDIter climbing a great hill, one only finds that 
there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a 
view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have 
come. But I can rest only for a moment for with freedom come responsibilities, 
DQG,GDUHQRWOLQJHUIRUP\ORQJZDONLVQRW\HWHQGHG´0DQGHODD 
 
Mandela recognised that even having achieved the tremendous outcome of being the 
first Black President of South Africa, there still remained a multitude of challenges to 
address. Having overcome imprisonment, state repression, and legalised discrimination, 
the wider underlying issues of criminalisation persisted. This is reflected by the 
relationship between criminalising political expression and conflict transformation, as 
while certain formal measures can be reformed, the wider social realities persist. 
7UDQVIRUPLQJ FRQIOLFW GRHV QRW HQG ZLWK WKH ILUVW µKLOO¶ EXW UHTXLUHV both seeing the 
µYLVWD¶EHKLQGDQGWKHFKDOOHQJHVDKHDG7KLVWKHVLVKas, accordingly, sought to do both.  
 
Through an in-depth analysis of new evidence regarding criminalising political 
expression this thesis has sought to reframe the conceptual understanding of 
criminalisation and its implications for conflict transformation. Looking backwards it 
has analysed CPE in four important conflict contexts, across two in-depth case studies, 
providing original theoretical arguments, thereby contributing towards the wider field of 
conflict analysis in terms of theory as well as new empirical evidence. Moreover, it 
analysed four further cases to demonstrate the evolving and reactive nature of CPE as it 
responds to and shapes the conflict context. In this way, the social realty constructed by 
CPE is used reactively to respond to new developments in the conflict, while also 
shaping the practices which follow. Furthermore, looking forwards the research 
provides a range of insights into the theory and practice of conflict transformation, 
which inform a wide range of state practices in terms of addressing political expression. 
This thesis has, therefore, highlighted the challenges and opportunities CPE poses for 





Appendix 1. Interview Consent Form 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Daniel Kirkpatrick from the 
University of Kent. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about 
perceptions of criminalisation from individuals within and following a conflict. I will be 
one of approximately 60 people being interviewed for this research.  
 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for 
my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty. 
 
2. If I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to 
decline to answer any question or to end the interview.  
 
3. The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the 
interview. An audio tape of the interview and subsequent dialogue will be made.  
 
 If I don't want the interview to be audibly recorded, please cross this box
   
4. I agree to the following level of confidentiality 
[Please check one of the following options] 
 Full anonymity, all identifiable details will be removed or changed in the 
transcript to ensure that I will not be identified. 
 No anonymity, I am happy to be identified by name and for my transcript to be 
transcribed directly. 
 
5. I understand that the data from my interview relevant to this research project will be 
transcribed and I will be sent a copy of the transcript for approval before it is used in 
any publication.  
[Please check one of the following options] 
 I do not want to be sent a written version of my transcript and give my approval 
for it to be used in publication as agreed during my interview 





6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the 
University of Kent's Ethical Review Board.  
 
7. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my 
questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this 
study.  
 
8. I have been given a copy of this consent form.  
 
 
____________________________   ________________________  
My Signature      Date  
 
 
____________________________   ________________________  
My Printed Name     Signature of the Researcher  
 





Appendix 2. Sample interview questions for a South African lawyer1 
 
1. As a defence attorney what do you find to be the most pressing issues for the 
criminal justice system in South Africa at present? 
 
2. What do you understand by the term criminalisation? 
a. What do you believe its purpose or intention to be? 
 
3. I understand that you've practiced law since before the end of Apartheid.  
a. What were the main challenges for you as a lawyer practicing under the 
Apartheid legal system? 
b. You were then involved in the writing the new constitution in 1994. What 
significance do you think the constitution held? 
c. Historically the relationship between the state and the judiciary was very 
close and led to perceptions of it being politicised. Do you think this was 
addressed and if so how? 
 
4. One issue which has been raised before is there being a historical 'criminal' 
narrative, whereby the Apartheid state continually sought to criminalise political 
groups and actions. 
a. What impact do you think it would have had historically?  
b. Does this still exist in any way do you think?  
c. How do you think it was best addressed or could be addressed? 
 
5. One frequently raised issue in Northern Ireland was that criminalising political acts - 
through censorship, banning of organisations, restrictions on events - blurred the 
boundaries between crime and politics historically but also now in the contemporary 
environment. 
a. Do you think this has been an issue for South Africa? 
b. Does it continue at all today and if so how has it developed from its 
historical nature under Apartheid? 
c. Did it affect public trust and confidence in the police or in the rule of law? 
d. What do you think would be best ways of addressing this? 
 
6. A number of others interviewed have raised issues around historical crimes from 
Apartheid not being pursued. 
a. Do you think this is the case and if not why do you think people perceive it 
to be an issue still? 
b. In Northern Ireland prosecutions for those who committed politically 
motivated offences is deeply contested and polarised. Do you find the same 
to be true here? 
 
7. My research looks at the politicising of criminal acts whereby an ordinary criminal 
offence is linked explicitly to a political motivation. And by linking a political 
                                                          
1 As the interview methodology was semi-structured interviews, these questions were only used as a 
guide, not as a structured framework. They were designed to ensure all the central topics were covered 
in a way that engaged with the interviewees context, but only deferred to if the interview itself was 
going off topic. 
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motivation to an offence, the state essentially criminalises it alongside the act. For 
example it could be committing a murder for a particular organisation. 
a. Why do you think the apartheid Government decided to do this historically - 
linking a political motivation to an offence - under the Terrorism Act and the 
various other pieces of legislation? 
b. Do you think contemporary legislation - the Terrorism Act - continues to do 
this at all? 
  
8. Do you think the issues of criminalisation are unique to South Africa or are there 
other cases which demonstrate similar patterns? 
 
9. Having heard what it is I'm researching are there any particular individuals or 
organisations you would recommend contacting? If so, how would you recommend 




Appendix 3.  Risk assessment completed for South Africa  
 




Student engaging in fieldwork will complete the University on-line travel 
insurance notification form. 
Ill health 
 
Overseas Travel Health Questionnaire to be completed in advance of travel.  
University travel insurance covers medical expenses. Information is on 
University insurance WebPages ± these should be read before travel. All 
recommended vaccinations will be taken. Student should consider personal 





Detailed itinerary should be left with family and office. Prepare travel 
routes in advance. Arrange for contact with office if away for more than 
one week. All interviews will be held in either public locations, university 
institutions, or else coordinated through trusted contacts in advance. 
Road Travel 
 
Due to crime on public transport a car will be rented for part of the 
fieldwork. Travel advice for driving will be consulted in advance and 
insurance cover will be purchased. Road standards are mostly very good, 
but some roads in remote areas are less well maintained and may have 
potholes. Drive cautiously, obey speed limits and avoid unfamiliar rural 
areas at night. Thieves have been known to employ various methods to 
make a vehicle stop (e.g. placing large stones in the middle of the road) 
enabling them to rob the occupants. Park in well-OLW DUHDV 'RQ¶W SLFN XS
strangers or stop to help apparently distressed motorists, as this is a 
technique sometimes used by hijackers.  
Emergencies 
 
Ensure office has an up-to-GDWHFRS\RIµ3HUVRQDO&RQWDFW LQ WKH(YHQWRI
DQ (PHUJHQF\¶ IRUP (QVXUH PRELOH SKRQH ZRUNV LQ GHVWLQDWLRQ FRXQWU\
Check FCO website for guidance on travel in destination country. Local 
news will be checked regularly to avoid any protests or riots. 
Crime Police contact details will be noted for each location. Keep large amounts 
RI PRQH\ H[SHQVLYH MHZHOOHU\ FDPHUDV DQG SKRQHV RXW RI VLJKW 'RQ¶W
change or withdraw large sums of money in busy public areas including 
foreign exchange facilities or ATMs. Thieves operate at international 
airports, and bus and railway stations. Keep your valuables safe and 
baggage with you at all times. Public transport will not be used. Travel will 
be contained to daytime. Travel and meeting will primarily be concentrated 
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